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The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College is delighted to join, for the second 
year, I-CONnect in making this unique resource available to scholars and practitioners of constitutional law and policy 
around the world. The first - 2016 - edition of the Global Review of Constitutional Law, to which the Clough Center 
was a proud partner, received the outstanding reception it deserved as it quickly established itself as an indispensable 
resource for the world community. The 2017 edition, with its expanded number of jurisdictions, will undoubtedly 
solidify the reputation of the Global Review. 
The Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy aims to offer a platform that meets, in depth and scope, 
the urgency of the ongoing challenges to constitutional democracy. Each year, we welcome to Boston College some 
of the world’s leading jurists, historians, political scientists, philosophers and social theorists to participate in our 
programs and initiatives. The Center also welcomes visiting scholars from around the world, and I use this opportunity 
to encourage interested scholars to contact us. More information about the Center’s activities, including free access to 
the Clough Archive, is available at http://www.bc.edu/centers/cloughcenter.html.
The Clough Center is deeply grateful to all the contributors to this year’s Global Review, and to its editors. Particular 
thanks go to Professor Richard Albert, a trusted friend and partner of the Clough Center, for his vision and initiative 
in turning the Global Review into reality. 
A RENEWED PARTNERSHIP IN SUPPORT OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 
Vlad Perju
Director, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy 
Professor, Boston College Law School 
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This year marks the third edition of the I·CONnect-Clough Center Global Review of Constitutional Law. First 
published in 2017 to review the constitutional law developments in the world in the year 2016, this edition reviews the 
constitutional law developments in the world in the year 2018.
)URPMXULVGLFWLRQVLQRXU¿UVW\HDUDQGODVW\HDUWKLV\HDUZHDUHSOHDVHGWRIHDWXUHMXULVGLFWLRQV:HFRQWLQXH
WRJURZVORZO\EXWVWHDGLO\:LWKWKHKHOSRIRXUFXUUHQWURVWHURIFRQWULEXWRUVDQGZLWKQHZLQWHUHVWIURPRXUUHDGHUV
and others, we hope to continue expanding our coverage of the world.
The purpose of the Global Review has remained unchanged since its founding. It is to offer readers systemic knowledge 
that has previously been limited mainly to local networks rather than a broader readership. By making this information 
DYDLODEOHWRWKHODUJHU¿HOGRISXEOLFODZLQDQHDVLO\GLJHVWLEOHIRUPDWZHDLPWRLQFUHDVHWKHEDVHRINQRZOHGJH
upon which scholars and judges can draw. Our ambition is to make our vast world smaller, more familiar, and more 
accessible.
:HDUHJUDWHIXOWRRXUDXWKRUVIRUSUHSDULQJWKHLUULFKLQVLJKWIXODQGLQIRUPDWLYHMXULVGLFWLRQUHSRUWV:HDOVRWKDQN
the leadership team at the International Journal of Constitutional Law²*UiLQQHGH%~UFDDQG-RVHSK:HLOHU&R
Editors-in-Chief, as well as Sergio Verdugo, Associate Editor, for publishing a few contributions from this year’s 
Global Review focused on Latin America to coincide with the 2019 Annual Conference of the International Society of 
3XEOLFKHOGRQ-XO\LQ6DQWLDJR&KLOH:HDOVRZLVKWRUHFRJQL]HWKHOHDGHUVRIWKH&HQWUDODQG(DVWHUQ(XURSHDQ
Chapter of the International Society of Public Law for hosting a regional workshop this past year for Global Review 
FRQWULEXWRUV:HKRSHWKHLULQLWLDWLYHLQVSLUHVRWKHUVWRKRVWVLPLODUSURJUDPVLQWKHLURZQSDUWRIWKHZRUOG:HJLYH
thanks as well to Gaurie Pandey at the Center for Centers at Boston College for her help once again in designing this 
beautiful volume.
:HUHVHUYHRXUELJJHVWWKDQNVIRU3URIHVVRU9ODG3HUMX3URIHVVRURI/DZDQG'LUHFWRURIWKH&ORXJK&HQWHUIRUWKH
Study of Constitutional Democracy at Boston College. Professor Perju continues to inspire us with his vision for the 
Center, which he has transformed into a leading site in the world for discussion and debate on constitutionalism. A 
OHDUQHGVFKRODURIWKH¿HOGDUHVSHFWHGWHDFKHUDQGDSDVVLRQDWHGHIHQGHURIGHPRFUDF\KHKDVRXUGHHSHVWJUDWLWXGH
:H LQYLWH LQWHUHVWHG DXWKRUV IURP QHZ MXULVGLFWLRQV WR FRQWDFW XV YLD HPDLO DW FRQWDFWLFRQQHFW#JPDLOFRP WR
express their interest in producing a report for next year’s Global Review. And, as always, we welcome feedback, 
recommendations, and questions from our readers. 
THE GLOBAL REVIEW TURNS THREE
Richard Albert and David Landau
Founding Co-Editors of I·CONnect and Co-Editors of the Global Review
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda
Co-Editors of the Global Review
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Argentina
Juan F. González-Bertomeu, Assistant Professor, ITAM
Ramiro Álvarez-Ugarte, Assistant Professor. UP/UBA
I. INTRODUCTION
In our 2017 report, we described a Supreme 
Court in flux. Early in 2016, two new jus-
tices joined a five-member Court against 
the background of broader political change.1
:HWKHUHLQKLQWHGDWSRVVLEOHMXULVSUXGHQWLDO
shifts, involving a redefinition of both the 
Court’s role in general and its standards on 
human rights law in particular. In 2017, an 
ostensibly minor decision but with heavy 
implications regarding the policies of mem-
ory, truth, and justice concerning human 
rights violations during the last dictatorship 
had invited strong popular backlash. In 2018, 
and after a legislative intervention, the Su-
preme Court revisited its decision, this time 
amidst turmoil within the Court itself. After 
an eleven-year tenure, Justice Lorenzetti was 
replaced in September as Court President by 
Justice Rosenkrantz, the member perceived 
to be most closely aligned with the nation-
al Executive.2 The move seems to have left 
strangled relationships within the Court and 
was followed by another power reconfigura-
tion, what may partly account for the relative 
paucity of significant cases decided during 
the year. The most important development 
in constitutional politics, concerning the le-
galization of abortion, took place outside the 
courts.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS  
:HVWDUWE\DQDO\]LQJZKDWSUREDEO\ZDVWKH
most important constitutional issue in Ar-
gentina during 2018: the legislative debate 
around the legalization of abortion. The de-
bate strongly engaged the public and chan-
neled constitutional discourse for the better 
part of the year. Next, we will turn to the Su-
preme Court. 
Abortion
Abortion is criminalized by the 1921 Crimi-
nal Code in force except for two cases: (a) if 
the pregnancy puts at risk the woman’s life or 
health, or (b) if the pregnancy is the outcome 
of rape (Section 86). The original wording of 
this second exception was infelicitous, creat-
ing the impression for some observers—in-
cluding religiously motivated people—that 
only pregnancies resulting from rape against 
mentally deficient women could legally be 
terminated. Both out of uncertainty about the 
law and ideological pushback, many doctors 
refused to perform legally permitted proce-
dures. In 2012, in FAL, the Supreme Court 
said the provision applied to rape committed 
against any woman, and that this stemmed 
from both statutory interpretation and the 
country’s human rights law commitments. 
The Court thus attempted to minimize the 
judicialization of such procedures, ordering 
all provinces to pass clear guidelines to guar-
antee access to legal abortions, a process still 
facing obstacles.
ARGENTINA
1 J. F. González-Bertomeu; R. Álvarez-Ugarte, ‘Argentina’ (2018), The I·CONnect-Clough Center 2017 
Global Review of Constitutional Law, pp. 13-14, https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3215613.
2 Disclaimer: During Justice RoZLURYHU[a»ZJVUÄYTH[PVUWYVJLZZ1\HU-.VUamSLa)LY[VTL\
submitted a letter of support. 
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In 2018, after months of engaged public 
demonstrations by women to protest gen-
der violence, President M Macri invited the 
(often-described as “reactive”) Congress to 
debate for the first time whether abortion 
should be legalized, a point that had long 
been at the forefront of an ever-growing local 
feminist movement and that a majority of the 
population seems to support.3 For weeks, the 
lower house listened to hundreds of experts 
and public figures who shared their views. 
The discussions were widely addressed by 
the media, and citizens mobilized for and 
against the measure (green and blue scarves 
became symbols for the former and the latter, 
respectively). In June, the lower house nar-
rowly passed a bill legalizing the termination 
of pregnancies during the first trimester and 
mandating health care providers to guarantee 
access to medications and procedures. After 
this result in a country where the Catholic 
Church and, lately, Protestant denominations 
opposing abortion exert social influence, the 
bill moved to the less democratically appor-
tioned Senate, where, after another round of 
debate, it was narrowly rejected. 
The debate invigorated a stale political sys-
tem, with many women (and men) forcefully 
reclaiming a voice in public discussions. In 
the lower house, it was moved by a women’s 
caucus organized across party lines and that 
promises to continue pushing for women’s 
rights. Also, either because of the virtues 
of deliberation or to save face by catering 
to an aware constituency, several legisla-
tors claimed to have changed their position 
during the debate, mostly for legalization. 
:KLOHRSSRVLQJ OHJDOL]DWLRQRWKHUVDFFHSW-
ed that aborting women do not belong in jail. 
Finally, though with differences (Macri’s 
party leaned toward the status quo), all par-
ties fractured around the matter, an unusual 
development for a legislature characterized 
by party cohesion. 
During the Senate debate, a senator in fa-
vor of legalization, suspecting that rejection 
would carry the day, called for the Court to 
intervene. He claimed that “[the Court] may 
surprise us with a comprehensive definitive 
decision … [that] Congress would have to 
follow … [T]he Court might settle what 
Congress did not dare to settle”.4 The Court, 
however, is likely to remain silent in the near 
future—even assuming that justices are will-
ing to intervene in this debate, there does not 
appear to be a relevant case in its docket or 
approaching it.
The Court Changes
The Supreme Court went through a process 
of renewal with the turn of the century, after 
a Court-packing move in the early 1990s left 
it in disrepute.5 This allowed the Court to re-
gain prestige and to be gradually perceived 
as impartial. Apart from the profile of the 
new justices, what contributed to this was 
the Court’s human rights agenda, expressing 
a relatively strong commitment to interna-
tional human rights law (since 1994 on par 
with the Constitution) and the interpretations 
made by relevant international bodies. The 
Court also expressed some willingness to 
get involved in cases of social significance, 
including structural litigation and social and 
economic rights litigation concerning the 
rights to health, housing, and an adequate 
standard of living. 
In December 2015, right after taking office 
as President, the right-leaning Macri select-
ed two candidates to fill vacant seats at the 
Court. A 2006 statute had ordered the gradu-
al reduction of the Court’s membership from 
nine members to five, a number reached in 
2014. In such a small body, two nominations 
potentially would be close to entailing a sig-
nificant accommodation at the Court. As we 
hinted last year, some indications suggested 
that the new members, Justices H Rosatti and 
C Rosenkrantz, might be willing to embrace 
a form of judicial minimalism and to weaken 
the previously expressed deference toward 
international human rights law and its adju-
dicatory bodies. Some cases from 2018 pro-
vide a degree of support to that view. 
Now, a series of developments at the Court 
has reached beyond its case law, though it 
will likely have an impact on the latter. In 
September, Justice Rosenkrantz was joined 
by two others to end Justice Lorenzetti’s 
eleven-year tenure as Court President, a re-
newable three-year position selected by the 
justices themselves that carries considerable 
power, including acting as the represen-
tative of the federal judiciary, supervising 
the administrative workings of the Court, 
and making such relevant determinations as 
the order and timing of decisions. Alleged-
ly, this change exacerbated an acrimonious 
confrontation between at least two of the 
justices, which made the general news for 
days. In December, a new coalition of jus-
tices (including Rosatti, who days before had 
supported Rosenkrantz) decided to strip the 
Court President of some relevant capacities. 
This perceived instability, which resulted in 
a slowdown in the pace of the Court, may not 
help cement its legitimacy.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES   
During 2018, the Court’s internal turmoil led 
it to push important decisions to the last part 
of the year. The Court seemed to be under-
going a period of ad-hoc coalitions, although 
a handful of sensitive cases show Justice 
Rosenkrantz as a lone dissenter. Some of 
the Court’s decisions were marked by a dis-
pute over interpretative doctrines and its re-
strained versus expansive role. Curiously, a 
few of its justices seemed to change their po-
sitions regarding this matter from one case to 
the next, and it will be their task to show that 
these changes were not politically motivat-
HG:HEHOLHYHWKDWZKLOHUHSUHVHQWLQJRQO\
a snapshot of the Court’s docket, the four de-
cisions we cover offer a decent view of this 
period of transition. A case nearly making 
the cut is Peralta Valiente,6 a summarily dis-
missed appeal of a foreigner expelled from 
the country, in which two dissenting justices 
(Rosenkrantz and Highton) claimed the per-
3 Eduardo Paladini, ‘Dos nuevas encuestas sobre el aborto’, Clarín, 8 August 2018, https://www.clarin.com/politica/nuevas-encuestas-aborto-horas-arran-
que-debate_0_rkAj4JusG.html
4 Senado de la Nación, MA Pichetto (debate of 8 August 2018), available https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OvWDyFoNj6c.   
5 González-Bertomeu and Álvarez-Ugarte, supra note 2. 
6 Peralta Valiente, Mario CAF 38158/2013/2/RH1 [2018].
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son’s rights had been violated for lack of no-
tification of his right to receive free legal aid. 
1. Batalla: The Constitution inside and 
outside the courts
The single most significant cases from 2017 
and 2018 concerned the same topic. In 2017, 
the case had involved the fate of one Mr 
Muiña, convicted in 2011 of kidnapping and 
torturing five people (one still disappeared) 
in the context of massive human rights viola-
tions committed during the last dictatorship 
(1976-1983).
In that case (Bignone), what was at stake was 
whether Muiña could claim a benefit regard-
ing how his prison term was to be calculated, 
or whether international human rights law 
concerning the fight against impunity pre-
vented that result. Muiña had invoked the 
so-called “Two for one” rule establishing 
that, after two years in detention, each extra 
day would count as two served if convicted. 
The rule had been repealed in 2001, before 
his arrest, but Muiña argued it still applied to 
him as a result of the Criminal Code’s “Most 
favorable to the defendant” rule, mandating 
that “[i]f the law in force at the time of the 
offense is different from that which exists at 
the time of the judgment or in the intermedi-
ate time, the more favorable law will always
be of application” (emphasis added). 
:KHQ LQ Bignone, a 3-2 majority granted 
Muiña the benefit he demanded, hundreds of 
thousands took to the streets to protest what 
they considered an affront to the social and 
legal consensus on memory and justice re-
garding past human rights violations. Days 
after the decision, and to prevent it from 
applying to similar cases, a unanimous Con-
gress passed a so-called “interpretative” stat-
ute, saying that the “Two for one” rule had 
never been meant to apply to cases involving 
human rights abuses. 
:HUHPDUNHGODVW\HDUWKDWWKH&RXUWZRXOG
have to analyze the validity of this statute, 
which it did in 2018 in a case known as 
Batalla due to the appellant’s name.7  The 
question the Court addressed was whether 
its previously announced criterion should 
change as a result of the enactment. The 
Court’s 4-1 plurality decision suggested an 
affirmative answer, but only two of the four 
justices voting to move away from Bignone
took the new statute into consideration. Jus-
tices Maqueda and Lorenzetti insisted on 
their previous position—mostly based on 
the state’s international obligations—and 
claimed that the statute did not add anything. 
In contrast, the remaining justices forming 
the decisional majority considered that the 
statute had changed the legal landscape. 
In Bignone—the previous case—Justices 
Rosatti and Highton each expressed the view 
that Congress had not legislated a difference 
between common crimes and human rights 
abuses, and that it was not for judges to alter 
the statute. A straightforward interpretation 
of their stance is that it referred to judges 
because that is what was at stake, but that 
Congress itself would be banned from differ-
entiating ex post as well. In Batalla, howev-
er, they jointly said that Congress had legiti-
mately established such a difference through 
the new statute. The statute was a reasonable 
legislative exercise that did not violate fun-
damental rights but only clarified the way 
to interpret the law, without creating a new 
crime or worsening punishment. In a show-
ing of restraint, the justices declared that 
judges were not the mouth of the law, but 
neither were they “freethinkers” who could 
DOWHUDVWDWXWHDVWKH\VDZILW:KHQWKHSURE-
lem lies ‘in a statute,’ the solution must come 
‘by way of a statute’, what had happened in 
the case. Each institution—the Court and 
Congress—had said its piece when it was its 
turn to speak, as is appropriate in a republic, 
and the Court therefore had to uphold Con-
gress’s view. 
Justice Rosenkrantz stuck to his position in 
Bignone, becoming the only dissenter. He 
considered the new statute unconstitutional, 
since its aim was not to clarify an obscure 
clause in the clear-enough “Two for one” 
statute. The new statute established that the 
latter did not apply to human rights viola-
tions, so the presupposition was that it did
apply originally to those cases. He added that 
the new statute was invalid even if seen as 
an interpretative rule because it entailed the 
retroactive application of the law to worsen 
a defendant’s standing. 
There are two ways to understand these 
opinions. One is as a genuine discrepancy 
regarding the nature of the “interpretative” 
statute. Justice Rosenkrantz concluded that 
the statute could not be regarded as such 
because, among other reasons, it violated 
constitutional protections, while Justices 
Rosatti and Highton concluded otherwise. If 
this was the issue at stake, Justice Rosenk-
rantz’s stance was a sensible one only if un-
derstood within the confines of his previous 
(and most probably wrong) criterion in Big-
none concerning the state’s human rights law 
obligations. If Congress did not distinguish 
between common crimes and human rights 
violations when enacting that statute, a new 
Congress could not do it now without vio-
ODWLQJQRQUHWURDFWLYLW\ :HGRQRWEHOLHYH
in a metaphysically ever-present Congress 
whose decisions across time cannot ever 
be retroactive.) Since Justices Rosatti and 
Highton had shared that view in Bignone, a 
superior option for them would have been to 
acknowledge that human rights law did soft-
en the ban on retroactivity, and that they had 
been wrong to say otherwise. 
Perhaps there is another way to conceive 
of the discrepancy. The position of Justices 
Rosatti and Highton might be construed as 
one indicating that the current Congress had 
offered its view—on par with that of the 
Court’s—on whether the “Two for one” stat-
ute must apply taking human rights law and 
constitutional law into consideration, and 
that the Court should accept that view. This 
would be compatible with a type of “depart-
mentalist” perspective of constitutional in-
terpretation, under which this is an activity 
that all three branches share equally. If this 
were these justices’ position, it would mark a 
change in the way justices conceive of con-
stitutional adjudication. But this would be 
reading too much into both Justices Rosatti 
and Highton’s vote and Congress’s own per-
ception as a constitutional interpreter.
7 Hidalgo Garzón, Carlos del Señor y otros FLP 91003389/2012/TO1/93/1/RH11 [2018].
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2. Asociación Francesa: minimalism and 
strict-construction
A case from 2018 further illustrates the in-
terpretative battles at the Court. A medical 
doctor and a hospital were found responsi-
ble for malpractice that occurred in 1994, as 
a result of which a baby girl had been born 
with spastic cerebral palsy. The hospital filed 
for bankruptcy, and, given her condition, the 
child’s parents asked the bankruptcy judge 
that they be paid with priority over any other 
credit, even if this meant altering the ranking 
established by statute. They said that several 
conventions on par with the Constitution—
including the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, mandating to privilege the “best 
interest” of the child—demanded that reclas-
sification.
In a 3-2 decision, the Court upheld a lower 
court’s denial of the request. Justices Rosen-
krantz, Highton, and Lorenzetti said that 
only legislators could alter the bankruptcy 
statute’s ranking. Though several obligations 
concerning special treatment of children 
flowed from human rights conventions, it 
was not possible to derive from them a spe-
cific recognition of a special privilege when 
a credit was involved. Justices Maqueda and 
Rosatti each filed a dissent, rejecting such 
strict constructionism. Maqueda emphasized 
the absolute vulnerability of the child and 
said that the claim was meant to protect her 
essential rights to life and the enjoyment of 
a level of existence adequate for her devel-
opment. Together with the obligations stem-
ming from the Constitution and human rights 
law, this meant that the statute establishing 
a ranking had to be struck down for not al-
lowing an exception that placed the credit in 
question on top of others. In a departure from 
his stance of restraint announced in Batalla,
Justice Rosatti largely agreed.  
3. Blanco: Pensions under ever-recurring 
crises
So far, under its current configuration, the 
Court has seemed unwilling to develop a so-
cial and economic rights agenda, something 
that would be authorized or mandated by a 
thick rights enumeration. However, it has de-
cided a few consequential cases. The Blanco
decision,8  announced in December, was the 
most significant: it involved the Executive’s 
authority to establish an adjusting formula 
to update pensions. This arithmetic opera-
tion defines how much money retirees will 
receive and how costly the state-run pension 
system will be, a sensitive question for any 
government.9
The decision in Blanco must be read against 
the backdrop of an economy almost perpet-
ually in crisis, with inflation levels eating up 
much of the income of retirees, hundreds of 
thousands of whom initiate legal actions to 
dispute the way their pensions are calculat-
ed. Blanco should also be read within the 
context of an over a decade-long case law 
in which the Court underscored the constitu-
tional principle of “mobility” in social secu-
rity (section 14 bis), according to which pen-
sions are to be adjusted to keep a “reasonable 
proportion between worker’s incomes and 
those of retirees.”10
In 2016, Congress acknowledged that the 
state owed a proverbial debt to retirees and 
offered a voluntary adjustment program. 
:KDWZDVDWVWDNHLQBlanco was the author-
ity to establish an adjustment formula of the 
now-devalued salaries to be used as the ba-
sis to calculate the pension of plaintiffs who 
had not signed into that program. The Social 
Security Administration (SSA, part of the 
Executive) vindicated its authority to choose 
the formula via an administrative decision. 
The SSA’s chosen index coincided with that 
of the voluntary program, but this entailed a 
lower pension for Mr. Blanco than the pen-
sion he would get under the index devised by 
a lower court. 
After analyzing a complex web of regula-
tions, the majority (all justices but Rosenk-
rantz) considered that it was up to Congress, 
and not the Executive, to decide on the for-
mula.11 The SSA had based its authority on 
a statutory provision from 1993 granting it 
the power to “apply, monitor and oversee” 
the pension system. For the Court, however, 
this could not be interpreted as a delegation 
to the SSA of the formula-setting authori-
ty, since, in 2008, Congress had eliminated 
from the statute an explicit delegation to 
create an index, establishing itself a new 
one to be applied for future adjustments. 
Now, since Congress was silent regarding 
the formula to update salaries before 2008, 
the Court fell back on a previous decision in 
which a Court-mandated index was used to 
calculate a plaintiff’s pension.12
Justice Rosenkrantz dissented. He argued 
that the Court had traditionally recognized 
in Congress a broad authority to decide how 
to organize the social security system, an 
authority Congress chose to exert on some 
occasions and delegated on others.13 A partial 
delegation to the SSA still existed because 
Congress had remained silent regarding the 
question of how to update pensions before
2008.14 He rejected the index chosen by the 
majority, and opted to defer to the Executive 
since the SSA’s formula fell within the con-
stitutional power vested in the Executive to 
issue instructions and rules “necessary for 
the enforcement of the laws of the nation 
[.…]”15 Blanco’s claim could only succeed 
if the formula was shown to be substantially 
flawed, something he had not proven.16
Rosenkrantz’s dissent appears as an exer-
cise of self-restraint in a matter with huge 
financial implications for the government. 
He said that “the most delicate mission for 
the judiciary [was] to keep itself within the 
boundaries of its jurisdiction.…” 17  On the 
other hand, by insisting it was for Congress 
and not the Executive to settle the matter, 
the majority was willing to limit the gov-
ernment. The majority said that “legislators 
[were] better suited to make real the goals 
of our constitutional text.” In mandating 
8 Blanco, Lucio Orlando CSS 42272/2012/CS1-CA1 [2018].
9 The state-run pension system coexisted with a private system from 1993 to 2008, when the entire system was renationalized.
10  Blanco, ibid., par 12, Badaro, Adolfo 329 Fallos 3089 [2006], Badaro, Adolfo 330 Fallos 4866 [2007], ,SSPɈ(SILY[V1VZt-HSSVZ 1914 [2009].
11, 12  Blanco, ibid
13,14 ,15,16  Blanco, ibid (Rosenkrantz’s dissent).
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that pensions were to be adjusted by stat-
ute, the Constitution “combine[d] the ide-
al of representation with the fulfillment of 
social rights.”18 Unless Congress chooses 
another formula, the Court’s criterion will 
apply to tens of thousands of similar cases.
4. UCR: elections and federalism 
A traditional political party—and a mem-
ber of the national ruling coalition—sued 
the southern Santa Cruz province to chal-
lenge the double simultaneous voting system 
(DSV) (Lemas) used for electing the gover-
nor.19 The system allows political parties to 
bring their primaries to the general election 
and to benefit from the parties’ fragmenta-
tion. A candidate carries the election if she is 
the most-voted politician of the most-voted 
party. Since all the party’s candidates’ votes 
are aggregated to determine the latter, this 
means a politician may win even if a can-
didate from a different party received more 
votes. This undemocratic result had taken 
place in the province in 2015. 
In a unanimous decision composed of four 
opinions, the Court dismissed the claim. The 
local constitution establishes that the “gov-
ernor and vice-governor shall be elected di-
rectly by the people of the Province by sim-
ple plurality of votes....”20 According to the 
provincial high court, the clause mandated 
plurality voting instead of absolute majority 
and referred to both candidates and political 
parties. A DSV system was compatible with 
both issues or conditions.21 For the Supreme 
Court, this was a plausible reading of the 
local constitution, given the deference with 
which federal bodies must treat provincial 
authorities when they reasonably exercise 
the autonomy accorded by the national Con-
stitution.22 (A case from 2003 also had con-
cluded that the DSV system did not violate 
the national Constitution.23) The Court still 
considered it appropriate to question the sys-
tem: it confused voters; fractured political 
parties; and took internal disagreement to the 
general election.24 However, the fact that “an 
electoral system [was] inconvenient [did] 
not make it by itself unconstitutional.”25
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2019 
This Court likely is in the process of de-
veloping new jurisprudential trends, partly 
pushed by the personae the new justices are 
adopting and the evolving coalitions with 
the remaining justices. In such a small body, 
much can change as a result of even a little 
accommodation. The new members of the 
Court seem to vote differently on import-
ant matters. Although it is too soon to tell, 
Justice Rosatti seems closer to summon or 
become part of a relatively stable majority 
around certain issues than is Court President 
Rosenkrantz.
Apart from a few significant cases, what im-
mediately lies ahead is a presidential elec-
tion in October 2019, which may indirectly 
affect the future of the Court and test the jus-
tices’ consistency. Also, the women’s rights 
advocates who strongly pushed for the legal-
ization of abortion will likely attempt to fight 
another legislative battle. Perhaps courts will 
also be called to intervene.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
2018 was a busy year in terms of Austrian 
constitutional law. First and foremost, the 
year marked the centenary of the Republic 
of Austria, founded in 1918 (formerly as 
“German-Austria”) after the end of the First 
:RUOG:DU (YHQ WKRXJK WKH )HGHUDO &RQ-
stitutional Act (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz; 
hence: B-VG) was only enacted in 1920, 
the enactment of the laws pertaining to the 
“provisional constitution” as well as the trig-
gering of the federal system, which both fell 
into the transitory period of 1918/19, were 
given due regard during the jubilee year. As 
to more recent developments, the new Con-
servative coalition government, which had 
been appointed at the end of 2017, launched 
several reforms of constitutional impact 
WKDWZLOO EH GLVFXVVHG LQ WKLV UHSRUW:KLOH
some of these reforms have not come into 
force (or even passed the legislative proce-
dure) yet, others already have or will do so 
in early 2019. However, since the coalition 
government only holds a simple majority in 
the National Council (the lower chamber of 
the Federal Parliament), the consent of one 
or more of the opposition parties is necessary 
in order to pass constitutional legislation. 
Moreover, the Austrian Constitutional Court 
delivered a number of important judgments 
that dealt with issues such as minimum so-
cial aid, asylum seekers, citizenship, parlia-
mentary investigation committees and inter-
sex people, as will be reported below. These 
cases demonstrate the varieties of “dialogue” 
between the lawmaker and the Constitution-
al Court, ranging from the repeal of laws to 
constituent interpretation to deference by 
the lawmaker in order to find out what the 
Court, among different options, considers 
constitutional. Finally, Austria took over the 
Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union for the second half of 2018 (for the 
third time, after 1998 and 2006)—a difficult 
task in times of crisis, in particular with re-
gard to Brexit, migration and fiscal issues. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Austrian Federal Constitution is not a 
codified constitution incorporated in a sin-
gle document, but consists of approximately 
500 fragments (laws, single provisions, sev-
eral state treaties, certain laws enacted prior 
to 1920), all of which are endowed with the 
formal rank of federal constitutional law. 
Accordingly, constitutional reforms often do 
not just refer to the main constitutional doc-
ument, i.e., the B-VG, but also other piec-
es of federal constitutional law. Thus, the 
most important constitutional reform project 
launched by the new Federal Government in 
2018 did not just amend the B-VG but also 
other parts of federal constitutional law. The 
respective constitutional bill1 was passed at 
the end of 2018 and its entry into force is 
partly set in 2019, partly at a later date. Its 
main concern is a reform of the highly com-
plicated allocation of powers between the 
federation and the nine constituent Länder 
(states). Art 12 B-VG, which enlists several 
subject matters for which the federation is 
responsible to enact framework laws, while 
the Länder are entitled to pass implementing 
laws and to execute them, will in the future 
apply only to a few politically controver-
sial subject matters, such as social aid.2 In 
turn, most of the enlisted matters were either 
transformed into exclusive federal subject 
AUSTRIA
1 BGBl I 2019/14.
2 See below III.1.
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matters under Art 10 B-VG or into pow-
ers under the residuary competence of the 
Länder (Art 15 para 1 B-VG). Even though 
the shared type of competence, which Art 12 
B-VG enshrines, was not totally abolished, 
the amendment sought to make the alloca-
tion of powers clearer and more coherent. 
Inasmuch as the transformed subject matters 
became either part of the exclusive federal or 
Länder competence, the reform was neither 
over-centralistic nor just Länder-friendly, 
which enabled the political compromise re-
quired for constitutional approval. The same 
amendment, moreover, eliminated the mutu-
al approval rights of the federation and the 
Länder, respectively, regarding the bound-
aries of district administrative authorities, 
which are now exclusively regulated by the 
governments of the Länder and those of the 
district courts, which are regulated by the 
Federal Government. Likewise, the amend-
ment includes some other minor issues of a 
deregulatory and clarifying nature. 
A deregulatory effect was also intended by 
the Second Federal Law Clarification Act, 3
which was, however, passed as an ordinary 
law. According to this Act, all federal laws 
and regulations entered out of force by 31 
December 2018 unless they fell under ex-
ceptions mentioned in the Act itself (e.g., 
federal constitutional laws or provisions) or 
were mentioned in the schedule to this Act. 
Even though the aim to decrease the num-
ber of federal laws and regulations—the 
law of the Länder was not concerned—was 
generally welcomed, the Act was severely 
criticized for its technical design: the main 
concern was that important laws or regula-
tions might be overlooked and accordingly 
not mentioned in the schedule, and would 
thus automatically enter out of force. For 
reasons of legal clarity and certainty, it was 
suggested to, vice versa, enlist those laws 
and regulations that should enter out of force 
instead of enlisting those that should. Still, 
the schedule enlists on 240 pages just those 
laws and regulations that should not enter 
out of force. 
Other constitutional amendments referred, 
among minor legal issues, to adaptations re-
quired by the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation,4 which provides legal protection by 
the administrative courts of the federation 
and the Länder, the Administrative (Appeal) 
Court and the Constitutional Court. The pro-
posal to pass a headwear ban for elementary 
schools (apart from a similar ban for nursery 
schools that fell into the competence of the 
Länder that, in a formal agreement with the 
federation,5 obliged themselves to enact such 
bans) was politically much more contested. 
The coalition parties in the National Coun-
cil initiated the respective amendment to the 
School Teaching Act at the end of 2018, i.e., 
a constitutional provision that would require 
a qualified quorum and majority in the Na-
tional Council.6 An Anti-Face-Veiling Act7 
had already been enacted as an ordinary law 
under the previous Federal Government. 
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generally ban the veiling of faces in public 
places, which, inter alia, applies to the burqa 
or niqab, the new amendment is concerned 
with a more specific ban: under ten-year-
old pupils in elementary schools would be 
prohibited to wear head-covering garments 
based on ideology or religion, which goes 
beyond the prohibition of face veils and, 
inter alia, refers to ordinary headscarves as 
well. At the same time, the draft provision 
emphasizes that the ban seeks to implement 
certain constitutional and educational values 
such as the equality of men and women or 
the social integration of children in accor-
dance with Austrian traditions. In case of a 
violation of the ban, the parents would be 
asked to attend a briefing by the responsible 
authority in order to be informed about the 
reasons of the violation and their respective 
responsibility. Only if the violation was con-
tinued or the parents ignored the invitation 
more than once would they be fined. It is 
currently unclear whether the qualified quo-
rum and majority required for this constitu-
tional provision will be met. The question 
also is whether a constitutional amendment 
would at all be required for the enactment of 
this provision. The provision would likely 
interfere with the freedoms of religion and 
opinion—if children at that age can be pre-
sumed to be able to exercise those rights—as 
well as the right to private life or the right 
of parents to ensure school education and 
teaching in conformity with their own re-
ligious and philosophical convictions. All 
these rights are entrenched in the ECHR and 
its Protocol No 1, which in Austria form part 
of federal constitutional law. At the same 
time, however, the ban might exactly protect 
the freedoms of religion, opinion and private 
life, inasmuch as children must not be forced 
by others to cover their heads, as well as fur-
ther the equality between men and women 
and other important public interests, such as 
social integration. Also, the ECtHR’s cases 
Köse and Others v. Turkey and /H\ODùDKLQY
Turkey [GC] show that a headwear ban may 
be legitimate under certain conditions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In recent years, the Austrian Constitution-
al Court has had to deal with a couple of 
thousand cases per year, most of which are 
rejected for formal or substantive reasons.8
In 2018, many cases dealt with violations of 
rights of asylum seekers or persons entitled 
to the right of asylum, while the Constitu-
tional Court also held that persons with sub-
sidiary protection status were not entitled to 
the same rights (more concretely, the right 
of family reunification) as persons belong-
ing to the latter group. The Constitutional 
Court also dealt with numerous other issues, 
ranging from the review of elections to the 
constitutionality of cash machine fees. In 
this section, a selection of decisions will be 
examined more closely since they raised par-
ticular attention.
3 BGBl I 2018/61.
4 BGBl I 2018/22.
5 Art 3 para 1 Vereinbarung gemäß Art. 15a B-VG zwischen dem Bund und den Ländern über die Elementarpädagogik für die Kindergartenjahre 2018/19 bis 
2021/22, BGBl I 2018/103.
6  495/A XXVI. GP.
7 Anti-Gesichtsverhüllungsgesetz, BGBl I 2017/68.
8 See, most lately, the Constitutional Court’s annual report 2017, https://www.vfgh.gv.at/downloads/taetigkeitsberichte/VfGH_Taetigkeitsbericht_2017.pdf.
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1. VfGH 7 March 2018, G 136/2017-19 (Lower 
Austria); 27 June 2018, G 415/2017 (Vienna); 
1 December 2018, G 308/2018-8 (Burgen-
land); 11 December 2018, G 156/2018-28 
(Upper Austria): Minimum Social Aid
Social aid is a shared competence under Art 
12 B-VG, entitling the federation to enact 
framework laws and the Länder to enact im-
plementing laws as well as to execute them. 
As long as the federation does not pass a 
framework law, however, the Länder will 
have full legislative competence. So far, the 
federation has not passed a framework law 
under this competence—which will, howev-
er, change soon—so that all Länder enacted 
their own laws on minimum social aid. Since 
applications for minimum social aid have 
strongly increased with the large number of 
persons entitled to asylum, the Länder react-
ed in different ways in order to reduce costs. 
In 2018, the Constitutional Court examined 
the relevant legislation of four Länder. The 
compatibility of these models with the Con-
stitution attracted vast attention, since the 
Federal Government simultaneously pre-
pared a draft bill for a new federal frame-
work law (which, to some extent, resembles 
the Upper Austrian model).9 In this dialogue 
between different legislatures and the Con-
stitutional Court, the latter’s decisions prove 
a particularly important yardstick for the 
constitutional design of this new law, with 
the examined Länder laws serving as its 
“laboratories”.
In the Lower Austrian case, the Constitution-
al Court struck down provisions that, with 
regard to the amount of social aid, discrimi-
nated against those beneficiaries who, within 
the last six years, had stayed in Austria less 
than five years. The Constitutional Court 
held that this provision, which also referred 
to Austrian citizens among others, discrim-
inated between Austrian citizens living in 
Austria and those living elsewhere and that 
this different treatment could not be reason-
ably justified, since it was not understandable 
why a stronger motivation to work (instead 
of receiving social aid) should be needed 
for Austrian citizens living outside Austria. 
Likewise, it was held unconstitutional that 
the law discriminated between other persons 
with regard to their stay in Austria, e.g., be-
tween persons entitled to asylum that could 
not return to their own country and other 
migrants that could. Moreover, the Constitu-
tional Court struck down as unconstitutional 
the provision according to which social aid 
for persons living in the same household 
should, as a total, not exceed 1,500 euros. 
:KLOHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWDGPLWWHGWKDW
the lawmaker could, in principle, reduce so-
cial aid in the case of more persons living 
in the same household because of decreasing 
“synergetic” costs, this ought to be done rea-
sonably and in accordance with the concrete 
and individual need of the respective number 
of persons. The fact that families additional-
ly receive “family aid” and that the provision 
made some exceptions was not considered a 
sufficient justification.
In the Burgenland case, the Constitution-
al Court decided in a very similar manner. 
Additionally, the Court held that Art 1 of the 
Federal Constitutional Act on the Rights of 
Children10 had been violated because the 
limit of 1,500 euros per household particu-
larly affected large families with more chil-
dren. In both cases, it is interesting to find 
how the Constitutional Court applies the 
equality principle, namely (just) with regard 
to the relation between Austrian citizens 
among each other and between other persons 
among each other. 
In the Vienna case, the Constitutional Court 
repealed a provision that denied minimum 
social aid to underage Austrian citizens who 
can neither themselves receive such aid nor 
receive it from parents if they are not entitled 
to it.
In the Upper Austrian case, the basic mod-
el of minimum social aid was found to be 
constitutional because it does not absolutely 
limit the minimum social aid per household 
but allows additional aid for additional per-
sons living in that household, even though 
the additional aid is significantly lower than 
the basic aid due to “synergetic” costs of per-
VRQVOLYLQJLQWKHVDPHKRXVHKROG:KLOHWKH
Constitutional Court held that the lawmaker 
had a wide margin of appreciation to decide 
on social aid systems and its limits, it also 
emphasized that the lawmaker, when provid-
ing for social aid, had to consider the min-
imum requirements of a life led in human 
dignity. The Constitutional Court, however, 
repealed a provision of the Upper Austrian 
law which, when limiting minimum social 
aid per household, did not distinguish be-
tween persons living in the same household 
who receive minimum social aid from those 
that do not.
2. VfGH 15 June 2018, G 77/2018-9: Entry of 
Intersex Persons into Civil Register
In this case, an intersex person sought to 
have their gender entry in the Austrian Civil 
Register changed to a term other than “male” 
or “female”. The request was refused by the 
administrative authority and the refusal con-
firmed by the Upper Austrian administrative 
court against which a complaint was lodged 
at the Constitutional Court. Sec 2 para 2 no 3 
Civil Register Act11 mentions just “gender” 
among the general Civil Register data, but 
does not specify between different genders. 
The Constitutional Court found it possible 
to interpret this provision consistently with 
the Federal Constitution inasmuch as the 
Civil Register authorities should register 
the individual gender requested by a person 
and not just “male” or “female”. The au-
thorities might, however, verify whether the 
requested entry term was adequate—terms 
such as “inter”, “open” or “diverse” were 
suggested—since persons were not entitled 
to choose any kind of term for their gender. 
The Constitutional Court based its decision 
on Art 8 ECHR, which forms part of Aus-
trian federal constitutional law, arguing that 
a restriction to have one’s gender entry lim-
ited to just “male” or “female” would not 
be proportional and thus violate the right 
to one’s own gender identity. The Constitu-
tional Court did not, however, deal with the 
numerous provisions in the B-VG that just 
mention males and females—e.g., with re-
gard to voters or the obligation of male cit-
izens to military or civilian service. Neither 
did the Constitutional Court point out that 
it had been the same Court that, in VfSlg 
9 104/ME XXVI. GP.
10 Bundesverfassungsgesetz über die Rechte von Kindern, BGBl I 2011/4.
11 Personenstandsgesetz, BGBl I 2013/16 as amended by BGBl I 2018/104.
16 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
18.929/2009, had acknowledged that the 
Austrian legal system recognized just male 
or female gender. Moreover, consistent inter-
pretation should only be applied in the case 
of doubt left by other interpretive methods. 
Sec 77 Civil Register Act, however, provides 
that all male denominations in this Act apply 
to females as well. The Court considered this 
provision to have been made just for reasons 
of linguistic equality, eclipsing its meaning 
with regard to the interpretation of “gender” 
in Sec 2 para 2 no 3 of the same Act. Still, 
it would be paradoxical to assume that a 
law recognizes more than two genders and 
at the same time requires that all terms re-
lating to persons for which the male term is 
used applies to females as well, but not to a 
third gender. The same problem will arise in 
numerous laws that expressly apply to two 
genders only, e.g., in the context of gender 
equality and non-discrimination. It is not at 
all clear how such provisions should be dealt 
with just by consistent interpretation, which 
shows that this is in truth an issue for the 
lawmaker.
3. VfGH 3 October 2018, G 69/2018-9:
Adoption of Children by Homosexual 
Couples
Already in 2017, the Constitutional Court 
had repealed a provision of the Austrian Civ-
il Code which prohibited homosexual cou-
ples to marry, even though the same Court 
had, in previous cases, upheld the difference 
between marriage (for heterosexual couples) 
and registered partnership (for homosexual 
couples).12 Substantively, however, the deci-
sion is also a consequence of previous judg-
ments in which the Constitutional Court al-
lowed homosexual couples to receive sperm 
donation13 and to adopt children14. The de-
cision made in 2018 follows in the same 
strain: § 197 para 3 Austrian Civil Code15
provides that if a child is only adopted by 
an adoptive father (or an adoptive mother), 
all legal family relations to the biological 
father (or mother) will cease to exist. This 
provision was held to be unconstitutional by 
a lesbian complainant who had ended her re-
lationship with the biological mother of the 
child, but nevertheless wanted to adopt the 
child afterwards, without, however, replac-
ing the biological mother. According to the 
Constitutional Court, a literal interpretation 
of the provision (allowing the replacement 
of a biological parent only by an adoptive 
parent of the same gender) would indeed vi-
olate the right to equality and Art 8 ECHR. 
But the Constitutional Court also held that 
it was possible—and even required—to con-
strue the provision consistently with these 
constitutional rights inasmuch as an adop-
tive father could also replace a biological 
mother and an adoptive mother a biological 
father. Even though neither the wording nor 
the explanatory materials suggested this re-
sult, the Constitutional Court applied consis-
tent interpretation instead of striking down 
the provision. This is one example where 
the Constitutional Court applies consistent 
interpretation as a “primary” instead of—as 
in some other cases—subsidiary interpretive 
method that seems to express deference to-
wards the lawmaker whose provision thus is 
not struck down, while the reasons and mo-
tives intended by the lawmaker are neverthe-
less totally reversed. 
4. VfGH 11 December 2018, E 3717/2018-
42: Deprivation of Citizenship 
In 2017, the right wing Freedom Party sub-
mitted a list to the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior that contained the names and other 
data of more than 66000 persons of allegedly 
Turkish citizenship who were also supposed 
to be Austrian citizens. According to the 
Austrian Citizenship Act,16 a person gener-
ally—unless certain exceptions apply—los-
es Austrian citizenship when obtaining the 
citizenship of another state. The Freedom 
Party claimed that it had received the list 
anonymously and that the list, showing the 
current status of allegedly Turkish voters in 
Austria, could demonstrate the illegal sta-
tus of (allegedly) Turkish citizens who thus 
would have to lose their Austrian citizenship. 
As a consequence, the Länder authorities re-
sponsible for carrying out the federal Citi-
zenship Act began to individually examine 
the nationality status of persons mentioned 
in the list, which, in some cases, entailed a 
deprivation of Austrian citizenship. In a case 
where the Viennese administrative court had 
rejected the complaint of a person who had 
been deprived of his Austrian citizenship be-
cause of an alleged reacquisition of his for-
mer Turkish citizenship, a complaint against 
that decision was lodged before the Consti-
tutional Court. The Constitutional Court held 
that the complainant had been violated in his 
right to equality because the administrative 
court had used the list as a token of evidence, 
even though it could not be proven that the 
list was real and correct. Ex officio investi-
gations, which would have to be led by the 
authorities, could not be supplanted by such 
a list. It was the obligation of the authorities 
to prove that the person was a Turkish citi-
zen, whereas it was not the obligation of that 
person to prove that he was not a Turkish cit-
izen. Even though many enquiries had been 
made, neither the origin and truth of the list 
could be clarified nor could the complainant 
obtain relevant evidence from the Turkish 
authorities that he was not a Turkish citizen. 
The Constitutional Court, repealing the ad-
ministrative court’s decision, concluded that 
as long as the authorities could not prove 
the Turkish citizenship of the complainant, 
one had to assume that he was not a Turk-
ish citizen and should therefore not have lost 
his Austrian citizenship. The Constitutional 
Court also mentioned that a concerned par-
ty was obliged to a “certain participation” 
in the procedure if “justified by ex officio 
investigation results and not exceeding tol-
erable limits for the concerned party”, but 
did not spell out what this meant in detail. 
However, since many cases will be similar 
and since, as long as the Turkish authorities 
do not cooperate, it will not be clear wheth-
er the respective persons are in truth Turkish 
12 VfGH 4 December 2017, G 258/2017 ua (G 258-259/2017-9).
13 VfSlg 19.824/2013.
14 VfSlg 19.942/2014.
15 Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, JGS 1811/946 as amended by BGBl I 2018/100.
16 Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz, BGBl 1985/311 as amended by BGBl I 2018/56.
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citizens, the Austrian authorities will not be 
allowed to deprive such persons of their Aus-
trian citizenship.
5. VfGH 14 September 2018, UA 1/2018-15 
(first BVT case); 11 December 2018, UA 
2/2018-17 (second BVT case); 11 Decem-
ber 2018, UA 3/2018-30 (Eurofighter case): 
Parliamentary Investigation Committees
In accordance with its new competence un-
der Art 138b B-VG, the Constitutional Court 
had to decide on appeals raised in the context 
of two parliamentary investigation commit-
tees. In 2018, the National Council estab-
lished these committees with regard to the 
examination of two separate issues, name-
ly the non-transparent purchase of military 
aircraft (“Eurofighter case”) and the contro-
versial police raid on the Federal Constitu-
tion-Protection and Antiterrorism Agency 
(“BVT case”). In the Eurofighter case, the 
respective investigation committee itself ap-
pealed to the Constitutional Court in order to 
require the Finanzprokuratur (the legal advi-
sory body of the Republic) to submit all doc-
uments on the “Task Force Eurofighter”. The 
Court held that the Finanzprokuratur had to 
oblige this request. In the first BVT case, the 
Constitutional Court was appealed to by the 
other investigation committee and accord-
ingly required the Federal Minister for the 
Interior to submit at least certain documents 
to the committee. In the second BVT case, 
the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal 
made by complainants who asserted the vi-
olation of their personality rights because 
certain documents that concerned them had 
been forwarded to the investigation commit-
tee. According to the Court, the complaints 
had been delayed and, moreover, incorrectly 
addressed to the Constitutional Court that 
was not competent to decide on such an ap-
peal since their personality rights had not 
been violated. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The Federal Government has already laid 
down an ambitious program for 2019, which 
will, among other issues, focus on tax re-
form, digitalization and health matters. At 
the same time, it may be expected that the 
Constitutional Court will decide on a number 
of laws passed under the new government ei-
ther on the appeal of the parliamentary oppo-
sition or on individual appeal. Among these, 
the social insurance reform, the planned pro-
hibition of headwear in elementary schools 
and the minimum social aid federal law are 
likely to be dealt with by the Court. After the 
intense election years 2016-2018, no regu-
lar elections at federal or Länder level will 
take place in 2019 except the election of the 
parliament of the Land Vorarlberg. In May 
2019, however, Austrian citizens will vote in 
the EU parliamentary elections. Last but not 
least, 2019 will be the centenary of the first 
constitutions of the Austrian Länder under 
the new Republic.
V. FURTHER READING
Gerhard Baumgartner (ed), Öffentliches
Recht.-DKUEXFK1:9
Hans Georg Ruppe, ‘Ehe für alle - Grun-
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
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Karl Korinek and others (eds), Österre-
ichisches Bundesverfassungsrecht (R 14, 
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Benjamin Kneihs/Georg Lienbacher (eds), 
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fassungsrecht (R 21, August 2018)
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Bangladesh
Ridwanul Hoque, Professor of Law at the University of Dhaka
Sharowat Shamin, Lecturer in Law at the University of Dhaka
I. INTRODUCTION
Bangladesh witnessed heaps of constitution-
al law developments in 2018, with the much-
talked-about general elections that were held 
on 30 December. In recent years, especially 
since 2014, fair, participatory, and peaceful 
elections appeared to be a daunting chal-
OHQJHIRU%DQJODGHVK¶VGHPRFUDF\:LWKWKH
11th parliamentary elections on the calendar, 
therefore, the whole year of 2018 remained 
occupied with tensions, debates and contro-
versies in every sphere of public and private 
life. The Supreme Court, too, was extraor-
dinarily busy with bail petitions of detained 
politicians and ordinary people as well as 
electoral petitions. On the other hand, two 
major social movements, by university and 
school students, for reform of reservation in 
government jobs and road safety, received 
enormous mass support as they aimed at 
mending some long-standing good-gover-
nance ills, but were mishandled by the gov-
ernment.
At the legislative front, the Parliament, over-
whelmingly dominated by the ruling party, 
enacted a controversial digital security law, 
whittling down all critiques and protests 
from the rights activists and social actors 
who claimed it was anti-rule of law and 
would stifle online freedom. The Supreme 
Court continued with its previous year’s ac-
tivism in the area of compensatory justice 
but played a largely passive role in protecting 
civil and political rights. Promisingly, how-
ever, it handed down two leading decisions 
concerning sexual violence prosecution and 
the protection of rape survivors. 
:HVWDUWZLWKPDMRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORS-
ments of 2018 in part II, which addresses im-
portant decisions, enactments, controversies 
in politics and civic good-governance move-
ments. The third part of this report analyzes 
some select constitutional cases, followed by 
conclusions in part IV. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
11th General Election 
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy 
with general elections every five years. Ma-
jor opposition boycotted the 10th general 
election of 5 January 2014 as their demand 
for the re-installation of the election-time 
caretaker government system was not met. 
The 15th Constitutional Amendment abol-
ished the caretaker system in 2011 after the 
Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional 
for being undemocratic. The 2014 elections 
led to a practically one-party government, 
which made the year 2018 an extremely sig-
nificant year for participatory democracy. 
During 2018, the major opposition Bangla-
desh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Begum 
Zia remained busy battling legally and polit-
ically for her release at least on bail. Many 
other senior leaders of BNP also remained 
busy attending courts. Until the last moment, 
the party remained undecided as to whether 
to take part in the election at all or without 
the party leader participating.
Keeping suspense alive for the whole year, 
all political parties finally participated in the 
election after 10 years, the democratic credi-
bility of which was widely questioned. BNP 
joined the election with an electoral alliance 
with major opposition parties except one that 
joined the ruling party block. This strategic 
alliance, called Oikya Front (United Front), 
BANGLADESH
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 19
was helmed by Dr. Kamal Hossain, the re-
nowned international law scholar and former 
chair of the country’s constitution drafting 
committee. They consistently accused the 
government and the law enforcers of car-
rying out unlawful detentions, arrests and 
lawsuits against their leaders and supporters. 
They also blamed the Election Commission 
for not ensuring a level playing field for all. 
The opposition alliance won only eight seats 
out of 300, while the ruling party secured 
259 seats on their own and a total of 288 
seats with allies.
National and international media reported 
vote rigging and deadly violence, which cost 
at least 20 lives, including a security force 
member.1 Moreover, despite the opposition’s 
defiance, a controversial ordinance autho-
rized the use of electronic voting machines 
(EVMs). EVMs were used for the first time 
in the country for six electoral seats, but they 
proved faulty. 
Overlooking the opposition’s demand for 
fresh elections, the new Parliament, exclud-
ing those eight opposition members-elect, 
commenced its journey. The government 
gives opposition party status to a party that 
ran in the elections as an ally of the ruling 
party. This echoes the same democratic de-
cay that was seen in the 10th Parliament 
except that the appointed opposition party 
has not taken any membership in the current 
Cabinet.
Student Movements
In April and August, two major student pro-
tests took place. The first one demanded ref-
ormation of the quota system in public em-
ployment and the second was the road safety 
movement by the high school kids. 
The Constitution permits positive discrimi-
nation to benefit women or children, or any 
‘backward section’ of the people (Art 28) 
to ensure constitutional equality (Art 27) as 
well as equal participation for all citizens in 
public service (Arts 28-29). However, 56% 
of government jobs were reserved for var-
ious categories of citizens, of which 30% 
alone were for children and grandchildren 
of liberation war fighters and just 1% for 
physically challenged people. The reform 
had been demanded for years, but this year’s 
movement was refuelled by a clash between 
the reformists and the ruling party’s student 
wing, also lately invaded by the police. The 
students blocked major streets in Dhaka as a 
protest against police attacks on them. Soon, 
the movement spread nationwide and re-
ceived civil society support.
Leaders and participants of the movement 
were arrested, attacked and prosecuted. One 
reportedly disappeared and was killed. Dia-
logue with the reformists and administrative 
committee recommendations all went in 
vain when the Prime Minister declared ab-
olition of the quota system altogether a few 
months before the election. This made both 
the reformists and the beneficiaries unhappy. 
Finally, however, a notification in October 
abolished the quota system in the upper two 
tiers of government jobs. 
The second student protest for safe roads 
began in the background of a horrific road 
accident on a busy Dhaka street on 29 July, 
when two schoolchildren, awaiting their bus, 
were killed by a speeding bus. It was racing 
with another to pick up more passengers 
from the stop. The average daily death count 
on Bangladesh roads is 20, which makes 
them among the deadliest. This time, how-
ever, fellow students immediately occupied 
the streets, vandalized transports and com-
menced a movement demanding justice and 
traffic law reform. The movement spread 
throughout the capital the very next day. The 
teens realized that the flouting of traffic rules 
and the widespread and open-secret corrup-
tion in the licensing system were the main 
reason for such clandestine accidents. For 
days, they kept the entire capital city seized 
and continued to regulate the traffic system, 
sometimes assisting the traffic police. They 
defied several calls for a recess, leaving the 
government worried. After over a week, 
this protest was also brutally suppressed, as 
private individuals, with state agencies as 
onlookers, attacked the protesting students 
indiscriminately. Panicked and traumatized, 
the students went home, but left a big ques-
tion mark on their constitutional rights to or-
ganize and freedom of expression. 
This was the movement where a renowned 
photojournalist, Dr. Shahidul Alam, was 
picked up from his residence by undercover 
policemen on the charge of instigating the 
student movement. Dr. Alam’s ‘fault’ was 
that he took photos of the protests and com-
mented that the attackers were from the rul-
ing party. Charged under the infamous sec-
tion 57 of the ICT Act 2006, Dr. Alam was 
denied justice for over 100 days, after which 
he was released on bail.
The two movements pointed a finger at the 
ailing condition of freedom of expression in 
Bangladesh. The quota reform movement 
could have given rise to a healthy constitu-
tional dialogue on affirmative action, which, 
unlike in India, has never been a prominent 
issue in the country. It has never made any 
participatory and deliberative legislation to 
carry out constitutionally authorized affir-
mative measures for weaker or underdevel-
oped sections of its citizens. The government 
clearly missed out on an opportunity to enact 
such laws to realize one of its constitutional 
goals: social justice and inclusive develop-
ment. The road safety movement, however, 
can be said to have had some impact, albeit 
minimal, as a new transport law was hur-
ried-up. It remains faulty, however, and its 
making was devoid of public participation. 
On a positive note, the police now enforce 
traffic rules on a more regular basis and more 
strictly than before. 
Digital Security Act of 2018
Amid huge criticism at home and abroad, the 
Parliament enacted the Digital Security Act 
2018 in October, many provisions of which 
contradict constitutional freedom of expres-
sion. The news editors’ forum has been pro-
testing since the drafting of the law, and they 
now demand that at least nine sections of it 
be amended. These provisions, they argue, 
1 From among many media reports, see a report in Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/07/the-world-should-be-watching-bangladeshs-elec-
tion-debacle-sheikh-hasina/ (last accessed 14 Feb 2019).
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allow the authorities to shut down any online 
portal any time and prosecute any person on 
the vague allegation of publishing or spread-
ing rumor or ‘controversial’ information. 
This draconian law sanctions higher fines 
and prison terms, extending to life imprison-
ment. The 2018 Act has in fact ingeniously 
reenacted the infamous section 57 of the ICT 
Act 2006 that was widely used to silence 
online activists and the media mostly in the 
name of regulating ‘defamatory’ comments 
against political higher-ups and anti-reli-
gious writing.
New Judicial Appointments 
Prior to the general elections, three High 
Court Division (HCD) judges, including a 
female judge, were elevated to the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court (SCAD) af-
ter almost three years since the last appoint-
ment. This raised the strength of SCAD to 
seven against the approved number of 11. 
As we predicted in our 2017 report regard-
ing controversiality, the most senior judges 
were superseded too, and one appointee is 
a brother of a sitting SCAD judge. The ap-
pointments also had political undercurrents, 
and the government seemingly foresaw po-
litically sensitive issues to come before the 
SCAD, including the issue of bail and the 
participation in elections of the now interned 
opposition leader. Earlier in May, the HCD 
got 18 new additional judges, and the cre-
dentials of many of them were controversial. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
As we noted in the 2017 report, the Supreme 
Court has in recent years developed a prac-
tice of awarding compensation for what are 
in fact ordinary torts, such as medical negli-
JHQFHDQGURDGDFFLGHQWV:HDUHFULWLFDORI
this trend because it does not meet the test 
of ‘gross’ violation of constitutional rights 
that the SCAD laid down for such a remedy 
(Bangladesh v. Nurul Amin (2015) 3 CLR 
(AD) 410). The new constitutional tort juris-
prudence, however, has become quite popu-
lar amongst legal practitioners and academ-
ics. In 2018, there were several constitutional 
compensation decisions, both interim and 
final. In the case of the traffic accident that 
led to the student movement for road safety, 
for example, the HCD in October hurriedly 
ordered the bus owners involved to pay huge 
compensation to the victims’ families. In an-
other case, in which 17 patients lost eyesight 
following their negligent eye surgery at a 
private clinic, the SCAD affirmed the HCD 
decision holding the clinic and a pharmaceu-
tical company liable to pay 1 million BDT to 
each victim. 
In 2018, a judicial decision sought to forge 
certain reforms in the functioning of lower 
criminal courts. In Md Aynul Haque v. The 
State,2 the HCD issued a set of guidelines for 
Sessions Courts, asking them, inter alia, to 
hold a monthly ‘judicial conference’ to iden-
tify and overcome the problems that they 
confront when dispensing justice. Questions 
have always remained about the impact of 
such pedagogic rulings short of any system-
atic and viable judicial reform, which is long 
overdue. In retrospect, we recall that earlier, 
in December 2017, the apex court approved 
the disciplinary rules for the junior court 
judges, which were later officially notified 
after yearlong tension with the Executive. 
At the constitutional rights level there were 
multiple decisions, but those on gender-based 
violence and women’s rights received wider 
attention. Regarding the most precious ques-
tion of the protection of people’s liberty, life 
and freedom of expression, however, the year 
witnessed judicial avoidance and abdication. 
One sees almost no proactive civil rights de-
cision in 2018, which was marred by mass 
arrests, false prosecutions and suppression 
of freedom of expression. Interestingly, the 
year 2018 saw a few cases in the field of so-
cial rights that are judicially non-enforceable 
in Bangladesh (Art 8(2)).
Below, we first set out the leading cases con-
cerning structural issues and then analyze 
civil rights cases, followed by social/collec-
tive rights decisions.
1. Eunus Ali Akond vs. State: Legality of an 
original constitutional provision
In this case, Art 70 of the Constitution, 
which provides for the anti-defection law, 
was challenged. Unlike in India where the 
52nd Constitutional Amendment introduced 
the anti-defection law, Article 70 was en-
acted into Bangladesh’s founding Constitu-
tion of 1972. That provision, after a couple 
of amendments, was restored to its original 
form via the 15th Amendment in 2011. 
On the question of admissibility of this chal-
lenge, the HCD handed down a split judg-
ment (15 January 2018). Chowdhury J ruled 
for its admissibility, relying on his own ob-
servation, made in an earlier decision,3 that 
Art 70 was undemocratic. The other judge on 
the bench, Justice Kamal, summarily reject-
ed the petition and reasoned that an original 
provision of the Constitution was unassail-
able. Drawing on the Constituent Assembly 
debates, he further argued that the anti-defec-
tion law was a guarantor of democracy. Ka-
mal J was also on the bench that invalidated 
the 16th Amendment, but there he refrained 
from raising a constitutional objection to Art 
70. In the present case, the two judges have 
reiterated their respective ideology about the 
legality of Art 70, which thus raises a seri-
ous question of their impartiality to hear the 
challenge.
The matter went to a third judge, Justice 
Taher, who agreed that Article 70 is a ‘safe-
guard’ for the Bangladeshi democracy, rea-
soning that an original provision of the Con-
stitution is not subject to judicial review. 
The judge cited the SCAD’s old observation 
(reported in 19 BLD (AD) 276) that Art 70 
in the original Constitution was a pragmatic 
solution for democratic durability.
2. Disqualifications for election to Parliament
At the end of 2018, the Supreme Court faced 
a surge of cases concerning electoral dis-
putes, including the much-talked-about pe-
tition of Khaleda Zia, the opposition chief 
2 Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 20550 of 2014.
3 (K]VJH[L(ZHK\aaHTHU:PKKPX\P])HUNSHKLZO HCD, May 5, 2016, invalidating the 16th Amendment. This was endorsed by the Appellate Division, in 
which a petition for review of the decision has been currently pending. For details, see our 2016 and 2017 reports.   
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and a former prime minister, who sought to 
run in the general election. In early 2018, a 
criminal court convicted Khaleda Zia with 
five years in prison on several corruption 
charges. On appeal, this punishment was 
raised to 10 years by the HCD, which rea-
soned that there was no scope for it to take 
a lenient approach to corruption. A further 
appeal has now been pending in the SCAD, 
the final court of the country. Because of 
this conviction, Zia could not compete in 
the election. Interestingly, however, a politi-
cian who defected from her party and whose 
conviction for corruption was affirmed by 
the HCD in November 2017 (and, like Zia’s 
case, was on further appeal in the SCAD) 
could run in the general election.
The Constitution prohibits any convict from 
participating in the election until after five 
years of his release (Art 66(2)(d)). However, 
the question of whether a person whose con-
viction has not yet become ‘final’ with the 
last court’s affirmation can run for election 
has yet to be authoritatively decided, unlike 
the case in India.
On the question of the impact of Art 66(2)(d), 
another significant verdict was handed down 
on 1 March 2018. A 2014 writ petition, lodged 
after the 10th general election, challenged the 
legality of the office of a ruling party MP 
who was released from jail allegedly before 
serving the full length of his conviction, thus 
invoking disqualification under Art 66(2)(d). 
On 6 December 2016, a division bench of 
the HCD handed down a split decision. Over 
another year later, a one-judge court decided 
that the challenge was inadmissible under 
Art 102 as it involved the resolution of dis-
puted facts (Shakwat Hossain Bhuiyan v Ban-
gladesh,:31RRI 7KH&RXUW
questionably reasoned that its judicial review 
authority does not permit adjudication of fac-
tual issues. Even a plain reading of Art 102(2) 
does not suggest the lack of such authority 
when it comes to the question of constitution-
al legality of any public office. 
3. BLAST v Bangladesh: Human dignity of 
rape victims
,QWKLV3,/:31RRIE\VL[
human rights organisations, a colonial and 
reprehensible system of medical examina-
tion of rape victims, called the ‘two-finger-
test’ (TFT), was challenged on constitutional 
grounds including the ground of violation of 
human dignity. The petitioners argued that 
the impugned TFT was incompatible with 
Bangladesh’s international obligations to 
protect the victims of sexual offences and 
prevent their retraumatization. TFT permits 
doctors to inspect the hymen of any rape sur-
vivor as well as to test her vaginal laxity to 
determine her previous virginity.
In April 2018, the HCD banned the inhumane 
TFT and held that the test does not have any 
evidential value or scientific merit. Five 
years after lodging the litigation, the HCD 
declared the inhumane test to be arbitrary, 
discriminatory and violative of fundamental 
constitutional rights of rape survivors. The 
decision was arrived at after relying on an 
expert committee report. Notably, the Court 
framed a guideline with eight directives for 
criminal justice actors to follow, at the core 
of which lies the protection of victims’ priva-
cy and dignity. 
4. Naripokkho v Bangladesh: Effective 
prosecution of rape cases 
,QWKLV3,/:31RRIWKH+&'
issued directives in the form of an 18-point 
guideline with a view to ensuring the effec-
tive prosecution of sexual violence offenders 
as well as the protection of rape survivors. 
This has been a structural reform litigation as 
well as an abstract judicial review inasmuch 
as the petitioners sought judicial interven-
tion to close the gap in the existing practice 
of investigation and prosecution of rape cases 
generally, and not any specific remedy for the 
concerned victim. The case indeed built on 
an earlier decision in which the Court issued 
guidelines on how to deal with sexual harass-
ment at work. The background that led to the 
PIL was the rape of an indigenous girl on 21 
May 2015, who was picked up from a bus 
stop and gang-raped in a running microbus 
by five men. The victim’s family members 
went to three different police stations to lodge 
a complaint, but the police turned them away. 
Following media reports, the family finally 
succeeded in registering a case, and the vic-
tim was medically examined after three days 
of rape. Such a delay often results in the loss 
of substantive evidence of rape. 
In the guidelines published on 22 April 2018, 
the Court recommended that an online report-
ing system for complaints of rape should be 
introduced, DNA samples must be sent for 
test within 48 hours of the incident and the 
dignity and privacy of the victim must be 
maintained at all stages. The Court ordered 
that the guidelines were to be complied with 
until legislation is enacted. In short, the Court 
in effect enforced the rape victims’ constitu-
tional rights to equality and life and liberty.
5. M/S Liberty Fashion Wears v Bangladesh 
Accord Foundation (2018) 6 CLR (HCD) 
107: :RUN SODFH VDIHW\ LQ WKH UHDG\PDGH
garments industry 
In this case, the Court in fact enforced the 
workers’ collective right to work in a safe 
environment. The decision is an extraordi-
nary instance of judicial intervention in a 
bid to improve the standard of life at work 
of millions of garment-industry workers. Af-
ter the deadly ‘Rana Plaza Disaster’ in 2013 
that killed some 1200 workers when an in-
dustrial building collapsed, the government 
established a body with private partners, 
including foreign buyers of ready-made 
Bangladeshi garments, to overhaul the safe-
ty system in the industry. The Bangladesh 
Accord Foundation, a private body, was re-
sponsible for implementing a national plan 
RIDFWLRQRQILUHDQGEXLOGLQJVDIHW\:KHQ
4 This decision is in line with 4V\SHUH4K(IK\S/HRPT])HUNSHKLZO)3+/*+ ^OPJO^HZKLZJYPILKHZ[OLº+H[HÄU[\YU»PU)HUNSHKLZO
PU9PK^HU\S/VX\Lº;OL¸+H[HÄU¹;\YUPU)HUNSHKLZO!6WLUPUN<W1\KPJPHS9L]PL^VM7YP]H[L)VKPLZ»6J[VILY!O[[WZ!HKTPUSH^ISVN
VYNYPK^HU\SOVX\L[OLKH[HÄU[\YUPUIHUNSHKLZOVWLUPUN\WQ\KPJPHSYL]PL^VMWYP]H[LIVKPLZ
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Liberty Fashion Wears, a private company, 
was excluded from the scope of this plan of 
action, they sought constitutional remedies 
under Art 102. The whole issue was, there-
fore, whether the inactions of a private body 
could be remedied under judicial review 
jurisdiction. Article 102(1) allows the en-
forcement of fundamental rights against pri-
vate bodies, while under Art 102(2), judicial 
review on the ground of breach of legality 
can only be sought against public agencies. 
A judge on the division bench quite uncon-
vincingly argued that the private litigant had 
constitutional rights to enforce (Chowdhury, 
J), which the other judge refuted (Kamal, J). 
However, both judges ruled that since the 
respondent, although a private entity, was 
under the supervision of government author-
ities and discharging a public-law function, 
a judicial review would bind them under Art 
102(2).4
6. Syed Kamal & BLAST v Bangladesh (WP 
No. 1509 of 2016): Enforcement of socioeco-
nomic rights
PIL’s focus on the realisation of socioeco-
nomic rights has remained at an extreme-
ly low level in recent years. In a landmark 
PIL decision on 8 August 2018, however, 
the HCD enforced the right to ‘medical 
care’, which is a non-justiciable state poli-
cy principle in Bangladesh. The Court held 
that traffic accident victims have a right to 
receive emergency medical treatment from 
all hospitals and clinics—private and public 
(per Ahmed, J). This decision thus marks a 
notable exception to the long-standing ab-
sence of legal and judicial activism on social 
and collective rights of the disadvantaged 
sections of the people. The decision argu-
ably represents the Constitutional Court’s 
institutional voice for poor or disadvantaged 
people. Private hospitals in Bangladesh gen-
erally refuse to admit road-accident victims, 
most of whom are poor. The real but hidden 
reason for such refusals had always been a 
fear of losing earnings. One unique aspect 
of the judgment is the enclosure of private 
entities within the remedial framework, who 
will now have to share some of the burden 
of the State vis-à-vis an increasing number 
of traffic accident victims. Much social and 
legal activism will, however, be needed to 
translate the verdict into a reality. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Given that the main opposition party is once 
again left out of the Parliament formed af-
ter the 2018 general elections, the year 2019 
will be of great importance for constitutional 
law, politics and democracy. Ensuring dem-
ocratic practice would likely be a serious 
challenge for the government. In the 2017 
report, we anticipated that the fate of the 
16th Amendment of the Constitution would 
probably hold the heat up in the Court. This 
DQDO\WLFDOSURSKHF\ZHQWLQYDLQ:HUHPDLQ
skeptical this year as to the reemergence of 
the issue of the 16th Amendment’s legality 
in 2019. This year the higher judiciary will 
have to put significant effort to overcome 
both internal weaknesses and external pres-
sures, which had been evident in the past few 
years. Like the past year, cases of abuses of 
the newly enacted digital security law will 
likely increase, pulling the Court into a test-
ground to show its ability and willingness to 
protect freedom of speech and information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two months of 2018, Belgian 
politics were dominated by controversy on 
whether the Prime Minister could approve 
the so-called UN Migration Compact. The 
disagreement resulted first in a minority 
government and finally led to the resignation 
of the federal government. These events are 
elaborated below, since they constitute the 
most important constitutional developments 
in Belgium over the course of 2018. Next, 
the article gives an overview of the main 
cases of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 
the past year that may be of interest to an 
international audience. Finally, the overview 
looks ahead to the upcoming vacancy in the 
Constitutional Court, a number of interesting 
pending cases and the upcoming electoral 
period.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
During the last two months of 2018, Belgian 
politics were dominated by controversy. The 
main question at issue was whether Prime 
Minister Charles Michel could approve the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Reg-
ular Migration (hereafter: UN Migration 
Compact),1 an intergovernmental agreement 
promoting a common global approach to 
migrant flows, at the UN intergovernmen-
tal conference in Marrakesh on 10 Decem-
ber 2018, and formally endorse it at the UN 
General Assembly on 19 December 2018. 
In spite of it being non-binding, it is gener-
ally accepted that the Compact can be used 
as guidelines for legal developments. In the 
end, the Prime Minister both approved and 
endorsed it, which first resulted in a minority 
government and finally led to the resignation 
of the government. 
After the federal elections of 25 May 2014, 
Flemish parties N-VA, Open VLD and 
&'	9 WRJHWKHU ZLWK :DOORRQ SDUW\ 05
established government Michel I. All four 
government parties initially agreed on the 
Compact and PM Michel pledged Belgium’s 
support at the UN General Assembly. Fol-
lowing Austria’s opposition to the Compact 
and the local elections of 14 October 2018, 
which led to an increase of votes for the ex-
treme right party Vlaams Belang, N-VA (i.e., 
New Flemish Alliance, a Flemish nationalist, 
right-wing political party), and more impor-
tantly its Secretary of State for Migration 
Theo Francken, suddenly started to oppose 
the Compact, while the three other govern-
ment parties continued to defend it. This 
created a situation of deadlock. N-VA also 
refused the proposal to write a supplementa-
ry declaration on how the text is interpreted 
by Belgium. Since the decisions of the gov-
BELGIUM
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ernment are made on the basis of consensus, 
N-VA could no longer be part of a govern-
ment that would endorse the Compact.
Consequently, as of 9 December, the other 
three parties continued as a minority govern-
ment— which is quite exceptional in Bel-
gian politics—without N-VA and with the 
support of only 52 of 150 seats in the House 
of Representatives. It is controversial wheth-
er this rearrangement established a new gov-
ernment, as the Prime Minister did not of-
fer the resignation of his government to the 
King, but only entailed the dismissal of three 
ministers and two Secretaries of State and a 
redistribution of the powers among the re-
maining members of the government. How-
ever, it became common to refer to (the new) 
“Government Michel II” in the press. The 
opposition claimed that the government re-
quired a vote of confidence, a position which 
was supported by a considerable number of 
scholars, but not by all.
Nonetheless, after ten days, on 18 December, 
the Belgian government eventually fell. PM 
Michel tried to find support from left-wing 
opposition parties in order to stay in pow-
er until the parliamentary elections in May 
2019. However, the socialists and greens an-
nounced that they would table a motion of no 
confidence in Parliament,2 which triggered 
the Prime Minister to offer his resignation 
to the King. The day after, on 19 December, 
PM Michel endorsed the Migration Com-
pact. After consultations with the presidents 
of the political parties, King Filip accepted 
the resignation of the government on 21 De-
cember, which turned it into a caretaker gov-
ernment with limited powers. 
N-VA has proposed a turn to confederalism 
after the federal, state and European elections 
in May 2019. However, it is now uncertain 
whether a list with constitutional provisions 
susceptible to amendment will be approved 
before the elections. According to the consti-
tutional amendment procedure of Article 195 
of the Constitution, that is necessary in order 
to be able to amend the Constitution (with a 
two-thirds majority) after the election. Unde-
niably, 2019 will again be an interesting time 
for consociational democracy in Belgium.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2018, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
delivered 183 judgments and handled 226 
cases in total. Regarding the nature of the 
complaints, conflicts of competencies be-
tween the federated entities and the federal 
state only represent 4% of the judgments 
in 2018. The majority of cases concern in-
fringements of fundamental rights. In 2018, 
the principle of equality and non-discrimi-
nation is still the most invoked principle be-
fore the Court (51%), followed by review of 
compliance with the jurisdictional warran-
ties of Article 13 (6%), the property rights 
of Article 16 (6%), the right to private and 
family life of Article 22 (6%), the socioeco-
nomic rights of Article 23 of the Constitu-
tion (6%), the guarantees in taxation matters 
of Articles 170 and 172 (4%), the personal 
freedom and legality of criminal charges of 
Article 12 of the Constitution (4%) and the 
freedom and equality in education of Article 
24 (3%). References were made to the juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in 49 cases. Moreover, the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) is also regularly 
reflected in the judgments of the Constitu-
tional Court, with references to this case law 
in 17 cases. References to other sources of 
international law can be found in 29 cases.
1. Measures of Integration and Exclusion
At the end of 2016, the Belgian legislator 
inserted two new conditions in the Immigra-
tion Act of 15 December 1980: the so-called 
“integration efforts” and “newcomers decla-
ration.” As to the first condition, a person has 
to provide evidence, in the first term of his 
temporary residence permit, of his willing-
ness to integrate into society. If he is unable 
to prove his “reasonable effort” to integrate, 
the Immigration Office can put an end to its 
permit. The second condition implies that a 
person applying for a residence permit needs 
to sign a declaration indicating that he or she 
“understands the fundamental values and 
norms of society and will act accordingly.” 
Signing this “newcomers declaration” will be 
a condition of admissibility for the residence 
permit. In case no. 126/2018, the Constitu-
tional Court rejected almost all arguments 
invoked against both conditions. However, it 
ruled out that the criminal past of a person 
can be taken into account when measuring 
his integration efforts because of the dispro-
portionately wide scope of that criterion. It 
is also interesting to note that the freedom 
of expression and religion, according to the 
Court, includes the right of a person not to 
reveal his convictions. It observes, howev-
er, that the newcomers declaration does not 
compel a person to accept the fundamental 
values and norms of society, but only to un-
derstand them and act accordingly.
Under Article 23 of the Citizenship Code, 
citizens may have their citizenship with-
drawn if they seriously breach their duties 
as Belgian citizens, provided that the with-
drawal does not result in the person con-
cerned being made stateless. This provision 
makes it possible to exclude certain citizens 
from the national community when their 
conduct demonstrates that they do not accept 
the basic rules of community life and seri-
ously infringe on the rights and freedom of 
their fellow citizens. The Antwerp Court of 
Appeal submitted preliminary questions to 
the Constitutional Court concerning the ap-
plication by the state prosecutor to have FB’s 
Belgian citizenship withdrawn. FB had been 
convicted of criminal offences of acts of vi-
olence and leadership of a terrorist group. In 
case no. 16/2018, the Constitutional Court 
considered the provision not discriminato-
ry. As a matter of fact, citizenship can only 
be withdrawn in cases where citizenship is 
not obtained as a result of birth but on the 
ground of a declaration, before the age of 
18 years. According to the Court, this dif-
ference of treatment is based on an objective 
and relevant distinguishing criterion, which 
2 0UJHZLVMHUVYKPUHY`]V[LVMUVJVUÄKLUJL7HYSPHTLU[PUKPJH[LZ[OH[P[UVSVUNLYZ\WWVY[Z[OLNV]LYUTLU[I\[NV]LYUTLU[PZUV[VISPNLK[VYLZPNU0U
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Prime Minister and forces the government to resign (Article 96 of the Constitution).
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is linked to the way Belgian citizenship was 
acquired and the ties maintained with the 
national community. Further, the Court held 
that the impugned provision did not infringe 
on the general legal principle of non bis in 
idem enshrined in Article 14.7 ICCPR and 
Article 4 Protocol 7 ECHR. The withdrawal 
of citizenship at issue is not a penalty but a 
civil measure. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the Court, for the first time in its history, 
ruled that the hearing, for security reasons, 
would be televised (interlocutory Judgment 
no. 1/2018). 
2. Fight against Terrorism
In 2018, the Court addressed two cases that 
dealt with regulations regarding counter-ter-
rorism. In case no. 8/2018, the Court rejected 
an appeal for annulment of Article 140sexies 
of the Criminal Code that penalized those 
who leave or enter the national territory with 
the intent to commit terrorist acts or crim-
inal offences of incitement to commit ter-
rorist acts. According to the Court, the fact 
that it can be difficult for the prosecuting 
authorities to prove double “intention” (the 
intention to adopt a specific behavior which 
itself is motivated by a more precise inten-
tion) was insufficient to conclude that this 
provision is inconceivable with the principle 
of legality in criminal matters. Moreover, it 
did not affect the free movement of persons. 
The Court concluded that the text of this 
Article, despite its general scope containing 
cross-references, is sufficiently foreseeable 
and a more precise definition of the term “in-
tention” is not necessary. It is for the judge 
to assess this intention objectively on a case-
by-case basis.
Case no. 31/2018 concerned an action for an-
nulment of two Articles of the act containing 
a number of provisions to combat terrorism 
(here: Terro III). The first item was Article 2 
Terro III, which amended Article 140bis of 
the Criminal Code in three different ways, 
of which two were challenged before the 
Constitutional Court. Article 140bis, final 
sentence, of the Criminal Code contained a 
so-called “risk requirement,” which means 
that only serious indications of a possible 
terrorist crime may be punished. Article 2, 3° 
Terro III deleted that risk requirement aimed 
at simplifying the assessment of evidence. 
However, this deletion was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court because it violated the 
freedom of expression. The Court considered 
that the intended aim does not justify that a 
person is likely to be sentenced to five to ten 
years’ imprisonment and be fined, even if the 
risk requirement would not be fulfilled. The 
Court stipulated that the effects of this pro-
vision remained in force until 1 September 
2018. The second item was Article 6 Terro 
III, which facilitates the conditions for is-
suing an arrest warrant in cases of terrorist 
crimes that exceed the maximum penalty of 
five years. The Court rejected this action as 
unfounded because the rights of the accused 
are not disproportionately affected. The pro-
cedural safeguards were still guaranteed, in-
cluding the fact that the investigating judge 
remains competent.
3. Access to Justice (pro bono legal advice)
In 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled in 
two remarkable cases relating to access to 
justice, specifically with regard to pro bono
legal advice. In one of them, a rare argu-
ment concerning forced labor was raised. 
Pro bono legal advice is a service to which 
citizens are entitled if certain conditions are 
met. This advice is offered by attorneys who 
are later paid by the government on the ba-
sis of a performance-related code. Attorneys 
usually offer their services voluntarily. In an 
act in 2016 however, the legislator decided 
that the bar association can force attorneys to 
perform pro bono whenever this is necessary 
for the effectiveness of the service. Qualify-
ing this measure as forced labor, a number 
of attorneys and a bar association applied to 
the Constitutional Court. In its decision no. 
41/2018, the Court disagreed. It observed 
that attorneys have a significant role to play 
in the administration of justice. They also en-
joy certain privileges. Given that, they can 
be expected to contribute to the performance 
of the justice system, which is a pillar of the 
rule of law. Moreover, pro bono services are 
an essential element of the right to legal aid 
as provided in Article 23 of the Constitu-
tion. Qualifying lawyers are free to exercise 
the profession of attorney as they please, so 
whoever chooses this profession accepts the 
burdens that come with it, including provid-
ing pro bono services. As such, the Court 
concluded, the measure does not violate the 
right to free choice of a profession, nor does 
it constitute forced labor.
The Court’s judgment in case no. 77/2018 
potentially has more far-reaching conse-
quences. During the last years, access to jus-
tice has increasingly been analyzed through 
the prism of financial access. Obviously, 
access to pro bono services is an essential 
component of that. Through the act of 2016 
already mentioned above, the legislator had 
restricted the access to those services by im-
posing a broader definition of the means tak-
en into account to determine an individual’s 
need for assistance and by tightening pre-
sumptions of need and control mechanisms. 
In addition, the legislator introduced a limit-
ed, flat rate contribution required from any-
one relying on pro bono services. Although 
the law provided for general and individual 
exceptions, the Constitutional Court struck 
this new financial burden in view of the 
standstill obligation in Article 23 of the Con-
stitution. The Court was puzzled by the idea 
that a contribution was imposed on litigants 
who were, by definition, incapable of paying 
for their legal advice. By lack of numbers 
demonstrating a real problem of overcon-
sumption, the argument that the measure was 
intended to promote a responsible litigation 
attitude was equally rejected. As a result, for 
the first time, the Court found a violation of 
the standstill obligation as it is applicable to 
the right to legal aid.
4. Curtailing the Vulture Funds
The Federal Act of 12 July 2015 curtails the 
activities of so-called “Vulture Funds”; it was 
adopted unanimously by the Belgian Parlia-
ment and found its origin in a bill drafted in 
consultation with the Committee for the Ab-
olition of Illegitimate Debt, an umbrella of a 
bunch of NGOs. The Court rejected an ap-
peal for annulment of that act introduced by 
NML Capital Ltd., a subsidiary of Paul Sing-
er’s hedge fund Elliott Management Corp., 
registered in the Cayman Islands (case no. 
61/2018). The act provides that when cred-
itors pursue an illegitimate advantage by 
the purchase of a State’s loan or debt obli-
gation, their rights towards the debtor State 
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will be limited to the price they paid for the 
purchase. The challenged act also prohibits 
the issuance of an enforcement order in Bel-
gium, or the adoption of measures aimed at 
ensuring the payment of the debt, where this 
gives the creditor an illegitimate advantage. 
The pursuit of an illegitimate advantage is 
deduced from the existence of a manifest 
disproportion between the purchase value 
of the loan or debt obligation by the creditor 
and the face value of the loan or debt obliga-
tion, or else between the purchase value of 
the loan or debt obligation by the debtor and 
the amount they demand in payment. The 
Court held that this limitation is not infring-
ing property rights, nor primary or secondary 
EU Law, nor the right to a fair trial. The cri-
terion of “manifest disproportion” between 
the said values is deemed to be sufficiently 
precise to be applied by the courts and the 
curtailing to the purchase value is not in-
fringing on the undisturbed enjoyment of the 
property of the creditor.
5. Data Protection
In 2018, the Court addressed four cases that 
dealt with the protection, management and ex-
change of personal data. Case no. 29/2018 con-
cerned an action for annulment of federal legis-
lation that provided for automatic exchange of 
data between utility companies and the provid-
ers of social housing in order to combat domi-
cile fraud. Although the Court acknowledged 
that the measure interfered with the right of 
social tenants to retain respect for their private 
lives ex Article 22 of the Constitution and Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR, it held that it was pertinent and 
proportionate in light of the aim to effectively 
and efficiently combat social fraud. According 
to the Court, the legislator had foreseen suffi-
cient guarantees to contain the pushing, mining 
and storing of data. 
The Flemish Parliament had adopted similar 
legislation in October 2016. Indeed, it had 
also provided for an additional exchange 
of personal data between government de-
partments and agencies in order to combat 
domicile fraud in social housing. The new 
measure essentially required all agencies 
involved in social housing to share informa-
tion with the supervisory authorities if they 
suspected fraud. The Flemish Tenants Asso-
ciation challenged the legislation before the 
Constitutional Court (case no. 104/2018). 
The Court considered the measure to be an 
interference with the right to respect for pri-
vate life ex Article 22 of the Constitution and 
Article 8 ECHR, which was nevertheless jus-
tified in light of the fight against social fraud. 
According to the Court, the legislator imple-
mented strict boundaries for the exchange of 
data. Not only does the information provider 
have to check whether the data are relevant 
and useful for the receiver’s statutory duties 
but the receiver also has to effectively limit 
the use of the information to its statutory du-
ties. Moreover, according to the Court, the 
exchange of data only leads to higher levels 
of government efficiency, since the infor-
mation exchange is limited to relevant data 
that other government agencies involved in 
social housing already obtained. 
In case no. 174/2018, the Constitutional 
Court annulled Articles 39bis, §3 of the Code 
of Criminal Investigation and Article 13 of 
the Act on Special Investigation Methods. 
On the basis of these provisions, the Public 
Prosecutor had become competent to order 
a non-confidential network search, instead 
of the previously competent investigating 
judge. The Court held that an investigation 
method that enables access to all personal 
communication data presents an interfer-
ence with the right to respect for private life 
comparable to a house search or wiretap-
ping. Considering the severity of the inves-
tigation method and the lack of procedural 
safeguards similar to the guarantees comple-
menting a house search, the Court held that 
a network search can only be ordered by an 
investigating judge. 
Last year, the Court referred four cases for 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU. One of these 
cases, concerning the new Belgian Data 
Retention Act, deserves particular attention 
(case no. 96/2018). This act replaced the pre-
vious one annulled by the Court in a judg-
ment (case no. 84/2015)3 narrowly tailored 
to the judgment of the CJEU that declared 
invalid the EU Directive 2006/24/EC on data 
retention.4 The annulled Belgian Act trans-
posed that directive. Meanwhile, the CJEU 
has confirmed and has even strengthened 
its views in a more recent judgment.5 The 
CJEU held indeed that Directive 2002/58/
EC must be interpreted as precluding na-
tional legislation, which, for the purpose 
of fighting crime, provides for general and 
indiscriminate retention of all traffic and lo-
cation data of all subscribers and registered 
users relating to all means of electronic com-
munication. Furthermore, those provisions 
preclude national legislation governing the 
protection and security of traffic and location 
data and, in particular, access of the compe-
tent national authorities to the retained data, 
where the objective pursued by that access 
(in the context of fighting crime) is not re-
stricted solely to fighting serious crime, 
where access is not subject to prior review 
by a court or an independent administrative 
authority, and where there is no requirement 
that the data concerned should be retained 
within the European Union. However, the 
ECtHR adopted a different view on data re-
tention when it found that Swedish legisla-
tion on the subject did not infringe on Article 
8 ECHR.6 Although the new Belgian Act is 
stricter than the previous one, it nevertheless 
still provides for massive data retention, but 
more limited in time and subject to more 
safeguards to avoid misuse of those data. 
The Constitutional Court found it necessary 
to continue its dialogue with the CJEU, of-
fering it the opportunity to nuance, detail 
or alter its jurisprudence7 given the fact 
that the Belgian legislator is of the opinion 
that it is simply impossible to practice more 
3 See Developments in Belgian Constitutional Law: The Year 2015 in Review: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/10/developments-in-belgian-constitution-
HSSH^[OL`LHYPUYL]PL^%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
4 Cases C -293/12 and C-594/12+PNP[HS9PNO[Z0YLSHUKHUK:LP[SPUNLYHUK6[OLYZ [2014] CJEU.
5 Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 ;LSL:]LYPNLHUK>H[ZVUHUK6[OLYZ [2016] CJEU.
6 Centrum för Rättvisa v Sweden App no 35252/08 (ECHR, 19 June 2018). In February 2019, the case was referred to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber.
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differentiated data retention as advocated 
by the CJEU (an opinion that is shared by 
other EU Member States).8 Furthermore the 
Court noted that more than one reference for 
a preliminary ruling was pending before the 
CJEU,9 that an advocate general has deliv-
ered opinions which are critical for the case 
law and that data retention is not only prac-
ticed in view of combating serious crime but 
also, e.g., to protect the physical and moral 
integrity of minors in the fight against sexual 
abuse by electronic communication means.10 
The Court therefore submitted several pre-
liminary questions to the CJEU concerning 
the interpretation of Directive 2002/58/EC 
read in conjunction with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
On January 1, 2019, 337 cases were pend-
ing before the Constitutional Court. Some of 
these cases are of interest to an internation-
al audience. The Court must, for example, 
decide whether the Unstunned Slaughter 
Ban LQWURGXFHGLQWKH)OHPLVKDQG:DOORRQ
Region is compatible with the freedom of 
religion, the separation of church and state 
and the freedom of labour and enterprise, 
and whether the Federal Transgender Act 
respects the non-discrimination principle. 
Various cases concern the right to privacy, 
in particular with regard to the obligation 
to communicate personal data (e.g., client 
data by Airbnb hosts and Air companies) to 
the authorities. Furthermore, we have cas-
es on the Act to Combat Squatting, the act 
providing that there should be a minimum 
service of the railways in case of an indus-
trial action and the act prohibiting some per-
sons to be blood donors. In October 2019, 
a Dutch-speaking11 Justice from the group 
of former MPs,12 Erik Derycke, is retiring, 
which means a new judge from that group 
has to be appointed. Lastly, new elections for 
the European Parliament, the Federal Parlia-
ment and the parliaments of the federated 
entities will be held on 26 May 2019.
8#O[[W!Z[H[L^H[JOVYNUL^ZUV]L\L\YVQ\Z[KH[HYL[LU[PVU4:YLWVY[ WKM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
9 Referrals of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal London, 31 October 2017, Case C 623/17 Privacy International / Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
TVU^LHS[O(ɈHPYZLHand of the Audiencia provincial de Tarragona, Sección cuarta, 14 April 2016, Case C 207/16, Ministerio Fiscal. The Grand Chamber 
has already delivered judgment in the latter case: Case C 307/16 Ministerio Fiscal [2018] CJEU. 
10 See 2<]-PUSHUK App no 2872/02 (ECHR, 2 December 2008).
11 The Court is composed of six Dutch-speaking and six French-speaking Justices, each linguistic group electing their own president.
12 The Court is composed of six former Members of Parliament and six Justices with a background in the legal or academic profession.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to 2017, the events in 2018 wit-
nessed several quite diverse constitutional 
matters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the 
elections in October 2018, the political life in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was (and still is) re-
volving around the distribution of mandates 
in legislative bodies in the country. In par-
ticular, the contentious question was which 
census to apply when distributing mandates, 
the 1991 one or the 2013 one. This continues 
to emphasize the importance of the partici-
pation of all citizens of Bosnia and Herze-
govina in its system of government under 
non-discriminatory conditions, yet doesn’t 
support the status of the constituent peoples 
that remain an integral element of the hetero-
geneous legal and political order of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
:LWKVRPHH[FHSWLRQVDQGIRUDFKDQJHWKH
focus of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was shifted to the excises, 
criminal procedure, and land registries. One 
possible explanation for this might be that 
after it became clear that several decisions 
of the European Court for Human Rights, 
namely 6HMGLüDQG)LQFLY%RVQLDDQG+HU-
]HJRYLQD=RUQLüY%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD
and Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, would 
not be implemented again, attention was 
shifted to another direction. During 2017, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe, the Head of the Delegation of the 
European Union to Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na, and the European Union Special Repre-
sentative in Bosnia and Herzegovina urged 
representatives in the Parliamentary Assem-
bly to amend the country’s Constitution and 
Election Law. Since 2018 was an election 
year, it was expected that the representatives 
would adopt modifications to the Constitu-
tion and Election Law in order to harmonize 
them with the aforementioned decisions of 
the European Court for Human Rights. But 
in the end, the representatives put pressure 
on the Constitutional Court to decide in 
several cases involving the amendments to 
the Election Law and did not comply with 
its decisions. As the elections approached, it 
became obvious that there was not enough 
time to amend the Constitution and Election 
Law. The subject was set aside, and so too 
the pressure from the Constitutional Court, 
although not entirely. As a result of that, un-
like in the previous year, the Constitution-
al Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina heard 
quite diverse cases. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
The political representatives still show 
no progress in introducing constitutional 
amendments that would make the constitu-
tional system of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
responsive. At the same time, internal in-
termediaries, such as the Office of the High 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
still remain mere bystanders. During 2018, 
ethnicity continued to play an important role 
in constitutional reality since there is still a 
lot of support for ethnic strongholds, which 
became and have remained a fundamental 
factor in the system of government. 
In terms of the above-mentioned decisions 
of the European Court for Human Rights, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remains inert in taking steps 
to harmonize constitutional and legal norms 
with the decisions. In 2009, the European 
Court, deciding in the case of 6HMGLü DQG
BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA
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Finci v. BaH,1 established that the constitu-
tional provisions that rendered the applicants 
ineligible for election to the Presidency of 
BaH were discriminatory. (In this case, the 
persons who did not identify themselves as 
one of the constituent peoples.) Later on, 
in 2014, in the case of =RUQLüY%D+,2  the 
European Court reinforced the previous de-
cision. Finally, in 2016, in the case of Pilav
v. BaH,3 the European Court again looked 
into the provisions of the Constitution, this 
time from a different angle. In particular, the 
Presidency of BaH consists of one Bosniac 
and one Croat, each directly elected from 
the Federation of BaH, and one Serb direct-
ly elected from the Republic of Srpska. The 
European Court held that the applicant (in 
this case a Bosniac living in the Republic of 
Srpska) were prevented from being entitled 
to stand for the election to the Presidency and 
therefore the Court found it to be a discrim-
inatory feature of the constitutional system. 
All of this means that the persons who do not 
identify themselves as one of the constituent 
peoples are still ineligible for election to the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
that the Serbs from the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina are prevented from being 
entitled to stand for the election to the Pres-
idency in the same way the Bosniaks and 
Croats from the Republic of Srpska are.
The report of 2017 noted that the Constitu-
tional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by 
its decision U-23/14, established that certain 
provisions of the country’s Election Law are 
not in conformity with its Constitution. These 
include the provision that “each of the con-
stituent peoples shall be allocated one seat in 
every canton” as well as the provisions that 
stipulate the number and ethnic belonging of 
the delegates in the House of Peoples in the 
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina based on the 1991 census. The 
Constitutional Court ordered the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
harmonize the provisions with the Constitu-
tion no later than six months from the day 
of delivery of the decision. However, in July 
2017, the Constitutional Court established 
that the Parliamentary Assembly had failed 
to enforce its decision within the given time 
limit, and, by its decision 54/17, rendered the 
provisions ineffective from the day follow-
ing the ruling being published in the Official 
Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Followed by this and amidst heated dis-
cussions and pressure from different stake-
holders, the Central Election Commission 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina issued the In-
struction Amending the Instruction on the 
Procedure for Administering Indirect Elec-
tions for the Bodies of Authority in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina under the Election Law. 
The instruction provides for the division 
of mandates in the House of Peoples of the 
Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina according to the 2013 census. 
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that according to the Constitution of the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the con-
stituent peoples and members of the group of 
Others shall be proportionately represented; 
however, such proportionate representation 
shall follow the 1991 census until Annex 7 of 
the Dayton Peace Agreement is fully imple-
mented. To that end, the 1991 census shall 
be appropriately used for all calculations 
requiring demographic data until Annex 7 is 
fully implemented. There are two problems 
related to this. 
First, a comparison between the census in 
1991 and 2013 points out significant differ-
ences in ethnic composition before and af-
ter the 1992-1995 conflict. Some cities and 
municipalities that were once predominantly 
populated by one constituent people are now 
almost entirely populated by another. Some 
cities and municipalities became unpopu-
lated. The population that was once mixed 
became territorially distributed in such way 
that ethnic belonging became territorially 
embedded. That would surely affect the dis-
tribution of mandates according to the deci-
sion U-23/14 of the Constitutional Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the instruction 
of the Central Election Commission. 
Second, Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment regulates the return of refugees and dis-
placed persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
after the conflict. In order to be considered 
as implemented, it is necessary that, in line 
with Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, the Office of the High Representative 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina deliver a de-
cision to confirm this. Since the Office has 
not made any decision so far, Annex 7 is not 
considered to have been implemented, which 
means that, in accordance with the Constitu-
tion of the Federation of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, only the 1991 census can be used as 
a basis for the calculation. Nevertheless, one 
cannot disregard that the ruling of the Con-
stitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ordered the Parliamentary Assembly to har-
monize the provisions with the Constitution, 
and when the Court established that the Par-
liamentary Assembly had failed to do so, it 
rendered the provisions ineffective. 
The saga further developed in January 2019, 
when the applicants (27 representatives in the 
House of Representatives of the Parliament 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na) required a review of the constitutionality 
of the Instruction Amending the Instruction 
on the Procedure for Administering Indirect 
Elections for the Bodies of Authority in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina under the Election Law. 
The Constitutional Court rejected the request 
as inadmissible since it was not competent 
to take a decision (case U-24 18). The Court 
concluded that the challenged Instruction on 
Amendments is an implementing regulation, 
passed by the Central Election Commission 
in order to implement the Election Law in 
the process of administering indirect elec-
tions for the bodies of authority in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, which determined the pre-
liminary number of delegates to the House 
of Peoples of the Parliament of the Federa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be elected 
from cantonal assemblies. Accordingly, and 
taking into account the fact that it concerned 
a temporary provision, the Court concluded 
that the subject in the case did not consist of 
a general act, the constitutionality of which 
could be reviewed by the Constitutional 
1 :LQKPǅHUK-PUJP])VZUPHHUK/LYaLNV]PUH(WWUV  HUK,*[/9+LJLTILY 
2 AVYUPǅ])VZUPHHUK/LYaLNV]PUH(WWUV,*[/91\S`
3 Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App no 41939/07 (ECtHR, 9 June 2016).
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Court. Moreover, taking into account the 
content of the request in the case at hand, 
the Constitutional Court did not find any 
reason why the contested implementing act 
of the Central Election Commission would 
raise an issue of violation of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court, taking into account the 
mentioned circumstances and in particular 
the jurisprudence related to the interpreta-
tion of its jurisdiction, concluded that it was 
not competent to decide on the review of the 
constitutionality of the impugned act of the 
Central Election Commission. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The core activity of the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018 was the 
same as in 2017. The Court was lodged by a 
large number of appeals with regard to the 
right to a fair trial, notably with regard to the 
failure to take a decision within a reasonable 
time. To that end, the Constitutional Court 
ordered the competent judicial bodies to 
complete their proceedings urgently. In its 
sessions, the Court highlighted the failure 
to meet the requirement of deciding within 
a reasonable time as a problem that is very 
much present in the judicial practice in the 
country. Apart from this, the focus of this 
report is on several decisions that raised 
constitutional issues in several different 
fields.
1. U-5/18: The Law on Excise Duties in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
This case challenged the constitutionality of 
laws on excise duties, revenues, and taxes 
that have been adopted by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
applicants (19 representatives of the House 
of Representatives of the Parliamentary 
Assembly) filed a request for a review of the 
constitutionality of the Law on Amendments 
to the Law on Excise Duties, the Law on 
Amendments to the Law on Payments into 
the Single Account and Distribution of 
Revenues, and the Law on Amendments to 
the Law on Indirect Taxation System. The 
applicant claimed that the challenged laws 
are in contravention of the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant also 
stated that the challenged laws were adopted 
in a summary procedure in the course of 
the first reading and then in the course of 
the second reading. The applicant claimed 
that this procedure may be applied only in 
the case of a law of lesser scope or degree 
of complexity and that the aforementioned 
simplified procedure does not apply to the 
challenged laws. The applicant also argued 
on the authorized proponents of laws, 
claiming that the second chamber undertook 
the prerogatives of the executive power by 
putting forward the challenged laws. In line 
with this, the applicant claimed that under 
the course of the chosen procedure, the only 
proponent of the law could be the Council of 
Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not 
the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary 
Assembly.
Deciding in this case, the Constitutional 
Court dismissed the request as it established 
that the challenged laws are in conformity 
with the Constitution. The Court established 
that the challenged laws were approved 
by both chambers of the Parliamentary 
Assembly by the majority of those present 
and voting, respecting the necessary majority 
for adoption. It also established that the laws 
did not take effect before publication in the 
Official Gazette and that the transcripts of 
deliberations were published and that the 
public aspect of their sessions was secured. 
The Court could not accept the claims with 
regard to deliberation in the course of an 
urgent legislative procedure and the claim 
that the principle of separation of powers 
was violated as well founded. The Court was 
aware of the fact that it is undisputed that the 
second chamber may be a proponent and that 
is sufficient for it to conclude that there was 
no violation of the principle of separation 
of powers as well as no violation of the 
appropriate provisions of the Constitution 
in regard to compliance with the principle of 
the separation of powers.
2. U-8/18: The principle of the constituent 
peoples and the principle of non-
discrimination
This case challenged the application of 
several provisions of several cantonal 
constitutions in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina with regard to the 
principle of the constituent peoples and 
the principle of non-discrimination. The 
applicant (the Deputy Chair of the House 
of Representatives of the Parliamentary 
Assembly) filed a request for review of the 
constitutionality of several articles of the 
Constitution of the Posavina Canton, the 
Constitution of the Herzegovina-Neretva 
Canton, the Constitution of the Zenica-Doboj 
Canton, the Constitution of the Bosnian-
Podrinje Canton, and the Constitution of the 
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not in compliance with the principle of the 
constituent status of peoples and principle of 
non-discrimination. The applicant claimed 
that all three constituent peoples—the 
Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—should be 
constituent on the whole territory of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina without discrimination. 
The applicant then cited the articles from the 
aforementioned constitutions that refer only 
to the Bosniaks and Croats as constituent 
peoples as well as the articles that define 
only the Bosnian and Croatian language 
as the official languages and the Latin 
alphabet as the official alphabet in these 
cantons. According to the applicant, this was 
contrary to the preamble of the Constitution 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the Serbs 
were discriminated against. Apart from this, 
the applicant questioned the competence of 
the Constitutional Court of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina to decide in this 
case, arguing that the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a central-
level constitutional court, should decide as a 
constitutional court of a sub-national entity.
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina declared the request 
inadmissible as it was not competent to take a 
decision. It also referred to the Constitutional 
Court of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as a competent authority to 
decide in this case. The Constitutional 
Court also noted in the reasons for its 
decision that there were no circumstances 
indicating that the Constitutional Court of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
interpreted and applied the Constitution of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
contrary to the Constitution of Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina. This is especially taking into 
account the previous relevant case-law of 
the Constitutional Court of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the 
Constitutional Court referred to its decision 
U-5/98, known as the “constituent peoples” 
decision, which established all three 
constituent peoples as constituent on the 
whole territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
regardless of the entities and cantons. By 
this decision, the Court also struck down 
as unconstitutional all provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that did not reflect the principle 
of the constituent peoples. The Court then 
considered that since the provisions of the 
cantonal constitutions have to be harmonized 
with the Constitution of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principle of the 
constituent peoples also applies in this case. 
3. U-15/18: Authorized officials in the 
criminal procedure
This case concerned the scope of authorized 
officials in the criminal procedure 
determined by the Criminal Procedure Code 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant 
(the Second Deputy Chair of the House 
of Representatives of the Parliamentary 
Assembly) filed a request for review of 
the constitutionality of the provision of the 
Criminal Procedure Code referring to the 
authorized officials under the authorization 
of the Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant 
challenged the provision that considers 
expert associates, as well as investigators 
working for the Prosecutor’s Office under the 
authorization of the Prosecutor, as authorized 
officials. The applicant claimed that under 
this provision the authorized officials are all 
persons authorized under the scope of police 
forces, including the State Investigation and 
Protection Agency; the Border Police of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; the court, financial, 
and military police; customs and taxation 
authorities, etc. However, the applicant also 
claimed that this provision was imprecise, 
unclear, and against the rule of law since the 
number of authorized officials was widened 
to include expert associates and investigators 
of the Prosecutor’s Office working under 
the authorization of the Prosecutor. The 
applicant believed that this was against the 
provisions of the Law on the Prosecutor’s 
Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the 
scope of the work of this office is performed 
by the chief prosecutor, four deputy chief 
prosecutors, and prosecutors. The Law did 
not mention the possibility of employing 
authorized officials. This is important since 
potential authorized officials did not possess 
adequate training and knowledge, and direct 
supervision by the prosecutor could not 
compensate for this. 
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina established that the challenged 
provision of the Criminal Procedure Code 
was compatible with the Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court, among others, 
established that the above provision in 
the challenged part meets the “quality of 
law” requirement in terms of its precision 
and clarity and foreseeability, thereby not 
leaving room for arbitrary decision-making 
and possible abuses. In other words, it was 
compatible with the rule of law principle 
under Article (I)(2) of the Constitution. 
Authorized officials, regardless of their 
authorization, perform their duties under the 
supervision of and by informing a prosecutor. 
It follows that the relationship between the 
prosecutor and the authorized officials is 
hierarchical, in which the prosecutor is the 
supreme authority running the investigation 
while the authorized officials act on his 
order. The Court was not convinced that this 
rendered the challenged provision imprecise 
and unclear.
4. U-7/18: The constitutionality of the Law 
on Land Registry
This case challenged the constitutionality of 
the Law on Land Registry in the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicants 
(29 representatives of the National Assembly 
of the Republic of Srpska) filed a request 
for review of the constitutionality of the 
Law on Land Registry of the Federation 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The applicant 
claimed that the provisions are against the 
right to property. The reasons were that the 
characteristics of the registration of real 
estate in Bosnia and Herzegovina were 
based on two registers, the land registry and 
cadaster, while many European countries 
joined these two registries under a single 
institution. The applicant claimed that 
the challenged provisions introduced the 
protection of the property that was not 
acquired on a valid legal basis because it 
enabled the current beneficiaries to register 
as owners even when they did not have 
any legal basis to possess the particular 
property. The challenged provisions also 
allowed for the procedure to be conducted 
on bulletin boards, meaning that the person 
did not necessarily have knowledge of the 
actions that were carried out in the process 
of establishing or replacing land registers 
and ownership rights. The applicants were 
convinced that this was against the principle 
of legal certainty, which is a prerequisite for 
the development of democratic societies. It 
has been pointed out that it was exactly the 
opposite of legal security.
Deciding on the request, the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina established 
that the challenged provisions of the Law on 
Land Registry of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were in accordance with 
the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and the European Convention on Human 
Rights. The Court pointed out that there was 
no established standardized organizational 
structure of real estate registration in Europe. 
Also, the registration in land registers was 
not carried out solely on the basis of a factual 
situation, but all other relevant documents 
and evidence, which were also taken into 
account, could serve when determining 
ownership and other rights and limitations 
on real estate. Therefore, the Court found 
that challenged provisions did not violate 
the right to property. Finally, the legislator 
prescribed public announcements through 
daily newsletters that are distributed 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina as well 
as through the Official Gazette of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, all with the aim of including 
persons who hold certain property rights that 
are subject to registration in land registries. 
Accordingly, it followed that the legislator 
had taken reasonable measures to ensure 
that persons involved were included in this 
proceeding.
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IV. LOOKING AHEAD
As predicted in the previous report, the 2018 
elections intensified relations in political life 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On one side, the 
pressure that was put on the Parliamentary 
Assembly to amend the Election Law has 
now transferred to the Election Commission, 
who took the initiative to implement the de-
cision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. On the other side, the Eu-
ropean Commission and the American Em-
bassy in Sarajevo expressed their support for 
the Central Election Commission. The point 
at issue, then, is what role the Constitutional 
Court will play further. 
Setting aside the cases based on a tendency 
to preserve individual interests of each con-
stituent people along territorial lines in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, in 2019 the Constitu-
tional Court will most likely continue to be 
overburdened with applications requesting it 
to examine whether the constitutional rights 
(the right to a fair trial, the right of access to 
court, the right to an effective legal remedy, 
etc.) have been violated or disregarded, and 
whether the application of the law was, pos-
sibly, arbitrary or discriminatory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
2018 was certainly one of those years Bra-
zilian constitutionalists will remember for 
generations. First, the year marked the 30th 
anniversary of the 1988 Constitution. The 
Constitution symbolized the transition from 
dictatorship to democracy. Since it was 
enacted, Brazil has accomplished several 
extraordinary achievements: monetary sta-
bility, institutional stability (despite having 
gone through two impeachment processes 
and massive corruption scandals) and deep-
ened social inclusion (with income distribu-
tion and the reduction of extreme poverty 
and inequalities). The endurance of Brazil’s 
Constitution despite the economic, political 
and social turmoil of recent years should be 
celebrated.
Yet, 2018 was also a stress test for Brazil’s 
democratic institutions. The 2018 presiden-
tial elections were the most polarized and 
turbulent in the country’s recent history. 
Inevitably, the Judiciary was a central play-
er in political disputes. The conviction of 
ex-President Lula on appeal barred him from 
running in the presidential race. Regardless 
of how well based the conviction may have 
been, it certainly affected the outcome of 
the elections, paving the way for Jair Bol-
sonaro’s poll victory. Several observers fear 
that the election of the far-right candidate as 
president of Brazil may trigger a process of 
democratic backsliding in the country and 
produce setbacks in the protection of minori-
ty rights. 
Finally, the Supreme Court (STF) itself 
faced strong criticism by different dissatis-
fied sectors. The Court was often divided 
in the complex struggle against systemic 
corruption, not always corresponding to so-
ciety’s expectations. The centrality of the 
Court and its public exposure amplified its 
structural deficiencies, notably the Justices’ 
power to issue unilateral/monocratic deci-
sions with massive political impact without 
immediately subjecting them to the Plenary 
for ratification.
Despite these challenges, this report demon-
strates that the STF still played a relevant 
role in several cases of strong political im-
pact. Its most impactful decisions in the 2018 
term displayed the Court’s tendency to focus 
on the exercise of its major role—to protect 
and promote fundamental rights, which may 
prove to be crucial in the 2019 term.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Following the already turbulent years of 
2016 and 2017, when Brazil endured a 
presidential impeachment and a consid-
erable political crisis involving the whole 
political class, in 2018, the country elected 
WKH IDUULJKW3UHVLGHQW -DLU%ROVRQDUR:LWK
his election, Brazil was once again in the 
international spotlight, as Latin America’s 
biggest economy and the world’s fourth big-
gest democracy was seemingly adhering to 
an illiberal mindset that is gaining traction 
in various parts of the globe. 2018 was the 
year when the three branches of power were 
BRAZIL
34 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
strongly challenged: President Michel Temer 
saw his popularity sharply plummet, leaving 
office with 62% of Brazilians deeming his 
government bad or very bad (a slight im-
provement from August, when the number 
was 82%1); Congress endured a severe le-
gitimacy crisis, which may continue in 2019 
despite the largest number of first-elected 
congressmen in decades;2 and the Supreme 
Court was engulfed by the political crisis and 
saw its authority largely questioned.3
Such a context naturally raises some con-
cerns about the capacity of Brazilian institu-
tions to protect democracy. On the one hand, 
the 2018 elections, when the President, State 
Governors, Federal and State Representa-
tives, and 2/3 of the Federal Senates were 
elected, did not put an end to the political 
crisis. In fact, many features of the so-called 
“new policy” Bolsonaro’s government and 
his affiliates in Congress aim to implement 
have been portrayed as a bad omen for de-
mocracy elsewhere.4 On the other hand, in 
such a scenario, many Brazilians saw the 
Supreme Court as the last institutional resort 
to defend Brazil from potential attacks on 
its democratic credentials. However, in the 
2018 term, the Supreme Court made more 
visible its internal divisions and the difficul-
ties in dealing with the challenges that would 
soon knock on its door.
Firstly, the so-called Operation “Car 
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political bigwigs and businessmen5 —chal-
lenged the Supreme Court’s role as a crim-
inal court in cases where it has original 
jurisdiction to try politicians (“privileged 
jurisdiction”). Although the Supreme Court 
restricted the scope of such prerogative (see 
below),6 the pace of its rulings on the mat-
ter has been slower than society expects. In 
a growingly polarized political environment, 
the comparison of such cases with the one 
incriminating former President Luis Inácio 
Lula da Silva, who does not owe such a priv-
ilege, would naturally become an argument 
against the judicial system as a whole by 
Lula’s many supporters. Unlike most Opera-
WLRQ³&DU:DVK´FDVHVLQWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
Lula was convicted by a federal judge in July 
2017 and had this conviction upheld on ap-
peal in January 2018, a few months before 
the start of the electoral campaign, in which 
he was planning to run for president. 
Lula’s conviction inescapably thrust the Ju-
diciary, and more specifically the Supreme 
Court, into the heart of the political dispute. 
Lula filed a petition for habeas corpus before 
the Supreme Court to prevent him from start 
starting to serve prison time. In April 2018, 
by a 6 to 5 majority, the Court rejected Lula’s 
habeas corpus, following recent rulings that 
set the precedent that defendants who have 
their prison sentence affirmed on appeal 
serve jail time immediately. This decision 
and Lula’s arrest sparked protests among 
supporters. Moreover, the so-called “Clean 
Records Act”7 bars political candidates who 
have had their convictions upheld by an ap-
pellate court from running in elections. De-
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Party (PT) registered Lula as its presidential 
candidate. By that time, ex-President Lula 
was the front-runner in opinion polls. Ulti-
mately, the Superior Electoral Court ruled 
that the Clean Records Act bars the former 
president from being nominated as a candi-
date in the 2018 presidential bid.8 Fernando 
Haddad, a relatively unknown politician by 
then, replaced Lula in the polls a few weeks 
before the first round. Although reaching 
44.9% of the votes in the runoff, Mr. Haddad 
was defeated by Jair Bolsonaro, whose polit-
ical platform was boldly shaped by attacks 
on PT and Lula.
In the upcoming term, the Supreme Court 
will certainly be challenged by a new type of 
dispute. For instance, during the presidential 
campaign, in addition to many controversial 
statements against minorities, Mr. Bolsonaro 
suggested the possibility of packing the Su-
preme Court by increasing its size from 11 
to 21 justices. The idea lost steam, but still, 
how the STF will react to the foreseeable at-
tacks on Brazil’s democratic credentials will 
be the key for its success or failure. And this 
will come at a time when the Court is under 
pressure both from the political establish-
ment and civil society. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
In this section, the STF’s most relevant rul-
ings in the 2018 term are summarized. The 
cases are presented in chronological order.
1. HC (“Habeas Corpus”) 143.641, decided 
02/20/2018: Collective habeas corpus grant-
ed to pregnant women and mothers of young 
children held in pre-trial detention
1 ‘Após reprovação recorde, Temer encerra governo com rejeição em queda, mostra Datafolha’ (Folha de S. Paulo, 22 December 2018) https://www1.folha.
uol.com.br/poder/2018/12/apos-reprovacao-recorde-temer-encerra-governo-com-rejeicao-em-queda.shtml accessed 30 January 2019.
2 See André Shalders, ‘Eleições 2018: Câmara e Senado terão a maior renovação das últimas décadas, estimam analistas’ (BBC Brasil, 8 October 2018) 
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3 See ‘O ano do Supremo - e o que esperar para 2019’ (JOTA, 24 December 2018), <https://www.jota.info/stf/do-supremo/o-ano-do-supremo-e-o-que-es-
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4 See Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt,  How Democracies Die (Crown, 2018); Tom Ginsburg and Aziz Z Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy, 
(University of Chicago Press, 2018); Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet (ed.), Constitutional Democracies in Crisis? (Oxford University 
Press, 2018). 
5 ‘Operation Car Wash: Is this the biggest corruption scandal in history?’ (The Guardian, 1 June 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/01/
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6 STF, Ação Penal n. 937, Rel. Min. Luís Roberto Barroso, DJ 3 de Maio de 2018.
7 See Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, ‘Moralizing Brazilian Elections: A Judiciary’s Role?’ (Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 3 March 2018) <http://www.iconnectblog.
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8 See Mariana Lopes, ‘Brazil’s jailed former president Lula barred from running again by electoral court’ (the Washington Post, August 31, 2018) <https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/brazils-jailed-former-president-lula-barred-from-running-again-by-electoral-court/2018/08/31/88cfcb7c-ac9b-
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The second panel of the Supreme Court ad-
mitted for the first time the possibility of fil-
ing a collective petition for habeas corpus to 
ensure access to justice for the most vulner-
able social groups and prevent the violation 
of their rights. The panel, by majority vote, 
granted the collective writ of habeas corpus
to determine the release from pre-trial de-
tention and placement under house arrest of 
all women prisoners who are either pregnant 
or mothers of children of up to 12 years of 
age, or mothers of persons with disabilities 
(regardless of their age). The majority of the 
Court held that the remedy was necessary on 
the grounds that these women and their kids 
are systematically subjected to degrading 
conditions of detention for being deprived 
of prenatal and postpartum healthcare. The 
order granted did not exclude the application 
of non-custodial measures.
2. RE (“Extraordinary Appeal”) 670.422 
and ADI 4.275, decided 03/01/2018: Trans-
gender persons’ right to official documents 
that reflect their gender identity
The Plenary of the STF unanimously held 
that transgender people have the right to 
change their name and gender marker on 
their official documents without undergoing 
gender reassignment surgery or any other 
medical treatment. The Court also estab-
lished, by majority vote, that such change 
may be effected administratively, before a 
civil registry office, regardless of prior ju-
dicial authorization. The Brazilian Supreme 
Court found that the right to official docu-
ments reflecting gender identity derives 
from the constitutional principles of equality, 
human dignity and liberty, and that the sur-
gery requirement would also violate the right 
to physical and mental integrity of transgen-
der persons, since it is a highly invasive and 
high-risk procedure.
3. ADI (“Direct Action of Unconstitutional-
ity”) 5.617, decided 03/15/2018: Public fund-
ing for women candidates
A few months before the start of the 2018 
election campaign period, the Supreme 
Court struck down as unconstitutional the 
provision of the 2015 electoral reform law 
which limited public funding to women can-
didates to 15% of each party’s share of fund-
ing. Since 1997, Brazil has adopted a legal 
quota requiring parties to nominate 30% of 
women candidates for the Lower House. Yet 
this policy had a low impact on increasing 
women’s political representation: by 2017, 
the country still had less than 15% of female 
representation in Congress. In view of this 
reality, the STF held that the constitution-
al principles of equality between men and 
women, human dignity and political plural-
ism require that parties allocate at least 30 
percent of their share of public funding to 
electoral campaigns of female candidates.
4. HC 152.752, decided 04/04/2018: Enforce-
ment of criminal sentence against President 
Lula after first appellate ruling
The Supreme Court voted 6 to 5 to reject the 
petition for habeas corpus filed by ex-Pres-
ident Luís Inácio Lula da Silva seeking to 
invalidate the decree of arrest issued against 
him after his prison sentence was affirmed on 
appeal. The Court then reaffirmed three deci-
sions issued in 2016 (which became binding 
upon every court) holding that defendants 
who have their prison sentence affirmed on 
appeal can serve time provisionally even if 
an appeal to a superior court is still pending: 
HC 126.292, decided 02/17/2016; ADC43-
MC (injunction order at the direct action of 
constitutionality), decided 10/05/2016; and 
ARE 964246-RG (appeal in extraordinary 
appeal with “general repercussion”), decid-
ed 11/10/2016. 
5. AP (“Criminal Action”) 937 QO, decid-
ed 05/03/2018: Limitation of the scope of the 
“privileged jurisdiction” for public authorities
At the criminal trial of a former federal dep-
uty accused of electoral corruption while 
he was the mayor of a small town, the STF 
narrowed the scope of the “privileged juris-
diction,” whereby high courts have original 
jurisdiction to try more than 30,000 author-
ities. The privileged jurisdiction, in its for-
mer scale, contributed to the inefficiency of 
the criminal justice system, since judges are 
better equipped than high courts (especially 
the Supreme Court) to conduct criminal pro-
ceedings at an appropriate speed. The ma-
jority of the Court held that the “privileged 
jurisdiction” is applicable only to offenses 
committed by officials in the course of their 
duty and while in office. Justice Luís Rober-
to Barroso, the rapporteur of the case, argued 
that this restrictive interpretation better har-
monizes the prerogative of original juris-
diction with the constitutional principles of 
equality, republic, probity and administrative 
morality, and was in line with the Court’s 
precedents.
6. ADI 5.508, decided 06/20/2018: Plea bar-
gain agreements with the Federal Police
The majority of the STF held constitutional 
the negotiation of plea bargain agreements 
by the chief of police during police investi-
gations. The Court found that (i) this possi-
bility does not interfere with the power of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office to file criminal 
charges, (ii) the Public Prosecutor’s Office 
has to issue an opinion about the agreement 
in such cases, and (iii) the Judiciary has to 
approve the benefits (e.g., reduction of crim-
inal sentence) granted by the plea bargain 
agreement entered into with the Police.
7. ADI 5.794 and ADC 55, decided 
06/29/2018: Labor law reform – Optional 
union contributions for employees and em-
ployers
In 2017, Congress passed sweeping reforms 
to Brazil’s labor laws advancing President 
Michel Temer’s reform agenda to kickstart 
the economy. One of the many contentious 
changes to the legal framework governing 
employment relations was the extinction of 
the mandatory union contribution for em-
ployees and employers. The reform con-
ferred an optional character to the tax requir-
ing express authorization of the employees to 
allow the discount of the amount from their 
paychecks. The Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 
decision, upheld the constitutionality of such 
reform. The Court found that freedom of as-
sociation allows employees and employers 
to choose whether or not to join a union and 
to make union payments. According to the 
majority, Congress has the power to regulate 
the matter, which is political in nature, thus 
36 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
being entitled to greater judicial deference. It 
also emphasized the paternalistic and corpo-
ratist character of the former union system in 
Brazil, made up of more than 11,000 unions 
of employees and 5,000 unions of employ-
ers, which are generally unrepresentative.
8. ADPF 324 and RE 958.252, decided 
08/30/2018: Labor law reform – Constitu-
tionality of unrestricted outsourcing
As part of the labor law reform, Congress 
also passed a law allowing for unrestricted 
outsourcing. Prior to the reform, the out-
sourcing of a company’s core business activi-
ties was prohibited by rulings of the Superior 
Labor Court (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho 
[TST]). Only the outsourcing of ancillary 
activities, such as cleaning, courier and sur-
veillance services, was permissible. By a 7 
to 4 vote, the Plenary of the STF held lawful 
the authorization of outsourcing of all con-
tracting companies’ activities. The majority 
of the Court found that outsourcing does not 
in itself represent more precarious working 
conditions for outsourced workers nor a vi-
olation of human dignity or other workers’ 
rights. It nevertheless held that the contract-
ing company is both responsible for verify-
ing the outsourcing company’s suitability 
and economic capacity, and is subsidiarily 
liable in cases of non-compliance with labor 
standards or social security regulations. 
9. RE 888.815, decided 09/12/2018: Homes-
chooling outlawed
The Court discussed whether or not a family 
has the right to homeschool their children in 
view of the state’s constitutional duty to pro-
vide education. Justice Barroso, the rappor-
teur of the case, considered that homeschool-
ing—a practice that is often associated with 
a family’s religious freedom—is a constitu-
tional modality of education. Two dissenting 
justices deemed the practice unconstitution-
al. Nonetheless, the Court, by majority, held 
that although home education does not vio-
late the Constitution, it is not allowed due to 
the absence of legislation regulating it.
9. RE 888.815, decided 09/12/2018: Homes-
chooling outlawed
On the eve of the second round of the 2018 
presidential election, the Supreme Court 
unanimously struck down Electoral Court 
judges’ decisions authorizing a series of 
raids in more than 40 universities all over 
the country to censor political speech of 
students and professors on the grounds that 
it constituted illegal negative campaigning 
against the candidate Jair Bolsonaro. The 
Court held that decisions allowing officers 
to enter universities to (i) confiscate flyers 
and teaching materials defending democracy 
and democratic values, (ii) seize hard drives 
of computers, (iii) suspend classes, lectures 
and public events against fascism or related 
to the 2018 election, and (iv) remove ban-
ners with the inscriptions “antifascist” and 
“dictatorship never again” violated freedom 
of expression, academic freedom and univer-
sities’ constitutional autonomy. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The new political landscape that came out of 
the 2018 elections should lead the Supreme 
Court to an increasingly active role in 2019, 
at least in theory. In such a polarized political 
landscape, it is foreseeable that many politi-
cal disagreements will knock on the Court’s 
door. The question is, however, whether the 
Court will be willing to exert such a role af-
ter the stormy year of 2018. The Court has 
discretionary power to define its agenda and 
the timing of decision-making. Its Chief Jus-
tice, Dias Toffoli, suggested that the Court 
will adopt more self-restrained behavior and 
let political matters be decided by political 
players.9  :KLOH WKLV PD\ VRXQG SUXGHQW
depending on the degree of self-restraint, 
it may also be interpreted as a sign that the 
Court is washing its hands of politics when 
Brazil may need it the most to defend core 
democratic values. This is the dilemma that 
lies ahead for the Supreme Court, and much 
of its legitimacy and authority will rely on 
how it will deal with it.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite a lack of both constitutional amend-
ments and nationwide elections, the year 
2018 in Bulgaria was highly interesting from 
a constitutional perspective. The first half of 
2018 was shaped by Bulgaria’s presidency 
of the Council of the European Union. The 
“European Presidency” was given highest 
priority by the government because smaller 
member countries such as Bulgaria can use 
it to influence the EU agenda and present 
themselves on the European stage. Domes-
tically, the government showed increasing 
signs of instability. Here, the ruling coali-
tion consists of four parties, including the 
center-right party of Prime Minister Boyko 
Borissov, “Citizens for a European Develop-
ment of Bulgaria” (GERB), and three small 
extreme right-wing parties that formed the 
“United Patriots” alliance. Four ministers 
from each coalition partner resigned due to 
several scandals during the second half of 
the year. 
Two problematic trends have emerged in 
relation to the latest constitutional develop-
ments. First, Bulgaria meets a poor and de-
creasing standard of media freedom. Accord-
LQJWRWKH:RUOG3UHVV)UHHGRP,QGH[
the country scores worse than any other in 
the EU (ranking 111th of 179 studied coun-
tries worldwide).1 There is also widespread 
corruption and collusion in politics, media 
companies, and within a restricted circle of 
a few oligarchs. Second, the state political 
branches continue to endanger the rule of 
law, fundamental rights, and judicial inde-
pendence. Most prominently, the Supreme 
Judicial Council, whose majority is de fac-
to controlled by the parliament, began its 
preliminary investigations into Chairman of 
the Supreme Court of Cassation Lozan Pan-
ov. This may lead to Panov’s impeachment. 
:KLOH WKH &KDLUPDQ KDV YRFDOO\ FULWLFL]HG
both the government and the politicization 
of the Bulgarian judiciary, he has cynically 
been charged with infringing on judicial in-
dependence.
Parliament also adopted an amendment to the 
Criminal Code on December 13, 2018, that 
allows a delay of up to 48 hours (24 in cas-
es involving children) before notifying third 
parties about an arrest. This would deny an 
imprisoned person access to legal assistance 
during that time. It also entails that relatives 
(parents when the case involves children) of 
the arrestee will not initially be informed of 
their whereabouts. Bulgarian President Ru-
men Radev (an independent who was nom-
inated in 2016 by the main opposition party, 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party/BSP) vetoed the 
amendment, but the parliament overturned 
this action on January 16, 2019, by an abso-
lute majority against the votes of the BSP.
In this context, the Bulgarian Constitution-
al Court (BCC) is anything but a bulwark of 
fundamental rights and the rule of law. There 
were only three judgments (i.e., Nos. 2, 10, 
and 14/2018) among the 17 decisions issued 
in 2018 in which the BCC contributed to 
protecting those constitutional principles and 
values (see section III). Its most debated rul-
ing also attracted considerable international 
attention. Here, the Court did the opposite of 
ensuring protections by declaring the Coun-
cil of Europe’s “Istanbul Convention” un-
BULGARIA
1 Reporters Without Borders, ‘Bulgaria: Corruption and Collusion Between Media, Politicians, and 
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constitutional (see section II). This data may 
be explained by the very restricted access to 
the BCC and a high degree of politicization 
associated with judicial appointments.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS: REJECTION 
OF THE “ISTANBUL  
CONVENTION”
The Council of Europe Convention on Pre-
venting and Combating Violence against 
:RPHQ DQG 'RPHVWLF 9LROHQFH WKH VR
called “Istanbul Convention”) was conclud-
ed in 2011. It aimed to provide a compre-
hensive legal framework for the prevention 
of gender-based and domestic violence, to 
protect victims, and to ensure the prosecu-
tion of such violent offenders. The Bulgarian 
government signed the Convention in April 
2016.
Ratification of the Convention entered the 
parliamentary agenda in late 2017. A fierce 
debate arose at this time. In particular, there 
was a heated argument in Bulgaria over the 
translation and meaning of the word “gen-
der.”2 Many political and religious groups 
(especially the Bulgarian Orthodox Church) 
attacked the Convention on this basis. These 
groups argued that it would encourage young 
people to identify as transgender and there-
by lead to the legal introduction of a third 
sex and same-sex marriage in Bulgaria. Pol-
iticians from many parliamentary parties 
joined in this criticism, particularly those 
from the ruling coalition United Patriots and 
oppositional BSP. The Socialists even pro-
posed that the parliament (the National As-
sembly) hold a referendum on the Conven-
tion’s ratification. 
This harsh criticism mirrored widespread 
homophobia and the prevalence of socially 
conservative and patriarchal values in Bul-
garian society. However, it contradicted the 
fact that Bulgaria shows the highest level of 
violence against women among all EU mem-
ber states.3 :KLOH 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU %R\NR
Borissov initially defended the Istanbul 
Convention, he and his party (GERB) finally 
deferred to the massive societal and parlia-
mentary opposition. Instead of advocating 
for the Convention, which the previous gov-
ernment (also led by Borissov and his party) 
had signed, GERB deputies requested that 
the Constitutional Court review the Conven-
tion’s constitutionality.
Notably, the deputies did not argue for the 
Convention’s unconstitutionality, but instead 
referred to the large amount of societal criti-
cism that had reached the parliament. The ap-
plicants stated that “the social significance of 
the Convention, the high public interest and 
the high degree of political engagement of 
the society” had motivated them to appeal to 
the BCC.4 Specifically, they cited some of the 
main points raised by the Convention’s crit-
ics regarding use of the terms “gender” and 
“stereotyped roles” as socially-defined cate-
gories, which may contradict the biological 
terms “sex,” “man,” and “woman” as used in 
the Bulgarian Constitution. The debate on the 
Istanbul Convention entirely neglected to fo-
cus on protecting women and children against 
violence because of these developments, in-
stead discussing the self-conception of Bul-
garian society with regard to gender roles. 
In their amicus curiae letters, the Minis-
tries of Foreign Affairs and of Jurisprudence 
(both led by GERB politicians) and the State 
Agency for Child Protection argued for the 
constitutionality of the Istanbul Convention. 
The Ministry of Healthcare (also led by a 
GERB politician) issued an undecided opin-
ion, while President Rumen Radev argued 
for its unconstitutionality. 
The Constitutional Court issued its high-
ly controversial decision on July 27, 2018. 
Although it recognized that “countering vi-
olence against women is a matter of funda-
mental importance for Europe and part of the 
core European values,” the BCC declared 
the Istanbul Convention unconstitutional. 
:KLOH IRXU RI WKH  MXGJHV GLVVHQWHG WKH
BCC substantially adopted the position of 
the Convention’s conservative critics. 
The Court criticized the Convention as 
self-contradictory because it used the biolog-
ical terms “men” and “women” while also 
referring to the social concept of “gender.” 
They asserted that this would not only lead 
to inconsistent interpretations but also com-
promise the rule of law. The BCC went as 
far as to argue that the Convention would de-
stroy any possibility of preventing violence 
against women, as follows: “By defining 
‘gender’ as a social construct, the Conven-
tion compromises the boundaries of the two 
sexes—man and woman—as biologically 
determined. However, if the society loses its 
ability to differentiate between a woman and 
a man, combating violence against women 
would remain a rather formal, but non-dis-
chargeable commitment.”
Usage of the social concept of “gender” was 
also seen as contravening the Bulgarian Con-
stitution. The BCC opined that all Bulgarian 
law was based on a biological differentiation 
between women and men and that there were 
biological definitions for the different social 
roles based on these sexes. The judges par-
ticularly referred to Art. 6, § 2 Const., which 
bans any “privileges or restriction of rights 
on the grounds of […] sex [“pol”],” and Art. 
47, § 2 Const., which states the following: 
“Mothers shall be the object of special pro-
tection on the part of the State and shall be 
guaranteed prenatal and postnatal leave, free 
obstetric care, alleviated working conditions 
and other social assistance.”
Although the Istanbul Convention obviously 
provides a more modern approach to gender 
relations than the more traditional concep-
tion of the Bulgarian Constitution (adopted 
in 1991), the judgment did not indicate how 
2 The translation provided by the Council of Europe uses the Bulgarian wordœŒŏWVS^OPJOTLHUZ¸ZL_¹PUZ[LHKVM[OL[LYTňŊŉőňŞŔ (KüLUKȋY or “gen-
KLY¹PU,UNSPZO^OPJOOHZILLUJVTTVUS`\ZLKPU)\SNHYPHMVYHJV\WSLVM`LHYZ
3 European Institute for Gender Equality, ‘Gender Equality Index 2017: Violence Against Women, The Most Brutal Manifestation of Gender Inequality’, 
#O[[WZ!LPNLL\YVWHL\ZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZKVJ\TLU[ZFTOLUUFWKMWKM%HJJLZZLK 1HU\HY` BKH[HHYLMYVTD
4 )\SNHYPHU*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[!+LJPZPVU5V(SSJP[LKQ\KNTLU[ZHYLH]HPSHISLPU)\SNHYPHUH[#O[[W!JVUZ[JV\Y[ININ(J[Z%HJJLZZLK 1HU\-
ary 2019 (all translations were done by the author).
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 39
adoption of the Convention would cause any 
concrete unconstitutional consequences. The 
Istanbul Convention does not depart from the 
traditional binary gender order at any point, 
not least in its definition of “gender,” which 
deliberately leaves room for country-specific 
interpretations by the national legal orders. 
According to Art. 3, lit. c of the Convention, 
“‘gender’ shall mean the socially construct-
ed roles, behaviors, activities and attributes 
that a given society considers appropriate for 
women and men.”5 These aspects were also 
mentioned in the dissenting opinions of the 
four BCC judges. 
A main consequence of the decision was 
that the BCC obstructed ratification of the 
Istanbul Convention, which could have been 
an important step in the fight against gen-
der-based and domestic violence in Bulgaria. 
This was not the first time the BCC appeared 
to act as a highly politicized body. Instead 
of defending key constitutional principles, 
e.g., human dignity (Art. 6, § 1 Const.) or 
the special protection of mothers (Art. 47, 
§ 2 Const.), the Court bowed to pressures 
from the political majority and vocal social 
groups.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
The BCC has been criticized as a politicized 
body for a long time. Such criticism comes 
from experts in the political and legal sci-
ences as well as the Bulgarian media.6 The 
BCC’s politicization is mainly derived from 
its appointment rules for judges and config-
uration of the types of procedure. First, the 
Court consists of 12 judges who are appoint-
ed for a non-renewable term of nine years. 
Four judges are appointed by the President 
of Bulgaria, four are elected by the Nation-
al Assembly through a simple majority, and 
four are elected by the joint meeting of the 
judges of the two highest ordinary courts 
(i.e., the Supreme Court of Cassation and the 
Supreme Administrative Court, also with a 
simple majority). This allows for politically 
motivated appointments for at least eight of 
the 12 bench posts. Indeed, the 2018 BCC 
was dominated by judges who were appoint-
ed through a GERB majority in parliament 
and by former GERB President Rossen Plev-
neliev (served from 2012–2017). 
Second, political actors can easily access the 
BCC, but it is largely inaccessible to ordi-
nary citizens. Its caseload is also dominated 
by abstract review proceedings and so-called 
“constitutional interpretations.” This is a pe-
culiarity of some post-socialist constitution-
al courts, where certain state authorities are 
entitled to request interpretations of consti-
tutional provisions without any specific pre-
requisites. In contrast, there is no individual 
constitutional complaint and only the two 
Supreme Courts (none lower) are allowed 
to initiate concrete review proceedings. Al-
though the Ombudsman (or -woman) of the 
Republic of Bulgaria (since 2006) and the 
Supreme Bar Council (since 2015) may ad-
dress the BCC with questions related to hu-
man and citizen rights, this has not led to a 
significant increase in the number of cases 
brought before the Court. Together, these 
rules lead to a comparatively low caseload, 
but result in a high degree of politicization in 
court decisions. 
Nevertheless, 2018 was the most active year 
for the BCC since 2001 with 17 issued de-
cisions. Six cases were brought before the 
Court by the two Supreme Courts, five by 
parliamentarians, three by the Supreme Bar 
Council, two by the Ombudswoman, and 
one each by the President and the Prosecu-
tor General.7 The following passages will 
describe the most important decisions of 
the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (except 
for its ruling on the “Istanbul Convention,” 
which was examined above).
1. Decision No. 7/2018: The Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
The Istanbul Convention was not the only 
international treaty that was placed on the 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court’s table in 
2018. President Rumen Radev and the So-
cialist Party have also openly criticized the 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (CETA) between Canada, the EU, and 
its member states for a considerable amount 
of time. CETA was concluded in 2014. It was 
approved by all contracting parties (includ-
ing Bulgaria) in 2016/17. Substantial sec-
tions have been provisionally applied since 
September 2017.
Although President Radev did not openly 
challenge CETA before the BCC, he request-
ed a binding interpretation of several consti-
tutional provisions and equipped this request 
with some questions related to CETA. He 
thereby attempted to defeat ratification of 
the treaty. Radev specifically asked about 
the conditions under which so-called “mixed 
treaties” jointly concluded by the EU and its 
member states with a third country become 
part of Bulgarian law. Additionally, he asked 
whether CETA constituted a transfer of na-
tional sovereignty rights, which would re-
quire ratification according to Art. 85, § 1, 
No. 9 Const. Although not explicitly men-
tioned, this referred to the establishment of 
an Investment Court System for investment 
protection and dispute resolution. Since the 
aforementioned constitutional provision re-
quires a two-thirds majority of all deputies 
for ratification, this would provide the oppo-
sitional BSP with its current 79 of 240 seats 
in the National Assembly, almost a blocking 
minority against CETA’s ratification.
Despite four dissenting votes questioning the 
admissibility of Radev’s request, the consti-
tutional judges unanimously rejected the 
President’s implicit claim for the unconsti-
tutionality of CETA. On April 17, 2018, the 
BCC declared that mixed treaties referred 
to the external relations of the EU (and its 
member states) with other countries. Such 
treaties do not therefore “confer to the Euro-
pean Union powers ensuing from this Con-
5 Emphases added.
6 4PJOHLS/LPUHUK:[LMHU,^LY[º/V^+V;` WLZVM7YVJLK\YL(ɈLJ[[OL+LNYLLVM7VSP[PJPaH[PVUVM,\YVWLHU*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[Z&(*VTWHYH[P]L:[\K`
of Germany, Bulgaria, and Portugal’ (2016), 9 ,\YVWLHU1V\YUHSVM3LNHS:[\KPLZ"7VSPUH7H\UV]Hº2HR2:Z[HUHWVSP[PȏLZRPVYNHU»B/V^[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVU-
al Court Became a Political Body] +L\[ZJOL>LSSL6J[VILY#O[[WZ!WK ^JVTW,.@%HJJLZZLK 1HU\HY` 
7 Two claims by the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme Bar Council were jointly decided (No. 6/2018; see below, subsection III.5).
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stitution” as stipulated in Art. 85, § 1, No. 
9 Const. and can be ratified by an ordinary 
parliamentary majority. The BCC also ruled 
that mixed treaties (as with any other inter-
national treaties ratified by Bulgaria) were 
part of national law and thus supreme to na-
tional legislation. On December 6, 2018, the 
National Assembly finally and almost unan-
imously ratified CETA with 102 supportive 
votes, one negative vote, and 10 abstentions 
(the latter 11 votes were cast by BSP depu-
ties).
2. Decision No. 1/2018: Employees’ rights
In its first decision issued in 2018, the BCC 
submitted a January 16 ruling on a case filed 
by Ombudswoman Maya Manolova against 
a provision of the Labor Code stemming 
from 1992. According to Art. 245, § 1 of the 
Labor Code, employers must “guarantee” 
their employees 60% of their contractually 
agreed salary as long as the payment is at 
least equal to the statutory minimum wage. 
This provision was designed to allow com-
panies to overcome economic difficulties by 
lowering salary payments. Manolova argued 
that the provision contradicted several con-
stitutional provisions, including Art. 48, § 5 
Const., which states that “employees shall be 
entitled to […] remuneration for the actual 
work performed.” She also pointed out that it 
violated the social state principle in the con-
stitutional preamble. 
The BCC rejected these claims in a contro-
YHUVLDOGHFLVLRQ:KLOHVL[MXGJHVUXOHGWKDW
the claim was unfounded and two argued 
for inadmissibility, four dissenting judges 
(including Court Chairman Boris Velchev) 
ruled that it was founded. The first six judg-
es decided that Art. 245, § 1 of the Labor 
Code did not give employers the discretion 
to pay less than contracted remuneration. 
This was based on an interpretation in con-
formity with the constitution and a review of 
the historical motives of the parliament from 
1992. The challenged provision guarantees 
employee rights (even in cases of economic 
or financial difficulty) in the sense that pay-
ments can only be lowered to a certain ex-
tent. Thus, the provision does not constitute 
a subjective right for the employer.
In a reaction to this judgment, Ombuds-
woman Manolova submitted a draft amend-
ment to the Labor Code to the parliament. If 
passed, it would limit the possibility to pay 
less than the contractually agreed salary to 
a one-month period. The National Assembly 
had not yet considered this proposal at the 
end of 2018.
3. Decision No. 2/2018: Resignation of a 
deputy
Deputy Delyan Dobrev (GERB) issued his 
resignation on October 3, 2017. This was a 
reaction to the so-called “Kumgate” scandal, 
which revealed that Dobrev had placed his 
cousins and groomsmen in key city adminis-
tration positions in his hometown of Hasko-
vo in his former capacity as Minister of Eco-
nomic Affairs (served in 2012/13). However, 
the parliamentary majority refused to accept 
Dobrev’s resignation. Dobrev’s mandate as 
deputy thus remained active. This move by 
the governing parties to protect an affiliated 
politician was brought before the Constitu-
tional Court by the oppositional Socialists. 
The Court followed their claim, according 
to which a deputy’s “resignation present-
ed before the National Assembly” (Art. 72, 
§ 1, No. 1 Const.) is an individual decision 
of the deputy and cannot be rejected by the 
parliament. The judgment was highly disput-
ed amongst all 12 judges and only reached 
a seven-to-five majority (the narrowest pos-
sible). Since the five dissenting judges had 
all either been appointed by former President 
Plevneliev (GERB) or elected by a GERB 
majority in parliament, politicization along 
party lines may explain the stark controversy 
among the judges in an otherwise clear case.
4. Decision No. 16/2018: Removing a 
Vice-President of the National Assembly
Another conflict occurred between the ruling 
and oppositional parties regarding an inter-
nal parliamentary decision. This also reached 
the Constitutional Court in 2018. The Na-
tional Assembly voted Vice President Valery 
Zhablyanov (BSP) out of office on February 
21. This decision was supported by the rul-
ing parties (GERB and the United Patriots), 
which reproached Zhablyanov for criticizing 
Bulgaria’s friendship treaty with Macedo-
nia (signed in August 2017), describing the 
totalitarian “People’s Courts” (which were 
established by the Bulgarian communists in 
1944) as part of a “necessary and inevitable 
wartime justice,” and violating order in the 
parliament on February 1 during a tribute to 
the victims of the communist regime.
A total of 60 BSP deputies challenged Zh-
ablyanov’s removal before the BCC. They 
argued that the decision did not conform to 
Art. 5, § 1, No. 2 of the Standing Orders of 
the National Assembly because Zhablyanov 
did not “systematically exceed” his rights as 
stated in the motives of the parliamentary de-
cision. They argued that the decision would 
therefore breach several constitutional provi-
sions, including the rule of law (Art. 4 Const.) 
and the constitutionality and legality of the 
decisions of the National Assembly (Art. 73. 
Const.). The court’s decision was again highly 
disputed among the judges, this time without 
revealing an obvious party pattern. The BCC 
rejected the claim by a 7-to-5 majority on No-
vember 6, 2018, thereby subscribing to the 
majority opinion in parliament. 
5. Decision No. 6/2018: Code of Criminal 
Procedure I
As mentioned in the beginning of this report, 
Bulgaria has received regular criticism for its 
lack of success in combating corruption. In 
early 2018, the National Assembly changed 
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) to 
fulfill the European Union’s ongoing de-
mand to improve the legal framework for 
fighting high-level corruption and organized 
crime. An extension of the competencies of 
the Specialized Criminal Court was partic-
ularly contested. This body was established 
as a special anti-corruption court in 2011. 
An amendment of Art. 411a CCP gave the 
court competency to judge members of the 
government, deputies, judges, prosecutors 
and investigators, mayors and deputy may-
ors, and several other categories of high state 
officials not only in cases of corruption and a 
variety of other crimes.
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The Supreme Court of Cassation and the Su-
preme Bar Council challenged this amend-
ment before the BCC by arguing that a court 
competent for a certain group of suspects (and 
not for certain crimes) was not a “specialized 
court” as allowed for by Art. 119, § 2 Const., 
but an “extraordinary court,” which was 
banned by Art. 119, § 3 Const. This was there-
fore in breach of the constitutional principles 
of the rule of law and equality before the law. 
The Constitutional Court unanimously re-
jected this claim on March 27, 2018. It de-
clared that “specialized courts” may also be 
courts with jurisdiction over a specific group 
of subjects. It not only referred to similar 
courts in France, Slovakia, and the Ukraine 
but also to the competencies of the City 
Court in the Bulgarian capital Sofia, which 
is (except for corruption crimes) the first in-
stance court on crimes committed by mem-
bers of government, members of parliament, 
and magistrates. However, the Constitution-
al Court did not outline any general distinc-
tions for a constitutional “specialized” court 
as opposed to an unconstitutional “extraordi-
nary” court. Regardless, it remains to be seen 
whether this amendment will cause visible 
and sustainable results in the fight against 
high-level corruption in Bulgaria.8
6. Decision No. 14/2018: Code of Criminal 
Procedure II
The Supreme Bar Council also challenged 
a large number of other amendments to the 
Code of Criminal Procedure that were adopt-
ed by the governing coalition in November 
2017. The Constitutional Court accepted 19 
of the 21 challenged amendments on Octo-
ber 9, 2018, but annulled the remaining two. 
It first declared a provision in Art. 247c CCP 
unconstitutional. This provision allowed 
hearings without the assistance of a lawyer. 
The BCC then annulled a restriction on le-
gal recourse in Art. 351 CCP, according to 
which material breaches of procedural rules 
in pre-trial proceedings were excluded from 
recourse to courts. The Constitutional Court 
thus strengthened the rule of law and the 
right to legal defense.
7. Decision No. 10/2018: Suspension from 
office of civil servants 
The final BCC case presented in this re-
port involves a Supreme Court of Cassation 
challenge to Art. 214, § 2 of the Law on the 
Ministry of Interior. This provision stipu-
lated that a civil servant would lose their 
salary and social insurance while serving 
a temporary suspension from office due to 
disciplinary proceedings resulting from sus-
picions of malfeasance. The Supreme Court 
of Cassation argued that the challenged pro-
vision contravened several constitutional 
principles, specifically, the legal protection 
of labor (Art. 16 Const.) and the right to so-
cial security and social assistance (Art. 51, 
§ 1 Const.). The Constitutional Court unan-
imously accepted this claim on May 29, 
2018, thereby declaring the challenged pro-
vision unconstitutional and strengthening the 
social rights of civil servants.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Four newly elected judges began their nine-
year terms with the Bulgarian Constitutional 
Court on November 1, 2018. Notably, law 
professor Atanas Semov was appointed by 
President Rumen Radev. Thus, for the first 
time since 2009, one of the new judges ap-
pointed by the political branches was not 
nominated by GERB. Nonetheless, signifi-
cant depoliticization of constitutional justice 
in Bulgaria is not expected in the near future. 
In political terms, 2019 will likely be charac-
terized by the European elections in May and 
the local elections in autumn. Both elections 
will be important tests for the fragile coali-
tion between GERB and the United Patriots. 
There is thus a chance that the coalition will 
dissolve throughout the year or Prime Min-
ister Boyko Borissov will resign (as he did 
in both 2013 and 2017). Either case would 
most probably result in the fourth snap elec-
tion in Bulgaria since 2013.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last major constitutional overhaul 
in 1996,1 Cameroon has awaited the effec-
tive establishment of institutions provided 
by the Constitution.2 This is true of the Con-
stitutional Council, created by the Constitu-
tion of 18 January 1996 but delayed in han-
dling cases until 2018—twenty-two years 
after its creation. Though this Cameroonian 
constitutional adjudication body is important 
to the legal apparatus, it still did not fulfill 
expectations in 2018, as the crisis in the 
two English-speaking regions was getting 
worse.3 This State form-based crisis, started 
in October 2016,4 was apparently not critical 
enough for the government to engage in con-
stitutional reform that would put an end to 
it and lead to peaceful cohabitation between 
Anglophone and Francophone regions of the 
country.5   
On the contrary, 2018 resulted in the gov-
ernment’s infra-constitutional responses 
to a crisis having an obvious constitutional 
nature. However, senatorial and presidential 
elections have been the main constitutional 
activities of the year that conveyed some 
steps forward, though they did not lead to 
a political landslide. Indeed, as major con-
stitutional developments, those elections re-
sulted in the beginning of the second Senate 
and particularly the issuance of the very first 
Constitutional Council rulings. The elector-
al proceedings resulted in some decisions 
which will enrich the case law of this or-
gan in charge of constitutional adjudication. 
2019 will also be an electoral year for legis-
lative, regional and municipal elections that 
were postponed because the country could 
not financially hold three major elections in 
2018.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Though constitutional systems are intended 
to be rooted in time to guarantee their reli-
ability, sometimes the legal and institutional 
framework may need to be reconsidered in 
order to suit the changes of present-day soci-
eties. This is undoubtedly, to a certain extent, 
the justification and the merit of the present 
annual report of the Global Review of Con-
stitutional Law of the I•CONnect-Clough 
Center. This one questions the major consti-
tutional developments carried out by country 
over a specific year. However, there is no 
need for substantial disruptions to set a value 
on a constitutional system. It is continuous-
CAMEROON
1 The Constitution of Cameroon, usually known as the Constitution of 18 January 1996, is actually an 
amendment of the Constitution of 2 June 1972, though there has always been a controversy as to whether 
it is a new constitution or an old one.  
2 The current Constitution of Cameroon came into force on 18 January 1996 and was amended on 14 
April 2018.
3 ;OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUKVLZUV[KPɈLYLU[PH[LIL[^LLU[OL[LUYLNPVUZVM*HTLYVVUHJJVYKPUN[V[OLPY
SPUN\PZ[PJPKLU[P[`ILJH\ZL[OLJV\U[Y `SLNHSS`RUV^UHZIPSPUN\HSWYHJ[PJLZ,UNSPZOHUK-YLUJOHZVɉJPHS
SHUN\HNLZ;OLYLMLYLUJLVM¸,UNSPZOZWLHRPUNYLNPVUZ¹OLYLPZ[`WPJHSS`ZVJPVSVNPJHSK\L[V[OLMHJ[[OH[PU
these two regions English is the dominant language, as French is in the eight others.
4:LL*4-VTIHK¸¸+L]LSVWTLU[ZPU*HTLYVVUJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSSH ^¹0*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY
Global Review of Constitutional Law 37 (2017). 
5 Cameroon, which had been colonised by Germany in 1884, is a bilingual country practising English and 
French inherited from British and French dominance, after the country was placed under the aegis of the 
UN in 1946 following the defeat of the German army during the Second World War. 
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ly tested by its own application. The major 
constitutional developments that have taken 
place in Cameroon during 2018 fall in line 
with this. The cases that were looked at did 
not allow for either a major breakthrough of 
the existing constitutional system or its rein-
forcement, though that reinforcement can be 
inferred from the implementation and appli-
cation of constitutional and political events 
provided within the constitutional text. The 
current report can therefore be based on three 
main events, namely the senatorial and presi-
dential elections that respectively took place 
on 25 March and 7 October 2018, and a third 
event related to the effective establishment 
of the Constitutional Council, whose very 
first rulings dealt with the electoral disputes 
stemming from both sets of elections.
Senatorial elections held in March 2018 
mark the beginning of the second composi-
tion of the chamber.6 The history of the Up-
per House of the Cameroonian Parliament is 
similar to the other political institutions laid 
down within the constitutional Act of 18 Jan-
uary 1996, whose effective establishment oc-
curred more than two decades later. Beyond 
the simple fact that they opened the second 
term of the Senate, these elections provided 
an opportunity to assess the first mandate 
of this chamber whose mission, pursuant to 
Section 20, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution, 
is to represent regional and local authorities. 
The least that can be raised on this point is 
that, since the first elections held on 14 April 
2013 setting up the effective functioning of 
the Senate, the process of decentralization 
has stagnated under conflicts as regards the 
prerogatives between national institutions 
DQGORFDORQHV:RUVHVWLOOWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
of regions as regional and local authorities, 
in other words as decentralized local collec-
tivities, within which senators are suppos-
edly being elected and appointed,7 is still 
pending. The absence of regions skewed the 
election of senators since they are supposed 
to be voted by an electoral college compris-
ing both regional councilors (who still do not 
exist) and municipal councilors, who are the 
only electors who have cast their ballot for 
the first two elections to the Senate.
The second major political event held in 
2018 was the election of the President of 
the Republic for a seven-year term.8 The in-
cumbent President, Paul Biya, who has held 
office since 6 November 1982, faced eight 
other candidates. Among them are some re-
sounding names such as Maurice Kamto, an 
internationally known law professor; Akere 
Muna, a lawyer whose reputation crosses 
borders; and Josua Osih, who inherited the 
chairmanship of the historical opposition par-
ty Social Democratic Front (SDF) ruled until 
then by Ni John Fru Ndi. Following results 
made public by the Constitutional Council, 
the reigning party, known as the Cameroon 
People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), of 
the incumbent President Paul Biya won the 
election with 71.28% of the vote, followed 
by the Cameroon Renaissance Movement 
(CRM) of Maurice Kamto with 14.2% and in 
third position, the Universe Party of 39-year-
old Cabril Liibi with 6.28%. The SDF, long 
considered the primary opposition party, 
came in fourth position with a disappointing 
UHVXOWRI:KLOHWKHVHRIILFLDOUHVXOWV
do not really surprise the observers of the 
Cameroonian political scene, they nonethe-
less help draw some lessons.
The main lesson was the electoral litigation 
conducted before the Constitutional Coun-
cil, whose proceedings were only the second 
time this court has sat as constitutional judge 
and as judge of electoral operations.9 Among 
the seventeen petitions submitted before the 
Constitutional Council by the defeated can-
didates seeking the cancellation of the pres-
idential election, the Council noted the rel-
evance of some arguments brought forward 
by the petitioners. Furthermore, the pro-
ceedings were broadcast live on State tele-
vision and private television stations. Those 
public hearings, seen by some as democracy 
in progress, tended to call national and in-
ternational attention to the accountability 
and transparency of the electoral process in 
Cameroon. However, they were etched into 
memory and resulted in some non-negligible 
decisions that will henceforth be part of the 
constitutional case law.   
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The very first decisions of the Constitutional 
Council rendered following disputes of the 
elections held in 2018 were not what one 
would have expected. The seventeen peti-
tions lodged before the Constitutional Coun-
cil by five defeated candidates pleading for 
the partial or total cancellation of the pres-
idential election have either been dismissed 
or declared inadmissible. The same outcome 
resulted with petitions submitted during the 
post-electoral dispute of senatorial elections. 
If some petitions looked trivial, there were 
others—though held inadmissible—that 
raised important legal matters. This report 
discusses two of these petitions that can be 
considered representative of some major 
stakes of the electoral process and the un-
derlying problem of the ongoing crisis in 
Cameroon. The first one, lodged by Maurice 
Kamto, beyond the legal relevance that can 
be inferred from some pleas in law put for-
ward, purported to undermine the electoral 
process of Cameroon. The second petition, 
related to post-electoral disputes of senato-
rial elections, raised the question of voter 
turnout in areas that suffer from instability.
1. Kamto Maurice v. Constitutional 
Council: Disqualification and discharge for 
legitimate suspicion 
This case was lodged on the occasion of the 
post-electoral disputes by Maurice Kamto, 
defeated candidate in the 7 October 2018 
presidential election, where he asked for 
the recusal of some members of the Con-
stitutional Council. These petitions were 
intended to support other requests that tar-
geted the partial or total cancellation of pres-
6 ;0U*HTLYVVU[OL:LUH[LPZJVTWYPZLKVMZLUH[VYZVM^OVTHYLLSLJ[LKI`PUKPYLJ[\UP]LYZHSZ\ɈYHNLHUKHWWVPU[LKI`[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJ
7 According to Section 20, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution and Section 214 of the Electoral Code, each region shall be represented in the Senate by ten (10) sena-
[VYZZL]LUVM^OVTLSLJ[LKI`PUKPYLJ[\UP]LYZHSZ\ɈYHNLVUHYLNPVUHSIHZPZHUK[OYLLHWWVPU[LKI`KLJYLLVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJ
8 Since the amendment of the Constitution of 14 April 2008, the President of the Republic is elected for a term of 7 years. He shall be eligible for re-election. 
9 The Supreme Court previously acted as the electoral judge, according to the provisions of Section 64, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution. 
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idential election results due to irregularities 
that have been recorded, according to the 
petitioner, during electoral operations. The 
six concerned petitions10 were examined by 
the Council following formal requirements 
and ruled inadmissible for procedural rea-
sons. Nonetheless, Kamto’s petition sought 
to recuse some members of the Constitu-
tional Council and therefore provoke their 
discharge for legitimate suspicion. If these 
claims surprised many legal theorists and 
practitioners because neither the Electoral 
Code11 nor the law laying down the function-
ing and the organization of the Constitution-
al Council provided for the disqualification 
and the discharge of members of this institu-
tion, the audacity of these petitions should be 
recognized. However, having looked close-
ly at the issue, one can honestly admit that 
they raised substantive matters which cannot 
merely be swept away on the sole basis of 
their illegality.    
:LWKLQKLVILUVWILYHSHWLWLRQV0DXULFH.DP-
to requested the disqualification of six mem-
bers of the Constitutional Council, namely 
Clément Atangana (President of the Coun-
cil), Emmanuel Bonde, Ahmadou Tidja-
ni, Jean Baptiste Baskouda, Joseph-Marie 
%LSRXQ:RXP DQG WKH ODWH -HDQ )RXPDQH
Akam, who recently passed away. He based 
his request on the fact that those members 
of the Constitutional Council have been for 
some, and are still for others, members of the 
ruling party CPDM. He wanted the Council 
to disqualify its own members because they 
were neither independent nor impartial to en-
sure the regularity, sincerity and transparen-
cy of the presidential election. He therefore 
requested their replacement by the authority 
in charge of their designation.12 He pleaded 
to the Council to have “jurisdiction of its ju-
risdiction,” in accordance with Section 18 of 
Law No. 2004/005 of 21 April 2004, laying 
down the status of members of the Consti-
tutional Council as amended by Law No. 
2012/016 of 21 December 2012.
This section provides that: “The Constitu-
tional Council ruling by a majority of (2/3) 
two-thirds of its members may, on its own 
motion or at the request the authority of des-
ignation, terminate, after the completion of 
a contradictory procedure, duties of an in-
cumbent member who might have shirked 
his commitments [or] breached the regime 
of his incompatibilities…”
Kamto’s petitions require attention to a 
number of observations concerning Cam-
eroonian substantive law in order to under-
stand the grounds for their rejection by the 
Constitutional Council. In the first instance, 
following the disqualification of members, 
irrespective of the fact that the Council, by 
joining all the petitions due to their connec-
tion,13 declared them as inadmissible be-
cause the author lacks standing,14 ruled on 
the substance by declaring that the purpose 
of these requests are “a preliminary question 
which should be decided through a special 
procedure the petitioner did not initiate.”15
Lawfully arguing, it should be understood 
that it is not possible, in the current positive 
law of Cameroon, for a petitioner to recuse 
the members of the Constitutional Council. 
This is an institution that enjoys a peculiar 
political stature inherited from the French 
model, unlike some other countries where 
constitutional justice is exercised through 
judicial bodies. The political past of some 
members who are not acting as judges, even 
though some are career magistrates,16 cannot
justify their disqualification for the sheer 
fact that only sitting magistrates,16 namely 
judges, can be recused under Cameroonian 
law. Indeed, in accordance with Section 
591 of Law No. 2005/007 of 25 July 2005 
to lay down the Criminal Procedure Code, 
any sitting judge can be recused for any of 
the reasons restrictively specified by that 
law. Furthermore, once designated, as stated 
implicitly by Law No. 2004/005 of 21 April 
2004 laying down the status of members of 
the Constitutional Council, all members of 
the Council are said to be discharged from 
their political duties.17      
It is on the basis of this request for disqual-
ification that Petition 355 intervened. Its 
purpose was related to the discharge for le-
gitimate suspicion of the above-mentioned 
members of the Constitutional Council. 
The preliminary motion filed in this petition 
sought the referral of the post-electoral liti-
gation of the presidential election to another 
judicial body because of legitimate suspicion 
towards the members of the Constitutional 
Council. This request also fell in line with 
inadmissibility and was declared unfounded 
because no statutory law in Cameroon ex-
pressly allowed the discharge of a member 
regarding electoral disputes before the Con-
stitutional Council, which is the last-resort 
body in the matter of presidential, senatorial 
and legislative elections. 
2. Njenje Valentine Kleber v. Elecam, 
CPDM, ANDP, UNDP
The petition lodged before the Constitutional 
Council by Njenje Valentine Kleber, 18 repre-
10 Petition Nos. 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355/SRCER/G/SG/CC of 15 October 2018. 
11 3H^5VVM (WYPSYLSH[PUN[V[OL,SLJ[VYHS*VKLHZHTLUKLKHUKTVKPÄLKI`3H^5VVM+LJLTILY
12;OLLSL]LU4LTILYZVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\UJPSHYLKLZPNUH[LKMVYH[LYTVMVɉJLVMZP_`LHYZHZMVSSV^Z![OYLLPUJS\KPUN[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL*V\U-
cil, by the President of the Republic; (3) three by the President of the National Assembly after consultation with the Bureau; (3) three by the President of the Senate 
after consultation with the Bureau; (2) two by the Higher Judicial Council. Besides the eleven members provided for above, former presidents of the Republic shall 
ILL_VɉJPVTLTILYZVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\UJPSMVYSPML
13 Petitions Nos. 350, 351, 352, 353 and 354.
14 Kamto v. Constitutional Council (n 024/CE/CC/2018) 16 October 2018.
15 Ibid. 
16 Among the eleven members of the Constitutional Council, two, including the President, are career magistrates.
17 Section 5, Paragraph 1.
18 Petition No. 007/CCES/2018 of 28 March 2018. 
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sentative of the party SDF within the Region-
al Supervisory Commission19 of the South-
:HVW UHJLRQ GXULQJ WKH VHQDWRULDO HOHFWLRQV
of 25 March 2018, is similar to the request 
made on the occasion of post-electoral dis-
putes of presidential polling by Josua Osih.20
In this petition, he requests from the Council 
the cancellation of senatorial elections with-
in the Division of Lebialem, especially in the 
Kupe-Manengouba Subdivision and by ex-
WHQVLRQZLWKLQWKHUHJLRQRIWKH6RXWK:HVW
as a whole. According to the petitioner, these 
elections were severely affected by incidents 
that could have struck down the outcome of 
senatorial polls in this electoral constituency. 
To meet this goal, the litigant based his re-
quest on Section 132, Paragraph 2 of the 
Electoral Code, which states: “The Consti-
tutional Council shall rule [on] all petitions 
filed by any candidate, any political party 
which took part in the election or any person 
serving as a representative of the Adminis-
tration for the election, requesting the total or 
partial cancellation of electoral operations.” 
He argues that:
This is predicated upon hard, incontro-
vertible and compelling facts and evi-
dence garnered before, during and after 
25 March 2018 senatorial elections in the 
various polling stations throughout the 
6RXWK:HVW UHJLRQ +H LOOXVWUDWHV VRPH
cases that will guide the members of the 
Constitutional Council in reaching a rea-
soned decision that will uphold the rule 
of law, fairness, equity and justice, to Wit. 
For the cases that have been illustrated, the 
petitioner sought to demonstrate that an 
election could not be held in suitable con-
ditions within a context of instability due 
to the ongoing crisis. Concerning the first 
case illustrated in the Kupe-Manengouba 
electoral district, he argued that there was 
no gain saying that no election took place in 
some places of this subdivision. According 
to him, there was cogent evidence that all 
along, terror and horror gripped the locality 
as there was a sustained exchange of gunfire 
between unidentified assailants and forces of 
law and order, causing civilians to flee for 
their safety. In order to challenge the valid-
ity of the election in this electoral constitu-
ency, he referred to irregularities related to 
the sole signature on result reports by repre-
sentatives of the ruling party. He concluded 
from the above that no election took place 
in Kupe-Manengouba and that the electors 
were simply disenfranchised because of the 
“series of attacks by unidentified gunmen.”
The second case illustrated by the petition-
er concerned the Lebialem electoral district. 
He argued that there is evidence according 
WRZKLFKWKLUWHHQYRWHUVRI WKH:DEDQHDQG
Alou areas were locked up in Dschang in 
WKH:HVW UHJLRQ DQG FRQYH\HG E\ KHOLFRS-
ter to Menji in order to cast their ballot in 
an empty city. From this allegation, he tried 
to show that this was constitutive of the vi-
olation of laws and fundamental freedoms, 
which are key conditions for free, fair, trans-
parent and credible elections, and a violation 
RI WKH 6RXWK:HVW JRYHUQRU¶V LQVWUXFWLRQV
prohibiting all movements on polling day. 
In a polling station, the applicant noted that 
only twenty-seven people effectively cast 
their ballot compared to ninety-three peo-
ple enrolled on the electoral list. Moreover, 
he reportedly claimed that this polling sta-
tion had been closed at 4:30 pm instead of 
6:00 pm as provided by the Electoral Code. 
The other argument invoked by the plaintiff 
was that two political parties, namely ANDP 
and UNDP, a coalition to the ruling party, 
did not appoint their representatives in the 
Regional Supervisory Commission of votes 
as required by the electoral law. The peti-
tion points out that in the Manyu Division, 
all one hundred voters21 were locked up and 
cut off from any communication with the 
other participating political parties, with the 
exception of the ruling party CPDM. They 
were supposedly housed in different hotels 
around the electoral ward two days before 
the polling date.
Although the Constitutional Council de-
clared the petition of Njenje Valentin Kleber 
to be “inadmissible for lack of locus standi”
and for lack of reliable evidence of irregular-
ities presented to the Council, a core ques-
tion still emerged from this request: whether 
an election can reasonably be held within a 
difficult security environment.22 In answer-
ing the question, the nature of the election 
at stake should be taken into account. As 
far as the presidential election is concerned, 
where the electoral constituency is nation-
wide, the issue of the coverage rate of votes 
validly cast by district or region may appear 
anecdotal. This is what the Constitutional 
Council acknowledged within its rulings on 
facts alleged in a similar petition lodged on 
the occasion of the 7 October 2018 presiden-
tial election.23 It is the same argument that 
was raised by the lawyers of the body in 
charge of elections, namely Elections Cam-
eroon (ELECAM), and those of the winning 
party in response to Maurice Kamto’s and 
Josua Osih’s petitions: an election having a 
nationwide constituency cannot be partially 
annulled.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2019, there should be no constitutional 
developments that will substantially change 
the underlying problems Cameroon is facing 
today. The year will also be marked by the 
holding of elections that were supposed to 
take place in 2018 but were postponed be-
cause of cost reasons. These are communal 
19 (JJVYKPUN[V:LJ[PVU7HYHNYHWOVM[OL,SLJ[VYHS*VKL[OL9LNPVUHS:\WLY]PZVY`*VTTPZZPVUZOHSSLUZ\YL[OLJV\U[PUNHUK]LYPÄJH[PVUVM]V[LJV\U[PUN
operations on the basis of reports forwarded by polling stations.
20 1VZ\H6ZPO],SLJHT*7+4 (n 025/CE/CC/2018) 17 October 2018.  
21 Pursuant to Section 222, Paragraph 1 of the Electoral Code, senators are elected by regional and municipal councilors. 
22 Njenje Valentine Kleber v. Elecam, CPDM, ANDP, UNDP (n 008/CE/CC/2018), 3 April 2018.
23 Josua Osih (n 025/CE/CC/2018).   
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elections to elect local councilors and legis-
lative ones that should start another five-year 
term of office for members of parliament. 
More importantly, regional elections, if they 
are held for the first time, will significant-
ly contribute to setting regions in place in a 
definitive way as decentralized local author-
ities.24 The hope surrounding these regional 
elections would be to put an end to the hy-
per-centralization of the State, which if it 
endures will jeopardize the decentralization 
process and exacerbate local tensions.
V. FURTHER READING
Charles M Fombad (ed), Constitutional
Adjudication in Africa (Oxford Universi-
ty Press, 2017), published online (14 June 
2018).
24 A region in Cameroon has a double status. On the one hand, it is an administrative unit, i.e., an extension of the central government headed by an appointed 
governor; on the other hand, it is a decentralized collectivity where the regional executive should be elected be the local community. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Cape Verdean (CV) constitutional sys-
tem is rather recent because the country 
only achieved independence from Portugal 
in 1975,1 and from then until 1990 it had a 
one-party system.2 The Constitution in force 
was enacted in 1992,3 establishing a demo-
cratic liberal system based on the rule of law, 
basic rights and people’s sovereignty, which 
adopts the values of human dignity, freedom 
of the individual, equality and solidarity. 
4The country has a semi-presidential system 
of government5 with independent courts: 
three superior courts, the Constitutional 
Court (CC), the Supreme Court of Justice 
(SC) and the Auditors Court as well as two 
regional appeals courts and district courts in 
almost all municipalities of the Archipelago. 
Between independent rankings and studies6
and a political regime that has been cele-
brated in the early twenty-first century,7 the 
health of liberal democracy in Cabo Verde, 
despite some criticism from political par-
ties that circumstantially happen to be in 
the opposition, is not bad, at least when 
compared with African neighbors and some 
other countries in the developed world. This 
report aims to present political, legislative, 
jurisprudential and doctrinal developments 
of CV Constitutional Law in 2018. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
2.1. At the political and social levels, 2018 
was marked by the announcement of a 
new composition of the Executive that 
expanded the numbers of ministers and 
secretaries of state,8 with the addition of 
a Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister of 
State. This development was understood 
as a sort of abjuration of 2016 election 
campaign pledges of the current ruling 
party. That was the result of 2016 election 
campaign pledges. Constitutional contro-
versies between the Government (GR) and 
the President of the Republic (PR) emerged 
CAPE
VERDE
1 Richard Lobban, Jr., Cape Verde. From Criolo Colony to Independent Nation (Westview Press, 1995).
2 Humberto Cardoso, O Partido Único em Cabo Verde. Um Assalto à Esperança (INCV, 1993); Mário Silva, 
Contributo para a História Político-Constitucional de Cabo Verde, 1974-1992 (Almedina, 2015).  
3 Constitutional Law Nº 1/1992, of 25 September, consolidated version republished after its third revision, 
OJ, I-S, n. 17, n. 12, 03.05.2010, pp. 394-457, and, for a presentation in English, Aristides Lima, ‘Cape 
Verde’ in: Gerhard Robbers (ed.), Encyclopaedia of World Constitutions (FoF, 2007) vol I, 174-178.   
4 José Pina-Delgado, ‘Constituição de Cabo Verde de 1992 – Fundação de uma República Liberal de 
Direito, Democrática e Social’ in José Pina-Delgado and Mário Silva (eds.) Estudos Comemorativos do XX 
Aniversário da Constituição de Cabo Verde (Edições ISCJS, 2013), 113-159.
5 6J[m]PV(TVYPT5L[VHUK4HYPUH*VZ[H3VIVº:LTPWYLZPKLU[PHSPZTPU3\ZVWOVUL*V\U[YPLZ!+PɈ\ZPVU
and Operation’, 21 Democratization, 434-457. 
6 See Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democratic Report 2018 (V-Dem Institute, 2018), 94, where it is 
JSHZZPÄLKHZHSPILYHSKLTVJYHJ`"+LTVJYH[PJ0UKL_!4L[VV&7VSP[PJHS7HY[PJPWH[PVU7YV[LZ[ZHUK
+LTVJYHJ`,0< YHURPUNNSVIHSS`HUKZLJVUKPU(MYPJHPU[OL\W[PLYVMÅH^LKKLTVJYHJPLZ
HUK[OL-YLLKVT/V\ZL9LWVY[#O[[WZ!MYLLKVTOV\ZLVYNYLWVY[MYLLKVT^VYSKJHWL]LYKL%
accessed 12 February 2018, appearing with the status of free.  
7 Peter Meyns, ‘Cape Verde: An African Exception’ (2002) 13 JoD 153-165, and Bruce Baker (2006), ‘Cape 
Verde: the Most Democratic Nation in Africa?’ 44 JMAS 493-511.
8 Presidential Decree [PD] No 2/2018 of 4 January, OJ, I Serie [I-S], n. 2, 04.01.2018, 26.
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on matters of foreign policy related to the 
constitutional division of powers between the 
two branches, with the Head of State arguing 
that the GR has a duty to consult with him on 
negotiations with foreign powers in order to 
conclude a treaty. The country also experi-
enced some social unrest with major strikes, 
in particular a controversial one promoted 
by the national police union that resulted in 
disciplinary proceedings and the dismissal of 
some of its members from the corporation,9
and the organization of semi-autonomist 
marches in the Northern Islands of the Archi-
pelago aimed at increasing the decentraliza-
tion of power; 
2.2. It was also a year of consolidation of 
important Constitutional Institutions in-
cluding the CC, the Ombudsman and the 
National Authority on Data Protection, 
though in the last cases the consolidation 
was combined with complaints of bud-
getary and staff problems in conducting 
their respective missions.10 There was 
continuous political strife in the Parlia-
ment (Assembleia Nacional) involving 
different constitutional interpretations of 
the role of the opposition and the limits 
of the parliamentary majority powers. The 
controversies included the Speaker’s con-
duct as an impartial umpire, and acrimoni-
ous discussions between the center-right, 
SUREXVLQHVV DQG SUR:HVWHUQ PDMRULW\
party (MpD) and the center-left, more 
statist and Afro-nationalist main opposi-
tion party (PAICV)11 as well as with the 
junior parliamentary party, center demo-
cratic-Christian UCID. This was the case 
when the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
National Defense announced a new secu-
rity partnership with the US that led to the 
approval of a SOFA,12 and the enactment 
of amendments to the Foreigners Act in 
order to exempt nationals of EU member 
countries from visas to enter the country, 
where the main source of revenue is the 
tourism industry.13 Verbal confrontations 
between the two main parties moved to 
an unseen event in the country when two 
MPs entered into physical engagement at 
Parliament House.14     
2.3. Despite this, relevant legislation was 
approved in domains important for Con-
stitutional Law: 
2.3.1. In the rights protection system, im-
portant substantive developments are note-
worthy, such as the enactment of the Code 
of Execution of Criminal Sentences, 15
which substituted the previous statute of 
1988, approved before the Constitution of 
1992 and embedded in a more authoritar-
ian criminal philosophy, and the Right to 
Food Act,16 which recognizes this right of 
individuals and collectivities to continuous 
access to food in sufficient quantities. In 
the labor and social security domains, oth-
HU PHDVXUHV LQFOXGHG WKH 6WXGHQW:RUNHU
Statute;17 the Telework18 Act,  which ex-
tends Labor Code protection to telework-
HUVDQDPHQGPHQWWRWKH0LQLPXP:DJH
Law to increase the base amount;19 and an 
act to protect the legitimate expectations of 
workers as a result of unforeseen and detri-
mental effects of an amendment to the gen-
eral law on social security.20
At the institutional level, 2018 led to the 
approval of the Regulation of Labor Inspec-
torate21 and of the Regulation of the Ombuds-
man Office.22 It also saw the promulgation 
of a decree to regulate media companies and 
media outlet registration, allocating these 
powers to the independent National Media 
Regulation Authority,23 and the passing of a 
law to designate the National Commission on 
Human Rights and Citizenship as the nation-
al preventive mechanism for purposes of the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention Against 
9 See Inforpress, 17/07/18, available at <https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/pm-denies-that-punishment-of-sinapol-leaders-is-a-way-of-conditioning-trade-unionism-
PUJHIV]LYKL&SHUN$LU%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` (SSWYLZZHY[PJSLZX\V[LKPU[OPZYLWVY[^LYLHJJLZZLKVU[OLZHTLKH`
10 See Inforpress, 28.11.2018 <https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/ombudsman-has-planned-a-budget-of-33-million-escudos-but-needs-52-million-escudos-to-oper-
H[LPU &SHUN$LU%
11 :LL0UMVYWYLZZ#O[[WZ!^^ ^PUMVYWYLZZW\ISJ]MVYTLYJHIV]LYKLHUWTJYP[PJPaLZ[OLNV]LYUTLU[\UIYPKSLKULVSPILYHSPZTS\ZH&SHUN$LU%HUK
Inforpress, 17.04.2018 <https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/pm-responds-to-jose-maria-neves-stating-that-the-dilapidated-socialism-of-his-predecessor-led-tacv-to-
IHURY\W[J`&SHUN$LU%
12 (WWYV]LKMVYºYH[PÄJH[VU»I`[OL5H[PVUHS(ZZLTIS`9LZVS\[PVU5V0?VM1\S `610:UWW :LLHSZV0UMVYWYLZZ
#O[[WZ!^^ ^PUMVYWYLZZW\ISJ]ZVMHNV]LYUTLU[ZH`ZJHIV]LYKLOHZUV[NP]LUPU[VHSS[OLKLTHUKZVMUVY[OHTLYPJHUZ&SHUN$LU%HUK0UMVYWYLZZ
#O[[WZ!^^ ^PUMVYWYLZZW\ISJ]WYPTLTPUPZ[LYYLM\[LZ[OLWHPJ]SLHKLYZ[H[TLU[ZHUKZH`Z[OH[ZVMHHNYLLTLU[PZJSLHYHUKL_WSPJP[&SHUN$LU%
13 0UMVYWYLZZ#O[[WZ!^^ ^PUMVYWYLZZW\ISJ]MVYTLYJHIV]LYKLHUWTJYP[PJPaLZ[OLNV]LYUTLU[\UIYPKSLKULVSPILYHSPZTS\ZH&SHUN$LU%0UMVY-
WYLZZ#O[[WZ!^^ ^PUMVYWYLZZW\ISJ]NV]LYUTLU[HWWYV]LZ[OLHTLUKTLU[VM[OLKLJYLLMVY[OLTH[LYPHSPaH[PVUVM[OL]PZH^HP]LYSH^&SHUN$LU%
and Law-Decree No 46/2018 of 13 August, OJ, I-S, n. 54, 13.08.2018, 1350-1371, which was subsequently challenged in the CC by PAICV MPs focusing on the 
norms that increased the Airport Security Fee.    
14 Inforpress, 15.11.2018 <https://www.inforpress.publ.cv/mpd-parliamentary-group-challenges-moises-borges-to-resign-from-the-positions-and-functions-he-oc-
J\WPLZ&SHUN$LU%
15 Legislative-Decree, No 6/2018, of 31 October, OJ, I-S, n. 70, 31.10.2018, 1678-1749.
16 Law No37/IX/2018 of 16 August, OJ, I-S, n. 55, 16.06.2018, 1384-1392. 
17 Law No 41/IX/2018 of 16 November, OJ, I-S, n. 75, 16.10.2018, 1800-1802. 
18 Legislative-Decree No 11/2018 of 5 December, OJ, I-S, n. 79, 05.12.2018, 1920-1923. 
19 Decree-Law No 15/2018 of 19 March, OJ, I-S, n. 15, 19.03.2018, 434.
20 Decree-Law No 69/2018 of 20 December, OJ, I-S, n. 15, 20.12.2018, 2080-2081.
21 Decree-Law No 55/2018 of 24 October, OJ, I-S, n. 24, 24.10.2018, 1619-1630. 
22 Decree-Law No 24/2018 of 14 May, OJ, I-S, n. 29, 14.05.2018, pp. 670-679.
23 Decree-Law No 47/2018 of 13 August, OJ, I-S, n. 54, 13.08.2018, 1371-1377.
24 Government Resolution No 98/2018 of 24 September, OJ, I-S, n. 61, 24.09.2018, 1546-1547.
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Torture, granting it powers to visit places of 
detention and also to receive individual com-
plaints (Article 2).24 In addition, also com-
ing from an international source, Parliament 
DXWKRUL]HGDFFHVVLRQWRWKH:,32&RS\ULJKW
Treaty of 1996;25 to the Marrakesh Treaty 
WR)DFLOLWDWH$FFHVV WR3XEOLVKHG:RUNVIRU
Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, 
or Otherwise Print Disabled of 2013;26  and, 
with a rather unorthodox procedure, ‘acces-
sion’ to the Open Government Declaration.27
2.3.2. Rules of Parliament28 were also en-
acted in June and entered into force in Oc-
tober, inserting new precepts providing for 
bimonthly sessions rather than monthly 
ones as before; for the obligation of the PM 
to present himself, once a month, for de-
bates with the opposition; for the strength-
ening of the specialized committees role; 
for the establishing of an ethics commission 
and for a rationalization in time available 
for speeches. The ambitious bill of region-
alization, which required a two-thirds ma-
jority, narrowly passed a first reading vote, 
but it is not certain if it will attract enough 
support from opposition party benches to 
be definitively approved.  
2.3.3. Some developments occurred in 
the field of the system of justice with the 
enactment of the Auditors Court Law,29
granting the organ expanded powers of 
oversight and leading to the appointment of 
new judges to replace predecessors whose 
term of office had long since expired.30 It is 
also worth mentioning that Ms. Costa and 
Mr. B. Delgado, elected, respectively, to an 
(&2:$6&RXUW RI -XVWLFH MXGJHVKLS DQG
a Judicial Council Chairmanship, left their 
functions as substitute judges of the CC.31
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The CC, composed of three permanent jus-
tices, was created by a 1992 amendment of 
the Constitution, but only started operating 
in 2015, delivering its first ruling in 2016. 
In 2018 it maintained close to 30 decisions 
a year.  
Despite the Court having broad jurisdiction, 
comprising decentralized and centralized 
judicial review of legislation (both pre- and 
post-promulgation), constitutional complaint 
for violation of civil and political rights by 
public powers (including the judiciary) and 
settlement of electoral, parliamentary and 
intra-party disputes, of the 29 collective de-
cisions of 2018, 24 involved constitutional 
complaints. Nonetheless, some of the rulings 
were mere decisions conceding to the com-
plainants the possibility of correcting their 
memorials, standard opinions on admissibil-
ity written by the CJ  (Borges v. SC; Ezeonwu 
and Duru v. SC; CIMA v. SC; Barros et al. 
v. SC; Zirpoli v. District Court of Praia; Se-
medo v. Director of the Central Penitentiary 
of Praia and Minister of Justice), or merit 
opinions written by Justice Pina-Delgado 
on a matter—invocation of violation of the 
presumption of innocence in a dimension of 
the in dubio pro reo clause in reason of error 
in analysis of evidence—that, despite some 
initial divisions, are by now reasonably set-
tled between the judges in the sense that the 
CC only intervenes to grant relief if the trial 
court and the appellate court act arbitrarily 
or in a contradictory manner (Barbosa v. SC; 
Fonseca v. SC; Ezeonwu and Duru v. SC).
Other rulings included minor decisions (R.
18 and 19/2018) related to the confirmation 
of causes of cessation of functions of its sub-
stitute justices written for the Court by Jus-
tices Lima and Pina-Delgado, respectively, 
and to a post-opinion request related to clar-
ification and alleged omission of a 2017 rul-
ing that led to R 9/2018, authored by Justice 
Pina-Delgado. There were also relevant rul-
ings included, namely an admissibility deci-
sion where the CC, in an opinion written by 
the CJ Semedo, granted its first provisional 
measure involving the decision of a request 
to revert the freezing of assets determined by 
the Public Prosecutor’s Office; another—R 
10/2018: Joaquim Wenceslau v. SC—written
on behalf of the Court by the same Justice 
in order to adopt an injunction to declare 
null and void a disciplinary procedure where 
a public employee was dismissed from of-
fice without the possibility of contesting a 
change in the indictment; an opinion written 
for the Court by Justice Pina-Delgado on a 
constitutional complaint—Nascimento v. 
SC—in which, despite not granting the relief 
sought, considered that the appellate court 
may have applied an unconstitutional rule 
that conditioned appeal on previous payment 
of court fees, which should be scrutinized 
following a request by the Attorney-General; 
and, finally, Ruling 23/2018, written by Jus-
tice Pina-Delgado with Justice Lima dissent-
ing, concerning judicial review of legislation 
referred by the Attorney-General where it 
followed a precedent established in a simi-
lar case decided in 2016 when it developed 
the test it generally applies in cases of rules 
challenged on the basis of the principle of 
legitimate expectations, both in situations of 
pure retroactivity and of mere retrospectivity 
of laws.
25 Resolution No 92/IX/2018 of 29 October, OJ, I-S, n. 69, 29.10.2018, 1660-1667.
26 Resolution No 93/IX/2018 of 29 October, OJ, I-S, n. 69, 29.10.2018, 1667-1676.
27 National Assembly Resolution No 75/IX/2018 of 2 March, OJ, I-S, n. 15, 02.03.2018, pp. 369-371.
28 OJ, I-S, n. 41, 21.06.2018, pp. 1060-1095. 
29 See Law No 24/IX/2018 of 2 February, OJ, I-S, n. 7, 02.02.2018, 95-120.
30 PD No 28/2018 of 24 October, OJ, I-S, n. 67, 24.10.2018, 1618, appointing Mr. da Cruz, a jurist and career auditor at the Court, as the CJ; Ms. Reis, a career 
Q\KNL"4Y*HYKVZVHTPUPZ[Y`VMÄUHUJLJHYLLYPUZWLJ[VY"4Y=4VU[LPYVHZLUPVYJHYLLYH\KP[VY"HUK4Y*4VU[LPYVHZWLJPHSPZ[PUÄUHUJLZ
31 Declaration of Cessation of Functions of the Substitute Justices of the CC of 9 October 2018, OJ, I-S, n. 65, 19.10. 2018, 1615. 
32 OJ, I-S, n. 21, 11.04.2018, 505-530.
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Major Decisions
1. R 7/2008 - Monteiro v. National Electoral 
Commission [NEC] – Electoral Appeal 32
Despite this decision being adopted by the 
CC as an Electoral Court, it dealt with im-
portant constitutional matters, such as the 
principle of participatory democracy and the 
principle of equality. It followed a challenge 
promoted by Mr. Monteiro, a candidate in the 
last presidential election who had his request 
for reimbursement of electoral campaign ex-
penses denied by the NEC on grounds that he 
failed to reach the threshold of 10% of votes 
established by the Electoral Code. The CC, 
in an opinion written by Justice Pina-Delga-
do with Justice Lima concurring, understood 
that it was approached not to exercise its 
role as constitutional jurisdiction but as an 
electoral one and in order, as any court under 
the mixed CV judicial review model,33 to set 
aside legal rules contrary to constitutional 
principles. In that position, it dismissed the 
argument brought by the plaintiff that the 
principle of participatory democracy was 
breached by the limit imposed by ordinary 
legislation, stressing, after an examination of 
the preparatory works and the political con-
text of the adoption of the Constitution, that 
the correct interpretation of that principle did 
not lead to a positive obligation to support all 
candidacies in an equal manner, but only to 
underline the principles of a competitive and 
multiparty democracy to contrast the princi-
ple of revolutionary democracy that was one 
of the pillars of the previous one-party sys-
tem. Nonetheless, it found a violation of the 
principle of equality insofar as it understood 
that the threshold was too high and dispro-
portionate after inserting for the first time a 
test of proportionality in the framework of 
the equality scrutiny.
2. PR Referral for Ex-Ante ‘Advice’ on the 
Constitutionality of the Amendment Act 
of the Law on Essential Public Services – 
Judicial Review 34
The PR wanted ‘advice’ on the constitu-
tionality of a norm inserted in the Law of 
Essential Public Services that expanded its 
coverage to reach solid urban waste, but al-
lowed the service to be charged on the same 
invoice of other public services, leading to 
a situation where failure to pay the former 
would suspend the continuous delivery of 
electricity, water or phone services. The CC 
found that such a norm infringed the clauses 
that obliged the state to take into account the 
economic interests of the consumers as well 
as the principles of justice—in this matter, 
overcoming an internal division between 
two of its justices concerning the meaning 
and reach of the clause—and good faith in 
the relations between the administration and 
private persons.
3. Teixeira v. SC I and II – Constitutional 
Complaints
These two decisions are related to the same 
case linked with Mr. Teixeira, who was sub-
jected to pre-trial detention for allegedly 
murdering a person in circumstances that he 
understood were classifiable as self-defense. 
In the first decision, R 8/2018,35 written by 
Justice Pina-Delgado for the Court with Jus-
tice Lima dissenting, the CC dealt, firstly, 
with the question of whether the absence of 
a decision by the SC on a post-trial request 
challenging the omission of the Court in an-
swering one of the pleas violated the plain-
tiff’s right to a speedy trial, and, after drafting 
a test discussed in the framework of leading 
cases of the ECHR, the SCOTUS and the 
Spanish CC, concluded that the appeal court 
breached that constitutional guarantee; sec-
ondly, it used the right of self-defense recog-
nized with the right of resistance by Article 
19 of the Constitution to consider that the SC 
violated the plaintiff’s rights when it did not 
consider the effects of that norm in interpret-
ing a rule of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
that exempted suspects of having commit-
ted a crime in circumstances that may pre-
clude wrongfulness of being subjected to 
pre-trial detention. In the second decision 
(R 25/2018), written by CJ Semedo for the 
Court,36 the CC dealt with the related matter 
of establishing whether the SC breached the 
constitutional clause of presumption of inno-
cence and the guarantee of not being kept in 
pre-trial detention outside the temporal lim-
its of the law when it twice extended its du-
ration by appealing to the special complexity 
of the matter and ruled that the rights of the 
complainant were violated because the facts 
did not point to an objective complexity and 
because the reasoning of the SC, as far as it 
stressed that the maintenance of Mr. Teixeira 
in pre-trial detention was necessary because 
the matter was causing ‘social alarm,’ was 
incompatible with his right to freedom of the 
body and to the value of human dignity. 
4. PR Referral for Ex-Ante ‘Advice’ on the 
Constitutionality of the Enabling Act to Re-
view the General Commercial Companies 
Code (GCCC) and to Enact the Corpora-
tions Code (CorC) –  Judicial Review
This referral dealt directly with the constitu-
tional distribution of legislative powers be-
tween the National Assembly and the GR in 
the framework of an Enabling Law approved 
by the former granting powers to the latter 
to edict amendments to the GCCC and to 
enact a new CorC. This took place because 
the PR understood that the matter fell under 
the regime of concurrent legislative compe-
tence and thus the GR could approve legis-
lation without that act. The Court’s Advice 
(2/2018),37 written by Justice Pina-Delgado, 
followed a different path, finding that the en-
abling act was not unconstitutional because 
the parameters inserted in it would inevita-
bly lead to the approval of rules that limit the 
right to property, that incriminate conduct, 
and that establish administrative sanctions, 
all matters included in the set of competenc-
es of the National Assembly, though delega-
ble by an enabling act.
5. Borges v. SC – Constitutional Complaint
33 See also Judicial Review Systems in West Africa. A Comparative Analysis (IDEA, 2016).
34 OJ, I-S, n. 28, 11.05.2018, 655-664.
35 OJ, I-S, n. 25, 02.05.2018, 574-604.
36 OJ, I-S, n. 88, Sup, 28.12.2018, 11-26.
37 OJ, I-S, n. 44, 02.07.2018, 1141-1156.
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Mr. Borges, after being arrested by the po-
lice, was submitted to pre-trial detention by a 
judge order and subsequently convicted and 
sentenced for drug-trafficking, arms posses-
sion and conspiracy by the trial court. He did 
not appeal his convictions on the first two 
counts, but he argued that when the district 
public prosecutor challenged all the items 
of the ruling on the grounds that the penalty 
was too light, Mr. Borges should have been 
notified by the judge. The fact is that the trial 
judge admitted the appeal but did not com-
municate this to Mr. Borges, who, for that 
reason, failed to present his defense at the 
SC, which subsequently ruled that even if 
that were the case it could not be acted upon 
because the plaintiff did not react in the three 
days established by the law and that the lack 
of notice was only a minor irregularity and 
not an insurmountable nullity that could be 
argued at any time until the end of the pro-
cedure. The CC in R 24/2018,38 written by 
Justice Pina-Delgado with Justice Lima dis-
senting, disagreed, considering that the lack 
of notification was a grave breach of proce-
dure and due to the right to contest accusa-
tions, of judicial defense and of due process, 
it had to be interpreted as constituting an 
unsurmountable nullity void of effects, and 
ordered the repetition of the procedure start-
ing with the decision of admissibility by the 
trial judge and the notification of the sus-
pect. In addition, the plaintiff also pleaded 
to be released because in his opinion he was 
kept in pre-trial detention for more than 30 
months by the time he complained to the CC, 
challenging the interpretation of the SC that 
he had been convicted by a stable decision 
that was already res judicata, and concluding 
that he was no longer in pre-trial detention, 
but instead had already started to serve the 
criminal sentence. The CC adopted the un-
derstanding that considering the Constitution 
establishes a subjective right to the consti-
tutional complaint, it is not possible to con-
sider that a ruling of the SC, provided that 
it is still subject to an appeal to the CC, was 
a final decision for the purposes of ending 
status as a pre-trial detainee. Thus, the tem-
poral limits attached to the status were ap-
plicable, meaning that the plaintiff had to be 
released pending re-trial of the district pros-
ecutor’s appeal because by that time the term 
for maintenance of a person in that condition 
had already been exceeded.
6. Hills v. SC – Constitutional Complaint
This case dealt specifically with privacy and 
data protection in the framework of criminal 
investigation, being filed by Mr. Hills, a Ni-
gerian national resident in CV convicted of 
drug-trafficking, who alleged that the appeals 
court did not exclude evidence obtained in 
contravention of his rights to inviolability of 
home and protection of correspondence and 
communications. This occurred because the 
criminal police entered his house, accessed 
a mail package and read the contents of his 
cellphone without judicial warrant and with-
out his voluntary consent. In R 27/2018,39
written by Justice Pina-Delgado, the CC rec-
ognized a general right to privacy which in 
its reasoning is linked to a myriad of consti-
tutional guarantees, concluding that the SC 
should have excluded the evidence obtained 
without proper judicial warrant in situations 
in which the criminal police could not autho-
rize themselves to enter people’s homes or 
to interfere with their correspondence, com-
munications or personal data for purposes of 
investigation. Thus, it declared the breaches 
and granted relief by an injunction to ex-
clude all evidence obtained by illegal means. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Certain negative reactions from ordinary 
court judges to those CC decisions on crim-
inal matters have meant that next year could 
lead to tense situations between the two ju-
risdictions, similar to other countries where 
CCs can scrutinize the way the ordinary 
courts apply the law. At any rate, the CC will 
be busy with major constitutional challenges 
that were submitted, namely related to the 
constitutionality of certain provisions of the 
US-CV SOFA and of the Airport Security 
Fee Act. 
Though uncertain, 2019 could also be the 
year of the approval of important constitu-
tional or legislative acts, namely amend-
ments to the Constitution and to the Electoral 
Code, and the enactment of the Regionaliza-
tion Law as well as the election of two new 
substitute judges of the CC to replace the 
ones that left functions; of the reappointment 
of the Attorney General for another term in 
office or the replacement of the holder of the 
office by a new one.  
V. FURTHER READING
José Pina-Delgado, ‘O Direito Internacio-
nal Público no Direito Cabo-Verdiano’ in 
Jorge Bacelar Gouveia and Francisco Perei-
ra Coutinho (eds.), O Direito Internacional 
Público nos Direitos de Língua Portuguesa 
(CEDIS 2018), 81-176. 
Edalina Sanches, Party Systems in Young 
Democracies. Varieties of Institutionaliza-
tion in Sub-Saharian Africa (Routledge, 
2018), chap. IV (CV). 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Our previous 2016 and 2017 reports have 
shown examples that aim to identify and 
illustrate two trends that the Chilean Con-
stitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional 
de Chile—from now on, the ‘CC’) has de-
veloped. First, the CC has become a con-
sequential body that can challenge existing 
legislative majorities by declaring the un-
constitutionality of important legislative 
bills when the judges believe that those bills, 
or parts of them, violate the Constitution.1 
Our reports claimed that the critical judicial 
mechanism that the CC used to assert its re-
view power against legislative majorities is, 
although not exclusively, the ex-ante judi-
cial review mechanism. It is worth noticing 
that, in the Chilean constitutional system, the 
President can influence the Congress’s legis-
lative agenda, and the Congress can hardly 
enact any new piece of legislation without 
the President’s consent. Thus, the CC typi-
cally uses the ex-ante judicial review against 
bills sponsored by the President, a fact that 
increases the public visibility of the deci-
sions that declare the unconstitutionality of 
the bills using the ex-ante review procedure. 
An initial version of that power was intro-
duced first by the 1970 amendment to the 
1925 Constitution,2 but its current version 
is the one implemented by the 1980 Con-
stitution, which partly followed the French 
model.3
Our previous reports also briefly described 
a second CC trend: that the inaplicabilidad
mechanism—an ex-post and concrete ju-
dicial review power the CC uses to declare 
that a specific ordinary court should not use 
certain legal provisions to solve contingent 
legal controversies—is triggering relevant 
litigation aimed at protecting fundamental 
rights, such as the right to due process and 
equal protection of the law.4
This 2018 report confirms and expands on 
the two trends stated in our previous 2016 
and 2017 reports. As we will illustrate by 
examining a group of selected rulings, first, 
the CC has continued to assert its judicial 
review power in ex-ante procedures during 
legislative procedures. Second, the CC is 
consistently growing a significant forum for 
fundamental rights litigation through its ex-
post judicial review power, partly due to the 
considerable number of inaplicabilidad cas-
es that litigants and judges bring to the CC. 
CHILE
1Iván Aróstica, Sergio Verdugo and Nicolás Enteiche, ‘Developments in Chilean Constitutional Law’ in Rich-
ard Albert and others (eds), .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (I·CONnect-Clough Center 2017); 
Iván Aróstica, Sergio Verdugo and Nicolás Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ in Richard 
Albert and others (eds), .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^(I·CONnect-Clough Center 2018).
2 6U[OLÄYZ[L_HU[LQ\KPJPHSYL]PL^WV^LYPU[YVK\JLKPU*OPSLZLL,UYPX\L:PS]H*,S;YPI\UHS*VUZ[P-
[\JPVUHSKL*OPSL (1971-1973), vol 38 (second edition (2008), Cuadernos del Tribunal Constitucional 1977); 
Sergio Verdugo, ‘Birth and Decay of the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal (1970–1973). The Irony of a Wrong 
Electoral Prediction’ (2017) 15 0U[LYUH[PVUHS1V\YUHSVM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ 469.
37YVIHIS`[OLTVZ[PUÅ\LU[PHS,UNSPZO^YP[[LU^VYRKPZJ\ZZPUN[OL-YLUJOTVKLSPZ[OL^VYRI`(SLJ:[VUL
‘The Birth and Development of Abstract Review: Constitutional Courts and Policymaking in Western Eu-
rope’ (1990), 19 7VSPJ`:[\KPLZ1V\YUHS 81; Alec Stone, ;OL)PY[OVM1\KPJPHS7VSP[PJZPU-YHUJL;OL*VUZ[P[\-
tional Council in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 1992).
4 See Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Developments in Chilean Constitutional Law’ (n 1) 49; Aróstica, 
Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 58.
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The year 2018 has been particularly crucial 
for the inaplicabilidad because the number 
of inaplicabilidad legal actions has been 
drastically elevated. A search using the CC’s 
online research engine shows that in 2018, 
1663 new cases arrived, compared to 916 
in 2017 and 357 in 2016.5 Inaplicabilidad
legal actions triggered 1618 cases in 2018 
compared to 883 in 2017 and 299 in 2016. 
As we will explain later, part of the reason 
why the number of inaplicabilidad cases has 
escalated is related to the way the doctrinal 
positions of the CC in critical cases like the 
ones in Weapons and Emilia, discussed in 
our previous reports,6 have invited more liti-
gation on specific issues.
To be sure, the Chilean inaplicabilidad
mechanism is probably not as relevant as 
the prominent Colombian tutela mecha-
nism used by the Constitutional Court of 
that country (nor is it a similar legal action). 
7 Compared to the Colombian tutela, the 
Chilean inaplicabilidad has procedural con-
straints that limit its doctrinal impact on the 
way the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court engage with fundamental rights litiga-
tion.8 Despite that limitation, our examples 
illustrate the fact that the inaplicabilidad can
still be a valuable device for rights protec-
tions, as it is frequently used to consolidate 
or reiterate specific fundamental rights inter-
pretations.
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the course of the two trends stated above 
during the year 2018. Those rulings solved 
high-profile cases that attracted the attention 
of the media. Three out of the six judgments 
were pronounced by the CC using its ex-ante 
judicial review power, and three decisions 
are inaplicabilidad cases. Since this report 
must be brief, we will not mention separate 
judicial opinions, ignoring dissents and con-
currences.
The next section provides some context by 
briefly exploring the state of the Chilean po-
litical system and by describing some events 
that are relevant for the CC. Then, this re-
port dedicates two sections to summarize 
and analyze the most high-profile cases of 
the year 2018. The first one focuses on the 
most important decisions released as a result 
of the ex-ante judicial review procedure, and 
the second one on the other decisions that we 
selected.
II. THE STATE OF CHILEAN  
DEMOCRACY AND THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The Chilean democratic system seems to be 
in good shape. Elections are competitive; 
there is uncertainty on which political alli-
ance will win the next elections; conflicts are 
generally solved by institutionalized means; 
politicians respect judicial rulings; and elec-
tions have been held on a regular and unin-
terrupted basis since democracy was rees-
tablished in 1990. If we use Jack Balkin’s 
definition of what constitutes a constitu-
tional crisis,9 drawing from Sanford Levin-
son’s work, Chile is far removed from such 
a crisis. Although a group of politicians, in-
cluding former President Michelle Bachelet, 
have promoted the enactment of a new con-
stitution, Chilean institutions are respected 
and the debates on whether the Constitution 
should be reformed have been channelized 
through the current constitutional amending 
procedures. Even though Chilean political 
and judicial institutions seem to be strong, 
the violent events that have occurred in the 
southern Araucanía region, in the context of 
the conflict over indigenous demands, posit 
one of the key challenges that the country is 
currently discussing. 
In March 2018, President Bachelet ended 
her presidential term. Sebastián Piñera, the 
leader of the center-right political alliance, 
became the new President of Chile and will 
finish his term in the year 2022. A few days 
before leaving the presidential office, for-
mer President Bachelet submitted a bill to 
the Congress proposing to replace the Chil-
ean Constitution with an entirely new con-
stitutional text.10 That project offered many 
changes to the Constitution, including a pro-
posal to redesign the CC. It is worth mention-
ing that the 2005 constitutional reform had 
established the current institutional model 
of the CC, which was pushed by the former 
Socialist President Ricardo Lagos and ap-
proved by a bipartisan political agreement. 
The Lagos reform had increased the number 
of judges, changed the judicial appointment 
mechanisms and expanded the powers of the 
CC. The 2005 Court is, indeed, a different 
court compared to the one established by the 
1980 Constitution.
Today, some politicians promote reforms to 
the CC. President Piñera’s platform—pub-
lished in 2017—had suggested to reform the 
way CC judges are appointed. There seem to 
be ongoing political negotiations on wheth-
er the CC’s powers should be modified and 
on whether the judicial appointment mech-
anisms should be reviewed, but no consen-
sus has pushed for specific reforms yet (we 
are writing this report in early February of 
2019). Changes to the regulation of the CC 
are a challenging political task, as they re-
quire a bipartisan agreement broad enough 
to achieve the legislative supermajorities 
needed to modify the Constitution’s Chapter 
5 https://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/buscador [accessed 2/11/2019].
6 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Developments in Chilean Constitutional Law’ (n 1) 49; Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 
1) 58.
7 On the way the tutela cases have produced important doctrinal trends in Colombia, see generally Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and David E Landau, *VSVTIPHU
Constitutional Law: Leading Cases (First edition, Oxford University Press, 2017).
8 See some illustrative cases in the book by Gastón Gómez Bernales, 3HZ:LU[LUJPHZ+LS;YPI\UHS*VUZ[P[\JPVUHS`:\Z,MLJ[VZ:VIYL3H1\YPZKPJJP}U*VTU 
(Ediciones Universidad Diego Portales, 2013).
9 Jack M Balkin, ‘Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot,’ in Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson and Mark Tushnet (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? 
(Oxford University Press, 2018).
10 See 7YV`LJ[VKLYLMVYTHJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSPUPJPHKVLUTLUZHQLKL:,SH7YLZPKLU[HKLSH9LWISPJHWHYHTVKPÄJHYSH*VUZ[P[\JP}U7VSx[PJHKLSH9LWISPJHBoletín 
N° 11.617-07.
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VIII.11 Moreover, no partisan coalition pres-
ently dominates the legislative agenda, as the 
current political composition of the Congress 
considers the existence of three political alli-
ances and some independent legislators.
In the meantime, the CC has continued to use 
its powers. As we will show in later sections, 
in 2018 the CC reviewed some legislative 
bills that were originally sponsored by for-
mer President Bachelet, and other bills pro-
moted by the current Piñera administration. 
Despite the importance of the ex-ante judi-
cial review mechanism in evaluating legis-
lative bills,12 most of the CC’s work focused 
on the inaplicabilidad cases.
The year 2018 was also important for the CC 
because of changes in its composition. Judge 
Carlos Carmona, who had been appointed to 
the CC by former President Bachelet during 
her first presidential term, ended his judicial 
term on April 9, and Marisol Peña, who had 
been nominated to the CC by the Supreme 
Court, completed her term on June 10. Both 
Judge Carmona and Judge Peña served their 
full nine-year judicial terms. Also, they both 
served as Chief Justices of the Court. In 
Chile, constitutional judges cannot be reap-
pointed, and the Chief Justice is elected by 
her peers. Judge Peña was the first female 
Chief Justice to head the CC in its histo-
ry. To replace Judge Carmona and Judge 
Peña, President Piñera appointed Miguel A. 
Fernández, and the Supreme Court nominat-
ed María Pía Silva, respectively. Both Judge 
Fernández and Judge Silva are constitutional 
law scholars that have lectured at the P. Uni-
versidad Católica de Chile.13
III. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 
EX-ANTE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
POWER
1. The Controversy Over the New Powers of 
the Government’s Tax Agency (STC 5540)
The CC reviewed parts of a legislative bill 
that aimed to modernize the institutional 
framework of the Chilean banking system 
and the Financial Market Commission. 
Among several amendments to existing as-
sociated regulations, the bill included provi-
sions intended to empower the Chilean Tax 
Agency (in Spanish, the Servicio de Impues-
tos Internos, hereinafter, the ‘SII’), which is 
the Chilean equivalent to the American Inter-
nal Revenue Service. The legal issue at stake 
was associated with the fact that the bill pro-
vided for expanding the SII powers over the 
taxpayers in different ways. The SII’s new 
powers were supposed to be reviewed by 
the CC because they were considered to be 
‘organic laws,’ as they somehow related to 
judicial matters. According to Article 77 of 
the Constitution, legal provisions regarding 
the organization or the powers of the judi-
ciary are ‘organic laws’ and, therefore, they 
are supposed to be reviewed by the CC in the 
ex-ante judicial review procedure.
One of the rules that the CC declared un-
constitutional consisted of a provision that 
aimed to allow the SII to require banks and 
other institutions to communicate payments 
and wire transfers from Chilean accounts 
to accounts located abroad or of incoming 
funds to the country from a foreign account 
that exceed US$10,000. This SII power, as 
stated by the bill, could be exercised with-
out the need of obtaining previous judicial 
authorization.
According to the CC, the need for judicial 
authorization in these cases is constitutional-
ly required by the due process clause (Article 
19, No. 3, Par. 6 of the Constitution). The 
CC’s doctrine states that the clause includes 
the fundamental right to access courts of law 
if an administrative agency is imposing an 
unfavorable decision against a private party. 
Once the SII has obtained the information, it 
is too late to repair the harm made to the tax-
payer’s rights. The CC established that ‘the 
prior judicial authorization is constructed as 
a manifestation of due process since it de-
notes the existence of its elements: access to 
justice and the bilateral nature of the process. 
As a result of the absence of any of these el-
ements, the legal provision under examina-
tion must be declared unconstitutional.’ (our 
translation of c. 67 of the ruling).
This ruling is relevant at least because of 
three reasons. First, the CC expanded and 
deepened its understanding of the scope of 
the due process clause by confirming that 
these sorts of procedures need previous ju-
dicial authorization and that the legislative 
bodies must introduce this guarantee if they 
intend to empower an administrative agency 
in these cases. This decision connects with a 
broader doctrine that was previously outlined 
by the CC in earlier rulings, such as the Di-
rección General de Aguas case (STC 3958) 
that we examined in our 2017 report.14 The 
new decision finds a new application for that 
doctrine while detailing it further. Second, 
the CC has consistently defended the powers 
of ordinary judges to review administrative 
11 (JJVYKPUN[V(Y[PJSLVM[OL*OPSLHU*VUZ[P[\[PVU[OLJOHW[LYYLN\SH[PUN[OL***OHW[LY=000JHUVUS`ILTVKPÄLKPMIV[OJOHTILYZVM*VUNYLZZHJOPL]LH
two-thirds majority. Also, the organic statute detailing the content of Chapter VIII and supplementing the Constitution on this matter requires a legislative super-
THQVYP[`]V[L(JJVYKPUN[V(Y[PJSL VM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUTVKPÄJH[PVUZ[V[OL**»ZVYNHUPJZ[H[\[LYLX\PYL[OLHWWYV]HSVMMV\YZL]LU[OZVMIV[OJOHTILYZVM
Congress.
12 We explained the reasons that justify the ex-ante judicial review mechanism, and described the way it operates, in our previous report. See Aróstica, Verdugo 
and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 55. Also, see Sergio Verdugo, ‘Control Preventivo Obligatorio. Auge y Caída de La Toma de Razón Al 
Legislador’ (2010), Año 8, No 1 Estudios Constitucionales 201; Felipe Meléndez Ávila, ,S*VU[YVS7YL]LU[P]V,U3H*VUZ[P[\JP}U(J[\HS!,S;LTVY(S+LZIVYKL,U3H
Función Legislativa (Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2017).
13 Another change in the CC’s composition was the nomination of two substitute judges. We will refer to these two appointments in our 2019 report, as they were 
JVUÄYTLKPU1HU\HY`VM[OH[`LHY
14 Aróstica, Verdugo and Enteiche, ‘Chile: The State of Liberal Democracy’ (n 1) 56.
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actions in the past, while understanding that 
judicial intervention is many times required 
should state officers want to impair the activ-
ity of private citizens. This new ruling con-
firms and strengthens that approach.
The final reason why this ruling is import-
ant is that cases like this one are typically 
situated in a relevant and broader debate in-
volving the scope of the executive branch’s 
power to intervene or influence independent 
administrative agencies that possess regula-
tory powers and that are able to punish pri-
vate citizens. The issue usually is not only 
to preserve judicial authority but to delineate 
the correct balance between the President’s 
powers and the powers that these sorts of 
agencies can employ, and how to preserve 
their independence. As is commonly framed 
in Chilean legal academia, although the Pres-
ident’s powers over these sorts of agencies 
are generally justified by the constitutional 
provision stating that the President is the 
state’s chief (Article 24 of the Constitution), 
these institutions are also supposed to have 
a relevant degree of independence. Chilean 
scholars typically debate on what the right 
scope of the President’s powers is, and on 
how to balance the need to protect the auton-
omy of these agencies with the President’s 
constitutional obligations.15
2. Reviewing the Bill that Aimed to Modify the 
Consumer Protection Law Agency (STC 4012).16
The CC reviewed a legislative bill whose 
purpose was to strengthen the organization-
al structure of the administrative agency in 
charge of enforcing the Consumer Protection 
Law (in Spanish, the Servicio Nacional del 
Consumidor, hereinafter, the ‘SERNAC’). 
The SERNAC aims to ensure compliance 
with consumer regulations and to promote 
and provide information on the rights and 
duties of the consumer. Among many mod-
ifications the bill sought to implement, legis-
lators also aimed at transferring some juris-
dictional powers to the SERNAC, which is 
why the CC understood that the bill included 
‘organic law’ provisions and reviewed these 
new powers using the ex-ante review proce-
dure—the explanation of the above case is 
also applicable in this case. 
The judicial powers granted by the bill were 
related to the consumers’ right to present 
and process consumer protection claims, 
and who could decide whether to file those 
claims directly to the SERNAC or the courts. 
The CC understood that the option to submit 
claims to the SERNAC involved an uncon-
stitutional exercise of judicial powers by an 
administrative agency. The CC defined judi-
cial power as an activity aimed at the solu-
tion of a conflict of legal relevance between 
interested parties and argued that the Consti-
tution prevents those kinds of disputes from 
being solved by an agency such as SERNAC. 
For that reason, the CC further claimed that 
the related provisions included in the bill 
harmed the power of the judiciary by violat-
ing the judicial power clause included in Ar-
ticle 76 of the Constitution, and Article 19, 
No. 3 of the Constitution, Subsections 5 and 
6. The CC also reasoned that the bill partly 
violated the separation of powers principle, 
and prevented the promulgation of the parts 
of the bill that infringed on the Constitution.
Among other relevant considerations made 
by the CC, the ruling stated that its decision 
is not necessarily analogous to other cases in 
which different agencies are empowered to 
punish private citizens (c. 39). The resolution 
also reaffirmed the ‘principle of access to jus-
tice’ of all those affected in matters related 
to Consumer Protection Law (c. 42). Finally, 
the CC declared the unconstitutionality of the 
SERNAC’s power to enact regulations. The 
CC argued that those regulations could only 
be passed by legislators following the corre-
sponding legislative decision-making process 
because, under Chilean constitutional law, all 
the regulations regarding fundamental rights 
should be made by the corresponding parlia-
mentary procedure (c. 43).
The CC’s decision triggered a relevant dis-
cussion among Chilean legal scholars, partly 
aimed at defining the boundaries among the 
powers of the judicial, executive and legisla-
tive branches of government, and it is critical 
for understanding the way parts of the sep-
aration of powers debates have taken place 
in Chile.
3. Reviewing the Legislative Bill Regulating 
the Gender Identity Statute (STC 5385)
The CC reviewed a bill intended to recog-
nize and regulate the gender identity right. 
The bill aimed to adapt existing regulations 
to accommodate that right. Parts of the bill 
allowed people to change the registration of 
their gender in the records of the Registro 
Civil, an agency in charge of registering and 
providing certificates such as marital status 
documentation and birth certificates, among 
many others. That way, the bill tried to ac-
commodate the legal identification officially 
provided by the state with the gender identity 
that each person possesses. 
During the legislative debates, some legisla-
tors argued that parts of the gender identity 
bill were unconstitutional, using arguments 
such as the ones considering the types of 
‘family’ that are protected by the Constitu-
tion (Article 1 of the Chilean Constitution 
protects the ‘family’), and the scope of the 
equal protection clause (Article 19, Nº 2 of 
the Constitution). These legislative debates 
triggered a larger discussion that attracted 
the attention of the media, different civil 
society organizations, and even celebrities. 
15 On this debate, see, for example, the following papers: Nicolás Enteiche Rosales, ‘Superintendencias: Una Necesaria Autonomía Constitucional’ in Julio Alvear 
T. and Ignacio Covarrubias C. (eds), +LZHMxVZ*VUZ[P[\JPVUHSLZ7YVWPLKHK+LIPKV7YVJLZV3PILY[HK9LSPNPVZH9tNPTLU7VSx[PJV`(KTPUPZ[YH[P]V (Tirant lo Blanch, 
2017); José Francisco García G. and Sergio Verdugo R., ‘De las superintendencias a las agencias regulatorias independientes en Chile: Aspectos constitucionales 
y de diseño regulatorio’ (2010) 22 (J[\HSPKHK1\YxKPJH263; José Manuel Díaz de Valdés J., ‘Anomalías Constitucionales de Las Superintendencias: Un Diagnóstico’ 
(2010) 8 Estudios Constitucionales 249; Luis Cordero Vega and José Francisco García, ‘Elementos para la Discusión sobre Agencias Independientes en Chile. El 
Caso de las Superintendencias’ (2012), (U\HYPVKL+LYLJOV7ISPJV 415.
16 See a useful summary released by the CC of the CC decision in http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/wp-content/uploads/Comunicado-de-prensa.pdf [accessed 
2/11/2019].
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Parts of the bill connected to the powers that 
previous laws had given to Family Judges, 
so the CC understood that those parts were 
‘organic laws’ and had a legal reason to re-
view the bill. Nevertheless, the CC did not 
have the power to review all the parts of the 
bill, as the legislators that had argued that the 
bill violated the Constitution did not present 
a formal claim. 
As a result, the CC only reviewed the parts 
of the bill that were associated with judicial 
powers. The CC declared that those parts did 
not violate the Constitution with a relatively 
brief ruling.
IV. OTHER RELEVANT  
CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
This section summarizes three inaplicabili-
dad decisions. It is useful to keep in mind 
that, even though the inaplicabilidad rulings 
do not produce a binding precedent, as the 
challenged legal provisions remain legally 
valid and applicable to other cases, the in-
aplicabilidad decisions can still trigger a 
persuasive precedent able to push for rele-
vant jurisprudential trends. If the CC’s ju-
dicial majority can gather eight votes out of 
a total of ten judges, it can even eliminate 
the unconstitutional legal provision from the 
corresponding statute. The importance of 
the cases that we will briefly summarize in 
this section is that the first decision solved a 
first-impression case, and the other two rul-
ings reversed previous judicial doctrines. All 
the cases involved litigation on fundamental 
rights issues. 
1. The Optometrists’ Case (STC 3519 and 
STC 3628)
The Chilean Código Sanitario, a statute reg-
ulating some issues related to healthcare, 
prohibits medical consultations or medical 
eye technicians from providing consultation 
inside establishments that sell eyeglasses 
(Article 126, Par. 2 of the Código Sanitar-
io). The ban harmed the rights of such es-
tablishments and optometrists—healthcare 
professionals without a medical doctor de-
gree—because of such prohibition. The CC 
received two petitions that asked the Court 
to declare the inapplicability of the prohibi-
tion and questioned whether there was a rea-
sonable justification for such a ban. The CC 
decided that the prohibition of practicing a 
medical profession or medical technology in 
these cases, within such establishments, had 
no justification (c. 11), and that it violated 
Article 19, No. 2 of the Constitution, which 
prohibits public officials to establish arbi-
trary differences.
2. The Labor Code and Public Employees 
Case (STC 3853)
The Chilean Labor Code, which is the pri-
mary statute regulating the workers’ and 
unions’ labor rights, establishes that public 
employees are subject and can benefit from 
the provisions of the Code only when certain 
matters are ‘not regulated by their respec-
tive statutes’ (Article 1, Par. 3 of the Labor 
Code). That way, if a specialized norm regu-
lates the specific matter concerning specific 
public employees, that norm—and not the 
Labor Code—should be applied. The Code 
also establishes that workers can file legal 
actions when their employers have infringed 
on their fundamental rights. This legal action 
is the procedural justification for specialized 
labor judges to decide whether firing an em-
ployee or other employer actions violate the 
workers’ fundamental rights (Article 485 of 
the Labor Code). 
San Miguel’s local government had removed 
an employee who was subject to a specific 
regulation (Law No. 18.833, regulating the 
Statute of Municipal Officials), and that em-
ployee had petitioned a labor judge to declare 
that the removal was unjustified and that it vi-
olated her fundamental rights. The labor judge 
accepted the petition and used the Article 485 
procedure to establish that the San Miguel lo-
cal government should pay compensation to 
the employee. The San Miguel Court of Ap-
peals had also ruled in favor of the employee. 
San Miguel’s local government asked the CC 
to declare the inapplicability of Article 485 
and argued that the specific regulation—and 
not the Labor Code—should control the case. 
In 2017, the CC had rejected a similar peti-
tion (STC 2926), but this new case provided 
an opportunity to revise the previous doctrine. 
The CC accepted the inaplicabilidad petition 
and argued that the specific law that applied 
to the San Miguel case was justified under a 
constitutional clause referring to the regula-
tion of the public sector (Article 38, Par. 1 of 
the Constitution) and that a general statute for 
public employees already existed. As a result, 
the CC claimed that the Labor Code could 
only be applied if the specific regulation ex-
plicitly said so (c. 8) and that in the case in 
point there was no rule referring to the Labor 
Code. If a new piece of legislation wanted to 
extend the Labor Code rights to public em-
ployees, it should say so explicitly (c. 10-11).
3. The Public Procurement Cases (STC 3570 
and STC 3702)
A rule of the statute regulating the procedure 
by which the state can purchase goods and 
services (the Public Procurement Law or, in 
Chile, the Ley de Compras Públicas) estab-
lishes that anyone who has been sentenced 
for anti-union practices or for violating the 
employees’ human rights, or for bankruptcy 
crimes established by the Criminal Code, are 
not allowed to pact contracts with the state 
for a period of two years (Article 4, Par. 1). 
Two universities that had been sentenced 
under Article 4, the Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile and the Universidad de 
Chile, presented petitions of inaplicabili-
dad to the CC. Among other arguments they 
made, both universities alleged that Article 
4 did not guarantee a fair and rational pro-
cedure and violated the Constitution’s due 
process clause.
In the past, the CC had decided that Article 4 
did not violate the Constitution (STC 1968, 
STC 2133, STC 2722-2729), but the CC 
revised its doctrine and decided in favor of 
the petitioners. The CC claimed that Article 
4 prohibition provides for a penalty that is 
automatically assigned, preventing a previ-
ous procedure that can allow businesses to 
defend themselves. Moreover, the employers 
were already punished by the labor law or 
the bankruptcy law, so Article 4 imposes a 
new penalty without a trial, violating the due 
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process clause (Article 19, No. 3, Par. 6 of 
the Constitution). Likewise, the CC claimed 
that the Article 4 prohibition does not allow 
differentiating situations that may, in fact, 
be different, violating the equal protection 
clause (Article 19, No. 2, of the Constitu-
tion).
V. LOOKING AHEAD
This report showed three key cases that 
exemplify how the ex-ante judicial review 
power has been used in high-profile cases. 
In them, the CC proved to be a consequen-
tial actor capable of influencing the legis-
lative decision-making process, although in 
the last case the CC avoided declaring any 
UXOHDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO:HDOVREULHIO\H[-
amined three inaplicabilidad decisions that 
illustrate how the CC is becoming a relevant 
forum for concrete judicial review litigation 
in cases concerning fundamental rights. To 
be sure, all the cases, even the ones decided 
through the ex-ante review procedure, in-
volve a fundamental rights reasoning, such 
as equality and due process. But the ones 
of the inaplicabilidad petitions do not only 
include abstract reasoning on fundamental 
rights but also provide the CC the opportu-
nity to decide controversies and impact the 
way ordinary judges in specific fields, such 
as Labor Law, solve specific legal conflicts. 
Even though there is an ongoing debate on 
how the CC will be reformed, and when, the 
observed trends will probably continue to be 
deepened in 2019.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Colombian Constitutional Court faced 
four key questions in 2018. First, how to bal-
ance constitutional principles with the aims 
of transitional justice in the constitutional 
review of constitutional amendments, acts, 
and legislative decrees that implemented 
the peace agreement signed by the Colom-
bian Government and the FARC Guerrillas. 
Second, how to achieve effective protection 
of social rights and the accomplishment of 
goals of the social state, in particular, un-
der the circumstances of massive immigra-
tion of Venezuelans. Third, in a country in 
which mining products amount to more 
than half of the total exports, how to solve 
collisions arising between public participa-
tion, environmental rights, and rights of the 
indigenous peoples on the one hand, and 
rights and interests linked to mining on the 
other. Fourth, how to catalyze deliberative 
democracy, in particular, by means of the 
participation of citizens in abstract processes 
of constitutional review and concrete proce-
dures of constitutional complaints (tutela).
This report undertakes a critical analysis of 
the way the Constitutional Court approached 
those issues in the most relevant 2018 cases.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Transitional Constitutionalism
In November 2016, the Colombian Govern-
ment and the FARC Guerrillas signed a peace 
agreement that put an end to one of the most 
long-lasting conflicts in the hemisphere. A 
challenge of the agreement was to secure the 
demobilization of former combatants and, 
at the same time, to guarantee justice, truth, 
reparation to victims, and non-repetition of 
the atrocities. The Constitutional Court has 
played a major role in solving the tensions 
between those goals, and in articulating the 
peace process with the structural principles 
of the 1991 Constitution. Since 2014, the 
Court has built an original corpus of transi-
tional constitutionalism.
The peace agreement is a political commit-
ment. Accordingly, Constitutional Amend-
ment 1/2016 created a special fast-track 
procedure for legal implementation of the 
Agreement via constitutional amendments, 
acts, and legislative decrees. It also empow-
ered the Constitutional Court with the com-
petence to undertake an automatic abstract 
constitutional review of those norms. The 
Court reviewed most of them in 2018. They 
concern amnesties or reduced sentences in 
favor of former combatants, limitations on 
their political rights, the procedures for crim-
inal justice under the Special Jurisdiction for 
Peace (a jurisdiction created for rendering 
accountable the participants in the conflict), 
the use of FARC assets for reparation to the 
victims, and the guarantees to political oppo-
sition which aim to strengthen deliberative 
democracy and create disincentives for the 
use of violence to pursue political ends. In 
the most relevant decisions, the Court in-
fused flexibility into some standards of con-
stitutional review for the sake of facilitating 
the transition.
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2. Social State
In 2018, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
addressed three major issues regarding the 
achievement of goals of the social state. First, 
whether the Constitution grants social rights, 
or at least a fundamental right to humanitarian 
attention, to undocumented aliens. In the last 
few years, Colombia has been facing the larg-
est migration crisis in its history. According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, over one 
million Venezuelans have crossed the border 
in the past three years. Most of them are still 
undocumented and endure circumstances of 
vulnerability. As a consequence, they have 
been requesting access to housing, health, ed-
ucation, and financial aid from the Colombi-
an Government. This comes during a public 
budgetary deficit and severe infrastructure 
limitations. Thus, the Government has denied 
services demanded by the immigrants. As a 
response, numerous Venezuelans have filed 
constitutional complaints (tutelas). The Con-
stitutional Court has acknowledged the finan-
cial limitations argued by the Government. 
However, it has also found that the principle 
of solidarity, which is at the heart of the con-
cept of the social state, grounds the protection 
of some fundamental rights to undocumented 
aliens; above all, the right to receive human-
itarian aid. 
The second issue related to the right to equal-
ity of women. The Court reviewed the con-
stitutionality of a section of Act 1819/2016 
that imposed a levy on feminine hygiene 
products (Judgment C-117/2018). The Court 
declared the unconstitutionality of the provi-
sion at stake with the argument that the levy 
targeted irreplaceable goods of exclusive fe-
male use. Hence, it held that the measure was 
discriminatory against women. Moreover, it 
considered that it was particularly harmful 
to women and girls with low income or who 
were in a state of vulnerability.  
The third matter concerned the challenge of 
choosing appropriate remedies for achieving 
the most effective realization of economic 
and social rights. That realization typically 
involves the design and implementation of 
public policies and the investment of finan-
cial resources. Both of them are traditionally 
subject of legislative and executive powers. 
In order to realize economic and social rights 
while respecting the separation of powers, 
the Court has begun to employ dialogical 
remedies involving a meaningful engage-
ment between the claimants and the com-
petent authorities for determining the most 
effective measure for the case at hand. 
3. Public Participation, Environmental 
Rights, Indigenous People’s Rights, and 
Mining Activities in Colombia 
Due to its economic and social relevance, 
the Colombian Government has declared 
mining an activity of public interest. As a 
result, there has been an influx of mining 
projects all over the country. Stakeholders 
have stressed that, under conditions of legal 
certainty, this industry could generate annual 
revenue of $1.5 billion. However, since 2013 
some communities have hosted popular con-
sultations and voted against the development 
of mining projects in their territories. This 
has elicited the question of whether peo-
ple are constitutionally empowered to ban 
mining activities by means of participatory 
mechanisms. In a landmark 2018 case, the 
Court ruled out this possibility.
In addition, Colombia is a party of the Con-
vention ILO 169. According to Section 6, in-
digenous people—and other ethnic groups—
hold a right to consultation concerning the 
development of projects that could directly 
impact their land. This right has also limited 
mining undertakings. Constitutional judges 
have suspended mining operations to en-
sure that consultation processes are carried 
out. Furthermore, indigenous people have 
filed tutelas for claiming compensation for 
environmental damages caused by mining 
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Colombian Constitutional Court redefined 
the constitutional scope of the rights to 
public participation in environmental de-
cision-making and to prior consultation re-
garding mining projects.
4. The Constitutional Court and Its Deliber-
ative Endeavor
Deliberation matters remarkably for consti-
tutional courts. It plays at least two core roles 
within these bodies. First, deliberation is a 
source of legitimacy, which alleviates the 
democratic deficit attributed to those consti-
tutional courts. To this extent, constitutional 
courts are expected to engage in deliberation 
in order to achieve the best decision based 
on the best argument. Both usually emerge 
from a reason-giving process open to all the 
relevant stakeholders. Second, deliberation 
brings about public contestation. Rather than 
stating the last word about all constitution-
al issues, constitutional courts should play a 
dialogical role in the framework of contem-
porary constitutional democracies. To this 
concern, constitutional courts catalyze delib-
eration and action of public and private ac-
tors, and open a space in which civil society 
can render officials accountable.
During the last 5 years, the deliberative per-
formance of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court has been outstanding. This is true re-
garding external deliberation, which implies 
the reason-giving engagement between the 
Court and external actors. Apart from the 
traditional amicus curiae, the Court has held 
public hearings in some of the most import-
ant cases. In them, the Court has used this de-
vice for involving the relevant stakeholders 
and igniting public deliberation on pressing 
constitutional issues, in the pre- and post-de-
cisional phases. Between 2014 and 2018 (5 
years), the Court held 24 public hearings, 
which is the same amount held by the Court 
between 1992 and 2013 (21 years). In partic-
ular, in 2017 and in 2018, the Court held 13 
public hearings, which denotes a significant 
growth of this deliberative practice. 
The Court held 6 public hearings in 2018: 
3 pre-decisional and 3 post-decisional. The 
pre-decisional public hearings related to 
3 of the most relevant cases brought to the 
Court that year, which concerned the tension 
between popular consultation and mining 
(A-138 of 2018), urban planning and broth-
el regulation (A-444 of 2018), and bilateral 
investment treaties (in particular, the treaty 
concluded between Colombia and France 
(A-707 of 2018). The post-decisional public 
hearings were about the 3 main structural 
cases in which the Court retained supervi-
sory jurisdiction; that is to say, prisons (A-
631 of 2018), forced displacement (A-634 of 
2018), and public health (A-668 of 2018). 
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The 3 pre-decisional public hearings were in-
tended to enable the Court to identify clearly 
what issue was at stake, to gather technical 
information, and to clarify the main argu-
ments behind each case. The public hearing 
held by the Court in case A-138 of 2018 gath-
ered public officials, mining actors, public 
officials from municipalities, and nongov-
ernmental organizations to discuss whether 
local communities are constitutionally em-
powered, through participatory mechanisms, 
to ban mining projects from their territories. 
The rationale behind the public hearing in 
case A-444 of 2018 was to launch “a forum 
for civil society organizations to participate; 
in particular those which work on the issue 
of the rights of victims and survivors of sex-
ual exploitation, with the aim that they are 
heard and taken into account.” In the public 
hearing developed in case A-707 of 2018, 
the Court tackled the technical information 
behind customary bilateral investment trea-
ty clauses such as most-favored nation, na-
tional treatment, indirect expropriation, and 
the very investor-state dispute settlement, 
among others. It is too early to determine 
whether and to what extent those public 
hearings enriched the final decisions in those 
cases.
The 3 post-decisional public hearings were 
sessions in which the Court followed up on 
the compliance to the remedies issued in the 
cases T-025 of 2004 (forced displacement) 
and T-760 of 2008 (public health) as well as 
T-338 of 2013 and T-762 of 2015 (prisons). 
In those follow-up hearings, the Court inter-
acted with central and local public officials, 
as well as civil society organizations, for de-
liberating about the hurdles to comply with 
remedies issued in structural cases. 
Up to 2018, the Court had held 34 follow-up 
public hearings related to forced displace-
ment, 22 regarding public health, and 2 
concerning prisons. The effectiveness of 
this strategy is an open question. The risks 
at stake are undisguisable. Rather than dia-
logical, it seems that those public hearings 
have become a sequence of monologues pre-
pared by public authorities to submit before 
the Court. Rather than a catalyst of public 
contestation, the Court has assumed a role of 
general administrator of public policies re-
lated to forced displacement, public health, 
and prisons. Rather than being judicial, those 
public hearings have become a forum of po-
litical accountability, where administrative 
authorities come to the Court as mere “ac-
count renders.” There is not reliable data on 
the benefits of those hearings over the effec-
tive protection of rights of victims of forced 
displacement, patients, and inmates.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Transitional Constitutionalism  
1.1. Judgment C-007/2018
Act 1820/2016 regulated the conditions to 
grant amnesties to former combatants. In de-
cision C-007/2018, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of that statute and held that 
most of its provisions were compatible with 
the Constitution. To reach this conclusion, it 
distinguished two types of crimes. First, in 
the case of politically motivated crimes—
as well as some other crimes connected to 
them—the Court ruled that granting amnes-
ties or ceasing prosecution were reasonable 
measures to attain peace. Second, the Court 
reiterated that some international crimes—
such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, 
and genocide, among others—cannot be ful-
ly pardoned, given that this would infringe 
on the rights of victims. Nevertheless, to 
strike a balance between peace and victims’ 
rights, the Court recognized that those who 
committed those serious offenses can (under 
some conditions) receive alternative and re-
duced sanctions. 
1.2. Judgment C-018/2018
In April 2018, by means of Judgment 
C-018/2018, the Constitutional Court upheld 
the “Opposition Statute.” This is an act that 
grants relevant political rights to politicians 
who declare themselves as part of the oppo-
sition or as independent. Those rights include 
entitlements to state funds for political cam-
paigns, and to special conditions to access 
the media. The Court acknowledged the im-
portance of promoting the peaceful exercise 
of the function of political opposition within 
a constitutional democracy, and in the midst 
of the implementation of a peace agreement, 
a timeframe in which former guerrillas were 
becoming political agents. The Court upheld 
the declaration of political opposition by 
political parties as a fundamental right, pro-
tected by an administrative injunction and 
exceptionally by the judiciary. However, the 
Court declared unconstitutional extending 
such protection to the social movements with 
representation in the Parliament and local 
collegiate bodies, with the argument that the 
Colombian Constitution aims at strengthen-
ing the protection of institutionalized politi-
cal parties. Moreover, the members of social 
movements engaging with political activities 
enjoy protection under the individual consti-
tutional right to political participation.
1.3. Judgment C-071/2018
In July, the Constitutional Court upheld the 
majority of the provisions contained in De-
cree 903 of 2017, which regulates the des-
tination of FARC assets (Judgment C-071 
of 2018). In accordance with the judgment, 
all FARC’s assets ought to be used exclu-
sively for the reparations of the victims of 
the armed conflict. Also, acknowledging the 
importance of the victims’ rights, the Court 
declared unconstitutional the possibility of 
using those assets to finance the reincorpo-
ration to civil society of former FARC mem-
bers. Finally, the Court stated that due pro-
cess should be granted in case bona fide third 
parties claim that their assets were included 
in the inventory of FARC assets without jus-
tification.
1.4. Judgment C-080/2018
Some months later, the Constitutional Court 
reviewed the constitutionality of a bill gov-
erning key aspects of the so-called Special 
Jurisdiction for Peace. The newly created 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace is a central 
piece in the apparatus designed to implement 
the peace agreement. It is empowered to de-
termine the criminal liability and potential 
sanctions applicable to former combatants. 
In one of the most consequential decisions 
for the implementation of the peace agree-
ment (Judgment C-080/2018), the Court en-
dorsed the constitutionality of the bill. How-
ever, it also addressed and clarified certain 
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contested issues, and held that: (a) the appli-
cation of amnesties or reduced sanctions is 
possible only if the perpetrators commit to 
the restitution of victims’ rights; (b) the right 
to participate in government is allowed only 
for those former combatants who, at the out-
set of the proceedings, explicitly recognize 
their criminal responsibility and contribute 
to restoring victims’ rights; (c) the extradi-
tion of former combatants who committed 
crimes before the peace agreement’s signa-
ture is prohibited, while in other cases (i.e., 
crimes that occurred after its signature and 
certified as such by the Special Jurisdiction 
for Peace), the President and the Supreme 
Court must consider the state’s duty to pros-
ecute serious crimes and protect victims’ 
rights before authorizing their extradition; 
and (d) noncombatants who were involved 
in the conflict may request to be tried by the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace. This judg-
ment elicited severe criticism concerning the 
intervention of the Court in the procedure 
for extradition, and the possibility that sexu-
al offenders of minors might receive lenient 
criminal treatment under the Special Juris-
diction for Peace.
2. Social State
2.1. Judgment T-210/18 
In Judgment T-210/18, the Court protect-
ed the right to health of two undocumented 
Venezuelans. The first was a single mother 
who had been diagnosed with cervical can-
cer in Venezuela. Initially, a hospital in Co-
lombia provided her radiotherapy and che-
motherapy. However, the hospital told her 
that since she did not have Colombian health 
insurance, they could not assist her anymore. 
The doctors gave her a medical order and 
warned her that she needed to continue with 
the treatment elsewhere. The second plain-
tiff was the mother of a two-year-old Vene-
zuelan boy who suffered from a hernia. She 
requested medical attention for her son. She 
claimed to be in the process of regularizing 
their migration status. The hospital, howev-
er, denied surgery because they were not yet 
enrolled in the Colombian health system. 
The Court ruled in favor of both plaintiffs. 
It argued that the principle of solidarity is 
a pillar of the Constitution. In virtue of that 
principle, the state must guarantee the min-
imum conditions of living to all human be-
ings, especially to those who are vulnerable, 
regardless of their migration status. 
2.2. Judgment T-027/18 
In Judgment T-027/18, the Court decided a 
case regarding the protection of persons with 
disabilities and their right to public higher 
education. The petitioner stated that a public 
university denied her rights to education and 
equality by not adjusting its curriculum to 
her hearing disability. The University argued 
that its programs complied with inclusive 
education regulation, even by the employ-
ment of a sign language interpreter. 
The Court experimented with methodology 
to balance the levels of realization of positive 
economic and social rights grounded on the 
principles of rationality and proportionality. 
:KHQDSSO\LQJWKLVPHWKRGRORJ\WKH&RXUW
granted certain reasonable and proportional 
claims. Regarding other claims, even though 
the Court determined that the intended level 
of realization was unreasonable, it ordered 
the University to implement alternative mea-
sures to effectively guarantee the petitioner’s 
right to access and remain in a higher educa-
tion institute.
2.3. Judgment T-091/18 
Following that trend, in Judgment T-091/18, 
the Court applied the above-mentioned pro-
portionality methodology for economic and 
social rights to address an issue concern-
ing education. In this case, the petitioners 
claimed that the Secretary of Education of 
Caquetá disavowed the rights to education 
and equality by not authorizing the open-
ing of high school grades at the rural public 
school of Salamina. The Secretary argued 
that the number of students demanding 
secondary education in the school was not 
sufficient to open new grades, according to 
applicable legal criteria. The Secretary also 
mentioned that there were two alternative 
schools to guarantee the right to education of 
the students. The Court considered that there 
were multiple plausible and reasonable alter-
natives to protect the right of the plaintiffs. 
Thus, it ordered a dialogue be established 
between the petitioners and the authorities 
as an appropriate judicial remedy. For the 
Court’s part, it had to determine the most 
appropriate alternative to guarantee the ef-
fective access of the petitioners to secondary 
education. The dialogue successfully led to 
the enrollment of most of the students in one 
of the schools available.
3. Public Participation, Environmental 
Rights, Indigenous People’s Rights and Min-
ing Activities in Colombia
3.1. SU-095/2018 
In this judgment, the Court declared the un-
constitutionality of the judicial decision that 
authorized the Municipality of Cumaral, 
Meta, to initiate a public consultation pro-
cess to ask its citizens whether they wanted 
to allow mining activities in their territory. 
The petitioner, a mining company that had 
an effective mining right to exploitation, ar-
gued that the result from the public consul-
tation implied in fact a veto to exercise legal 
mining activities. 
The Court declared that, even though par-
ticipation is a fundamental right (granted 
by Sections 40 and 79 of the Constitution), 
it ought to be exercised within its constitu-
tional limits. According to the Court, the mu-
nicipalities lack constitutional power to veto 
or annul the exercise of a national constitu-
tional competence via public consultation. 
Issuing mining and oil regulations is an ex-
clusive competence of the National Govern-
ment. Nevertheless, the Court admonished 
the Congress to legislate on a participation 
mechanism that allows communities to par-
ticipate on mining issues without granting 
them a veto power. 
3.2 SU-123/2018 
In this case, the petitioner was an indigenous 
community (Awa La Cabaña) that was ac-
knowledged to be at risk of physical extermi-
nation due to the armed conflict and the fact 
that it had suffered massive dispossession 
of its lands. The petitioner claimed that the 
National Environmental Licensing Authority 
and two oil companies were bound to con-
sult on a specific drilling project based on 
its direct impact on their rights to a healthy 
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environment and to access to and enjoyment 
of culture. 
The Court unified its case law on prior con-
sultation to the indigenous population. This 
decision set some rules regarding the appli-
cation of relevant elements of prior consul-
tation, for instance: (i) the notion of direct 
affectation; (ii) the scope of indigenous terri-
tory; (iii) the relations between prior consul-
tation and environmental justice; and (iv) the 
right of indigenous peoples to be compensat-
ed with an ethnic perspective. As a result, the 
Court ruled in favor of the petitioner com-
munity. It determined that, in application 
of the above-mentioned criteria, and of the 
Ruggie Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, the state has a duty of diligence to 
ensure prior consultation given the impacts 
that drilling activity may have on the com-
munity’s bio-cultural rights. 
3.3  A-616/2018 
In judgment T-733/2017, the Seventh Cham-
ber of the Constitutional Court, comprised of 
3 justices, decided a tutela presented by an 
indigenous community against Cerro Mato-
so, the largest nickel mine in Colombia. The 
petitioners claimed a violation of their right 
to prior consultation. The Chamber estab-
lished a violation of the rights to prior con-
sultation, health, and a healthy environment 
of the petitioners. Hence, the Court ordered 
the company to not only create a consulting 
process with the claimants but also: (i) to
compensate for damages caused by the op-
eration, including lost profit and non-pecu-
niary loss; (ii) to create a compensation fund 
with an ethnic perspective; and (iii) warned
Cerro Matoso that non-compliance to these 
orders would empower the constitutional 
judge to halt the mining operation. 
The company requested the Court to partial-
ly annul the decision because, in its opinion, 
it violated its right to due process. In this 
annulment instance, the plenary of the Court 
decided to annul orders (i), (ii), and (iii) on 
three grounds. First, the decision disavowed 
the constitutional precedent concerning the 
tutela as a remedy to protect fundamental 
rights and not to obtain reparations. Second, 
the decision did not motivate the need for 
the creation of an ethnic compensation fund. 
Third, order (iii) constituted a sanction not 
provided by the legal order. This infringed 
the due process of law of the defendant. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2019, the Constitutional Court will issue 
relevant decisions on whether bilateral in-
vestment treaties are according to the Con-
stitution, whether the use of glyphosate for 
eradication of illicit drug fields is allowed 
under the right to a healthy environment, 
and whether traditional possessors of vacant 
lands should be constitutionally entitled to 
own them.
Moreover, the deliberative endeavor of the 
Court concerning public hearings will be 
fulfilling the expectations of positioning it 
in a better epistemic status to decide, and 
promoting public discussion on highly con-
tested issues. However, the risks of misusing 
this deliberative device will undermine the 
credibility of the Court if the hearings do not 
upgrade the protection of fundamental rights, 
creating polarization and glossing over defi-
cient government performance. A challenge 
of the Court for 2019 is rationalizing public 
hearings for achieving their aims. In particu-
lar, the Court should assess the efficiency of 
follow-up public hearings for purposes relat-
ed to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction 
in structural cases.
V. FURTHER READING
Vicente F. Benítez R., ‘Judicial Review of 
Peace Amendments in Colombia: Towards 
Supraconstitutional Rules and Plurality Opin-
LRQV"¶Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 31, 2017, 
at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/10/
j u d i c i a l - r e v i e w - o f - p e a c e - a m e n d -
ments-in-colombia-towards-supraconstitu-
tional-rules-and-plurality-opinions
Carlos Bernal, ‘Introduction to I-CON-
nect Symposium–Contemporary Dis-
cussions in Constitutional Law–Part II: 
The Paradox of the Transformative Role 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court,’ 
Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Oct. 31, 2018, at: 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/11/
i n t r o d u c t i o n - t o - i - c o n n e c t - s y m p o -
sium-contemporary-discussions-in-consti-
tutional-law-part-i-the-paradox-of-the-trans-
formative-role-of-the-colombian-constitu-
tional-court
Magdalena Correa Henao, ‘I-CONnect 
Symposium–Contemporary Discussions 
in Constitutional Law–Part VIII: Popu-
lar Consultations Regarding Mining Proj-
ects in Colombia,’ Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 
Nov. 7, 2018, at: http://www.iconnectblog.
com/2018/11/i-connect-symposium-con-
temporary-discussions-in-constitution-
al-law-part-viii-popular-consultations-regar-
ding-mining-projects-in-colombia
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 63
Commonwealth Caribbean
Derek O’Brien, Senior Lecturer – Truman Bodden Law School
I. INTRODUCTION
In constitutional terms, 2018 was an event-
ful year for the region on a number of dif-
ferent levels. At the political level, the year 
began with the election of the first-ever fe-
male president in the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago, Madame Justice Paula-Mae 
:HHNHV D IRUPHU &RXUW RI$SSHDOV MXGJH
LQ WKH7XUNVDQG&DLFRV3UHVLGHQW:HHNHV
who had been nominated by the Prime Min-
ister, Keith Rowley, and whose nomination 
was endorsed by the leader of the opposi-
tion, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, was indirectly 
elected by an electoral college comprised of 
all the members of the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate. The election of Presi-
GHQW:HHNHVZDVIROORZHGVKRUWO\WKHUHDIWHU
by the appointment of only the second-ever 
female governor general of Barbados, Dame 
Sandra Mason. In elections in May, Barba-
dos also elected a new female prime minister, 
Mia Mottley, the leader of the Barbados La-
bour Party, which won all 30 of the available 
seats in the House of Representatives. The 
elections also resulted in the largest number 
of female members (six) being elected to 
Parliament. Though this was the first- ever 
clean sweep of an election in Barbados, clean 
sweeps are not uncommon in the region, 
and the year saw the Antigua Labour Party 
and the New National Party winning clean 
sweeps in elections in Antigua and Barbuda 
and Grenada, respectively. Elsewhere, the 
Government of St Vincent had to face down 
a vote of no-confidence, which it won by the 
narrowest of margins (8 to 7 votes) while 
the coalition Government, the APNU (Alli-
ance for Change, in Guyana), narrowly lost 
a vote of no-confidence towards the end of 
the year when a Government backbencher, 
Charandass Persaud, crossed the floor of the 
House of Representatives. 
At the level of constitutional reform, the citi-
zens of Antigua and Barbuda and Grenada si-
multaneously voted in referendums to reject 
an amendment of their respective Constitu-
tions to replace the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council (JCPC) with the Caribbean 
Court of Justice (CCJ). Meanwhile, in Trin-
idad and Tobago, a Joint Select Committee 
(JSC) composed of members of both houses 
of the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament has 
been reviewing a draft bill—the Constitution 
(Amendment) (Tobago Self-Government) 
Bill 2018—which provides for a decentral-
ized system of government for Trinidad and 
Tobago. 
Finally, at the juridical level, the High Court 
of Trinidad and Tobago ruled that laws that 
criminalise homosexuality are unconstitu-
tional1 while the CCJ, in two landmark judg-
ments,2 ruled that the law providing for a 
mandatory death penalty in Barbados and a 
law criminalising cross-dressing in Guyana 
are both unconstitutional. Also noteworthy 
was the announcement of the withdrawal 
by the Roman Catholic Church of its ap-
peal against the decision of the High Court 
of Belize in Caleb Orozco v Attorney Gen-
eral of Belize3 that section 53 of the Beliz-
ean Criminal Code, which criminalised ho-
PRVH[XDOLW\ZDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO:LWKWKH
withdrawal of the appellants it would appear 
COMMONWEALTH 
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1 Jason Jones v Attorney General Trinidad and Tobago, H.C.720/2017. CV.2017-00720 (unreported).
2 Nervais v The Queen [2018], CCJ 19 (AJ), and McEwan et al v Attorney General Guyana [2018], CCJ 30 
(AJ). Available at http://www.ccj.org/judgments-proceedings/appellate-jurisdiction-judgments
3 In the Supreme Court of Belize, Claim No. 668 of 2010. Unreported but available at http://cnslibrary.com/
wp-content/uploads/Belize-Court-of-Appeal-Judgment-Caleb-Orozco-v-AG-et-al.pdf. Last accessed 5 
January 2019.
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that homosexuality in Belize has effectively 
been decriminalised.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Since I have previously discussed the on-
going attempts across the region to replace 
the JCPC with the CCJ in my “2016 Year in 
Review,” I will not discuss here the issues 
arising from the failed referendum attempts 
in October of 2018 to replace the JCPC with 
the CCJ in Antigua and Barbuda and Gre-
nada. I will instead focus on efforts to rede-
fine the relationship between Trinidad and 
its sister island, Tobago, and the passage of 
“The Constitution (Amendment) (Tobago 
Self-Government) Bill 2018” (hereinafter 
“the 2018 Bill”).
Though relatively small, with a land mass 
of 116 square miles and a population of 60 
000, the island of Tobago has been agitating 
for several decades for greater autonomy 
from its larger and wealthier sister island, 
Trinidad. The most recent manifestation of 
Tobago’s desire for autonomy culminated in 
the 2018 Bill, which has been the subject of 
review by the JSC. Since there is not enough 
space within this short piece to comment on 
every detail of the 2018 Bill, I will instead 
highlight five of its main provisions. 
The first is a proposed amendment to the pre-
amble of the 1976 Constitution that would 
recognise the right of the people of Tobago 
to determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.
The second is a new constitutional provision 
that would provide for the equal status of the 
two islands.
The third is the creation of a new Tobago 
Legislature consisting of the President of 
Trinidad and Tobago, a House of Assembly 
(comprising 15 elected members and four 
Councilors) and a People’s House (a second 
chamber composed of 13 elected members). 
The Tobago Legislature would have power 
to make laws for the peace, order and good 
government of Tobago with respect to all 
matters except those listed in the Fourth 
Schedule of the Bill, which would be the ex-
clusive responsibility of the central govern-
ment. Those matters would include national 
security, foreign affairs, immigration and the 
appointment of the most senior public offi-
cials, which will continue to fall under the 
purview of the central government.
The fourth is the establishment of a Tobago 
Executive Council, comprising the Chief 
Secretary, a Deputy Chief Secretary and a 
number of other Secretaries appointed in ac-
cordance with the advice of the Chief Secre-
tary from among members of the House of 
Assembly, which would have direction and 
control of the Tobago Island Government 
and which would answer to the Tobago Leg-
islature.
Fifth, and finally, the President, when exer-
cising his functions under the Constitution or 
any other law, must do so in accordance with 
(unless otherwise stated by the Constitution 
or any other such law) the advice of not only 
the Cabinet but also the Tobago Executive 
Council. In return, the Chief Secretary must 
keep the President informed concerning mat-
ters of the Tobago Island Government.
The system of government envisaged by the 
2018 Bill may be described as “quasi-feder-
al” and is akin to that of a constitutionally 
decentralized union. It is basically unitary in 
form, but incorporates a constitutionally pro-
tected subnational unit of government that 
has functional autonomy. There will thus be 
a regional government for Tobago, but not 
for Trinidad. This arrangement resembles 
WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH :HVWPLQVWHU
Parliament in the UK and Scotland under the 
Scotland Act 1998 and gives rise to the prob-
lem of what has come to be known as “the 
:HVW /RWKLDQ TXHVWLRQ´ VLQFH WKH QDWLRQDO
Parliament must contain at least two MPs 
IURP 7REDJR 7KH :HVW /RWKLDQ TXHVWLRQ
refers to the anomaly caused by asymmetric 
devolution, in which devolved legislatures 
have law-making powers for some parts of 
the country, but the shared Parliament is also 
solely responsible for the government as a 
whole.4:KDW WKHQ LV WR KDSSHQZKHQ WKH
national Parliament votes on measures that 
DIIHFW 7ULQLGDG RQO\" ,V WKH LQWHQWLRQ WKDW
the two Tobagonian MPs will be excluded 
IURPYRWLQJRQWKHVHLVVXHV",IVRWKLVFRXOG
be problematic, given that the Government 
presently has a narrow majority in the elect-
ed House (holding 23 of the 42 seats), which 
includes the two MPs from Tobago. If these 
two MPs were not allowed to vote on matters 
that affected Trinidad only, the Government 
would no longer have a majority when these 
matters were voted upon. 
There is also the problem of lack of repre-
sentation of Tobagonians in the upper House 
of the national Parliament, which comprises 
31 senators appointed by the President: 16 
on the recommendation of the Prime Minis-
ter; six on the recommendation of the Leader 
of the Opposition; and nine by the President 
in his discretion from outstanding persons 
from economic or social or community orga-
nizations and other major fields of endeav-
our. There is no specific requirement that this 
number should include senators who repre-
sent the interests of Tobago and the 2018 Bill 
makes no provision for this. 
Finally, there is the larger question of Toba-
gonian influence on matters reserved to the 
central Government under the 2018 Bill, 
such as national security, foreign affairs, etc. 
:KLOHWKH%LOOSURYLGHVIRUPDQGDWRU\
quarterly meetings between the Chief Sec-
retary and the Prime Minister and the Chief 
Secretary may be invited to “air” Tobagonian 
matters at cabinet meetings, this is at the dis-
cretion of the central Government. As Toba-
gonians become accustomed to a measure of 
self-government, will they be satisfied with 
being excluded from decision-making in 
relation to such matters as national security 
DQGIRUHLJQDIIDLUV"7KHFXUUHQWVWDQGRIIEH-
tween the Scottish Government and the UK 
Government regarding Brexit is illustrative 
of the kind of tensions that can arise from 
such an asymmetrical relationship. 
The JSC was due to submit its report on the 
2018 Bill to the national Parliament by 31 
4 Jason Jones v Attorney General Trinidad and Tobago, H.C.720/2017. CV.2017-00720 (unreported).
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July, but the report has not yet been made 
publicly available. It is not, therefore, clear 
when, if ever, the Bill will be approved by 
Parliament. The 2018 Bill is supported by 
the current Prime Minister of Trinidad and 
Tobago, Keith Rowley, himself a Tobago-
nian native, but since it will entail amend-
ments to a number of the most entrenched 
provisions of the Constitution it will need to 
be approved by three-quarters of members 
of the House of Assembly of Trinidad and 
Tobago and two-thirds of the Senate. This is 
a formidable hurdle, which perhaps explains 
why efforts to introduce greater autonomy 
for Tobago have been so protracted. Given 
that the incumbent Government is already 
over three years into the life of the current 
Parliament, there must be a concern that if 
the Bill is not passed within the next two 
years and Prime Minister Rowley, who has 
thus far championed the 2018 Bill, does not 
win the next election, the Bill will eventually 
fall by the wayside. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Though it is of undoubted significance, the 
declaration of the High Court of Trinidad 
and Tobago in Jason Jones that laws which 
criminalise homosexuality are unconstitu-
tional is currently the subject of an appeal to 
the JCPC. I will, therefore, instead focus in 
this section on two landmark judgments of 
the CCJ: Nervais v The Queen and McEwan 
et al v AG Guyana. I will first briefly explain 
the CCJ’s approach in each case before pro-
ceeding to offer a critique of the CCJ’s ap-
proach, which is common to both cases.
1. Nervais v The Queen
This case was concerned with the constitu-
tionality of the mandatory death penalty in 
Barbados. This very issue had previously 
been considered by a nine-panel member of 
the JCPC in 2001 in Boyce and Another v At-
torney General Barbados.5 On that occasion, 
the JCPC had determined that the law-mak-
ing provision for the mandatory death pen-
alty (s2 Offences against the Person Act 
1861), being a pre-existing law, was saved 
from constitutional challenge by the gener-
al savings clause to be found in s26 of the 
Barbados Constitution. This is because s26 
provides that nothing contained in or done 
under a law enacted prior to the date of in-
dependence (being 30 November 1966) shall 
be held to be inconsistent with or in contra-
vention of any provision of sections 12 to 23 
of the Constitution (which list the rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution). In 
other words, the effect of s26 is to immunise 
all pre-independence laws from challenge on 
the grounds that they violate any of the rights 
and freedoms listed in sections 12 to 23 of 
the Constitution. Accordingly, the JCPC 
refused to deploy the modifications clause 
contained in s4(1) of the Independence Or-
der-in-Council, under which the Constitu-
tion was enacted, to modify the mandatory 
death penalty provided by s2 OAPA 1861 
to bring it into conformity with the Consti-
tution by substituting a discretionary for the 
mandatory death penalty.
The CCJ, however, took a quite different 
approach to this issue. Unlike the JCPC, the 
focus of the CCJ in Nervais was directed to-
wards the question of the enforceability of a 
quite different provision of the Constitution, 
s11, which provides as follows:
:KHUHDV HYHU\ SHUVRQ LQ %DUEDGRV LV
entitled to the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, 
the right, whatever his race, place of or-
igin, political opinions, colour, creed or 
sex, but subject to respect for the indi-
vidual rights and freedoms of others and 
for the public interest, to each and all of 
the following, namely:
(a) Life, liberty and security of the per-
son;
(b) Protection for the privacy of his 
home and other property and from 
deprivation of property without com-
pensation;
(c) The protection of the law; and
(d) Freedom of conscience, of expres-
sion and of assembly and association,
The following provisions of this Chap-
ter (ss12-23) shall have effect.
The answer to the question of whether s11 
of the Constitution was separately enforce-
able was critical because, unlike the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by sections 12 to 
23 of the Constitution, s11 was not subject 
to the immunising effect of the general sav-
ings clause in s26. Previously, the JCPC had 
treated clauses like s11, which are common 
to constitutions throughout the region, as 
mere preambles to the rights set out in the 
chapter guaranteeing fundamental rights 
and freedoms. Thus, for example, in Olivier
v Buttigeig, the JCPC observed of a similar 
provision found in the Constitution of Malta:
It is to be noted that the section begins 
ZLWK WKHZRUG ³:KHUHDV´7KRXJK WKH
section must be given such declaratory 
force as it independently possesses, it 
would appear in the main to be of the 
nature of a preamble. It is an introduc-
tion to and in a sense a prefatory or ex-
planatory note in regard to the sections 
which are to follow.6
Notwithstanding this precedent, Sir Dennis 
Byron, delivering judgment for the majority 
in Nervais, held that it would be irrational 
to attribute a meaning to the word “where-
as” that would make s11 impotent, i.e., un-
enforceable. The fact that s11 was omitted 
from the savings provisions in s26 did not, 
in his view, mean that s11 was preambular 
only. Rather, “the view that better accords 
with the protection of fundamental rights is 
that the Court is not prevented from holding 
that existing laws may be inconsistent with 
the rights and freedoms set out in s11.”7
Having decided that s11 was separately en-
forceable, the majority had little difficulty in 
finding that the protection of the law guar-
anteed by s11(c) included the right not to be 
subject to a mandatory death penalty. The 
5 [2004] UKPC 32.
6 [1967] 1 AC 115, 128F.
7 [39].
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question then arose as to whether the Court 
had jurisdiction to grant a remedy for this 
violation. Though it was acknowledged that 
s11 is omitted from the redress clause con-
tained in s24, which empowers the Court to 
remedy violations of the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution, this was not 
a reason in the majority’s view to assume 
that the rights guaranteed by s11 were not 
separately enforceable. The duty of the Court 
was “to give effect to the interpretation which 
is least restrictive and affords every citizen of 
Barbados the full benefit of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms.”8 This meant deploying 
the modifications clause contained in s4(1) of 
the Independence Order-in-Council to modify 
the mandatory death penalty provided by s2 
OAPA 1861 to bring it into conformity with 
the Constitution by substituting a discretion-
ary for the mandatory death penalty. 
In conclusion, Sir Dennis Byron, on behalf 
of the majority, declared that the Court was 
under a duty “to construe the conflicting pro-
visions of the Constitution, with a view to 
harmonizing them, where possible, through 
interpretation, and under its inherent juris-
diction, to fashion a remedy that protects 
from breaches and vindicates those rights 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.”9
2. McEwan et al v AG Guyana
This case was concerned with the constitu-
tionality of a pre-independence law in Guy-
ana, s153(1)(xlvii) of the Summary Jurisdic-
tion (Offences) Act, which makes it a crime 
for a man to dress in female attire, or for a 
woman to dress in male attire, in a public 
place, for an improper purpose. Though the 
case raised a number of distinct constitu-
tional issues concerning the compatibility of 
s153(1)(xlvii) with the right to equality and 
the right to freedom of expression, for pres-
ent purposes the most important issue was the 
preliminary question of whether the CCJ was 
barred by the general savings law clause con-
tained in Article 152 of the Constitution from 
testing the constitutionality of s153(1)(xlvii).
In answering this question, the CCJ, reiterat-
ing the views it had previously expressed in 
Nervais, declared: 
A Constitution must be read as a whole. 
Courts should be astute to avoid hin-
drances that would deter them from in-
terpreting the Constitution in a manner 
faithful to its essence and its underlying 
spirit. If one part of the Constitution 
appears to run up against an individual 
fundamental right, then, in interpret-
ing the Constitution as a whole, courts 
should place a premium on affording the 
citizen his/her enjoyment of the funda-
mental right, unless there is some over-
riding public interest (emphasis added).
:LWKWKLVREMHFWLYHLQPLQGWKH&&-LGHQWL-
fied “four broad and interlocking approach-
es” that it could take in order “to ameliorate 
the harsh consequences of the application of 
the saving laws clause.” The first was to con-
strue the savings law clause in Article 152 as 
narrowly as possible. The second was to ap-
ply the saving laws clause only to challeng-
es to the stipulated human rights provisions, 
i.e., in Guyana, Articles 138 to 149. The third 
was to avoid an interpretation of domestic 
law that places a state in breach of its inter-
national obligations. The fourth was to apply 
the modifications clause contained in s7(1) 
of the Constitution Act to the relevant pre-in-
dependence law before attempting to apply 
the savings law clause. 
Applying each of these approaches, in turn, 
the CCJ reached the following conclusions. 
Firstly, that the savings law clause did not 
apply to s153(1) because that provision had 
been amended so many times it was no lon-
ger an “existing law.” Secondly, since the 
Constitution is based on the implied princi-
ple of the rule of law, s153 could be struck 
down not because it violated the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution but because it violated this im-
plied principle on account of its vagueness. 
Attacking s153 in this way enabled the CCJ 
to circumvent the limits imposed on its juris-
diction by the savings law clause in Article 
152. Thirdly, that there was an onus on the 
courts to interpret the savings law clause as 
narrowly as possible to place it in compli-
ance with Guyana’s obligations under the 
American Convention of Human Rights 
and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, which had repu-
diated savings law clauses for denying the 
right to seek judicial protection against vio-
lations of guaranteed human rights. Fourthly, 
that the modification clause to be found in 
s7(1) of the Constitution Act, which brought 
the Constitution into force, must be read to-
gether with the savings law clause to bring 
pre-independence laws such as s153 into 
conformity with the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.
Having concluded that, for all of the above 
reasons, the Court should not be deterred 
by the savings law clause from testing the 
compatibility of s153 with the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the 
CCJ then proceeded to find that s153 was 
incompatible with both the right to equality 
and the right to freedom of expression. 
3. A critique of the CCJ’s approach 
As the CCJ declared in Nervais, the main 
purpose of establishing the CCJ was to pro-
mote the development of a “Caribbean” juris-
SUXGHQFH:KDWWKDWPLJKWPHDQLQSUDFWLFH
has never been precisely defined, but in one 
of its earliest judgments,10 Attorney General 
Barbados v Joseph and Boyce, the CCJ ex-
plained how it would go about developing its 
jurisprudence:
>:@HVKDOOQDWXUDOO\FRQVLGHUYHU\care-
fully and respectfully opinions of final 
courts of other Commonwealth coun-
tries and particularly, judgments of the 
[JCPC] which determine the law for 
those Caribbean states that accept the 
[JCPC] as their final appellate court.11
8 [39].
9 [68].
10 [2006] CCJ 1 (AJ). Available at http://www.caribbeancourtofjustice.org/judgments-proceedings.
11 [7].
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In Nervais, the CCJ added that the devel-
opment of its jurisprudence would require 
“evolution and change in relation to the ap-
proach of decisions of the [JCPC].”12 The 
CCJ’s judgment in Nervais is, however, nei-
ther respectful nor evolutionary.
Sir Dennis Byron, for example, delivering 
judgment for the majority, castigates Lord 
Hoffman (who delivered judgment for the 
majority in Boyce and Joseph) as suffering 
from “the imperial taint of the view that 
what was done under the colonial regime 
cannot be struck down.”13 Sir Dennis By-
ron then proceeds to accuse Lord Hoffman 
of “undermining the concepts of indepen-
dence and sovereignty,”14 and ascribes to 
Lord Hoffman a view which the latter has 
never professed; namely, “the unacceptable 
idea that colonial law as applied to colo-
nial subjects contained all the fundamental 
rights to which they were entitled.”15 There
are, undoubtedly, principled objections to 
the majority judgment of the JCPC in Boyce
and Joseph (see, for example, the dissenting 
judgment of Lord Bingham in that case), but 
this is simply argumentum ad hominem.
The argument that s11 of the Constitution of 
Barbados is separately enforceable is also far 
from evolutionary. There is simply no prec-
edent for this argument in the jurisprudence 
of the JCPC. Instead, the majority in Nervais
rely on an article by Tracy Robinson and Arif 
Bulkan,16 which argues, controversially, that 
the JCPC has previously misconstrued such 
clauses. Notwithstanding the novelty of this 
proposition, there is no attempt to grapple 
with the omission of s11 from both s24 and 
s26. As Justice Anderson observed, in his 
dissent in Nervais:
There is no explanation of how to recon-
cile a separate justiciability of s11 with 
the architecture of the constitutional 
provisions.
Similarly, the reliance by the CCJ in Nervais
and McEwan on the modifications clause, 
which had been so emphatically condemned 
by Lord Hoffman in Boyce and Joseph, de-
mands some explanation, but none is forth-
coming. Lord Hoffman’s approach is simply 
dismissed as being based on “mere conven-
tional wisdom.” The CCJ prefers instead to 
rely on the approach adopted by the JCPC 
to the modifications clause in the Consti-
tution of The Bahamas in the later case of 
Bowe (Junior) and Anor v The Queen,17 even 
though the terms of the appeal in Bowe were 
expressly framed so as to preclude re-argu-
ment of the points decided by the Board in 
Boyce and Joseph.
Because of the decisions in Nervais and
McEwan, the CCJ now finds itself at odds 
with the jurisprudence of the JCPC. This is 
uncharted territory for all concerned. Given 
the size of the panel in Boyce and Joseph, it 
is difficult to conceive of the JCPC overrul-
ing that decision any time soon, but for so 
long as it does not there will be two parallel 
human rights systems in the region. On the 
one hand, the judges of those countries that 
subscribe to the CCJ’s appellate jurisdiction 
will now be able to modify the entire body 
of pre-independence law to bring it into con-
formity with the Constitution. On the other 
hand, the judges of countries that continue 
to subscribe to the JCPC will remain bound 
to give effect to pre-independence law even 
where it violates the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution. In light of 
the decisions of the voters in the two most 
recent referendums in Antigua and Grenada, 
in 2018, to reject a proposal to replace the 
JCPC with the CCJ, and in light of the po-
litical deadlock in Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago over the same question,18 it seems 
likely that this bifurcation in the jurispru-
dence of the CCJ and JCPC will continue for 
the foreseeable future.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
As a result of the no-confidence vote in Guy-
ana, elections will be held a year earlier than 
expected unless the Government wins its 
constitutional challenge to the no-confidence 
vote, which is currently pending before the 
Supreme Court.
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has 
also announced that it intends to appeal to 
the JCPC against the decision of the High 
Court in Jason Jones. This will be the first 
time that the JCPC will have an opportunity 
to rule on the constitutionality of laws crimi-
nalising homosexuality, which are pervasive 
across the region. Justifying the decision to 
appeal, Trinidad’s Attorney General, Faris 
Al-Rawi, argued that “if you leave this mat-
ter simply to the High Court judgment level 
you may run the risk of another High Court 
judge with a contradictory point of view. The 
Government’s role, therefore, is important in 
appeal (sic) so that law ought to be settled.”19
12 [65].
13 [67].
14 [67].
15 [67].
16 ‘Constitutional Comparisons by a Supranational Court in Flux: The Privy Council and the Caribbean Bill of Rights,’ MLR 2017, Vol. 80, No.3, 380.
17 [2006], UKPC 10.
18 See D. O’Brien, ‘The end of the Caribbean Court of Justice? On failed constitutional referendums in Grenada, and Antigua and Barbuda.’ Available at http://con-
stitutionnet.org/news/end-caribbean-court-justice-failed-constitutional-referendums-grenada-and-antigua-and-barbuda
19 Rachel Espinet, ‘Trinidad and Tobago sodomy law struck down,’ Washington Blade, April 30 2018. Available at https://www.washingtonblade.com/2018/04/13/
trinidad-tobago-sodomy-law-struck/
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I. INTRODUCTION
This review presents key events in the con-
stitutional order of the Republic of Croatia 
that took place in 2018. The Freedom House 
³)UHHGRPLQWKH:RUOG5HSRUW´UHJDUGV
Croatia as a free country and rates it 1.5 / 7 
(“1=Most Free, 7=Least Free”).1 Political 
rights protection is rated 1/7 and civil liberties 
2/7. In this light, nothing changed with re-
spect to 2017. The electoral process is award-
ed the highest ratings, which is supplemented 
by the assertion that the head of government 
was elected in a free and fair election, as were 
the national legislative representatives. The 
electoral laws are given the same ratings and 
deemed as being impartially implemented by 
“relevant election management bodies”. 
In 2018, the Constitutional Court received 
4,868 cases, most of which belonging to two 
categories: 162 cases referred to procedures 
for assessment of the compliance of laws 
with the Constitution, and 4,514 cases related 
to proceedings initiated following a constitu-
tional complaint for the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitution.2 In the same year, the 
Constitutional Court resolved 4,875 cases, 
out of which 278 referred to procedures for 
assessment of the compliance of laws with 
the Constitution and 4,396 to proceedings 
initiated following a constitutional complaint 
aimed at human rights and fundamental free-
doms protection.3 In regards to the structure 
of the cases received from the establishment 
of the Court in 1991 to 31 December 2018, 
93,211 cases (87%) relate to constitution-
al complaints and 12,864 cases to constitu-
tional and legality review.4 In 2018, the main 
issues dealt with by the Constitutional Court 
involved popular initiatives for constitutional 
amendment and the proper role of the state in 
country economics.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
At this point, the issue of a citizen-initiated 
referendum needs to be touched upon. In 
2018, two civil initiatives collected a rather 
large number of citizens’ signatures to make 
the Croatian Parliament call a constitutional 
referendum. One of them was aimed at the 
amendment of the Croatian electoral system 
concerning parliamentary election and the 
other one to transferring the right to make the 
final decision on entering into international 
treaties to the citizens. As part of its com-
petencies referring to constitutionality and 
legality review, the Constitutional Court had 
the key role in resolving the procedural issues 
relating to referendum implementation since 
the Referendum and Other Forms of Personal 
Participation in the Exercise of State Power 
and the Local and Regional Self-government 
CROATIA
1 -YLLKVTPU[OL^VYSK*YVH[PH#O[[WZ!MYLLKVTOV\ZLVYNYLWVY[MYLLKVT^VYSKJYVH[PH%
accessed 30 January 2019. All the translations from Croatian into English are mine unless noted otherwise.
2 Pregled primljenih predmeta u razdoblju od 1990. do 31.12. 2019.
O[[WZ!^^ ^\Z\KOYZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZKVR\TLU[P7YLNSLKFWYPTSQLUPOFWYLKTL[HF\FYHaKVISQ\FVKF  F
KVFWKM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
3 Pregled riješenih predmeta u razdoblju od 1990 do 31. 12. 2018.
#O[[WZ!^^ ^\Z\KOYZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZKVR\TLU[P7YLNSLKFYPQLZLUPOFWYLKTL[HF\FYHaKVISQ\FVKF  F
KVFWKM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
4*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[VM[OL9LW\ISPJVM*YVH[PH:[H[PZ[PJZ#O[[WZ!^^ ^\Z\KOYOYZ[H[PZ[PRH%HJJLZZLK
30 January 2019.
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Act (hereinafter: Referendum Act)5 does not 
regulate all relevant issues.
The text below offers a brief overview of 
the constitutional provisions on referenda.6
The first Croatian Constitution,7 adopted in 
December 1990, envisaged only facultative 
referenda.8  Article 87, Paragraph 1 stipulated 
that the Croatian Parliament (at that time, the 
Croatian Parliament was a bicameral body 
and the Chamber of Representatives exer-
cised this power) is entitled to “call a referen-
dum on proposals to amend the Constitution, 
a bill or any such other issue as may fall with-
in its purview”. The Croatian president may 
also call a referendum on a Government’s 
proposal, but such an initiative shall include 
a countersignature of the prime minister and 
revolve around “a proposal to amend the 
Constitution or any such other issue as he/she 
may deem to be of importance to the indepen-
dence, integrity and existence of the Republic 
of Croatia” (Article 87, Paragraph 2).
A referendum is valid if “the majority of all 
registered voters in the Republic of Croatia” 
turn up to vote. A referendum decision shall 
be made by the majority of the votes cast at a 
referendum (Article 87, Paragraph 3). Such a 
decision is binding for the Government (Ar-
ticle 87, Paragraph 4). It should be stressed 
that neither the Croatian president nor the 
Croatian Parliament has ever exercised their 
constitutional powers and called a referen-
dum for constitutional amendment.9 The 
amendment of the Croatian Constitution of 
9 November 2000 provided the citizens with 
a pure novelty called “popular constitutional 
initiative”.10 This is the “most radical instru-
ment”, which empowers citizens to shape 
constitutional provisions independently.11 Ar-
ticle 87 was supplemented with Paragraph 3, 
which reads as follows:
“The Croatian Parliament shall call 
referenda on the issues specified in 
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Arti-
cle in accordance with law when so 
requested by ten percent of the total 
electorate of the Republic of Croatia”.
The first ten years following the above 
amendment of the Constitution did not see 
the application of that instrument. It was the 
year 2010 when the instrument became “a 
high priority political and legal issue”.12 Not 
long before the Croatian accession to the Eu-
ropean Union, it came to a significant change 
relating to the conditions for referendum or-
ganization.13 Article 87 (now Article 86) of 
the Constitution faced a major change in its 
Paragraph 4, which does not require “a ma-
jority turnout any more” for the referendum 
to be legally binding but sets forth that the re-
spective decision shall be made by the simple 
majority of the votes cast. 
The subsequent period brought out various 
civil initiatives and their goals. The only suc-
cessful civil initiative was called “In the Name 
of the Family” (U ime obitelji). That initiative 
was supported by the Catholic Church when it 
promoted the organization of a referendum for 
incorporation of the definition of marriage as a 
union of a man and a woman into the Consti-
tution, aiming to prevent legalisation of same-
sex marriage in the Croatian Parliament.14 The 
initiative resulted in the amendment of Article 
62 of the Constitution.15
Other civil initiatives were not so successful, 
DVKLJKOLJKWHGE\$QD+RUYDW9XNRYLüPRVW-
ly because they did not succeed in collecting 
the number of signatures required for calling 
a referendum, or because the Constitutional 
Court declared their referendum questions 
substantially unconstitutional.16 However, 
civil initiatives have disclosed some flaws 
in Croatia’s referendum system, from proce-
dural issues to issues relating to substantial 
compliance of referendum questions with the 
Constitution.17 The Constitutional Court has 
indicated those issues in a number of its cas-
es.18  All those problems culminated in 2018 
when two civil initiatives, “The People De-
cide” (1DURGRGOXþXMH) and “Truth about the 
Istanbul Convention” (Istina o Istanbulskoj), 
managed to collect a vast number of signa-
tures. 
Civil initiative “The People Decide” required 
a comprehensive electoral reform.19 It aimed 
to amend Article 72 of the Constitution sig-
nificantly. First, the reduction of the number 
of total deputies was required. In compliance 
with the current formulation of Article 72 of 
the Constitution, “the Croatian Parliament 
shall have no less than 100 and not more than 
5 ¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV    
6 ;OPZIYPLMYL]PL^OLH]PS`YLSPLKVU9VILY[7VKVSUQHR»Z[L_[!¸(IVSPZOPUN(SS4LJOHUPZTZMVY-P_PUN,SLJ[PVUZ¹!;OL*P[PaLUZ»0UP[PH[P]L[V*OHUNL[OL,SLJ[VYHS:`Z[LT
of Croatia (2015), 52 Croatian Political Science Review 104-106.
7 ¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV  
,UNSPZO[YHUZSH[PVU!#O[[W!^^ ^ZHIVYOYZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZ\WSVHKZPUSPULÄSLZ*65:;0;<;065F*96(;0(WKM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
8, 9, 10, 11 Podolnjak (n. 6), 105.
12(UH/VY]H[=\RV]Pǅ¸<Z[H]UPZ\K9LW\ISPRL/Y]H[ZRLPYLMLYLUK\TPUHYVKULPUPJPQH[P]L!HUHSPaHPWYPQLKSVaP¹¸*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[VM[OL9LW\ISPJVM
*YVH[PHHUK*P[PaLU0UP[PH[LK9LMLYLUKHPU[OL7LYPVK!(UHS`ZPZHUK7YVWVZHSZ¹AI7YH]MHR:]L\ȏ9PQ
13 ¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV
14 For more details, see Podolnjak (n. 6), 105.
15 ¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV
16/VY]H[=\RV]PǅU
17(UH/VY]H[=\RV]Pǅ¸<PTL<Z[H]H¹¶TH[LYPQHSULNYHUPJLWYVTQLUL\Z[H]H¸0U[OL5HTLVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVU¶:\IZ[HU[P]L3PTP[ZVM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS
*OHUNL¹AIVYUPR7-A
18 -VYL_HTWSL+LJPZPVU<=009 MYVT6J[VILY¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV 
19 1\KNPUNI`P[ZNVHS[OPZPUP[PH[P]LJHUILZHPK[VOH]LZ\JJLLKLK[OL¸0U[OL5HTLVM[OL-HTPS`¹PUP[PH[P]L[OH[[YPLK[VSH\UJOHULSLJ[VYHSYLMVYTPU6J[V-
ILY0[HSTVZ[YLWLH[LK[OLZ\JJLZZVM[OLYLMLYLUK\TVU[OLPUJVYWVYH[PVUVM[OLKLÄUP[PVUVMTHYYPHNLPU[V[OL*YVH[PHU*VUZ[P[\[PVUZPUJLP[NH[OLYLK
 V\[VM[OLYLX\PYLKZPNUH[\YLZ7VPU[00VM[OLKLJPZPVUX\V[LKHJJVYKPUN[V/VY]H[=\RV]PǅUUV[L:LLHSZV7VKVSUQHRU
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160 deputies”. The respective referendum 
question suggested that there shall be no more 
than 120 deputies. The initiative also called for 
a reduction in the number of representatives of 
national minorities from eight, as prescribed 
by the current electoral legislation, to six.20
Furthermore, it demanded preference vot-
ing for election of candidates to the Croatian 
Parliament, decrease of the electoral thresh-
old from 5% to 4% of valid ballots, a new 
manner of defining electoral constituencies, 
introduction of postal and electronic voting, 
and limited capacity for entering into political 
alliances.21 Besides the reduction in their total 
number, representatives of national minorities 
would be prevented from casting a vote of 
confidence and deciding on the state budget. 
That was the second question proposed by this 
civil initiative, and its goal was to supplement 
the Constitution with Article 72a.
Not far from the truth is Robert Podolnjak’s 
assertion that the most radical item of the 
proposed electoral reform was the constitu-
tionalization of the electoral system. Its fun-
damental principles, which are currently only 
prescribed by the law, would have been in-
corporated into the Constitution.22 The goals 
of this civil initiative were directed towards 
the so-called electoral engineering of big po-
litical parties, which benefit from such a sys-
tem at the detriment of citizens and therefore 
are not interested in system amendment.23 As 
detected by Podolnjak, a large share of Croa-
tian citizens feel that the electoral system is, 
although being given high ratings by foreign 
observers, such as in the “Freedom House” 
report, unfair and partial.24
A civil initiative called “Truth about the Is-
tanbul Convention” was engaged in gather-
ing voters’ signatures for denunciation of the 
Council of Europe Convention on preventing 
and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence (hereinafter: Istanbul Con-
vention). 25  Apart from the issue of denuncia-
tion of Istanbul Convention, this civil initiate 
also proclaimed amendment of the Croatian 
Constitution in a way that its Article 133 
should be supplemented with a paragraph 
which would read as follows: “The Croatian 
Parliament shall decide on denunciation of 
international treaties subject to ratification 
thereof or withdrawal from international or-
ganizations and alliances with the same ma-
jority as the one required for ratification of 
international treaties and assignment of pow-
ers to international organizations or alliances. 
Such issues may be subject to a national ref-
erendum”. 26
Both initiatives were collecting signatures 
from 13 to 27 May 2018 and afterwards ex-
pressed their doubts about the action of the 
bodies in charge of referendum implementa-
tion due to a lack of regulation of the subject 
matter, and consequently submitted their ap-
plications to the Constitutional Court.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Ruling No. U-VIIR-3592/2018 of 18 Decem-
ber 2018 and Ruling No. U-VIIR-3260/2018 
of 18 December 2018 – review of the 
constitutionality and legality of a national 
referendum 
After members of the “The People Decide” 
civil initiative had submitted the collected 
signatures calling for a referendum to the 
Croatian Parliament, the Parliament then 
requested the government to verify the col-
lected signatures or, in other words, to check 
whether the signatures were collected in 
compliance with Article 8c of the Referen-
dum Act. In its conclusion of 2 August 2018, 
the Government assigned the Ministry of 
Public Administration to coordinate activities 
related to checking the number of collected 
signatures and their validity. The Ministry 
forwarded the task to the Information Sys-
tems and Information Technologies Support 
Agency LLC - Apis IT LLC (p. 2).
On 3 August 2018, the initiative submitted 
to the Ministry of Public Administration a 
request for participation in the procedure for 
signature verification, adding that it, as the 
organizer, represents an interested party and 
thus should be enabled to participate in the 
procedure (p. 3). The request was rejected, 
and the initiative submitted a constitution-
al complaint to the Constitutional Court on 
3 October 2018. The applicant required the 
Constitutional Court to abolish the conclu-
sions of the Croatian Parliament and Gov-
ernment and order the Parliament to call a 
referendum and, “subsidiarily”, order the 
Government, Ministry of Public Administra-
tion and Ministry of Interior to permit par-
ticipation of initiative representatives in the 
signature verification procedure (p. 1.1).
The applicant’s objections (p. 4-4.2) can be 
summed up in the following way. The appli-
cant held that its participation in the signa-
ture verification procedure was “necessary...
due to the protection of a public interest and 
particularly the elimination of a doubt about 
the regularity and transparency of the proce-
dure”. The Ministry of Public Administration 
violated the applicant’s right to a response to 
the submitted request for participation in the 
above procedure. The Government did not 
provide an answer, and the Ministry of Public 
Administration gave it in an improper form, a 
form different from that of an administrative 
act, so the applicant was not able to file a le-
gal remedy and hence, its constitutional right 
to an effective legal remedy laid down in Ar-
ticle 18 of the Constitution had been violated. 
20(Y[PJSL7HYHNYHWOVM[OL(J[VU[OL,SLJ[PVUVM9LWYLZLU[H[P]LZ[V[OL*YVH[PHU5H[PVUHS7HYSPHTLU[JVUZVSPKH[LK[L_[¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¹UV   
53/03, 69/03, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/10, 24/11, 93/11, 120/11, 19/15, 104/15.
21 ¸;OL7LVWSL+LJPKL¹#O[[WZ!UHYVKVKS\J\QLOY%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
227VKVSUQHRWYV]PKLK[OLHZZLY[PVU^P[OPU[OLJVU[L_[VM[OL¸;OL7LVWSL+LJPKL¹JP]PSPUP[PH[P]LI\[P[ILHYZYLSL]HUJLMVYIV[OPUP[PH[P]LZMVY[OLPYZPTPSHYP[ `
Podolnjak (n. 6), 103-104
23 Ibid 103.
24 Ibid 104.
25 ¸6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L¶0U[LYUH[PVUHS;YLH[PLZ¹UV
26¸;Y\[OHIV\[[OL0Z[HUI\S*VU]LU[PVU¹#O[[W!PZ[PUHVPZ[HUI\SZRVQPUMV%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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Moreover, the applicant believed that neither 
the Constitution nor the Referendum Act sets 
out either power or obligation of the Croatian 
Parliament to entrust the Government with 
the task of verifying the number of signatures 
and their authenticity. Since such a decision 
is ill-founded, it can be deemed as arbitrary 
action, and as such, it is contrary to Article 19 
of the Constitution.
On 18 December 2018, the Consti-
tutional Court delivered Ruling No. 
U-VIIR-3592/2018 on the dismissal of the 
constitutional complaint of the “The People 
Decide” civil initiative. It held that the con-
clusions of the Government and the Parlia-
ment were not acts governed by Article 62, 
Paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Act on the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Cro-
atia (hereinafter: Constitutional Act)27 since 
they were not aimed at deciding on the con-
stitutional rights of the applicant and thus 
cannot be subject to contestation before the 
Constitutional Court (p. 7. 1). On the con-
trary, those acts were aimed at defining the 
obligations of the Government and the Min-
istry of Public Administration. 
The “Truth about the Istanbul Convention” 
civil initiative had similar remarks to the 
action of the government bodies in charge 
of national referendum implementation and 
consequently submitted a petition to the 
Constitutional Court on 4 September 2018. 
The petition had the form of a constitution-
al complaint and was directed towards the 
“statement” of the Ministry of Public Admin-
istration, in which the initiative’s request for 
participation in the procedure for verification 
of the signatures collected to initiate a refer-
endum on the denunciation of the Istanbul 
Convention was declined (p. 2). 
The applicant claimed that the Referendum 
Act does not stipulate the manner of con-
ducting the signature verification procedure, 
and therefore there were no obstacles to the 
participation of initiative representatives 
therein. The applicant added that the proce-
dure should be subject to general principles 
applied in electoral activities and advocated 
for an analogous application of the Act on the 
Election of Representatives to the Croatian 
National Parliament (p. 3.1; 4.1).28 Further-
more, the applicant expressed its doubt about 
the “transparency and objectivity of the pro-
cess” since the Government and Ministry of 
Public Administration had criticized the ref-
erendum questions on several occasions. A 
three-month delay in the initiation of the sig-
nature verification procedure was considered 
“unfair action of the authorities” (p. 3. 1).
The Constitutional Court established that the 
applicant complained about the action of the 
authorities after she had already submitted an 
application calling for a referendum to the 
Croatian Parliament, and added that due to its 
content, the petition was more of an applica-
tion for review of the constitutionality and le-
gality of national referendum implementation 
than a constitutional complaint (p. 3).
The Ruling elaborated on the Court’s powers 
relating to review of the constitutionality and 
legality of the referendum process and re-
ferred to the relevant case law (p. 5-6), high-
lighting the criteria for conducting a judicial 
review of the national referendum, stated in 
Article 96 of the Constitutional Act (p. 7). 
The Court noticed that the applicant based 
its claims on “general allegations” of viola-
tion of the democratic procedure, “ultimate-
ly reduced to a lack of competences of the 
legislative and executive bodies for signature 
verification” (p. 9). 
After examining the above facts, the Consti-
tutional Court concluded that the applicant 
did not provide “factually substantiated, clear 
and convincing reasons which would impose 
activation of the powers vested by Article 96 
of the Constitutional Act or reasons indicat-
ing that the action of the Government and 
its Ministry of Public Administration was of 
such a nature that it would represent a severe 
breach of democratic procedure rules or fac-
tual abolishment of the civil rights relating 
to the decision-making process at a referen-
dum”. (p. 12). The Constitutional Court em-
phasized the importance of the principle of 
minimum confidence in the authorities com-
petent for national referendum implementa-
tion based on the Constitution. 
In the end, it should be noted that although 
neither initiative has succeeded in collect-
ing the required number of signatures, they 
were very close to achieving that. In its de-
cisions, the Constitutional Court discussed 
procedural issues and if the initiatives had 
collected the required number of signatures, 
their content would have been probably chal-
lenged in terms of its compliance with the 
Constitution, particularly the part relating to 
the reduction of national minority rights. Ac-
cording to the Ministry’s report, the “Truth 
about the Istanbul Convention” civil initia-
tive managed to collect 345,942 valid sig-
natures while the “The People Decide” civil 
initiative collected 371,450 valid signatures 
for the first question relating to the amend-
ment of Article 72 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia and 367,169 valid signa-
tures for the second question referring to the 
supplement of the Croatian Constitution with 
Article 72a.29  In order to call a referendum, 
374,740 valid signatures were required.30
Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the 
Republic of Croatia no. U-I-1694/2017 and 
others of 2 May 2018 (Lex Agrokor) – the 
procedure for assessment of the conformity 
of an act with the Constitution
In early 2017, the Agrokor Group, which 
included over 70 legal entities, was facing a 
major liquidity and solvency crisis. The rea-
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son why its survival was a serious issue for 
the Government and the wider public was 
the fact that the concern had over 56,000 
employees, which makes 4.78% of the total 
number of people employed by legal entities 
in the Republic of Croatia (p. 26. 2). The fear 
that the crisis in this massive company would 
spill over to the entirety of the Croatian econ-
omy was the direct cause for the enactment 
of the Act on Emergency Administration in 
Companies of Systemic Importance to the 
Republic of Croatia (dubbed by the media as 
Lex Agrokor).31
In the Draft Act, sent to the Croatian Parlia-
ment on 31 March 2017, the Government 
explained the reasons for its enactment as 
follows: “(…) because the existing solutions 
from the Bankruptcy Act (“Official Gazette” 
no. 71/15 and 104/17) and the Act on Fi-
nancial Operations and the Pre-Bankruptcy 
Settlement (“Official Gazette” no. 108/12, 
144/12, 81/13, 112/13, 71/15, and 78/15) 
have not proven to be sufficiently efficient 
in managing the risks that affect the stabili-
ty of the Croatian economy in circumstances 
of deep financial difficulties for companies 
with systemic importance for the Republic of 
Croatia” (p. 13). The systemic importance of 
these companies, according to the Draft Act, 
“results from their size regarding the number 
of employees, their business relationships 
with other business entities within the econ-
omy, the distribution of their business activ-
ities in the entire territory of the Republic 
of Croatia, and/or their dominant economic 
position in one part of the territory of the Re-
public of Croatia...” (p. 13). 
Since 1991, the year in which the Republic 
of Croatia gained its independence, this has 
been the first case of a downfall of a “too-
big-to-fail” legal entity.32 The subject of this 
Act has been determined as “the measure of 
extraordinary administration for companies 
of systemic importance”. The specific proce-
dure set out in this Act “is urgent, and during 
the period of emergency receivership it is 
forbidden to initiate either the liquidation of 
the debtor’s property or pre-bankruptcy and 
bankruptcy procedures.”33 The parties for 
the management of extraordinary adminis-
tration procedures are “the court, emergency 
commissioner, advisory body and council of 
creditors” (Article 9). The court appoints the 
commissioner proposed by the Government 
(Article 11). The emergency commissioner 
has the rights and obligations of “the bank-
ruptcy trustee”34  (Article 12).
An application for assessment of the consti-
tutional merits of this Act, or some of its pro-
visions, has been submitted by 12 petitioners. 
There were numerous objections by the ap-
plicants, and the Ruling of the Constitutional 
Court alone is 184 pages long. The Constitu-
tional Court has divided the objections into 
two groups. The first group includes issues 
related to the lack of formal conformity be-
tween the Act and the Constitution. The most 
important objection emphasized by the ap-
plicants regarding this is that the Act has not 
been enacted by following the regular legis-
lative procedure, moreover, it has not even 
been scheduled in the annual plan of legisla-
tive activities. An emergency procedure was 
implemented instead, “signed by the Pres-
ident and announced in the Official Gazette 
of the Republic of Croatia on the same day 
it was voted through by the Croatian Parlia-
ment, and it came into effect on the first day 
after it was published” (p.17. 1). 
Among the numerous objections categorised 
as substantial non-conformity (p. 17. 2), the 
following needs to be pointed out: all the 
petitioners emphasized that the Act has no 
legitimate goal, and the Government has not 
stated the “objective and justified reasons” 
for its implementation in the Draft Act. Many 
petitioners pointed out that the problem re-
garding the Agrokor Group could be resolved 
by appropriate application of existing legal 
provisions, and if those were not satisfactory, 
those provisions should have been amended. 
The legal definition of “companies of sys-
temic importance”, according to some ap-
plicants, is arbitrary and discriminatory, be-
cause it only includes joint-stock companies. 
Some of the applicants claimed that this Act 
has “enabled the implementation of a single 
procedure of extraordinary administration 
over a parent company and its subsidiaries 
and affiliated companies, which resulted in 
an ‘unconstitutional’ breach of the legal sta-
tus of the debtors, as well as subsidiaries and 
affiliated companies” (p. 17. 2). 
In its assessment of the constitutional merits 
of the Act, the Constitutional Court accepted 
as relevant the statement of the Government 
that the prevention of risks for the Croatian 
economy represented by these companies 
constitutes “a particularly justified reason” 
that provides the option to the legislator to 
determine the vacatio legis differently than 
what is regulated as a rule, i.e., eight days 
following the publication of an act in the “Of-
ficial Gazette” (Article 90, Paragraph 3) (p. 
27.1). 
Regarding the substantial non-conformity 
between the Act and the Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court established that based 
on the constitutional provisions regarding the 
welfare state (Article 1) and the principle of 
social justice (Article 3), the legislator in the 
“circumstances of unfavourable economic 
and financial conditions…with an inappro-
priate and inefficient existing legal model” 
does not only have the option, but is obligated 
to implement “the essential economic policy 
measures” (p. 29. 7).
After that, the Constitutional Court consid-
ered whether the Act meets the proportion-
ality requirements from Article 16 of the 
Constitution, regarding the legitimacy of its 
goal, necessity, appropriateness and propor-
tionality stricto sensu for accomplishing the 
legitimate goal, and if the enactment of the 
Act had imposed an excessive burden on the 
debtors and the creditors (p. 30).
30 This was determined pursuant to the decree of the Ministry of Public Administration on total eligible voters on 13 May 2018 at 00, 00 h.
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Regarding the legitimacy of the goal of the 
Act, the Constitutional Court accepted as rel-
evant the statements of the Government that 
the goal of the Act to ensure the continuation 
of business activities for the companies of 
systemic importance and the “maximisation 
of their total value” for all the interested par-
ties (debtors, their employees, creditors, the 
economy as a whole) is justified (p. 31. 3). 
Regarding the proportionality of the disputed 
measure, to evaluate its appropriateness, the 
Constitutional Court compared “the effects 
of the initiated bankruptcy and pre-bankrupt-
cy proceedings” and the measures that have 
been accomplished so far for Agrokor (p. 
32.1). Government reports and the monthly 
reports from the emergency commissioner 
had convinced the Constitutional Court that 
the effects of the implemented extraordinary 
administration measure for Agrokor demon-
strated the appropriateness of the measure for 
accomplishing the goals of the Act, without 
encroaching on the state budget (p. 34. 6).
:KHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHPDWWHURIWKHQHFHVVLW\
of the measure, the Constitutional Court held 
that its necessity results from a legal void—a 
“lack of a legal framework for insolvency” 
for “systemic companies” undergoing fi-
nancial difficulty (p. 35). The Constitutional 
Court also established that this legal mea-
sure does not impose an excessive burden on 
the debtor and the creditors (p. 2.2.3). The 
“primary goal of the Act”, to “protect the 
sustainability of the company of systemic 
importance”, is “the prerequisite for the suc-
cessful reimbursement of the creditors” (p. 
40. 4). For those reasons, the final evaluation 
of the Constitutional Court was that the ex-
traordinary administration procedure meets 
the proportionality requirements (p. 41). For 
that reason, the Constitutional Court issued a 
ruling on the dismissal of the application for 
initiation of the procedure for assessment of 
the conformity of the Act with the Constitu-
tion as a whole as well as the conformity of 
the specific provisions of the Act.
IV.   LOOKING AHEAD
The Government’s legislative agenda and 
action plan for the year 2019 envisages 
adoption of a new Referendum Act in the 
first quarter of the year.35 It is evident that 
many problems relating to the implementa-
tion of the referenda proposed by the two 
civil initiatives arise from the existing legal 
lacunae. Gaps in the legislation are evident 
in rules on the collection of signatures to ini-
tiate a referendum and their verification. The 
first meeting of the working group set up to 
draft the new legislation took place in Octo-
ber 2018. The spokeswoman of the Ministry 
of Public Administration made a statement 
that the new law would focus on the elimina-
tion of the flaws in the extant regulation and 
streamlining the process. Some of the flaws 
that should be corrected concern deadlines 
for collection and submission of signatures 
for verification as well as the subsequent 
timeline for calling a referendum by the Cro-
atian Parliament. The legislation is expected 
to define bodies competent for the organiza-
tion of activities that take place before the 
referendum, such as campaigning, and to 
deal with the issue of financing civil initia-
tives.36 Questions on certain subject matter 
may be explicitly prohibited from a refer-
endum. The importance of regulating this 
issue is indicated by the current activities of 
the Association of Croatian Trade Unions, 
which is considering the collection of signa-
tures needed for calling a referendum against 
the pension reform package adopted by the 
Croatian Parliament in December 2018.37
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cy-
prus established a unitary yet bi-communal 
state, with the Greek-Cypriot and the Turk-
ish-Cypriot communities forming the axis 
upon which the constitutional arrangements 
operated. Following the collapse of the polit-
ical compromise between the two communi-
ties in 1964 and the withdrawal of the Turk-
ish-Cypriots from the government,1 Cypriot 
constitutional law has evolved by the appli-
cation of the doctrine of the law of necessity.2
Consequently, the law of necessity is always 
present in Cypriot constitutional discourse; 
nevertheless, it is continuously coupled with 
the counterbalancing effect of principles that 
ensure that the state is governed under the 
principle of separation of powers and with 
adherence to constitutionalism as well as 
with a persistent and effective guarantee of 
fundamental rights. 
Looking back at the year 2018, the constitu-
tional developments in Cyprus were relative-
ly limited. In 2018, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the lack of a constitutional procedure 
for filling parliamentary seats vacated before 
the commencement of the parliamentary 
term. Additionally, the Administrative Court 
issued two decisions relating to the reduction 
of benefits of civil servants and of pensions 
of former public servants as fiscal measures 
to reduce public expenditure. Finally, in 2018 
three references were resolved by the Su-
preme Court under Article 140 of the Consti-
tution, i.e., a procedure of preventive review 
of constitutionality that forms the primary 
method for ensuring separation of powers. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The year 2018 witnessed a few notable con-
stitutional developments and court decisions. 
The most remarkable constitutional develop-
ment was the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Andreas Michaelides a.o. v. Chief Returns 
Officer a.o. (Electoral Petition 1/2017),3
where by a narrow majority (6-5) it held that 
the Amending Law 82(I)/2017 was unconsti-
tutional as it was inconsistent with Articles 
65, 66, 69 and 71 of the Constitution as well 
as the principle of popular sovereignty. This 
decision gave rise to a major constitutional 
issue and created a new deadlock similar to 
the one created by Andreas Michaelides a.o. 
v. Chief Returns Officer a.o. (Electoral Peti-
tion 2/2016).4
Electoral Petition 2/2016 and its 
consequences
Following the parliamentary elections of 
May 2016, the chairperson of the Solidarity 
Movement, Dr. Theocharous, had won a seat. 
Yet she chose to keep her seat in the Europe-
an Parliament, thus her term of office in the 
House of Representatives never commenced. 
The Chief Returns Officer (CRO) granted the 
vacated seat to the Solidarity Movement’s run-
ner-up, Mr. Papadopoulos. Mr. Michaelides, a 
CYPRUS
1 P. Polyviou, Cyprus on the Edge: A Study in Constitutional Survival (Nicosia, 2013), pp. 5-26.
2 A. Loizou, The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (Nicosia, Cyprus, 2001); C. Kombos, The Doctrine 
of Necessity in Constitutional Law (Sakkoulas, 2015); C. Tornaritis, Cyprus and Its Constitutional and Other 
Problems (2nd, Nicosia, 1980); S. Papasavvas, La justice constitutionnelle à Chypre (Economica, 1998); C. 
Paraskeva, Cypriot Constitutional Law: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Nomiki Vivliothiki, 2015).
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candidate of the Democratic Rally, filed Elec-
toral Petition 2/2016 to the Supreme Court, in 
its capacity as the electoral court,5 challenging 
the procedure and arguing that a by-election 
should have been held instead of granting the 
seat to the party’s runner up. 
The election of the House of Representatives, 
including the replacement of vacant seats, 
is regulated by the Constitution and Law 
72/1979, as amended.6 Article 66(2) of the 
Constitution establishes that “[w]hen a vacan-
cy occurs in the seat of a Representative such 
vacancy shall be filled within a period not 
exceeding forty-five days of its occurrence, 
in such manner as a Law may provide”.7 Ar-
ticle 35(1) of Law 72/1979 further provides 
that if a seat is vacated during a parliamentary 
term, the vacant seat shall be assigned, within 
a maximum of forty-five days by the CRO, 
to the next candidate from the same political 
party having obtained the highest number of 
votes in the elections. In the event that the 
procedure of Article 35(1) cannot be applied, 
Article 35(2) calls for by-elections.
The respondents argued that their decision 
to assign the seat to Mr. Papadopoulos was 
based on the fact that Article 35 of the Law 
and Article 66 of the Constitution were not 
applicable in the present case, since the va-
cancy of Dr. Theocharous’s seat did not take 
place during the parliamentary term but prior 
to the commencement of the new term. By 
analogy, they chose to act on Article 35(1) as 
the best and only available option. The Su-
preme Court unanimously held that the as-
signment of Mr. Papadopoulos as an MP was 
null and void. Specifically, the Court said that 
the CRO could not have acted on the basis of 
Article 35 since that provision regulates the 
procedure for filling a seat during the parlia-
mentary term, and not before. And while one 
could argue that the initial approach of the 
CRO was correct, as his decision safeguard-
ed the existing proportional electoral system 
in Cyprus, which a by-election could disrupt, 
the CRO reached a deadlock, as there was no 
constitutional or legislative solution for fill-
ing a seat that was vacated before the com-
mencement of the parliamentary term.
Electoral Petition 1/2017
In the aftermath of the decision in Electoral 
Petition 2/2016, the House of Representa-
tives amended Article 35 with Amending Law 
82(I)/20178 in such a way as to allow seats va-
cated before an elected member of the Parlia-
ment has been sworn in to go to the runner-up 
of the same party. In an attempt to overcome 
the existing vacancy, the Amending Law fur-
ther provided for the retroactive effect of the 
amendment so as to cover seats that were not 
filled or were vacant on or after its entry into 
force. Accordingly, the CRO granted the seat 
once again to Mr. Papadopoulos.
In Electoral Petition 1/2017, the same peti-
tioner argued that the Amending Law, provid-
ing for the filling of non-occupied seats, was 
unconstitutional and therefore the nomination 
of Mr. Papadopoulos as an MP was null and 
YRLG:LWKDPDMRULW\RIVL[YRWHVWRILYHWKH
Supreme Court found the Amending Law 
contrary to Articles 65, 66, 69 and 71 of the 
Constitution, but also to the democratic prin-
ciple of popular sovereignty that is diffused 
in Part IV of the Constitution (regulating the 
House of Representatives) and which requires 
the election of representatives by the people. 
In particular, the majority indicated that Arti-
cles 66 and 71 relate to the vacancy of a seat 
and the replacement of MPs. Thus, since a 
person becomes an MP only after their public 
affirmation, as per Article 69 of the Constitu-
tion, the notion of non-occupation of a parlia-
mentary seat is unknown to the constitutional 
provisions. Finally, the majority held that Arti-
cles 65 and 66 of the Constitution—expressly 
providing for the “election” of the House and 
for “general elections”—safeguard the princi-
ple of popular sovereignty by neutralizing the 
possibility of electing as an MP a person who, 
without securing the seat and without giving 
the necessary affirmation, declines it.
On the contrary, the minority indicated that 
the fact that the Constitution itself does not 
regulate the filling of a “non-occupied” seat 
nor authorizes the legislator to regulate this 
issue, cannot be interpreted as depriving the 
Parliament of its constitutional authority to 
exercise legislative power in all matters.9 The 
minority held that the inexistence of the no-
tion of “non-occupied” seats in the Constitu-
tion does not hinder the House of Represen-
tatives from regulating this issue and thus it 
cannot raise the question of unconstitutional-
ity. Thus, the minority judges concluded that, 
since a different approach would amount to 
a limitation of the exercise of the legislative 
power as per Article 61 of the Constitution, 
the petition should have been rejected.
The response of the House of Representatives 
to this development was rather immediate. 
In June 2018, a new bill was voted into leg-
islation, amending the procedure for filling a 
parliamentary seat when an MP does not take 
up his/her duties by giving the necessary af-
firmation. The President referred this law to 
the Supreme Court and the referral awaits ad-
judication. Consequently, the 56th seat of the 
House of Representatives still remains vacant.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Human Rights 
On 12 November 2018, the Administrative 
Court examined in Christodoulidou a.o. v. 
5 The Supreme Court, acting as an electoral court, has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine petitions concerning the interpretation and application of the 
electoral laws. See Article 145 of the Constitution of Cyprus, which provides: “The Supreme Constitutional Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate 
ÄUHSS`VUHU`LSLJ[PVUWL[P[PVUTHKL\UKLY[OLWYV]PZPVUZVM[OL,SLJ[VYHS3H ^^P[OYLNHYK[V[OLLSLJ[PVUZVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VY[OL=PJL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJVY
VMTLTILYZVM[OL/V\ZLVM9LWYLZLU[H[P]LZVYVMHU`*VTT\UHS*OHTILY¹
6 The Elections of Members of the House of Representatives Law of 1979.
7 This provision was amended with the Law relating to the Second Amendment of the Constitution (Law 115(I)/1996).
8 See Elections of Members of the House of Representatives (Amending) Law (Law 82(I)/2017).
9 See Article 61 of the Constitution.
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the Republic a.o. the constitutionality of al-
lowance reductions and allowance abolitions 
of 211 applicants working the 24-hour shift 
system in public service (firefighters and 
nurses) and the police by virtue of the Law 
concerning the Budget of 2014.10 The plenary 
of the Administrative Court rejected almost 
all applications, with the exception of seven 
submitted by nurses that had been found to be 
in breach of the principle of equal treatment. 
All applicants argued that the reductions and 
abolition of benefits should be declared con-
trary to Articles 9 (right to decent living), 
24(1) (equality of persons in contributing 
in public burdens) and 28 (equality) of the 
Constitution as well as Article 1 of the First 
Additional Protocol to the ECHR. The Ad-
ministrative Court examined the facts before 
it and the events that led to the abolition or 
reduction of the relevant allowances and in-
dicated that the state was in a great financial 
crisis and had an obligation to implement the 
Memorandum of Understanding on financial 
assistance to Cyprus in order to cope with the 
financial crisis. In particular, Troika request-
ed from the Cypriot government to abolish 
anachronistic allowances, to reduce the re-
maining allowances of civil servants by 15% 
and to review the formula for calculating the 
overtime allowance, and achieve additional 
savings from allowances as a quid pro quo for 
receiving financial assistance. The Court held 
that the intervention to the right of property, 
via the reduction and abolition of allowances, 
was justified on grounds of public interest as 
such intervention was necessary and appro-
priate to achieve cost savings and a balanced 
budget for government expenditure. Addi-
tionally, the Court found that the 25% cut in 
shift allowances and 33.3% in the overtime al-
lowance calculation formula was not a dispro-
portionate restriction on the property right of 
the total remuneration, taking into account the 
financial benefit resulting from that restriction 
and the fact that a variety of other cuts in the 
wages, allowances and pensions of all cate-
gories of civil servants and public pensioners 
have ensured the saving of millions and a re-
duction in the budget deficit. As a result, the 
Court found that the reductions and abolition 
of certain allowances were constitutional.
In relation to the seven successful applica-
tions, the Administrative Court held that “the 
abolition of an allowance to hospital staff 
which would be paid only to nursing staff of 
Mental Health Services employed in closed 
hospital units, either in the Psychiatric Hos-
pital or elsewhere, violates the constitutional 
principle of equality and Article 28(1) of the 
Constitution which does not allow for arbi-
trary differentiations in reduction of the al-
lowance between civil servants of the same 
category”.11 More specifically, the Court in-
dicated that the distinction between nurses 
in closed hospitals for which the allowances 
remained the same and other nurses had as 
basis the sole fact that expenditure for the 
former was limited. Thus, the Court held that 
in the absence of any study establishing the 
distinction to justify such distinction, the dif-
ferent treatment was discriminatory and in 
violation of Article 28 of the Constitution.
Two weeks later, in Avgousti a.o. v. the Re-
public a.o.,12 the Administrative Court exam-
ined 115 applications submitted by pension-
ers who previously worked in the public and 
wider public sector and who argued that their 
pension deductions were unconstitutional. 
The applicants claimed, inter alia, that the 
Law concerning the Reduction in Emolu-
ments and Pensions of Officials, Employees 
and Pensioners of the Public Service and of 
the broader Public Sector (Law 168(I)/2012), 
on which the contested reductions were 
based, contravened Article 23(3) of the Con-
stitution. In particular, they supported that 
Article 23(3) sets out specific grounds for 
which a law may impose limitations or re-
strictions on the right to property; however, 
Article 23(3) does not enlist public interest as 
a ground legitimizing limitation to the right to 
property. On the other hand, the respondents 
claimed that the enactment of the contested 
Law was necessary, as illustrated by its pre-
amble, since during that period the Republic 
was in a difficult financial situation, and in 
order to avoid a further deterioration of the 
fiscal situation, it was necessary to reduce the 
expenditure of the public and the wider pub-
lic sector.
The Administrative Court ruled that deduc-
tion made by the state, as part of the fiscal 
measures adopted in December 2012 to sup-
port the Cypriot economy following a pre-
liminary agreement reached between Troika 
and Cyprus in November 2012, was indeed 
unconstitutional. Specifically, the Court re-
ferred to its case law in which pensions were 
considered an asset and a property right and 
according to which the completion of the ser-
vice in a pensionable post gives rise to pen-
sion; a contractual, acquired and crystallized 
right.13 Article 23(3) allows restrictions or 
limitations which are absolutely necessary 
in the interest of public safety, public health, 
public morals, town and country planning or 
the development and utilisation of any prop-
erty to the promotion of public benefit or for 
the protection of the rights of others. There-
fore, Article 23(3) does not permit limitations 
for budgetary considerations, consolidation 
of public finances, for streamlining pensions, 
nor for the rather general ground of public in-
terest. As a result, the Administrative Court 
found in favour of the applicants and declared 
the pension reductions as unconstitutional 
and in breach of Article 23(3). 
The Avgousti case caused alarm to the Min-
istry of Finance as the implementation of the 
decision would mean that the government 
would be obliged to reimburse the reductions, 
costing the state €30-€40 million per year. 
Consequently, the Attorney-General of the 
Republic and the Minister of Finance decided 
to appeal against the decision of the Admin-
istrative Court, and the appeal is awaiting ad-
judication.
10 Christodoulidou a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined Cases 441/2014 a.o., 12 November 2018.
11 Translation by the author.
12 Avgousti a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined Cases 898/2013 a.o., 27 November 2018.
13 See Koutselini-Ioannidou a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined Cases 740/2011 a.o., 7 October 2014. See also Charalambous a.o. v. the Republic a.o., Joined 
Cases 1480/2011 a.o., 11 June 2014.
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2. Separation of powers
In 2018, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of three laws passed by the 
House of Representatives prior to their prom-
ulgation, as per Article 140 of the Constitu-
tion.14 In Reference 1/2017,15 the Supreme 
Court issued an opinion on whether Com-
munity Secondary Schools Law,16 as amend-
ed by Amending Law of 2017,17 is contrary 
and inconsistent with the principle of the 
separation of powers and the Constitution of 
Cyprus. It was the applicant’s view that the 
provision of Article 11A, which is added by 
Amending Law of 2017, violates the principle 
of separation of powers. In particular, Article 
11A provides that the Ministry of Education 
and Culture may issue regulations stipulat-
ing school holidays, school celebrations and 
anniversaries. Additionally, it provides that 
the Ministry of Education has the authority, 
“after consultations with the Parliamentary 
Committee on Education and Culture”, to 
determine school anniversaries in which mes-
sages are read or discussions in classrooms 
are held. However, the issuance of regulations 
by virtue of an authorizing law shall be de-
posited with the House of Representatives for 
approval, as per Article 3 of Law 99/1989. 
Thus, Article 11A, read in conjunction with 
Article 3 Law 99/1989, violates the princi-
ple of separation of powers, as it enables the 
House of Representatives to interfere with the 
H[HFXWLYH SRZHU:LWK DPDMRULW\ RI  WR 
the Supreme Court held that the mandatory 
consultation of the executive with legislative 
power on a matter falling within the sphere of 
exclusive competence of the executive was 
unconstitutional and should be deleted in or-
der for the Amending Law to be promulgated. 
Consequently, after the deletion of the reser-
vation “after consultation with the Parliamen-
tary Committee on Education and Culture”, 
the Amending Law of 2017 was consistent 
with the Constitution and the principle of sep-
aration of powers. The minority judges found 
the Amending Law unconstitutional in its en-
tirety. Specifically, the minority indicated that 
since the need for consultation was deemed 
unconstitutional and contrary to the principle 
of separation of powers, the whole of Article 
11A was unconstitutional on the same ground, 
since Article 11A could not be separated in a 
reasonable and legitimate way.
On the same day, the Supreme Court issued 
its opinion on Reference 2/201718 on whether 
the 2017 Law Repealing the Law regarding 
the Regulation of Issues of Privatisation of 
2014 (Repealing Law) is contrary and incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the Republic 
and the principle of separation of powers. 
The Repealing Law essentially abolished the 
privatisation unit, a unit set up in 2014 to put 
in place a framework for the privatisation of 
state-owned entities and utilities, as per one 
of the conditions of international support 
agreed between Cyprus and Troika following 
the financial crisis of 2013. The applicant ar-
gued that the Repealing Law was in violation 
of the separation of powers and further inter-
fered with the Council of Ministers’ authority 
to supervise and dispose the property of the 
Republic, envisaged in Article 54(e) of the 
Constitution. By a narrow majority (6 to 5), 
the Supreme Court found that the House of 
Representatives acted within its power to leg-
islate on all matters, as per Article 61 of the 
Constitution, and consequently could lawful-
ly enact legislation abolishing the unit if it 
was of the opinion that the unit was no longer 
functional. Particularly, the Supreme Court 
held that Article 54(e) of the Constitution 
does not confer exclusive competence to the 
Cabinet to administer state-owned property; 
the legislative power affords to the Council, 
via law, the authority to produce secondary 
legislation and, thus, the said law prevails 
over regulations and decrees in accordance 
with the principle of hierarchy of legal norms, 
deriving from the rule of law. The minority 
was of the view that the Repealing Law was 
contrary to Article 54 of the Constitution and 
the principle of separation of powers, as the 
abolition of the Law deprives the executive of 
its right to exercise its constitutional author-
ities. It is noteworthy that the minority’s de-
cision drew on Reference 8/2016, a case with 
similar facts where the Supreme Court held 
that a 2016 amending law was in violation of 
Article 54(e) of the Constitution and the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers, since the 
Council of Ministers issued decrees in accor-
dance with the Constitution and the existing 
law in relation to the supervision and the dis-
posal of the Republic’s property and the 2016 
amending law neutralized those regulations.19
The last opinion issued by the Supreme 
Court, via the procedure of Article 140, was 
Reference 1/2018, where the Court unani-
mously found the Immovable Property (Ten-
ure, Registration and Valuation) (Amending) 
(No. 4) Law of 2017 consistent with the 
Constitution of Cyprus and the principle of 
separation of powers. The 2017 Amending 
Law introduced Article 75A to the basic law 
(Cap. 224), obliging all authorities (such as 
the land registry) to personally inform prop-
erty owners of any significant change in the 
value of their property by virtue of any decree 
or court decision. The applicant argued that 
the Amending Law, if promulgated, would 
remove from the executive the exclusive 
competence to exercise the general manage-
ment and control of the state’s governance, 
14 Article 140 of the Constitution provides “(1) The President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting jointly may, at any time prior to the promulgation of any 
law or decision of the House of Representatives, refer to the Supreme Constitutional Court for its opinion the question as to whether such law or decision or any 
ZWLJPÄLKWYV]PZPVU[OLYLVMPZYLW\NUHU[[VVYPUJVUZPZ[LU[^P[OHU`WYV]PZPVUVM[OPZ*VUZ[P[\[PVUB¯D0UJHZL[OL:\WYLTL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[PZVM[OLVWPUPVU
[OH[Z\JOSH^VYKLJPZPVUVYHU`WYV]PZPVU[OLYLVMPZYLW\NUHU[[VVYPUJVUZPZ[LU[^P[OHU`WYV]PZPVUVM[OPZ*VUZ[P[\[PVUB¯DZ\JOSH^VYKLJPZPVUVYZ\JOWYV]PZPVU
[OLYLVMZOHSSUV[ILWYVT\SNH[LKI`[OL7YLZPKLU[HUK[OL=PJL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJ¹;OLHWWSPJH[PVUVM(Y[PJSLHM[LY HUKZPUJL[OLWVZ[VM[OL
Vice-President is vacant, is enabled via the law of necessity.
15 President v. House of Representatives, Reference 1/2017, 5 February 2018.
16 Community Secondary Schools Law (Law 6/1961GCC).
17 The Community Secondary Education Schools, as amended by Articles 3(2) and 4 of the Transfer of the Exercise of the Authorities of the Greek Community 
Chamber and the Establishment of the Ministry of Education (Amendment No. 2) Law (Law 130 (I)/2018).
18 President v. House of Representatives, Reference 2/2017, 5 February 2018.
19 See President v. House of Representatives, Reference 8/2016, 2 May 2017.
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as well as the coordination and supervision 
of all public services, as safeguarded by Ar-
ticle 54(d) of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court held that Article 75A of the Amending 
Law introduced a general obligation of the 
relevant authority to disclose any decisions 
that may significantly affect the value of the 
property; yet, the question of what is likely 
to significantly affect the value of immovable 
property is left entirely at the discretion of 
the relevant authority. Therefore, the House 
of Representatives did not interfere with the 
executive power and did not breach the prin-
ciple of separation of powers.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
A significant development expected in 2019 
is the third decision relating to the saga of the 
56th parliamentary seat. In the event that the 
2018 Amending Law is also found incompat-
ible with the Cypriot Constitution, the only 
remaining and valid option would be a con-
stitutional amendment; namely the amend-
ment of Article 66 of the Constitution so as to 
introduce the notion of “non-occupied” seats. 
Additionally, judicial reform is also expected 
in 2019. The reform of the judicial system, 
through the creation of new courts and pro-
cedures, has been under discussion for more 
than two years in an attempt to speed up the 
dispensation of justice. In the wake of seri-
ous allegations concerning conflict of inter-
est among Supreme Court judges as well as 
allegations of collusion between them and 
prominent law firms, discussions seem to 
have speeded up. Indeed, the government has 
prepared nine bills, inter alia, for the creation 
of a Supreme Constitutional Court, an Appel-
late Court and a Commercial Court, and talks 
relating to the composition of the Supreme 
Council of the Judicature are also underway.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of Czech constitutional 
law, the year 2018 was marked by two im-
portant anniversaries: the 25th anniversary 
of the Czech Constitution (it came into force 
on 1 January 1993) and the 100th anniver-
sary of the republican state on Czech terri-
tory (the First Czechoslovak Republic was 
founded on 28 October 1918).
In terms of constitutional developments, the 
\HDU  ZDV QRW VLJQL¿FDQWO\ GLIIHUHQW
IURPWKH\HDU:HREVHUYHGFRQWLQXD-
tion of several trends that had already started 
in previous years, such as growing populism, 
polarization of the political scene, increasing 
pressure on independent media and journal-
ists, excessive use of presidential powers 
leading to changes in long-standing constitu-
tional practice, and negative effects of grow-
LQJFRQFHUQDERXWWKHFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWRI
the Czech Prime Minister. The outcome of 
these trends is a phenomenon not present in 
the Czech Republic since 1989: the govern-
ment supported by the votes of deputies of 
the Communist Party.
However, there was one important new 
theme in 2018: judicial independence. There 
ZHUH GLI¿FXOW QHJRWLDWLRQV DERXW WKH VHOHF-
tion of a new president of the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court between the President and 
representatives of the judiciary, and it be-
came public that the head of the President’s 
RI¿FHZDV WU\LQJ WR LQÀXHQFH WKH MXGJHVRI
the Constitutional Court (“CC”) and Su-
preme Administrative Court in their deci-
sion-making in cases related to the President 
RU3UHVLGHQWLDO2I¿FH1
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
After the parliamentary election of October 
2017 won by a margin of more than 18% by 
WKH SDUW\ RI$QGUHM%DELã $12 WKH SUR-
cess of government creation was complicat-
HG:HDOUHDG\ UHSRUWHG ODVW\HDUDERXW WKH
¿UVWJRYHUQPHQWRI$QGUHM%DELãQRPLQDW-
ed by President Zeman in December 2017 
without even having a chance to pass a con-
¿GHQFH YRWH LQ WKH &KDPEHU RI 'HSXWLHV
However, this situation was untenable in the 
ORQJWHUPVR$QGUHM%DELãFRQWLQXHGQHJRWL-
ations. After excluding all other possibilities, 
he decided to create a government of ANO 
and social democrats, supported by the Com-
munist Party. This government received a 
FRQ¿GHQFHYRWHLQ-XO\2IFRXUVHWKH
Prime Minister had to make several conces-
sions to the Communist Party for their sup-
port, such as proposing the bill on taxation 
of church restitutions or granting places in 
committees and boards for Communist Party 
nominees.
Even this government was not without trou-
ble. President Zeman refused to appoint the 
social democratic minister of foreign affairs, 
CZECH REPUBLIC
1 6UKȱLQ2\UKYH(UKYLH7YVJOmaRV]m7VaVY]VSm4`Umȱ!QHRZLWYH]mY\RHWYLaPKLU[HZUHüxV]SP]UP[ZV\KJL
>H[JOV\[4`UmȱPZJHSSPUN!/V^PZ[OLOLHKVM[OLWYLZPKLU[»ZVɉJL[Y`PUN[VPUÅ\LUJL[OLQ\KNLZ&
available at respekt.cz, published on 5 January 2019, accessed on 19 February 2019, https://www.respekt.
cz/tydenik/2019/2/vola-mynar
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allegedly because of his positive attitude 
to refugees, but more likely because in the 
2018 presidential campaign, he supported 
Zeman’s rival. This situation demonstrates 
the uneasy position of the Czech Prime Min-
ister, who normally should select the minis-
ters at his will but does not have any ready-
to-use constitutional means of overcoming 
rejection of his nominees by the President. 
This means that there is a gradual shift of 
the Czech model of separation of powers to-
wards the semi-presidential system, also in 
SDUWEHFDXVH3ULPH0LQLVWHU%DELãGRHVQRW
counteract President Zeman.
As previously mentioned, the year 2018 
brought judicial independence to consti-
tutional practice in the Czech Republic. In 
October 2018, the term of the long-standing 
president of the Supreme Administrative 
Court, Josef Baxa, expired. Since there is 
no constitutionally embedded representa-
tive body of judicial power, the presidents of 
three high courts (CC, Supreme Court, and 
Supreme Administrative Court) sought an 
audience with the President, who, with the 
consent of the Prime Minister, appoints the 
president and vice-president of the Supreme 
Administrative Court.
After long negotiations, Court presidents 
were able to persuade the President that the 
most suitable nominee would be the current 
vice-president of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court, Michal Mazanec. In return, Pres-
ident Zeman expected that a judge close to 
his administration would be appointed as a 
vice-president of the Supreme Administra-
tive Court. However, the law prevents ap-
pointing the vice-president from judges out-
side the Supreme Administrative Court, so 
in the end, another suitable candidate from 
within the Supreme Administrative Court 
ZDVDSSRLQWHG%DUEDUD3RĜt]NRYi
Not long after this, in January 2019, Josef 
%D[D DQG9RMWČFK âLPtþHN PDGH SXEOLF LQ
an interview with the prominent liberal jour-
nal Respekt that they were approached by 
WKH KHDG RI WKH RI¿FH RI 3UHVLGHQW =HPDQ
9UDWLVODY 0\QiĜ VHYHUDO WLPHV EHWZHHQ
 DQG  LQ RUGHU WR LQÀXHQFH WKHLU
decisions in cases related to the President or 
his administration. This information indicat-
ed that the President tried to deal with the 
judiciary on a quid pro quo basis, which is 
by some perceived as unconstitutional. The 
parliamentary subcommittee investigating 
WKLV LVVXH GLG QRW ¿QG DQ\ LQIULQJHPHQW RI
judicial independence, but the revealed facts 
are very troubling.
It is paradoxical that probably the most crit-
ical “development” has a rather stagnant or 
XQFKDQJLQJFKDUDFWHU:HUHIHUWRDPDVVLYH
FRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWRIWKH&]HFK3ULPH0LQLV-
WHU$QGUHM%DELã%DELãLVDQROLJDUFKRZQHU
of major newspapers and radio stations, and 
one of the largest Czech companies, Agro-
fert (comprising around 200 food produc-
tion, agriculture, chemical, and media com-
panies). He has been Prime Minister since 
2017, and although he was forced to transfer 
his enterprise to a trust fund to comply with 
QHZ OHJLVODWLRQ DJDLQVW FRQÀLFWV RI LQWHUHVW
FRPPRQO\ NQRZQ DV ³/H[ %DELã´ WKLV
does not diminish the fact that he remains a 
EHQH¿FLDU\RIWKHIXQGZKLOHKHWDNHVSDUWLQ
decisions about providing agricultural subsi-
dies and tax relief to Agrofert.
But there has been an important break-
through in this regard: an initial administra-
tive decision ruled that the Prime Minister is 
EUHDNLQJFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWUXOHVE\RZQLQJ
media outlets, including national newspa-
pers and the country’s biggest commercial 
radio station. The Prime Minister has already 
¿OHGDQDSSHDODJDLQVW WKLVGHFLVLRQFODLP-
LQJWKHUHLVQRFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWLQKLVFDVH
%HVLGHV WKDW0U%DELãKDVEHHQFULPLQDOO\
prosecuted for subsidy fraud related to ille-
gally obtaining European funding for build-
ing his residence, the so-called Stork Nest 
Farm. This situation poses a major threat to 
the rule of law and also for the independence 
of relatively new democratic institutions in 
the Czech Republic, especially prosecutors 
and police. The case was also investigated by 
WKH(XURSHDQ$QWL)UDXG2I¿FH ³2/$)´
which concluded that the rules for funding 
were breached. To receive funds for building 
6WRUN1HVW )DUP0U%DELã WUDQVIHUUHG WKH
farm project from Agrofert to his children, 
who are important witnesses in his case. His 
son, who has not yet been interviewed by the 
police, was living in Switzerland and Crimea 
in 2018, without knowledge of the investiga-
WLRQ6XFKVLWXDWLRQVFUHDWHVLJQL¿FDQWVHFX-
rity threats for the Czech Republic. Also, the 
European Commission is investigating the 
subsidies that Agrofert has received since 
0U%DELãZLWKVWDQGVQHJDWLYHSXEOLF-
LW\ LQDOO WKHVHGLI¿FXOW VLWXDWLRQV WKDQNV WR
considerable back-up from media he owns, 
which tend to downplay accusations against 
him and not cover matters negatively related 
to him at all.
The negative effect of this situation on hu-
man rights and the legislative works of the 
Parliament can be demonstrated by the ex-
ample of a proposed amendment to the Right 
to Information Act. The original version of 
the government proposal aimed, among oth-
ers, to exclude from the scope of the Act 
all information about criminal cases (apart 
IURP WKH ¿QDO MXGJPHQW DQG LQIRUPDWLRQ
on ongoing proceedings on infringement of 
obligations deriving from EU membership 
of the Czech Republic. Both these exclu-
VLRQV ZRXOG VLJQL¿FDQWO\ EHQH¿W0U %DELã
by reducing public availability of informa-
tion related to his criminal prosecution and 
misuse of European funds. Thanks to con-
cerns raised in public debate, deputies of 
RSSRVLWLRQ SDUWLHV LGHQWL¿HG WKLV WKUHDW DQG
passed amendments to the bill. They not only 
remove these exclusions but also include a 
QHZ LQVWUXPHQW IRUPRUH HI¿FLHQW HQIRUFH-
PHQW RI WKH ULJKW WR LQIRUPDWLRQ7KH ¿QDO
vote on this bill is expected in spring 2019. 
This situation demonstrates that extra-legal 
control mechanisms such as parliamentary 
opposition and civil society are a effective 
counterweight to the government.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Social Rights
Judgment Pl. ÚS 7/17 of 27 March 2018 - 
Constitutionality of a complete ban on smok-
ing in restaurants and other provisions of 
“Anti-Smoking Act”
A group of senators requested the CC to 
annul (besides other things) provisions of 
the so-called Anti-Smoking Act prohibit-
ing smoking inside the premises of catering 
service establishments. The senators mainly 
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 81
contested its paternalistic nature, resulting in 
a breach of a general right to freedom, the 
protection of property, and the right to pri-
vate enterprise.
At the outset, the CC stated that the Act fol-
lows various legitimate aims, such as pro-
tection of the health and life of individuals 
as well as certain vulnerable groups such as 
children, adolescents, and pregnant wom-
en. Moreover, it also might have a positive 
effect on the environment and reduce state 
expenditures on healthcare. Subsequently, 
WKH&&KDVVWDWHG WKDW¿QGLQJDVROXWLRQ WR
WKH FRQÀLFW EHWZHHQ WKH ULJKWV RI VPRNHUV
and those who are exposed to tobacco smoke 
is above all a matter for the legislature. The 
role of the CC in this respect is limited to as-
sessing whether the chosen solution consti-
tutes an inadmissible interference with any 
constitutional rights. The CC stated that the 
Act does not have such a deleterious effect 
on constitutional rights that would warrant 
its intervention. Thus, the CC concluded that 
the negative effect of smoking, whether ac-
tive or passive, on human health is a fact that 
does not need to be demonstrated. Therefore, 
the ban on smoking pursues a legitimate aim. 
Moreover, the separation of the premises 
and establishment of smoking rooms does 
QRWVXI¿FHWRSUHYHQWWKHQHJDWLYHHIIHFWVRI
smoking. In addition, the health of employ-
ees of catering businesses is damaged even 
in premises with smoking rooms (e.g., when 
cleaning such rooms). In general, smoking 
rooms neither protect the health of the popu-
lation nor guarantee the enforceability of the 
Act, at least in a manner comparable to the 
contested ban. From a comparative point of 
view, the complete ban is a standard solution 
in other countries as well. It does not vio-
late the freedom of smokers, as they can still 
smoke in the outdoor areas of catering facil-
ities, or in the street (outside the facilities).
Judgment No. I. ÚS 2637/17 of 23 January 
2018 – Obligation of the regional authority 
to provide a disabled person with access to 
proper social services 
In this case, the CC annulled the decision of 
the Supreme Administrative Court, which 
dismissed the complaint of a severely men-
tally disabled person claiming that regional 
DXWKRULWLHVIDLOHGWRIXO¿OOWKHLUSRVLWLYHRE-
ligation to provide him with appropriate so-
cial services. The complainant suffered from 
autism and lived in a small apartment with 
his also-handicapped mother and his (at that 
time) 80-year-old grandmother. Notwith-
standing that the whole family was involved, 
it was hardly manageable for them to take 
care of the complainant. Thus, they repeat-
edly contacted providers of social services 
and local and regional authorities asking to 
institutionalize him, but all their efforts were 
to no avail.
The CC found that disabled people in dire 
straits have the subjective right to access 
appropriate social care services. This right 
stems from both statutory (Section 38 of 
the Social Services Act) and constitutional 
provisions (right to health, right to an ad-
equate standard of living, and right to live 
independently and be included in the com-
munity). Subsequently, the CC stated that 
the above-mentioned right calls for a posi-
tive obligation of the government to guaran-
tee access to appropriate social care services 
to every disabled person in dire straits. This 
right, however, does not guarantee a per-
son’s access to social services on demand, 
but rather to such services that are adequate 
to their state of health and situation and ca-
SDEOHRIDVVXULQJWKHPDGLJQL¿HGOLIHZLWK
inclusion to society, independence, and per-
sonal autonomy to the fullest possible extent. 
In addition, the CC reiterated that regional 
authorities have a wide margin of discretion 
LQVHOHFWLQJWKHPHDQVWRIXO¿OOWKHVHREOLJD-
tions. Moreover, the obligations are progres-
sive by their very nature. This means that it 
is not necessarily a violation of the right in 
hand when an individual is not provided with 
services needed in the short term. The viola-
tion occurs only when the regional author-
ities remain completely inactive, or when 
WKH\IDLO WR WDNH UHDVRQDEOHDFWLRQV WR IXO¿O
the right in hand. In this respect, the author-
ities cannot disregard the fact that the more 
severe or untypical the handicap, the more 
demanding that social services are required 
in return.
2. Procedural guarantees in criminal 
matters
Judgment No. Pl. ÚS 15/16 of 16 May 2018 – 
Responsibility of the vehicle operator for the 
administrative offences of the driver
This judgment is one of the most controver-
sial of 2018. The CC dismissed the motion 
for annulment of Sections 10 (3) and 125f 
 RI WKH$FW RQ5RDG7UDI¿F FRQVWLWXWLQJ
an administrative offence that commits an 
operator of a vehicle (owner of the vehicle 
or a person authorized by the owner to use 
the vehicle) by non-securing that the driver 
DELGHVE\URDGWUDI¿FUHJXODWLRQV
The CC put the Act under review and found 
no violation of the Constitution. It stated that 
impugned provisions set down objective li-
ability of the vehicle operator by means of 
constituting his/her culpability for the ad-
ministrative offence. It admitted that indi-
vidual guilt and culpability is a ground rule 
in the construction of public law offences, 
EXWWKHMXVWL¿HGH[FHSWLRQFDQEHVHWRXWGXH
WR DQ HI¿FLHQF\ RI UHJXODWLRQ RYHU FHUWDLQ
areas of human conduct. And, in this case, 
the CC found that the impugned measure 
ZDVMXVWL¿HGEHFDXVHLWLVWKHRSHUDWRUKLP
herself who drives the vehicle or authorizes 
its usage by a third person. Thus, the main 
aim of the measure is not to punish a partic-
ular offender but to have a preventive effect 
on drivers. It presupposes that the operator 
will exert a pressure on a driver to abide by 
WKHURDGWUDI¿FUHJXODWLRQVRUKHVKHZLOOEH
liable for the offence. Moreover, it is only 
the right to private property that is infringed. 
The operator could only be imposed with 
DPLQRU ¿QH IRU WKH RIIHQFHZKLFK KDV QR
stigmatizing effect. This infringement, stated 
WKH&&LVSHUIHFWO\MXVWL¿HGSDUWLFXODUO\LQ
WKHVLWXDWLRQRIKHDY\YHKLFXODUWUDI¿FZKHUH
WKH SXEOLF DXWKRULWLHV ODFN HI¿FLHQW PHDQV
to investigate these offences. Frequently, it 
is evident that the offence was committed, 
but public authorities have no means to track 
down the driver. Usually, drivers “dodge the 
bullet” of the conviction by relying on the 
right to remain silent and not incriminate 
themselves or people they are intimate with 
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(Art. 37 (1) Charter). On top of that, the CC 
also found no violation of the right to the pre-
sumption of innocence. Notwithstanding the 
CC considered the offence as a criminal one, 
it stated that the presumption of innocence 
is rather a procedural rule that—unlike sub-
stantive constitutional rights—does not have 
any effect on the decision of the legislator to 
criminalize certain human behavior and the 
constitution of an offence as such.
:KDWPDNHVWKLVFDVHVRFRQWURYHUVLDOLVKRZ
the CC disregarded the right to the presumption 
of innocence both as a subjective right and also 
as the objective value of a society. But what is 
even more striking than the reasoning provided 
by the CC is the lack of opposition to it. It is 
noteworthy that no justice of the CC dissented 
from the opinion of the majority.
3. Right to private and family life
Judgment No. I. ÚS 1099/18 of 8 November 
2018 - Assisted fertilization from deceased 
husband
The applicant and her husband signed in-
formed consent for extracorporeal fertiliza-
tion consisting of cryopreservation of the 
husband’s sperm, which was later meant 
to be inseminated into the applicant’s ge-
netic information. Before the process was 
¿QLVKHG WKH DSSOLFDQW¶V KXVEDQG GLHG DQG
the clinic refused to complete it. It claimed 
that according to the Health Services Act, it 
could only proceed with a complete couple, 
which wasn’t the case of the applicant.
7KH DSSOLFDQW ¿OHG D FODLP WR WKH GLVWULFW
FRXUW UHTXLULQJ WKH FOLQLF WR ¿QDOL]H WKH
procedure. However, the district court con-
¿UPHG WKHFOLQLF¶VDSSURDFKDQGVWDWHG WKDW
it could not anticipate the husband’s will in 
WKHSURFHVVRIDUWL¿FLDOLQVHPLQDWLRQ,QWKH
following proceedings, the appellate court 
FRQ¿UPHG WKH FOLQLF¶V DSSURDFK 7KH 6X-
preme Court, in its extensive judgment, dis-
tinguished the applicant’s case from the case 
of Evans vs. the UK (from 10 April 2007, 
application number 6339/05) since in the 
pending case the applicant still had a chance 
of having a child, only not with her deceased 
husband. Besides that, the clinic is required 
WR¿QDOL]H WKHSURFHVVRQO\ DV D FXUH WR DQ
infertile couple, which does not apply in this 
case. The procedure at hand is therefore only 
applicable inter vivos and to a couple as a 
treatment for infertility.
7KH DSSOLFDQW¿OHG D FRPSODLQW WR&&&&
agreed with the Supreme Court and stat-
ed there was no violation of the applicant’s 
right to privacy and family life under Arti-
cle 8 of the Convention and Article 10 (2) 
of the Charter. CC concluded that common 
courts ruled in accordance with the appli-
FDEOH OHJLVODWLRQ -XVWLFH 'DYLG 8KOtĜ H[-
pressed a very persuasive dissenting opinion 
in the case, claiming that the common courts 
should have investigated in more detail the 
wish of the deceased husband, especially 
since if an anonymous donor provided the 
sperm, it could be used even after the donor 
died. The distinction between anonymous 
and non-anonymous donor was unreason-
able. The law shall serve the society and not 
YLFH YHUVD DQG FRXUWV VKRXOG ¿QGZD\V WR
interpret the law in accordance with consti-
tutionally guaranteed rights of individuals.
4. Judicial independence
Judgment No. III. ÚS 4071/17 of 31 July 
2018 - Eligibility of secret recording of court 
deliberation as evidence
In a criminal matter, the defendant chal-
lenged the impartiality of one of the judges 
deciding his case based on an unauthorized 
recording of deliberation of the judicial pan-
el. In the recording, the judge made offen-
sive remarks about the defendant and his 
attorney. The challenge was denied by appel-
late court based on the fact that the recording 
was made without knowledge of the judges 
and was therefore inadmissible as evidence.
&& UHFRJQL]HG WKDW WKHUH LV D FRQÀLFW EH-
tween the right to a fair trial of the defen-
dant and the right to privacy of the judge 
and conducted the test of proportionality 
to balance them. It noted that the recording 
might have contained parts where the judi-
cial panel was deliberating and/or voting, 
DQGWKDWWKLVW\SHRILQIRUPDWLRQLVFRQ¿GHQ-
tial. However, such information was not part 
of the evidence during the determination of 
impartiality of the judge because the judge’s 
FRPPHQWVZHUHGH¿QLWHO\QRWSDUWRIGHOLE-
erations or voting of the panel. CC conclud-
ed that the recording could not be excluded 
from evidence on this basis.
It understood the recording as a piece of 
valuable information concerning the impar-
tiality of the judge and stated that in this par-
ticular situation, there were no other possible 
pieces of evidence of similar information 
value that would interfere in a lesser amount 
with the judge’s right to privacy. According 
to the CC, without the recording, the right 
to a fair trial of the defendant would be al-
most impossible to enforce effectively, while 
the intensity of interference with the right to 
privacy of the judge was minor because the 
judge’s remarks were made during the de-
cision-making process. Also, the CC noted 
that the recording effectively cast doubt on 
the objective element of judicial indepen-
dence: the public trust in independent deci-
sion-making of that particular judge, in this 
case, was diminished. For this reason, the 
CC concluded that the previous decisions 
infringed the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
and annulled them.
5. Attorney-client relationship
Judgment No. II. ÚS 644/18 of 17 August 
2018 - Professional responsibility of attor-
ney advising a client to present misleading 
or false evidence
The CC only rarely decides cases related 
to the professional regulation of lawyers. 
However, in this case, the nature of the facts 
and inappropriate response of other courts 
led the CC to intervene. At the beginning 
of this case, an attorney represented a client 
in a civil suit. After initiating the civil suit, 
the client transferred its claim to a company 
specializing in the non-judicial recovery of 
claims. The result of this was, however, that 
the client was no longer an eligible partici-
pant of the civil suit. 
The client’s attorney claimed in front of the 
court that the claim was returned to the client, 
even though he knew it was not true. He also 
asked the client to sign an ante-dated contract 
FRQ¿UPLQJWKHUHWXUQRIWKHFODLPZKLFKWKH
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client refused. Later, the client also refused 
to sign an ante-dated contract allowing her to 
recover the claim instead of the company it 
was transferred to, which was again proposed 
by her attorney. This lead to the dismissal of 
the client’s claim. The client then sued her at-
torney for damages incurred by not informing 
her about the risks related to transferring the 
claim to a third party. The courts have reject-
ed the attorney’s liability for damages, stating 
that the client herself caused her civil suit to 
be dismissed by not providing necessary co-
operation to her attorney.
The CC found this conclusion unconstitu-
tional. The Ethical Code of the Czech Bar 
Association explicitly prohibits attorneys 
from presenting or proposing misleading or 
false evidence, even if their client would re-
quire it. According to the CC, if an attorney 
suggests to their client to follow unlawful 
procedure and the client refuses to apply it, 
it cannot be later held to their detriment, and 
thus it cannot allow the attorney to eliminate 
their liability. It is the client‘s constitution-
ally protected right to refuse to act unlaw-
fully. At the same time, the courts did not 
properly address all arguments brought by 
the client, especially that the attorney did not 
inform the client about the consequences of 
the transfer of the claim and possible loss of 
standing in court proceedings. Because of 
this, court decisions were not properly jus-
WL¿HGDQGWKHUHIRUHYLRODWHGWKHULJKWWRIDLU
trial of the client.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
:HDUHH[SHFWLQJDOOWKHDERYHVWDWHGSURE-
OHPVWRFRQWLQXH7KHFRQÀLFWRILQWHUHVWRI
3ULPH 0LQLVWHU %DELã ZLOO EH IXUWKHU GLV-
cussed and investigated as well as the crimi-
QDOFKDUJHVDJDLQVWKLP:HDUHDOVRHDJHUO\
awaiting further developments regarding the 
KHDGRIWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VRI¿FHDQGKLVWU\LQJ
WRLQÀXHQFHMXGJHVRIWKH&&DQG6XSUHPH
Administrative Court’s decision-making in 
cases related to the President or Presidential 
2I¿FH7KHUHLVDOVRDQH[SHFWDWLRQWKDWWKH
Communist Party is going to be displeased 
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
visited Ukraine at the end of 2018. One seat 
is vacant on the CC, as Justice Jan Musil 
stepped down as of 31 January 2019 and his 
successor has not yet been appointed. An 
election to the European Parliament is due 
in late May 2019. One of the most promi-
nent CC cases will be the law on taxation 
of church restitution, which, in case it gets 
adopted by the Parliament, will be certainly 
challenged by a group of opposition deputies 
due to its retroactive nature.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There were two opposing tendencies in Dan-
ish constitutional law in 2018. 
In some ways, Danish democracy became 
more inclusive. A new regulation made it 
possible for citizens to get the parliament to 
vote on proposals if 50,000 citizens backed 
them. Such an initiative is a small step in the 
direction of a more direct democracy. Four 
proposals received enough signatures during 
2018 to be considered by the parliament. 
However, at the end of the year, the parlia-
ment had rejected two of them while the oth-
er two were still under consideration. 
Similarly, in a move to expand voting rights, 
Denmark found a way to bypass a constitu-
tional rule that had removed voting rights for 
legally incapacitated individuals. 
However, in other areas Danish politicians 
appeared willing to challenge the limits of 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV)RUWKH¿UVWWLPHVLQFH
WKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DUDQRUJDQL]DWLRQZDV
banned. It now rests with Danish courts to 
decide if this is unconstitutional. Similarly, 
in several issues related to immigrants and 
minorities, Denmark changed direction in 
2018. The burqa was banned and social ben-
H¿WVIRUSHRSOHZKRKDYHOLYHGOHVVWKDQVHY-
en years in Denmark were reduced to such a 
low level that it might be unconstitutional. 
To acquire citizenship in Denmark, a hand-
shake is now required (enacted in response to 
certain religious Muslims who do not shake 
hands with the opposite gender) and several 
rules were enacted to more strictly regulate 
socially vulnerable neighbourhoods. Finally, 
a major Danish political party declared that 
their understanding of the Danish constitu-
tion was that it only grants rights to people 
with Danish citizenship and not to anyone 
else who lives in Denmark. This goes against 
an otherwise uncontested interpretation of 
the constitution. 
Another important constitutional develop-
ment was the reopening of the so-called Tibet 
&RPPLVVLRQ'XULQJRI¿FLDOYLVLWVIURP&KL-
na, Danish police have illegally prevented Ti-
betan protesters from being visible to Chinese 
RI¿FLDOV7KHLQTXLU\LQWRZKRJDYHWKLVRUGHU
was reopened due to new information. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
A. A more inclusive democracy
In January 2018, it became possible for cit-
izens to get the parliament to vote on a pro-
posal if 50,000 citizens backed it. The sys-
tem is very similar to the European Citizens’ 
Initiative in the EU. Practically, the website 
www.borgerforslag.dk was launched, on 
which citizens, using their digital ID, can de-
clare whether they support proposals made 
by other citizens. If 50,000 citizens support 
a proposal, it will be sent to the parliament. 
Technically, the parliament is under no obli-
gation to consider such proposals, but seven 
of the nine political parties in the parliament 
have promised to present them there, even if 
WKH\ GR QRW VXSSRUW WKHLU FRQWHQW7KH¿UVW
proposal to get 50,000 supporters was aimed 
at removing an existing regulation that lim-
its the possibilities of taking more than one 
university education. The second proposal to 
receive enough support proposed removing 
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the special pensions that ministers and their 
children receive. Both proposals were subse-
quently rejected in the parliament. Two other 
proposals received enough support during 
2018 to reach the parliament but were still 
under consideration at the end of 2018. They 
suggest prohibiting circumcision on healthy 
children younger than 18 years and making 
everyone over the age of 18 automatic organ 
donors.
According to the Danish constitution, a cit-
izen—following certain conditions—“shall 
have the right to vote in parliamentary elec-
tions, provided that he has not been declared 
incapable of conducting his own affairs”. 
This wording has been interpreted to mean 
that the parliament cannot grant such people 
parliamentary voting rights. Around 2,000 
people in Denmark have been placed in a 
guardianship due to impaired functional ca-
pacity, with the aim of protecting them from 
JHWWLQJ LQWR¿QDQFLDO SUREOHPVGXH WR WKHLU
own actions or exploitation. These people 
have automatically lost their voting rights 
in parliamentary elections following the 
wording of the constitution (while keeping 
their voting rights to both local elections and 
EU-parliamentary elections). Four citizens 
had sued the Danish government, claiming 
that this loss of voting rights was against 
their human rights, but the Supreme Court 
decided in favour of the government in Janu-
ary 2018. However, the case convinced Dan-
ish politicians to change the rules. Due to the 
GLI¿FXOW\ LQ FKDQJLQJ WKH 'DQLVK FRQVWLWX-
tion, this was not seen as an option. Instead, 
the legislation on guardianship was changed, 
making it possible to be declared only par-
tially incapable of conducting one’s own af-
fairs. The government’s interpretation of the 
constitution is that this solution prevents the 
loss of voting rights. The interpretation is un-
likely to ever be challenged in court.
B. Challenging the limits of constitutional 
rights
The Danish constitution, section 78, allows 
for prohibiting and dissolving organizations 
if they employ violence to attain their aims. 
+RZHYHUWKHRI¿FHRIWKH'LUHFWRURI3XEOLF
Prosecutions had earlier abandoned attempts 
to prohibit the motorcycle club Hells Angels 
GXHWRWKHGLI¿FXOW\LQSURYLQJWKDWLWLVWKH
organization itself that acts through violence 
and not just the individual members that are 
involved in violent activities on their own. 
Following several shootings in Copenha-
gen between various gangs, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions decided to instigate 
proceedings against the group “Loyal to Fa-
milia” with the aim of banning it. This was 
backed by the parliament, which simultane-
ously made a law detailing the consequenc-
es of an organization being prohibited. The 
group has now been prohibited but is await-
ing a court decision on whether the prohibi-
tion is unconstitutional. 
Discussions on immigration and especially 
on the presence of Islam have for several 
years been at the forefront of political de-
bate in Denmark. Several new laws were 
passed during 2018 concerning these top-
ics. Most debated was probably the prohi-
bition against covering the face in public. 
The intention of several politicians behind 
the law was to ban the burqa; however, due 
to regulations on religious freedom, the law 
was made more general. 
Special rules were also enacted in socially 
vulnerable neighbourhoods—called “ghet-
tos” by the government—which have a high-
er proportion of immigrants. These include 
the possibility of doubling the punishment 
for crimes committed in these areas. The 
exact same crime committed in two differ-
ent areas of Denmark can thus lead to two 
different punishments. The new laws also 
include rules that will economically punish 
parents in these areas if their children as 
young as one year of age do not attend oblig-
atory classes for 25 hours per week. Finally, 
the new rules include a plan which will lead 
to parts of the “ghettos” being demolished, 
thus moving existing inhabitants. Questions 
have been raised concerning whether some 
of these rules contradict basic principles of 
equality before the law or regulations against 
discrimination.
According to the Danish constitution, a for-
eigner can only become a Danish citizen if 
an act is passed in the parliament, which—
mentioning the foreigner by name—grants 
the citizenship. This has been interpreted 
by governments to mean that the parlia-
ment is never obligated to grant citizenship 
to anyone. In this view, the parliament can 
fully decide which rules—if any—they will 
apply for granting citizenship. However, a 
new rule implemented in 2018 is probably 
the most unusual one that the parliament has 
ever implemented in this regard. It is now 
a condition for getting citizenship that the 
applicant shakes hands—without wearing 
gloves—with a representative of the gov-
ernment (originally proposed to be the local 
PD\RUEXWDWWKH¿UVWRIWKHVHRI¿FLDOKDQG-
shake ceremonies it was the Minister of Im-
migration and Integration who had the hon-
our). It is no secret that the politicians behind 
WKLVQHZUXOHLPSOHPHQWHGLWVSHFL¿FDOO\IRU
those religious Muslims who refuse to shake 
hands with the opposite gender. 
Section 75 of the Danish constitution states 
that “Any person unable to support himself 
or his family shall … be entitled to receive 
public assistance”. In earlier cases, the Su-
preme Court stated that this means that the 
government must guarantee anyone in such 
a situation a minimum subsistence level. 
However, the exact level has not been made 
clear by the court. In 2018, the section re-
ceived new attention. Anyone who has lived 
less than seven years in Denmark within the 
last eight years receives a lower amount of 
money from the government in case of need 
than others – the so-called “integration al-
lowance”. Based on an analysis of the situ-
ation for families receiving this allowance, 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights con-
cluded in October 2018 that there were good 
reasons to assume that some of these families 
received less than the minimum subsistence 
level, which would be unconstitutional. The 
reaction from the government was less than 
positive to this claim. One month later—
November 2018—the government made an 
agreement with the Danish People’s Party to 
lower the integration allowance further.
Thus, it was a year in which the government 
and the parliament were willing to thread 
new paths and challenge the limits of con-
stitutional provisions. It should be noted 
that Denmark does not have a constitution-
al court and no automatic review of wheth-
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er a law is unconstitutional exists. Instead, 
an individual affected by a law can choose 
to institute proceedings in the normal Dan-
ish courts to have the law evaluated. Only 
if someone instigates such proceedings will 
the constitutionality of these laws be tested.
A further comment could be made about 
the fact that the Danish People’s Party—the 
second largest party in the parliament—an-
nounced in November 2018 that their under-
standing of the Danish constitution is that it 
only grants rights to people with Danish cit-
izenship and not to anyone else who lives in 
Denmark. This view was strongly criticized 
by several legal scholars and it is without a 
doubt an interpretation that goes against all 
established interpretations of the constitution. 
C. Existing commissions
The president of China visited Denmark in 
2012. During his visit, demonstrations were 
carried out in Denmark against the Chinese 
policies in Tibet. Demonstrators accused the 
Danish police of hiding the demonstrators 
WR SUHYHQW WKH &KLQHVH RI¿FLDOV IURP VHH-
ing them. In 2015, a commission, the Tibet 
Commission, was established to look into 
this matter, and in 2017, the Commission 
concluded that illegal orders had been given 
within the Copenhagen police department. 
However, the Commission found no evi-
dence that ministries or even the manage-
ment of the Copenhagen police department 
had made such orders or had any knowledge 
of them. 
During 2018, these conclusions came under 
heavy criticism. Various media reported that 
the Commission had not had access to emails 
from former employees in the police depart-
ment or in ministries, which included the en-
tire management of the Copenhagen police 
GHSDUWPHQWDVZHOODVDVLJQL¿FDQWDPRXQWRI
the relevant employees in ministries. Simul-
WDQHRXVO\ IRUPHU SROLFH RI¿FHUV H[SODLQHG
to the media that it had been a general prac-
tice to hide such protesters during Chinese 
state visits. Due to this new information, it 
was decided to not only reopen the Tibet 
Commission but also to widen the mandate, 
so now the Commission will look at all Chi-
nese state visits since 1995. This investiga-
tion is still ongoing. 
The Tibet Commission is not the only com-
mission looking into highly political topics. 
Denmark has had several tax scandals in re-
cent years, with the authorities not noticing 
massive tax fraud while also appearing un-
able to collect debts owed to the state. A tax 
commission has been tasked with investigat-
ing these events.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
Supreme Court Decision of 18 January 2018 
in case 159/2017: No violation of constitu-
tional or international obligations in rela-
tion to loss of voting rights.
This case concerned four plaintiffs who had 
been deprived of their legal capacity under 
a guardianship order, cf. section 6 of the 
Danish Guardianship Act. The Danish Par-
liamentary Election Act, section 1, states that 
in such circumstances, a person loses the 
right to vote for parliamentary elections. The 
plaintiffs argued that this was in breach of the 
Danish constitution, the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties. The Supreme Court found that this was 
not a breach of the Danish constitution. Sec-
tion 29 of the Danish constitution states that 
a person who is “incapable of conducting his 
own affairs” does not have the right to vote. 
Based on a detailed analysis of the historical 
development of the Danish constitution, as 
well as an analysis of the preparatory work 
to the Danish Guardianship Act, it was found 
that a person deprived of their legal capacity, 
cf. section 6 of the Danish Guardianship Act, 
was to be treated as a person “incapable of 
conducting his own affairs”. Thus, in reality 
it was the Danish constitution that prevent-
ed the plaintiffs from having voting rights. 
Based on this, the Supreme Court declared 
that even if international obligations had 
been breached, it could not lead to section 1 
of the Danish Parliamentary Election Act be-
ing invalid, since the rule was a consequence 
of the constitution. However, the Supreme 
Court also found that the rule did not breach 
international obligations. This was based on 
an analysis of decisions from the European 
Court of Human Rights, especially the Case 
of Alajos Kiss v. Hungary in which a viola-
tion of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 was found. 
The Danish Supreme Court noted that the 
ECHR had found that ensuring that only cit-
izens capable of assessing the consequenc-
es of their decisions and making conscious 
and judicious decisions participate in public 
affairs was a legitimate aim. However, the 
ECHR had found that the Hungarian pro-
vision was not proportional since it was an 
absolute bar on voting by any person under 
partial guardianship, irrespective of his or 
her actual faculties. In contrast with this, the 
Danish Supreme Court found that the Dan-
ish provision was proportional since it was 
DVLJQL¿FDQWO\QDUURZHUVFKHPHWKDQWKHRQH
in Hungary, and since Danish law operated 
with another guardianship which did not 
cause a loss of voting rights. The Supreme 
Court also made reference to the fact that 
a number of other European countries have 
similar regulations. Thus, the Supreme Court 
concluded that there had not been a breach of 
international obligations. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Elections for the European Parliament will 
be held in May. Elections for the Danish par-
liament are due at the latest in June 2019. Po-
litical parties in Denmark have for decades 
EHHQGLYLGHGTXLWH¿UPO\EHWZHHQWZREORFV
but recently several political parties have 
challenged the traditional alliances, making 
LWGLI¿FXOWWRIRUHVHHKRZDJRYHUQPHQWFRQ-
stellation will look after the elections. 
Both the Tibet Commission and the Tax 
Commission are ongoing and have potential 
implications at a major political level. The 
case on the banning of Loyal to Familia is 
also ongoing. Further, if the elections lead to 
a change of government, it is possible that 
a new government will open investigations 
into the background of the Danish decision 
in 2003 to join the war against Iraq. 
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I. INTRODUCTION1
The year 2018 was one of fighting against 
corruption and reshaping several public of-
fices, including the Council of the Judicia-
ry and the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court 
(ECC). This might signal an important turn-
ing point in the country’s constitutional his-
tory. Following the popular referendum in 
February, the Ecuadorian people agreed to 
appoint a transitory Council for Public Par-
ticipation and Social Control (CPPSC-t) and 
grant it extensive powers to evaluate virtu-
ally all public offices in Ecuador. The main 
constitutional development in 2018 was un-
doubtedly the dissolution of the ECC and the 
beginning of the process for the appointment 
of new justices. 
:H FORVHG ODVW \HDU¶V UHSRUW ZRQGHULQJ
whether the elected authorities would be able 
to “stir the country towards the rule of law, 
or will it be just another type of rule of man 
WKDWLVPRUHWHPSHUDWH"´7KLVLVVWLOOKDUGWR
say. In the public eye, the discharge of duties 
by the CPPSC-t has been received along par-
ty lines. On the one hand, Correistas have
been against every move by the CPPSC-t 
and unwilling to assume any responsibility. 
On the other hand, anti-correistas have been 
willing to overlook the shortcomings of the 
evaluation process. Outside this dichotomy, 
some have regarded this as a sui generis case 
of transitional justice.2 It is still too soon to 
evaluate, and the CPPSC-t will continue in 
office until March 2019.
Besides the three-month-long constitution-
al vacancy, Ecuador has witnessed several 
other turbulent moments with regard to the 
restructuring of the judiciary and corruption 
charges against numerous public officers, 
mainly from the government of President 
Correa. Many former authorities have been 
convicted, some of whom are serving time, 
others fugitives in foreign countries.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Popular Referendum
Last year, President Moreno submitted sev-
en referendum questions to the ECC for ap-
proval. The questions were about sensitive 
political and constitutional issues, like the 
indefinite reelection of the president or the 
redesign of the CPPSC. The decision on the 
approval of the questions posed a challenge 
to the ECC, as in 2015 it already dealt with 
the issue of the indefinite reelection of the 
president, and it was considered as a mea-
sure to expand the sphere of voting rights. 
This time, however, the referendum aimed at 
abolishing the indefinite reelection. Finally, 
the ECC refrained from deciding whether 
the referendum question was constitutional 
or not, and ducked the issue by simply letting 
the deadline pass.
By the time the referendum was held, Pres-
ident Moreno had made clear that he was 
ECUADOR
1 We are thankful to Sebastián Abad, Irina Burgaentzle and Sol González from University of San Francisco 
KL8\P[VMVY[OLPYNLULYV\ZOLSW;OLYLZWVUZPIPSP[`YLNHYKPUN[OLÄUHS[L_[PZVUS`V\YZ
2 Simeon Tegel, ‘A referendum in Ecuador is another defeat for South America’s left-wing populists,’ ;OL
>HZOPUN[VU7VZ[ (5 February 2018).
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distancing himself from Correa both in style 
and in substance. The constitutional refer-
endum3 was held on February 4, and all the 
questions of the referendum4 were decided 
affirmatively. This will mark the beginning 
of a set of reforms to rebuild the rule of law 
and its institutions over the year, but even 
more important than that, the outcome of the 
referendum reassured that popular support 
for President Moreno was still strong.
2. The transitional Council for Public 
Participation and Social Control 
Following the popular referendum, the Leg-
islative appointed seven counselors to the 
“transitory” CPPSC (CPPSC-t) from short-
lists by President Moreno. The CPPSC-t was 
granted via referendum the authority to eval-
uate the major public authorities and was in 
charge of the oversight and accountability 
of every other public official within the next 
year. The CPPSC-t also received the powers 
to dismiss those authorities that neglected 
their responsibilities or were corrupt. 
The referendum was neither explicit nor 
carefully drafted to give precise powers to 
the CPPSC-t. The CPPSC-t read the powers 
granted by referendum broadly to fulfill the 
popular mandate for reforms and transparen-
cy. For instance, it vindicated the competence 
to appoint provisional authorities and to call 
for the appointment of definitive ones. At the 
same time, it tried to draft its regulations as 
precisely as general principles of public law, 
such as due process of law, require.5
The discharge of duties of the CPPSC-t was 
not free from criticism, especially at the out-
set. On the one hand, public officials that 
were supposed to perform as comptrollers 
had pervasively concealed unthinkable acts 
of corruption for over a decade. The stakes 
were too high just to let go of the position 
with archives, files, and other evidence (if 
there was any left). Thus, the CPPSC-t faced 
every possible political and judicial inci-
dent. Even the Inter-American Commission 
was called to intervene, which went as far 
as asking for provisional measures from the 
Inter-American Court. It had to spend its 
first months under heavy fire—none of the 
targeted authorities truly stand a chance after 
a decade of a general perception of abuse of 
power, impunity, and biased decisions in fa-
vor of Rafael Correa’s Alianza Pais.
The first to be evaluated were the five mem-
bers of the National Electoral Council. 
Throughout the terms of Correa, the Elec-
toral Council was accused of electoral fraud, 
gerrymandering, and disqualifying political 
parties of the opposition, among others. The 
CPPSC-t gave the assurances of due process 
of law, but finally dismissed all of them in a 
99-page report and appointed five transitory 
members.
After a rocky start, CPPSC-t continued fol-
lowing its rules of procedure, and granted 
every evaluated authority the right to be 
heard and produce evidence in its favor. 
The fierce opposition from sympathizers of 
Correa faded more and more. The CPPSC-t 
evaluated several state organs, such as Om-
budsman, the Public Defender, the General 
Attorney of the State, General Comptroller 
of the State, Contentious Electoral Tribunal, 
the Attorney General, the Superintendents, 
the Constitutional Court, and finally the Ju-
dicial Council. All the procedures finished 
with the removal of the heads of the eval-
uated institutions and were followed by the 
designation of new leaders.
The CPPSC-t and its decisions were widely 
supported by Ecuadorian society, especially 
its president, the iconic public figure Julio 
César Trujillo6 The CPPSC-t relied on the 
backing of the National Assembly, which 
requested all state organs to cooperate with 
the evaluation procedure carried out by the 
CPPSC-t.
3. An arbitrary Constitutional Court goes 
vacant
In May, the CPPSC-t began to evaluate the 
ECC. Following the procedure, the justices 
of the ECC as well as civil society were of-
fered to present their reports and complaints 
about the performance of the ECC and its 
justices. After the assessment procedure in 
August, the CPPSC-t decided7 to cease the 
functions of all nine ECC justices8 for irreg-
ularities in their selection and appointment 
in 2012, for not complying with their con-
stitutional function to guarantee fundamental 
rights, and for misusing public funds desig-
nated to the ECC.
In connection with the selection and ap-
pointment of the justices, the CPPSC-t high-
lighted that neither the written nor oral part 
of the evaluation of the selected candidates 
was in line with an objective, transparent, 
and meritocratic assessment of the candi-
date’s professional knowledge and skills set 
forth by the Ecuadorian Constitution9  and 
by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American 
Court. The CPPSC-t found that the ECC did 
not fulfill its constitutional review functions 
3 6ɉJPHS9LNPZ[Y `:\WWSLTLU[5V-LIY\HY`
4;OLX\LZ[PVUZ^LYLHIV\[[OLMVSSV^PUN!PMJVYY\W[PVUZOV\SKILZHUJ[PVULKI`^P[OKYH^HSVMWVSP[PJHSYPNO[Z"PMHSS[OLKPYLJ[S`LSLJ[LKW\ISPJVɉJLYZZOV\SKIL
able to be reelected only once; 3) if the CPPSC should transitionally have the power to evaluate the performance of certain public authorities; 4) if crimes of sexual 
violence against children and adolescents should never be prescribed; 5) if metal mining should be prohibited in protected and urban areas; 6) if the law on the cap-
ital gains tax should be repealed; 7) if the area for oil extraction should be reduced inside the Yasuní National Park. The highest popular support was given to the 
question regarding sexual violence. 
5 See, No. PLE-CPCCS-T-O-009-03-2018. Every document on each evaluation procedure is publicly available here: http://www.cpccs.gob.ec/designacion-de-au-
toridades/
6 According to the last surveys of CEDATOS, 73% of Ecuadorian society supports the actions of the CPPSC-t. http://www.cedatos.com.ec/detalles_noticia.
php?Id=372
7 Resolution No. PLE-CPCCS-T-O-089-23-08-2018. (August 23, 2018).
8 Emma Roxana Silva Chicaiza, Pamela Martínez Loayza, Victor Francisco Butiña Martínez, Wendy Molina Andrade, Tatiana Ordeñana Sierra, Marien Segura 
Reascos, Ruth Seni Pinoargote, Manuel Viteri Olvera, and Alfredo Ruiz Guzmán.
9 Constitution of 2008, Art. 434.
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and left the country without effective control 
of constitutionality. The CPPSC-t emphasized 
that the ECC decided its cases arbitrarily and 
violated the principles of due process, fore-
seeability, and the rule of law. Furthermore, 
the CPPSC-t resolved that the arguments used 
in the ECC’s cases were selected in a discre-
tional fashion and were driven by the self-in-
terest of the president of the ECC. Finally, the 
CPPSC-t established that the ECC did not 
properly manage the public funds allocated to 
exercise its functions, especially in the field of 
public contracting. Ecuadorian public opinion 
welcomed this outcome with satisfaction, 
which mirrors a long-standing and general 
negative judgment towards the ECC.10
After removing the nine justices from the 
ECC, the CPPSC-t declared a 60-day-long 
constitutional vacancy.11 Following the res-
olution, all the pending cases and their dead-
lines were declared dormant for the period of 
the constitutional vacancy and it was decid-
ed they were to be analyzed by the newly se-
lected and appointed constitutional justices. 
In November, after a rigorous selection pro-
cedure, the CPPSC-t approved the list of the 
new candidates12 for the ECC. Among others 
was Hernán Salgado, previous judge of the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the Inter-Amer-
ican Court, as well as other prestigious law 
professors and professionals. 
4. Corruption
The breadth and depth of corruption scandals 
unveiled during 2018 were astonishing. The 
judiciary itself and its inability to adjudicate 
impartially for over a decade was the cen-
ter of the turmoil. Since 2013, the Council 
of the Judiciary, presided by Gustavo Jalkh, 
had been pervasively accused of directly in-
terfering with the independence of judges on 
a nationwide scale.13 In May, the Legislature 
impeached Jalkh, and the CPPSC-t found 
extensive evidence on the systemic arbi-
trariness in judicial decision-making, which 
generally favored the interests of Correa’s 
government and relatives. The “inexcusable 
miscarriage of justice” was the legal term 
of choice by the Council of the Judiciary to 
reprimand and dismiss disloyal judges with 
a chilling effect over the rest. The dismissal 
of judges under this figure paved the way for 
the Council of the Judiciary to appoint judg-
es that would avail themselves to tailor the 
decisions that the regime would require. In 
the face of all the evidence, Jalkh and the rest 
of the members of the Council of the Judi-
ciary were dismissed by the CPPSC-t.14 The 
CPPSC-t appointed five transitory members 
to the Judicial Council and created a sort of 
Sub-Committee for Truth and Justice (Mesa
de Verdad y Justicia) to hear complaints 
against judges, prosecutors, and clerks. The 
Sub-Committee heard over 800 cases and 
decided to dismiss 175 of the defendants.15
The task of the transitory Council of the Ju-
diciary was key to mending the rule of law in 
Ecuador. Under the particular circumstances, 
the task to evaluate judges without making 
them feel the type of undue pressure that 
had become usual was almost impossible. 
Among the transitory authorities appoint-
ed by the CPPSC-t, perhaps the transitory 
Council of the Judiciary was the one that 
faced more external criticism and internal 
division. According to a certain public per-
ception, it was resorting to similar grounds 
of dismissal for judges and prosecutors as its 
predecessors, which was questioned by a mi-
nority among its members.16
Corruption and lack of impartiality within 
the judiciary reached the level of covering 
up and leaving in impunity cases of politi-
cal violence. During 2018, a new National 
Attorney found evidence of a state crime in 
connection with the kidnapping of a political 
activist and ex-congressman in 2012. The 
evidence pointed in the direction of the Gen-
eral of the National Police and the Secretary 
of Intelligence Services under Rafael Cor-
rea.17 Both of them were sentenced to pris-
on,18 and the National Court of Justice issued 
a red arrest warrant against President Correa 
because of evidence that could incriminate 
him. Interpol declined to arrest and extra-
dite Correa from Belgium, and the criminal 
proceedings in Ecuador have halted until he 
appears before the Court.
Corruption has also tainted much of the pub-
lic works built during the past ten years. The 
National Court of Justice found the Comp-
troller General, Carlos Pólit (now fugitive), 
and his son guilty of extortion and bribery. 
They were sentenced to 6 and 3 years of pris-
on, respectively, due to crimes related to the 
Odebrecht scandal.19  In the oil sector, the 
National Court of Justice found that the for-
mer Minister of Oil20  and the former CEO21
of the Ecuadorian oil company Petroecuador 
10 :HU[PHNV)HZHILº*VY[L*VUZ[P[\JPVUHS$PUVWLYHJPHJVYY\WJP}UW\ZPSHUPTPKHK»B*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[$PULɈLJ[P]LULZZJVYY\W[PVUW\ZPSSHUPTP[`D4Pelagatos, 
7 August 2018). https://4pelagatos.com/2018/08/07/corte-constitucional-inoperancia-corrupcion-pusilanimidad/ accessed 22 February 2019.
11 Resolution No. PLE-CPCCS-T-O-095-31-08-2018. (August 31, 2018). 
12 Hernán Salgado Pesantes, Daniela Salazar Marín, Ramiro Ávila Santamaría, Teresa Nuques Martínez, Agustín Grijalva Jiménez, Alí Lozada Prado, Pablo 
Herrería Bonnet, Carmen Corral Ponce, and Karla Andrade Quevedo.
13 Santiago Basabe, ‘Consejo de la Judicatura: hacemos de la corrupción una práctica diaria’ (4Pelagatos, 2 October 2018). https://4pelagatos.
com/2018/10/02/consejo-de-la-judicatura-hacemos-de-la-corrupcion-una-practica-diaria/ accessed 22 February 2019.
14 Resolution No. PLe-CPCCS-T-O-037-04-06-2018.
15 Resolution of the Judicial Council No. 094A-2018.
http://www.funcionjudicial.gob.ec/index.php/es/saladeprensa/noticias/item/7094-mesa-de-verdad-y-justicia-investiga-casos-de-judiciales-destituidos.html
16 Fermín Vaca, ‘Las claves para entender las pugnas en la Judicatura’ (Plan V, 17 September 2018). http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/politica/claves-en-
tender-pugnas-la-judicatura accessed 22 February 2019.
17 7YLZZYLSLHZL-.,5¢+*O[[WZ!^^ ^ÄZJHSPHNVILJÄZJHSPHWYLZLU[V LSLTLU[VZKLJVU]PJJPVUWHYH]PUJ\SHYHKVZWLYZVUHZHSJHZVIHSKH
18 Criminal Proceeding No. 17721-2018-00012 (June 15, 2018).
19 Criminal Proceeding No. 17721-2017-00222.
20 Criminal Proceeding No. 17721-2016-1564 (June 12, 2018).
21 Criminal Proceeding No. 17294-2017-01641 (July 3, 2018).
90 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
were guilty of illicit enrichment, traffic of 
influences, and other charges of corruption. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Case Satya: gender identity22
The case was about a child, Satya, who was 
born in 2011. Her biological mother sought 
to register Satya under her family name and 
that of her female partner.23 This, however, 
was not possible according to the Ecuadorian 
Constitution and civil registry statutes. Satya 
was already legally recognized as the daugh-
ter of the lesbian couple in Great Britain. In 
Ecuador, the case had been dismissed in the 
final instance, but the Ombudsman’s Office 
brought the issue to the ECC alleging that 
there had been violations of constitutional 
rights in the course of the judicial decision. 
Besides the heated issue in regard to same-
sex parenting, this case touched upon the 
erratic jurisprudence of the ECC on the 
extraordinary judicial remedy or acción ex-
traordinaria de protección. The ECC has 
contradictory jurisprudence on when such 
a remedy is admissible, what sort of right 
might be violated in a judicial procedure, 
and whether the ECC has the power to over-
rule previous judicial decisions. The nature 
of the extraordinary judicial remedy and the 
powers of the ECC when deciding such cas-
es will have to be clarified by the next com-
position of the ECC, especially because the 
overwhelming majority of cases in the back-
log of over ten thousand pending cases are 
extraordinary judicial remedies. In practice, 
the extraordinary judicial remedy has been 
abused as if it were a sort of another instance 
and it has created a great deal of uncertainty. 
In this case, the ECC ruled that the Office 
of Civil Registry must register Satya as re-
quested by her biological mother.
2. Case of the Río Blanco: illegal mining 
and rights of nature24
The decision of the Provincial Court of Jus-
tice of Azuay on halting mining activities by 
the Río Blanco River was considered a land-
mark for the protection of the rights of nature 
and the local community. The local commu-
nity of Molleturo, in the southern province 
of Azuay, have opposed for a long time the 
mining project by Ecuagoldmining, owned 
by the Chinese Junefield Group. The project 
would take place in the biosphere reserve of 
Macizo del Cajas. UNESCO declared this 
to be a biosphere reserve in 2013 due to the 
exuberant biological diversity of this region, 
which includes moorland, wetland, man-
groves, and a marine ecosystem. The com-
munity of Molleturo filed a judicial remedy 
(acción de protección) that seeks to declare 
null and void all the mining licenses issued 
by the Ministry of Mining and Environment 
for drilling and gold mining by the Río Blan-
co River. They also seek to recover damages 
and other forms of reparation for the harm 
already caused to nature and the community.
The decision of the Court provided an anal-
ysis of the constitutional principle of sumak
kawsay (Quechua for “living well” or “full-
ness of life”) and the right to prior consulta-
tion to the community. The Court found that 
whereas Article 408 of the Constitution de-
clares an inalienable property of the State all 
nonrenewable natural resources, including 
mineral deposits and biodiversity, the State 
must respect the environmental principles 
laid down by Article 395 when administer-
ing such natural resources. 
The decision also considers the right to prior 
consultation of the affected communities in 
the planning and implementation of mining 
activities (Article 57, No. 7 of the Constitu-
tion). The Court recalled that in the popular 
referendum in February, Ecuadoreans voted 
in favor of restricting mining activities. The 
Court further reasoned that the 2008 Con-
stitutional paradigm mandates developing 
a “non-extractivist” economic model and 
replacing the anthropocentric approach to 
the protection of the environment with a bio-
centric or “ecocentric” approach, according 
to which human beings shall not be placed 
at the center of the legal protection (as un-
der liberal constitutionalism) but instead the 
ecosystem as a whole (which is a novelty in 
Andean Transformative constitutionalism). 
According to the Court, this ecocentric ap-
proach was adopted when the Ecuadorian 
Constitution of 2008 recognized “nature as 
a bearer of rights” and the sumak kawsay 
as the central principle of the Ecuadorean 
constitutional order. Under such reasoning, 
the Court decided that the Ministry had not 
abided by constitutional standards on prior 
consultation and that the rights of the local 
communities had been violated.
3. Case of the 2015 unconstitutional consti-
tutional amendment25
This was the first time that the ECC re-
viewed the constitutionality of an already 
promulgated constitutional amendment. The 
challenged constitutional amendment26 was 
adopted while Rafael Correa was still in of-
fice in 2015, and its central question was the 
indefinite reelection of the President. The 
challenge was brought on formal and sub-
stantial grounds by several plaintiffs. The 
ECC was criticized for not being willing to 
take the heat while it was still a relevant is-
sue but only when a second amendment had 
already made the issue moot.
The ECC declared that it has the power to ex 
post review the constitutionality of constitu-
tional amendments, following Articles 436.2 
and 75(1.a) of the Constitution and Article 
106 of the Organic Law of Jurisdictional 
Guarantees and Constitutional Review.27 Ac-
22 Judgment No. 184-18-SEP-CC, ECC.
23 (JJVYKPUN[V[OLUHTPUNWH[[LYUPU,J\HKVYHJOPSK»ZNP]LUUHTLPZ[VILMVSSV^LKI `PU[OLÄYZ[WSHJL[OLMH[OLY»ZMHTPS`UHTLHUKPU[OLZLJVUKWSHJLI`[OL
mother’s family name.
24 Decision of the Provincial Court of Azuay, No. 01333201803145 (August 3, 2018).
25 Judgment No. 018-18-SIN-CC, ECC. 
26 :\WWSLTLU[6ɉJPHS9LNPZ[Y`5V+LJLTILY
27 :\WWSLTLU[6ɉJPHS9LNPZ[Y`5V6J[VILY ;OLJVTWL[LUJLVMYL]PL^PUN[OLJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSP[`VMJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSHTLUKTLU[ZPZTLU[PVULKL_WYLZZS`
only in the Organic Law, not in the Constitution. This, however, did not appear as an issue in the decision of the ECC.
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cording to the Organic Law, the ECC is only 
allowed to review the constitutionality of 
amendments on formal grounds. Therefore, 
the ECC focused on possible errors during 
the amendment procedure, and it did not ad-
judicate anew on whether the selected pro-
cedure for the constitutional change in 2015 
was in line with the Constitution. In its ex 
ante review from 2015,28 the ECC consid-
ered that giving way to indefinite reelection 
of the President was not considered either an 
“alteration of the fundamental structure of 
the Constitution” or a “constitutive element 
of the Constitution,” and it did not “restrict 
any fundamental rights or guarantees” that 
allowed for a simpler amendment procedure. 
29 According to Article 441, the amendment 
that the ECC had approved had to be initiat-
ed by at least one-third of the members of the 
National Assembly, and for its adoption, it 
was enough to secure two-thirds of the votes 
of the National Assembly. 
In 2018, the ECC decided that the amend-
ment was initiated by the necessary number 
of members of the National Assembly, and 
that the final text of the amendment was ad-
opted by the required two-thirds majority as 
well. However, the ECC found that the appli-
cable procedure mandated that the National 
Assembly had to vote separately for each ar-
ticle, but the Assembly decided in a single 
vote. The ECC found this practice contrary 
to the principle of constitutional supremacy 
and rigidity. The ECC ruled that voting in 
blocks about different provisions to amend 
the Constitution violated the freedom of the 
electors and the democratic principle of de-
liberation; therefore, it was unconstitutional. 
The ECC clarified that the formal unconsti-
tutionality of the said amendment did not af-
fect its normative force.
This decision was one of the last judg-
ments of the ECC before its dissolution by 
the CPPSC-t. Under normal circumstances, 
a judgment on the unconstitutionality of a 
constitutional amendment might have been 
approached as a historic step in a country’s 
constitutional development. Nevertheless, 
this judgment has not received any attention 
in professional or general public discourse. 
One reason to explain this disinterest could 
be that the professional community con-
sidered this a strategic move of the ECC to 
prove its legitimacy and impartiality while 
it was under the evaluation of the CPPSC-t. 
Another reason seems to be that the decision 
does not have any major impact on the con-
tested amendments.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In October, the chairman of the CPPSC-t an-
nounced30 that the Council had fulfilled its 
mandate to evaluate the performance of sev-
eral state organs to strengthen the constitu-
tional institutions in Ecuador. The members 
of the CPPSC-t encouraged the Ecuadorean 
people to abolish this institution from the 
Constitution, hinting to include another ref-
erendum in the elections for local authorities 
that will take place in 2019. The reason is 
that the powers that the Constitution gives to 
the CPPSC to remove and appoint authori-
ties could easily be abused once again, and 
it may be better to give back those constitu-
tional powers to the Legislative, as it used to 
be before the 2008 Constitution. 
The National Electoral Council has already31
called for elections on March 24, 2019. They 
will not include a referendum, but new mem-
bers to the CPPSC will have to be elected. 
Public opinion seems to support the aboli-
tion of the CPPSC and encourages voting 
null on the elections.32 Their outcome will 
be important to consolidate the work of the 
CPPSC-t, which was not free from faults but 
pointed the country in the direction of un-
veiling corruption and abuse of power, and 
rebuilding the institutions needed in a liberal 
democracy. 
V. FURTHER READING
Juan Pablo Aguilar Andrade, El Mito del 
Nuevo Paradigma Constitucional (Corpo-
ración de Estudios y Publicaciones, 2018)
Mauricio Maldonado Muñoz, Los Dere-
chos Fundamentales. Un estudio conceptual 
(ARA Editores, 2018)
Andrés Martinez Moscoso – Teodoro Ver-
dugo Silva (coord.), Tensiones y contradic-
ciones de la democracia ecuatoriana (Uni-
versidad de Cuenca, 2018)
Sebastián López Hidalgo, Reflexiones acer-
ca de la legitimidad democrática de la justi-
cia constitucional en Ecuador (CEP – Uni-
versidad Andina Simon Bolivar, 2018)
28 Judgment No. 184-18-SEP-CC, ECC.
29 0U[OLKLJPZPVUVM[OL,**^HZJYP[PJPaLKILJH\ZLP[KPKUV[JVUZPKLYZLYPV\ZS`OV ^PU[OLJPYJ\TZ[HUJLZVM[OLTVTLU[[OLPUKLÄUP[LYLLSLJ[PVUVM[OL
7YLZPKLU[JV\SKHɈLJ[[OLWYPUJPWSLVMWVSP[PJHSYV[H[PVUWYPUJPWPVKLHS[LYUHIPSPKHKLULSNVIPLYUV) and political rights.
30 Press release No. 248 (October 19, 2018). See http://www.cpccs.gob.ec/2018/10/cpccs-t-explico-su-actuacion-y-propuesta-de-eliminacion-de-la-institucion/ 
31 Resolution of the National Electoral Council, No. PLE-CNE-3-21-11-2018.
O[[W!JULNVILJPTHNLZK,SLJJPVULZFF JVU]VJH[VYPHFTVKPÄJHKHWKM
32 Santiago Basabe, ‘Voto nulo = eliminar el Consejo de Participación Ciudadana’ [Null vote = eliminating the Council of Citizens’ Participation]. 4 Pelagatos. Febru-
ary 19, 2019. https://4pelagatos.com/2019/02/19/voto-nulo-eliminar-el-consejo-de-participacion-ciudadana/
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I. INTRODUCTION
Between brand new issues and continuous 
developments of the last years, the constitu-
tional status of Egypt in 2018 was rich and 
controversial. The emergency status was 
extended— again—with new relevant pro-
cedural orders. A law addressing the rights 
of the disabled was passed,1 a decision reg-
ulating the situation of a number of churches 
was delivered,2 and a new Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court was appointed,3 while the 
battle over the appointment of female judg-
es in the state council continued. In another 
context, a number of interesting decisions 
were issued by the Supreme Court address-
ing—among other matters—the regulation 
of pharmaceuticals, the interpretation of the 
Islamic Sharia,4 the sovereignty acts,5 the 
former Supreme Court judges’ status, and 
the previous civil associations law.6 After the 
explanation of the most salient constitutional 
developments, the reviewer, where applica-
ble, presents a brief comment.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The most prominent constitutional develop-
ment of 2018 was rooted in one of the es-
sential features of the constitutional system 
in Egypt, namely the problematic emergen-
cy status. Egypt has been under a “roughly” 
continuous emergency status since 1981 un-
der the rule of the former president Mubarak. 
This was suspended for a while after the 
revolution, given it was one of its major de-
mands. However, after August 14, 2013, the 
date of the dispersing of Rabaa sit-in, Egypt 
has been witnessing a sequence of declara-
tions and extensions of the emergency status, 
giving the army and the police forces excep-
tional powers over citizens.7
According to Article 154 of the Egyptian 
2014 Constitution, the President has the 
power to declare the emergency status, as 
regulated by law, and after consultation with 
the cabinet. The proclamation has to be ap-
proved with a simple majority and has to be 
submitted to the House of Representatives 
within 7 days. The Constitution limits the 
duration of the emergency status to three 
months. This limitation can be renewed for 
only one time with the approval of the Par-
1 -VYTVYLHIV\[[OPZSH^ZLL!;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKI4H`
2-VYTVYLHIV\[[OPZKLJPZPVUZLL!;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULW
3 +LJPZPVUVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL(YHI9LW\ISPJVM,N`W[U\TILY VM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L
Issue (29) repeated (c), July 21, 2018, p. 2.
4 -VYTVYLHIV\[[OLZLKLJPZPVUZZLL!;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKM(WYPSW
HUK;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULWHUK;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\L 
YLWLH[LKI4H`WW
5 -VYTVYLHIV\[[OPZKLJPZPVUZLL!;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULW
6 -VYTVYLHIV\[[OPZKLJPZPVUZLL!;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULW 
7 Yussef Auf, ‘The State of Emergency in Egypt: An Exception or Rule?’ (Atlantic Council, MENASource, 
2018) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-state-of-emergency-in-egypt-an-exception-
VYY\SL%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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liament with a two-thirds majority. In 2018, 
Egypt experienced two declarations of the 
emergency status, and two extensions, all 
according to the given constitutional pro-
cedures.8 Moreover, according to the last 
declaration of the emergency status in Oc-
tober 2018, the Prime Minister issued a de-
cision that obliges the General Prosecution 
to defer specific cases to the State Security 
Emergency Courts (a type of exceptional 
court) instead of the ordinary courts. These 
cases included felonies harming the security 
of the government from outside the country 
or internally, and crimes related to unlawful 
assembly, explosives, disruption of transpor-
tation, a number of press- and opinion-relat-
ed crimes, the violation of peace, supply and 
compulsory pricing, arms and munition, the 
preservation of places of worship, the viola-
tion of labor liberties, facilities sabotage, the 
regulation of assembly rights and peaceful 
demonstration, and terrorism.9
:KHWKHUWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHILFLWOLHVLQWKH
constitutional text itself or in its application 
is debatable. One may say the real circum-
stances can require an exceptional status that 
rightfully lasts for more than six months. 
However, the problem is with the laws reg-
ulating the emergency state themselves.10 As 
long as these laws adopt a broad and elastic 
formulation, this will give the President, the 
Parliament, and the Executive huge discre-
tionary power, and courts in charge of inter-
preting and applying these laws will play a 
limited role. This turns the emergency status 
into a normal status in the Egyptian constitu-
tional scenario, while the exercise of powers 
of constitutional adjudication paradoxically 
turns into an exceptional event. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The most important constitutional law cases 
in Egypt 2018 vary in their fields between 
the different relevant questions of the pro-
tection of civil freedoms and restrictions 
or powers of the state. Although not all the 
interesting cases can be included in this re-
view, the most prominent ones are, keeping 
in mind variation between the relevant sub-
jects. Other cases can be found in the Further 
Readings section.
1. Basel El-Aalaily v. The Prime Minister 
& Others: The Regulation of Pharmacies 
Ownership
The plaintiff challenged the constitution-
ality of clause (30) of law no. 127 of 1955 
modified by law number 253 regulating the 
practice of the pharmacy profession. This 
constitutional issue originated from a contro-
versy concerning the decision of the head of 
the central administration of pharmaceutical 
affairs declining the plaintiff’s request of is-
suing a license to open a public pharmacy in 
El Shorouk City. The administration rejected 
the issuance of the license, arguing that the 
mentioned clause forbids that a pharmacist 
be an owner or a partner of two pharmacies, 
and this would have been the case.
The plaintiff argued that these limitations 
breached the constitutional protection of pri-
vate property rights, as it consisted of an un-
reasonable restriction of these rights. More-
over, he claimed that the contested decision 
limited the social role of property rights by 
endangering public service and putting pos-
sible jobs at risk.
The court rejected these arguments and up-
held the constitutionality of the addressed 
clause on the basis that property rights are 
not absolute, and they have to be subject to 
the evaluation of their social roles. The leg-
islator has the discretionary power to regu-
late these rights with the aim of guaranteeing 
social needs. It is within this discretionary 
power that the legislator might and should 
balance the potentially conflicting consti-
WXWLRQDO LQWHUHVW :LWK LWV UHJXODWLRQ WKH
legislator considered that pharmacies pro-
vide an aspect of health care protected by 
Article 18 of the Constitution, and provide 
a viable balance of the constitutional inter-
ests involved. These interests include the 
protection of the profession of pharmacists 
from the mere application of free market 
self-regulation to guarantee that customers 
get the best possible quality and lower pric-
es. Moreover, the contested regulation aimed 
at preventing illegitimate competition within 
this profession, and at keeping it away from 
the mere profitable commercial attitudes 
given its close relevance to health care and 
the right to life. The Supreme Constitutional 
Court, then, held that the regulation of the 
legislator in this context was reasonable and 
logically connected to the objective of the 
law, and did not violate Articles 33 and 35, 
regulating property rights. Regarding the al-
leged breach of the right to labor protected 
by Articles 12 and 13 of the Constitution, 
the Court also rejected the claim on the basis 
that this right is not absolute, elaborating on 
the dimension of the right to labor as a public 
duty. In the Court’s view, the legislator drew 
a reasonable balance between constitutional-
ly relevant interests, such as the protection 
of public health, the prevention of unfair 
competition, and the guarantee of a real and 
effective supervision of the owner on the ac-
tivity of the pharmacy.
The Court, accordingly, decided that the reg-
ulation of the law did not violate the origin 
and essential core of the regulated rights, 
and consequently upheld the contested leg-
islation.11
In our opinion, however, the Court could 
have considered whether the current regula-
tion had reached its goals during the years 
of application, or even whether the contested 
8 +LJPZPVUVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL(YHI9LW\ISPJVM,N`W[U\TILYVM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKK+LJLTILYW
+LJPZPVUVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL(YHI9LW\ISPJVM,N`W[U\TILYVM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LK(WYPSW
+LJPZPVUVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL(YHI9LW\ISPJVM,N`W[U\TILYVM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKH1\ULW
+LJPZPVUVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL(YHI9LW\ISPJVM,N`W[U\TILYVM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKH6J[VILYW
9 +LJPZPVUVM[OL7YPTL4PUPZ[LYU\TILYVM`LHY;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKH6J[VILYW
Penal Code number 58 of year 1937, https://manshurat.org/node/14677
10 See last year’s report: Eman Muhammad Rashwan, ‘Egypt: The State of Liberal Democracy’ in Richard Albert and others (eds), .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\-
[PVUHS3H^#^^ ^IJLK\JSV\NOJLU[LY%
11 ;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULW
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regulation prevented a sole owner from be-
ing de facto owner of more than two phar-
macies. This is highly doubtful from our 
point of view.12 Of course, any deficits in 
the competition in the pharmacy market in 
Egypt cannot simply be overcome only by 
legal means. However, whatever the most 
appropriate means to regulate the matter at 
hand, we hold that the legitimacy of a given 
law does not only depend on its “rationali-
ty” and “logic” “in the books” but also on its 
functionality “in action”. This could be food 
for thought for the Supreme Court in its fu-
ture decisions.
2. Tiran & Sanafeer Cases
The Case of Tiran & Sanafeer Islands, con-
nected to the international treaty between 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea bor-
derlines, started in 2016, when a number of 
activists and lawyers took it to the judiciary. 
13 In 2018, two decisions were delivered by 
the Supreme Court on this issue.
The first was in the case filed by The Pres-
ident of the Republic, The Prime Minister, 
The Head of the Parliament, The Minister 
of Defense, The Minister of the Interior, and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs v. Ali Ayoub 
(Lawyer) & Others. The applicants filed this 
case as an “Execution Dispute” to ask for an 
urgent suspension of the execution of a deci-
sion delivered by the State Council. The con-
stitutional challenge concerned the jurisdic-
tion of the State Council over the dispute on 
the competence to sign and conclude the rel-
evant treaty. The State Council declared that 
the contested acts were null and void, basing 
the decision on Article 151 of the Egyptian 
Constitution, which prohibits the conclusion 
of any treaty that entails the cession of parts 
of the state’s territory.
The applicants alleged that the challenged 
decision by the State Council prevented the 
application of earlier decisions by the Su-
preme Court, which categorized similar acts 
by the Government as “Sovereignty Acts”, 
and thus not subject to any judicial review.14
First, the Supreme Court rejected the appli-
cants’ argument based on the fact that the 
matter was  res judicata. The Supreme Court 
affirmed that the res judicata was limited to 
the peculiar circumstances of the cases de-
cided, and that the cases at hand involved a 
different, though similar, subject. Accord-
ingly, the Court affirmed that the challenged 
decisions of the State Council did not per se 
preclude the application of the sovereign-
ty acts principle laid out by the Supreme 
Court, because the State Council decided the 
contested acts were not to be considered as 
sovereignty acts but as administrative acts, 
VXEMHFWWRMXGLFLDOUHYLHZ:KHWKHUWKLVFRQ-
sideration by the State Council was correct 
or not is not the subject matter of this first 
case.
The second case was decided on the same 
day by the Supreme Court (The President of 
the Republic & Others v. Ali Ayoub [Lawyer] 
& Others). This decision, unlike the first 
one, tackled the question of whether the sub-
ject matter of the case was falling into the 
category of sovereignty acts or not.
After the decision of the State Council 
courts—referred to earlier—an urgent case 
was filed before an ordinary court (not an 
administrative one, and therefore not under 
the jurisdiction of the State Council). The 
action aimed at the urgent suspension of the 
execution of the decisions delivered by the 
State Council on the basis that the subject of 
the dispute was a sovereign act that should 
be out of judicial review jurisdiction. The ur-
gent court decided to stop the execution and 
considered the decisions of the State Council 
as null and void. This decision was later up-
held by the relevant court of appeals. Con-
sequently, the situation came into a conflict 
between two judicial decisions from two 
different jurisdictions. In fact, the applicants 
asked the Supreme Court to disregard the de-
cisions delivered by the State Council and to 
give immediate application to the decisions 
delivered by the ordinary courts.
The Supreme Court decided that both the 
ordinary and administrative courts have no 
jurisdiction over the subject of the case.
Although the very complicated details of 
the case entailed an extremely detailed de-
cision that could be a reference for many le-
gal issues, the most important aspects of the 
Court’s decision may be listed as follows: (a) 
The Court rejected the defendants’ argument 
that there is no actual conflict between the 
two jurisdictions, as the administrative courts 
already had delivered their decisions and ex-
hausted their jurisdiction over the case be-
fore a new case was filed before the ordinary 
courts. It decided that this simultaneous liti-
gation does not generate a conflict that falls 
within the Supreme Court’s attribution; (b) 
Although the Parliament and the President 
had approved the treaty after filing the case 
before the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
and before this Court delivered its final de-
cision suspending the earlier State Council 
decisions, this does not mean that the parties 
no longer benefit from the Supreme Court 
deciding the case. First, because the non-ex-
ecution of the conflicting judicial decisions 
that are the subject matter of the conflict 
case is not a condition provided by law for 
the Court to be able to rule over the conflict. 
And second, even if a decision delivered by 
an incompetent court was executed, this can 
only be considered a mere material barrier 
in the way of the execution of the competent 
court’s decision, and in such case this bar-
rier should be removed; (c) The Court held 
that the signature and conclusion of an in-
ternational treaty is a sovereign act and does 
not fall within any court’s jurisdiction; (d) 
The Court held that it is the Parliament that 
should decide whether a treaty is tackling 
one of the State Sovereignty Rights and—in 
the affirmative case—it is the Parliament 
that is empowered to call a referendum to 
12 See for instance: Mohamed Fatouh, ‘أباطرة “السلاسل الصيدلية” يستولون على سوق الدواء.. نقابة الصيادلة تخاطب “الصحة” والوزارة “لا حس ولا خبر”.. الحق في الدواء: الحكومة تعاملت مع الأزمة بشكل فاشل’ 
º;OLLTWLYVYZVM[OLWOHYTHJ`JOHPUZHYL[HRPUNV]LY[OLKY\NTHYRL[;OL7OHYTHJPZ[Z»:`UKPJH[LPZHKKYLZZPUN¸OLHS[O¹HUK[OLTPUPZ[Y`^P[OUVYLWSPLZº;OL
right to medicine: The government dealt with the crisis in a failed manner’ ((OS4HZY#O[[WZ!^^ ^HOSTHZYUL^ZJVT %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
13 For more about the previous developments and details of the issue, see: Eman Muhammad Rashwan (n 10) 85.
14 ;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\L YLWLH[LKJ4HYJOW
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approve the international treaty (according 
to Article 151 of the Constitution); (e) The 
Court held that after the final approval of 
the treaty and its publication in The Official 
Gazette (what had already happened in the 
case at hand), the review over the treaty be-
comes an exclusive jurisdiction for the Su-
preme Court, its jurisdiction being limited to 
assessing the compatibility of the procedures 
of approving the treaty with the procedures 
explained in the Constitution, and to the ad-
herence of its content to its principles, the 
same power it has over ordinary laws;15  (f) 
However, the Court finally refused to review 
the question on the competence, as it held 
that the question was not relevant to the case 
at hand, which only concerned the conflict of 
jurisdiction between two courts.16
However, in our opinion, the Court disre-
garded a crucial deficit in procedural Egyp-
tian law, which gives a person the opportuni-
ty to preclude the execution of a final judicial 
decision by filing an opposite case over the 
same dispute before a different jurisdiction, 
even if he/she already knows that this sec-
ond jurisdiction has no competence over the 
case. In deciding these conflicts, the Court 
should have considered the intention of the 
litigants by investigating possible cases of 
“abuses of law”. In fact, the core dispute at 
hand did not concern a conflict of jurisdic-
tion between administrative and ordinary 
courts, but the justiciability of the act itself. 
In fact, the decision of the Supreme Court, 
declaring the invalidity of both the ordinary 
and administrative court decisions, supports 
this claim.
3. Justice Tahani El-Gebali v. The Pres-
ident of the Republic & Others: Supreme 
Court Justice Reappointments
The 2012 Constitution reduced the number 
of justices of the Supreme Court to 10 (keep-
ing the most seniors on the bench). This 
constitutional regulation was interpreted as 
revenge by the Islamists against the Court.17
One of the judges affected by this constitu-
tional regulation was justice El-Gebali, who 
filed the reported case.
The applicant requested the cancellation of 
the President’s decision dismissing her. She 
based her request on the constitutional prin-
ciple of judicial independence and on the 
prohibition of the judges’ dismissal, and on 
the change of political circumstances, which 
enabled the reappointment of most of the 
judges who were dismissed in the same con-
text.18
The Court rejected her application, arguing 
that the applicants requested the cancella-
tion of the reappointment of a number of the 
impeached judges; nonetheless, she had no 
interest in such a decision. Moreover, the 
Court rejected the request of reappointing 
herself, as this matter falls into the discre-
tionary power of the Court;19 finally, the 
Court noted that the 2014 Constitution ex-
plicitly preserved the legal consequences of 
the 2012 Constitution for reasons related to 
the stability of law. Consequently, the 2014 
Constitution chose the ways through which 
it corrects the invalid consequences of the 
2012 Constitution.20 The reappointment of 
the dismissed judges was not part of this and 
so not addressed by the 2014 Constitution.
As a final note, it may be of interest that 
Justice El-Gebali was the only female judge 
among the Supreme Court justices.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The main constitutional question that awaits 
Egypt in 2019 is whether the 2014 Constitu-
tion will be amended, mainly to enable the 
current President, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, to be 
re-elected for a third term.
As expected,21 in January 2019, a coalition 
in the Parliament submitted a constitution-
al amendment draft, including: (a) the ex-
tension of the presidential term from 4 to 6 
years; (b) the recognition to the current Pres-
ident of an exception through a transitional 
clause that accords him the right to run for 
presidency for two more terms added to the 
current term that is supposed to end in 2022, 
which gives him the chance to be a president 
for twenty sequential years; (c) the conces-
sion of additional presidential powers over 
the judiciary, including the appointment of 
the heads of judicial authorities, while the 
State Council’s powers are severely reduced; 
(d) the broadening of the powers of the mil-
itary, including “the protection of the Con-
stitution and democracy, and preservation of 
the main pillars of the state and civil society, 
the acquired interests of the people and rights 
and liberties of individuals;” (e) the broaden-
ing of the jurisdiction of military courts; (f) 
the addition of the vacancy of the vice-pres-
ident; (g) the creation of an upper chamber 
of the Parliament, named “Senate;” (h) the 
establishment of a 25% quota for women in 
the house of representatives, and (i) the guar-
antee of an “adequate” representation in the 
Parliament and municipalities for Christians, 
15 For more about the Supreme Constitutional Court power over reviewing treaties, see article (151) of 2014 the Constitution.
16 ;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\L YLWLH[LKJ4HYJOW
17 جابر نصار, ‘المحكمة الدستورية العليا في مشروع الدستور بين عداء غير مبرر وإنتقام غير مسبوق’ - The Supreme Constitutional Court in the Constitution Draft Between an Unreasoned 
Hostility and Unprecedented Revenge جريدة الوطن (2012).
18 For more about the dismissal details see: ‘تشكسل المحكمة الدستورية: 7 قضاة يعودون إلى محاكم أخرى وهيئة المفوضين والمحاماة’ Almasry Alyoum (25 December 2012) < https://www.
HSTHZY`HS`V\TJVTUL^ZKL[HPSZ%
19 (Y[PJSL VM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUZ[H[LK[OH[[OL:\WYLTL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[ZOHSSILMVYTLKMYVTHJOPLMQ\Z[PJLHUK¸Z\ɉJPLU[¹U\TILYVM]PJLJOPLMZ;OPZ
gives the decision whether the Court appoints new judges or not, and the selection of these judges to the Supreme Court itself.
20 ;OL6ɉJPHS.HaL[[L0ZZ\LYLWLH[LKP1\ULW
21‘Egypt Mulls Changing Constitution to Keep Sisi in Power’ (news 24, 2019) <https://www.news24.com/Africa/News/egypt-mulls-changing-constitution-to-keep-
ZPZPPUWV^LY %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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people with disabilities, laborers, farmers, 
the youth, and Egyptians residing abroad 
(even though the latter minorities are not 
guaranteed with a specific quota). Finally, 
the constitutional amendment draft aims at 
introducing an amendment to the amend-
ment procedures of the articles regulating 
the presidential terms or the principles of 
freedom and equality unless the amendment 
is related to further guarantees. However, 
this final amendment did not appear in the 
draft submitted later to the general commit-
tee of the Parliament.22
The amendments met the required majority 
in the general committee of the Parliament 
in February 2019, passing the first step for 
their approval.23 They now have to be voted 
through by a two-thirds majority of the Par-
liament, and then approved by the majority 
of the “correct participating votes” in a pub-
lic referendum. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
This report discusses developments in Finn-
ish constitutional law during 2018. It focus-
HV RQ WKH PRVW VLJQL¿FDQW GHYHORSPHQWV
including a major reform of the healthcare 
and social services system as well as reform 
of legislation related to civil and military 
intelligence. In addition, important opin-
ions by the Constitutional Law Commit-
tee of Parliament and major cases by the 
highest courts—the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Administrative Court—and other 
important bodies are discussed.
The intelligence legislation package, in-
cluding a constitutional amendment relat-
ed to the package, continued to be one of 
the most important themes on the Finnish 
scene of constitutional and political life in 
2018. Another pressing topic was the re-
form of the Finnish healthcare and social 
welfare system. Aside from their constitu-
WLRQDO VLJQL¿FDQFH WKHSROLWLFDODQGVRFLH-
tal importance of these two topics must be 
emphasized, not least because the Govern-
ment was already close to collapse due to 
the failure of healthcare and social welfare 
reform in 2015. Given also looming parlia-
mentary elections and European Parliament 
elections in the spring of 2019, 2018 was 
vibrant and intensive in Finnish constitu-
tionalism and politics.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the Constitutional Law Commit-
tee of Parliament, the primary authority of 
constitutional interpretation and review of 
legislation in Finland, issued 64 opinions 
on legislative proposals or other matters, 
including proposals for EU measures, con-
cerning their compatibility with the Con-
stitution of Finland as well as international 
human rights obligations binding upon Fin-
land.1
In-depth reform of the healthcare and 
social services system
In 2017, the Government submitted to Par-
liament extensive legislative proposals that 
healthcare and social services should be run 
by larger entities instead of municipalities, 
which are currently responsible for provid-
ing healthcare and social services. In addi-
tion, a central proposed change was related 
to opening up more opportunities for the 
private sector to provide healthcare and so-
cial services. The reform is needed because 
of problems related to the current health-
care system as well as the aging population. 
:KLOH WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQDO /DZ &RPPLWWHH
took the view that the reform is necessary, 
LWDOVR LGHQWL¿HGDQXPEHURIFRQVWLWXWLRQ-
al problems, especially insofar as the role 
of private actors within the so-called free-
dom-of-choice model was concerned. In 
addition, the Committee took the view that 
the schedule of the entry into force of the 
FINLAND
1 The Finnish system of constitutional review was discussed in more detail in the 2016 report on Finland, 
see Laura Kirvesniemi, Milka Sormunen and Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Developments in Finnish Constitutional Law: 
The Year 2016 in Review’, in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Šimon Drugda (eds.), 
;OL0*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (Clough Center for the Study of 
Constitutional Democracy 2017)
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reform jeopardized everyone’s right to ad-
equate social, health and medical services.2
After the opinion of the Committee, the 
legislative proposals on the reform were 
amended, and the Government submitted 
its new proposals to the Parliament in 2018. 
In 2018, the Constitutional Law Committee 
gave a new opinion on the reform in which 
it continued to stress the importance of 
paying attention to equal treatment of the 
inhabitants of municipalities in different 
parts of the country and their factual access 
to services necessary for the realisation of 
their fundamental rights. The Constitution-
al Law Committee took the view that the 
proposed legislation was still incompati-
ble with the Constitution in several ways.3 
Therefore, the Social and Health Committee 
of Parliament amended the bills, and now 
they are again pending before the Constitu-
tional Law Committee, which is expected to 
JLYHLWV¿QDORSLQLRQRQWKHFRPSDWLELOLW\RI
the proposed legislation in February 2019. 
It seems uncertain whether the reform will 
take place before the parliamentary elec-
tions of April 2019.
Constitutional amendment concerning 
secrecy of confidential communications for 
the purpose of allowing the enactment of 
civil and military intelligence legislation
In 2018, the Constitution of Finland was 
DPHQGHGIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQLWVKLVWRU\DF-
cording to the urgent procedure for consti-
tutional enactment in which an amendment 
is passed without acceptance from two sub-
sequent Parliaments.4 The amendment was 
adopted for the purpose of allowing the 
enactment of legislation on civil and mili-
tary intelligence, including their legal and 
parliamentary oversight, before the end of 
this Government term. The constitutional 
amendment entered into force on 15 Oc-
tober 2018. As 2018 came to an end, the 
proposed legislation on civil and military 
intelligence and on the oversight of intel-
ligence gathering was still pending before 
Parliament. 
Previously, section 10 of the Constitution 
provided that the secrecy of correspon-
GHQFH WHOHSKRQ\ DQG RWKHU FRQ¿GHQWLDO
communications was inviolable. Before 
the amendment, national security was not 
included in the grounds for limiting the 
VHFUHF\ RI FRQ¿GHQWLDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQV
After the amendment, section 10 provides 
that provisions on limitations to the se-
FUHF\ RI FRQ¿GHQWLDO FRPPXQLFDWLRQV WKDW
are necessary for the purpose of gathering 
intelligence on military operations or oth-
er such activities that pose a serious threat 
to national security can be laid down by an 
ordinary act. The threat directed at national 
security must be serious, and secondly, it is 
required that interfering with the secrecy of 
communications must be necessary for the 
purpose of intelligence gathering. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
Helsinki Court of Appeal prohibited 
discrimination in military service
Section 127 of the Constitution of Finland 
states that every Finnish citizen is obligat-
ed to participate or assist in national de-
fence, as provided by an act. Provisions 
on the right to exemption, on grounds of 
conscience, from participation in military 
national defence are laid down by an act. 
It follows from current legislation that all 
adult men are liable to perform either mili-
tary or civil service. The sentence for refus-
al is 173 days of imprisonment. 
6LQFHKRZHYHU-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHV
have been exempted from conscription by 
an act due to reasons of conscience based 
on their religious beliefs. Because the act 
FRQÀLFWHG ZLWK WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ LW ZDV
passed according to the procedure for con-
stitutional enactment to assume the status 
of the so-called exceptive enactment. Ex-
ceptive enactments constitute a traditional 
peculiarity5 of the Finnish constitutional 
system as they allow the adoption of leg-
islation that in substance derogates from 
the Constitution without amending the text 
thereof, subject to the proviso that such leg-
islation is approved in the procedure appli-
cable for constitutional amendments. Since 
its adoption in the 1980s, the act exempting 
-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHVKDVFRQWLQXRXVO\EHHQ
subject to criticism by, e.g., international 
human rights treaty bodies.
In the case before the Helsinki Court of Ap-
peal (23.2.2018 no. 108226), the defendant, 
ZKRZDVQRWD-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVKDGEHHQ
ordered to perform his civil service. He had 
refused and claimed that major reasons of 
conscience prohibited him from performing 
military or civil service. The District Court 
sentenced him to imprisonment. 
Contrary to the District Court, the Court of 
Appeal found that sentencing the defendant 
would constitute a violation of section 6 of 
the Constitution, according to which every-
one is equal before the law and no one shall, 
without an acceptable reason, be treated dif-
ferently from other persons on the grounds 
of sex, age, origin, language, religion, con-
viction, opinion, health, disability or other 
reason that concerns his or her person. 
In examining the question of conscription 
and alleged discrimination, the Court of Ap-
peal made reference to several cases of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Council. The Court found 
WKDW VLQFH -HKRYDK¶V :LWQHVVHV KDG EHHQ
2 Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 26/2017; Milka Sormunen, Laura Kirvesniemi and Tuomas Ojanen, ‘Finland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard 
Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Šimon Drugda (eds.), ;OL0*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (Clough Center for the 
Study of Constitutional Democracy 2018), 90–91
3 Constitutional Law Committee Opinion 15/2018
4 For more information on the normal and urgent procedures for constitutional enactment in Finland, see previous report concerning Finland, supra note 2, 90
5 )L[^LLU  L_JLW[P]LLUHJ[TLU[Z^LYLHKVW[LK^P[O[OLV\[JVTL[OH[ZVTLJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSWYV]PZPVUZHJ[\HSS`ILJHTL¸LTW[`ZOLSSZ¹HZ
they were hollowed out by numerous exceptive enactments. Since the reform of the constitutional system of 1995, the constitutional doctrine has been that 
L_JLW[P]LLUHJ[TLU[ZZOV\SKVUS`IL\ZLKMVYPUJVYWVYH[PUNPU[LYUH[PVUHS[YLH[PLZ[OH[JVUÅPJ[^P[O[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVU*VUZLX\LU[S `[OLPY\ZLOHZKYHZ[PJHSS`
diminished. In addition, the new Constitution of 2000 introduced a material limit for exceptive enactments by requiring that the derogation from the Constitu-
[PVUT\Z[YLTHPU¸SPTP[LK¹
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exempted from conscription due to reasons 
of conscience, sentencing the defendant 
ZRXOG EH LQ HYLGHQW FRQÀLFW ZLWK VHFWLRQ
6 of the Constitution, when interpreted in 
the light of Finland’s international human 
rights obligations. According to section 106 
of the Constitution, if the application of an 
DFW ZRXOG EH LQ HYLGHQW FRQÀLFW ZLWK WKH
Constitution, the court of law shall give pri-
macy to the provision of the Constitution. 
Consequently, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the charges. The fact that the act that ex-
HPSWHG-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHVIURPFRQVFULS-
tion had been enacted in the procedure for 
constitutional enactment had no bearing on 
WKH&RXUW¶V¿QGLQJ,WYRWHGRQWKHRXWFRPH
of the case.
In September 2018, the Government submit-
ted to Parliament a proposal to repeal the act 
WKDWH[HPSWV-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHVIURPFRQ-
scription.6  The bill was still pending before 
Parliament when 2018 came to an end.
Turku Court of Appeal upheld ban on 
Nordic Resistance Movement in Finland
On 28 September 2018, Turku Court of Ap-
peal upheld the decision of the Pirkanmaa 
District Court to ban the Finnish branch 
of the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Move-
ment.7 Like the District Court, the Court of 
Appeal found that the activities of the Nor-
dic Resistance Movement ran counter to ex-
isting laws and good practice. Consequent-
O\DZDUQLQJZRXOGKDYHEHHQLQVXI¿FLHQW
and a ban was necessary.
The Court of Appeal based its decision part-
ly on the fact that racial discrimination has 
a central role in the activities of the Nor-
dic Resistance Movement. The Court also 
noted that the movement idealizes fascism, 
is anti-Semitic and aims to infringe on the 
rights of sexual minorities. The Court stated 
that the movement has embraced violence 
and criminal offences committed in the 
name of the organisation and its values. The 
Court therefore ruled that the movement 
does not enjoy protection of constitutional 
rights such as freedom of speech and free-
dom of association. 
7KHUXOLQJLVQRW\HW¿QDOEHFDXVHWKH1RU-
dic Resistance Movement has appealed the 
decision in the Supreme Court. The ruling 
ZLOOEHFRPH¿QDOLIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWGRHV
not grant leave to appeal.
Helsinki District Court on hate speech online
In what can be considered an exceptional 
case, the Helsinki District Court found the 
owner of a racist media website, MV-me-
dia, guilty of 16 different crimes related to 
the activities of the site. In addition, two 
other persons involved in the activities of 
the website were found guilty of some of 
these crimes. The crimes included, among 
others, ethnic agitation and several aggra-
vated defamations.
The District Court noted that MV-media 
had been publishing and distributing rac-
ist, insulting and defamatory content for 
several years. The published content had 
included false information and disparaging 
insinuations as well as issues related to the 
private lives of the plaintiffs. The District 
Court held that from the point of view of 
freedom of speech, publishing the material 
could not be defended for public interest or 
any other acceptable cause. The defama-
tion was so severe that limiting freedom 
RI H[SUHVVLRQZDV MXVWL¿HG7KHSXEOLVKHG
content had disparaged the plaintiffs in an 
extremely offensive manner, and the motive 
behind publishing the writings had been to 
destroy their reputation. 
The District Court considered important that 
the owner of MV-media was the owner, ed-
itor-in-chief and overall person responsible 
for the content on the website. According to 
the Court, the owner decided on all content 
that had been published on the site regardless 
of who had originally written the material.
The owner received a jail sentence of one 
year and ten months. The two other persons 
received suspended sentences. Together, the 
compensations amounted to 184 000 euros.
Supreme Court on the freedom of speech 
and right to privacy
In a case before the Supreme Court 
(KKO:2018:51), the defendant had posted 
in an open Facebook group a news article 
about a person who had four months earlier 
been sentenced to imprisonment for aggra-
vated sexual abuse of a child. The post had 
included a photo of that person, taken from 
WKHSHUVRQ¶V)DFHERRNSUR¿OH7KH6XSUHPH
Court held that the defendant was guilty of 
dissemination of information violating per-
sonal privacy. 
The Supreme Court referred to several cas-
es of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Court of Justice of the European 
8QLRQLQH[DPLQLQJWKHDOOHJHGFRQÀLFWEH-
tween the freedom of speech and the right 
to privacy. The Court concluded that the de-
fendant had disseminated information con-
cerning the private life of another person so 
that the act had been conducive to causing 
that person damage and suffering and sub-
MHFWLQJ WKDWSHUVRQ WRFRQWHPSW:KLOH WKH
Court found that sexual crimes were serious 
and as such the defendant’s Facebook post 
was a part of the consideration of a matter 
of general importance, it also found that the 
combination of the link, a personal photo 
of the plaintiff and the fact that the news 
article had been published several months 
before the Facebook post clearly exceeded 
what could be deemed acceptable.
Supreme Administrative Court on the right 
to be forgotten
The Supreme Administrative Court as-
sessed in KHO 2018:112 whether Google 
had to remove from search results URL 
links containing personal information con-
cerning a man convicted of murder. Infor-
mation concerning the man was also ac-
cessible via Google searches that did not 
contain his name. The man had been found 
to have diminished responsibility for the 
6 Government Bill 139/2018
7 :LLWYL]PV\ZYLWVY[JVUJLYUPUN-PUSHUKZ\WYHUV[L "ZLLHSZVO[[WZ!`SLÄ\\[PZL[VZHZ[VUL^ZIHUFVUFULVUHaPFNYV\WF\WOLSKFI`F[\YR\FHWWLHSF
court/10429858, last accessed 15 February 2019
100 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
murder he had committed, meaning that he 
had a mental condition and so was not ful-
O\ OLDEOH7KHPDQ KDG ¿UVW DVNHG*RRJOH
to remove his information but Google had 
refused. After this, the Finnish Data Protec-
tion Ombudsman put forward a request for 
removing the data. 
In what can be considered an important 
precedent, the Supreme Administrative 
Court considered that the data in ques-
tion was sensitive information. The Court 
referred to the Google Spain case of the 
Court of Justice of the EU (C-131/12) on 
the “right to be forgotten” online. In that 
case, the CJEU ruled that when consider-
ing removal of links from search results, a 
fair balance should be sought between the 
legitimate interest of Internet users and the 
data subject’s right to respect for private life 
(article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights) and right to protection of personal 
data (article 8 of the Charter). As a general 
rule, the data subject’s rights override the 
interest of Internet users, but the balance 
may depend on the nature of the informa-
tion in question and its sensitivity for the 
data subject’s private life and on the interest 
of the public in having that information, an 
interest which may vary, in particular, ac-
cording to the role played by the data sub-
ject in public life.
According to the Supreme Administrative 
Court, even though the crime in question 
was serious, the man’s right to privacy and 
personal data protection outweighed public 
interest in receiving information.8
Non-discrimination and Equality Tribunal 
on the use of automated scoring system in 
issuing loan decisions
The National Non-discrimination and Equal-
ity Tribunal is an impartial and independent 
judicial body supervising compliance with the 
Non-discrimination Act as well as with the 
$FW RQ(TXDOLW\ EHWZHHQ:RPHQ DQG0HQ
The mandate of the Tribunal is to give legal 
protection to anyone who considers that they 
have been discriminated against. The Tribu-
nal may handle cases related to both private 
activities and public administrative and com-
mercial activities.9
In a case concerning a rejected loan (Case 
No. 216/2017, Decision of 21 March 2018), 
the Non-discrimination and Equality Tribu-
nal took a stand on the use of an automated 
scoring system on loan decisions issued by 
a credit company. The applicant, a Finn-
ish-speaking man in his thirties, complained 
that the use of the automated system consti-
tuted prohibited discrimination because the 
decision had been based on factors such as 
his place of residence, sex, age and mother 
language. 
The Non-discrimination and Equality Tri-
bunal held that using the automated scoring 
system had led to a situation where statis-
tical information concerning other persons 
was used as a basis for making assumptions 
about the applicant. The factors used in the 
assessment were prohibited grounds for dis-
crimination, and using these factors had led 
the credit company to assess the eligibility of 
the applicant more negatively than it would 
have based on information related to the ap-
plicant personally. The use of the automated 
scoring system was not proportionate and 
therefore constituted discrimination.
The Office of the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
on the rights of the child in substitute care 
An unannounced inspection to a children’s 
KRPH E\ WKH 2I¿FH RI WKH 3DUOLDPHQWDU\
2PEXGVPDQ LGHQWL¿HG D QXPEHU RIPDMRU
GH¿FLHQFLHVLQWKHWUHDWPHQWRIFKLOGUHQDQG
WKH XVH RI UHVWULFWLRQV 7KH 2I¿FH DVNHG
municipalities and the regional supervisor 
to report on the reasons that had led to the 
violations. 
The reports indicated a shortage of social 
service resources and an unreasonable 
workload among social workers responsi-
ble for children’s affairs. A large number 
of client families under the responsibility 
of social workers was preventing or at least 
hampering the supervision of substitute care 
SODFHV$FFRUGLQJWRWKHLQVSHFWLRQ¿QGLQJV
and reports received, the legal right of chil-
dren placed in care to a personal discussion 
with their own social workers had not been 
VDWLV¿HGLQHYHU\FDVH7KHULJKWRIDFKLOG
in substitute care to obtain the necessary 
care had been seriously compromised.10
Constitutional Law Committee on the 
constitutional environmental right
The Constitution of Finland contains a con-
stitutional environmental right. According 
to section 20 titled “Responsibility for the 
environment”, nature and its biodiversity, 
the environment and national heritage are 
the responsibility of everyone. Public au-
thorities shall endeavour to guarantee ev-
eryone’s right to a healthy environment and 
SRVVLEO\ LQÀXHQFH GHFLVLRQV WKDW FRQFHUQ
their own living environment. Section 20 is 
exceptional in that it is the only provision in 
the Constitution providing a responsibility. 
In its Opinion 55/2018, the Constitutional 
Law Committee assessed a legislative pro-
SRVDO DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK FRDO¿UHG SRZHU
and heating generation would be banned as of 
1 May 2029.11  The coal ban is part of Fin-
land’s National Energy and Climate Strategy 
for 2030. In the proposal, the Government 
referred to the need to ban coal in order to 
reach the aims of the Paris Agreement and 
to combat climate change. According to the 
*RYHUQPHQWELOOFRDOZRXOGEHWKH¿UVWIRV-
sil fuel to be banned, with the overall goal of 
Finland gradually stopping use of fossil fuels 
in energy generation and moving towards an 
emission-free energy system. It is estimated 
that the coal ban would cut carbon dioxide 
emissions in Finland by approximately one 
million tons a year.
8 O[[WZ!`SLÄ\\[PZL[VZHZ[VUL^ZÄUUPZOFJV\Y[FPZZ\LZFWYLJLKLU[FYPNO[F[VFILFMVYNV[[LUFKLJPZPVUFMVYFNVVNSLF[VFYLTV]LFKH[HSHZ[HJJLZZLK
February 2019
9 O[[WZ!^^ ^`][S[RÄLUPUKL_O[TSSHZ[HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
10 -PUSHUK6ɉJLVM[OL7HYSPHTLU[HY`6TI\KZTHU7YLZZYLSLHZL6J[VILYO[[WZ!^^ ^VPRL\ZHZPHTPLZÄLUF.)ZVZPHHSP[`VU[LRPQVPKLURVO[\\[VU[`V[H-
akka-vaarantaa-sijaishuollon-valvonnan-ja-kodin-ulkopuolelle-sijoitetun-lapsen-oikeuksien-toteutumisen, last accessed 10 February 2019
11 Government Bill 200/2018; Constitutional Law Committee, Opinion 55/2018
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The Constitutional Law Committee as-
sessed the proposal from the perspective 
of equality (section 6 of the Constitution), 
protection of property (section 15) and the 
freedom to engage in commercial activity 
(section 18). The Committee held that the 
aims of the proposal were well in accor-
dance with section 20 on the constitutional 
environmental right since the proposal aims 
at protecting the climate and the environ-
ment. In assessing the proportionality of the 
limitation of the freedom to engage in com-
mercial activity, the Committee took the 
view that as remarkable as the limitations 
may be, they have to be balanced with the 
aims of the limitation that have to be con-
sidered especially weighty. Similarly, the 
Committee held that the proposed limita-
tions to the protection of property were both 
acceptable and proportionate, especially 
when taking into account section 20 of the 
Constitution. Consequently, the Committee 
held that the proposal could be passed in the 
ordinary legislative procedure.
New Maternity Act
The Parliament adopted an entirely new act 
called the Maternity Act (253/2018) con-
cerning legal recognition of motherhood. 
The act was adopted in April 2018, and 
it will enter into force in April 2019. The 
Government bill was based on a citizen’s 
initiative. 
Under current legislation, the partner not 
giving birth to the child is required to adopt 
the child in order to be recognised as a par-
ent, which is a procedure that can be consid-
ered both cumbersome and discriminatory. 
The current situation is problematic from 
the perspective of the rights of the child, 
e.g., if the mother giving birth dies before 
the adoption procedure has been completed. 
The child would then have no legal parents.
The new act ensures that two women as a 
same-sex couple are legally recognised as 
mothers from the moment their child is 
born. If the child is born as a result of a 
fertility treatment, both women can be rec-
ognised as mothers before birth. The Mater-
nity Act does not, however, enable a child 
to have more than two legal parents. 
Government bill prohibiting child marriages 
The Government submitted a legislative 
proposal amending the Marriage Act. The 
legislative proposal aims at prohibiting per-
sons under 18 years of age to marry, which 
has previously been possible upon a dispen-
sation granted by the Ministry of Justice for 
special reasons.12 This possibility has been 
criticized, inter alia, by the Ombudsman for 
Children.13
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
In early 2019, Finland is preparing for two 
upcoming elections: parliamentary elec-
tions in April 2019 and European Parlia-
ment elections in May 2019. Year 2019 is 
also important from the perspective of in-
ternational collaboration. Finland holds the 
presidency of the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe until 17 May 2019. 
Finland’s third EU Presidency period of six 
months begins on 1 July 2019, and the na-
tional presidency programme regarding the 
presidency will be published in June 2019. 
It seems very likely that one of the major 
constitutional issues in 2019 will continue 
to be social welfare and healthcare reform. 
In addition, questions related to the urgency 
of preventing climate change are likely to 
affect legislative proposals.
In recent years, the Nordic countries, in-
cluding Finland, have also witnessed the 
rise of populism, including neo-Nazi and 
anti-immigration movements. Given also 
people’s attitudes towards immigration in 
the aftermath of the suspected crimes in 
Oulu,14 as well as subsequent plans of the 
Government to review international human 
rights obligations binding upon Finland,15 it 
can’t be ruled out that such developments 
may mutate into legislative proposals and 
other measures that give rise to serious hu-
man rights concerns during 2019.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There was something special about 2018 
because it was the 60th anniversary of the 
Constitution of the Fifth Republic. It was 
also supposed to be the year of a major 
constitutional change. Among other things, 
the number of MPs as well as the number 
of terms they could serve were supposed to 
have been reduced. The parliamentary pro-
cedure should have been modernised in or-
der to allow for a faster adoption of statutes 
and for the improvement of Parliament’s 
functions of control and assessment of pub-
lic policies. The powers of the High Council 
of the Judiciary should have been increased 
in order for judicial independence to be 
more effectively secured. Finally, regarding 
the Constitutional Council itself, the amend-
ment of the Constitution should have put an 
end to the membership of former Presidents 
of the Republic. Depending on the topic, a 
constitutional bill, an organic bill and an or-
dinary bill were tabled. However the Pres-
ident had to postpone this reform, which 
was discussed during the summer, because 
of the “Benalla scandal.” Indeed, Alexandre 
Benalla, one of his aides, was suspected of 
committing violence and impersonating a 
police officer. Because it was also suspected 
that there were attempts from the Executive 
to cover up the affair, the standing commit-
tees of both the National Assembly and the 
Senate decided to investigate this case and 
review the general administrative organisa-
tion of the presidency. Although it is difficult 
to delineate what powers the Parliament and 
the Judiciary, respectively, have to shed light 
on these facts, this was the first of a series of 
events that complicated President Macron’s 
political action. Several ministers, among 
whom many important ones, decided to re-
sign in September, and an important social 
movement, the “Yellow Vests” protest, led 
the Government to suspend several of the 
reforms it had planned. Thus, 2018 was a 
tricky year for French constitutionalism, and 
so it was a busy year for the Constitutional 
Council. Indeed, it continued controlling the 
results of the 2017 elections for the National 
Assembly and the Senate. Among the deci-
sions it rendered regarding constitutional 
review, special emphasis should be placed 
first on a ruling whereby the Council gave 
new life to the maxim of the Republic, “Lib-
erty, Equality, Fraternity,” and second on one 
about personal data protection, which seems 
to be a major source of concern for constitu-
tional judges everywhere in the world, and 
for years to come.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The first major ruling was Decision No. 
2018-717/718 QPC, in which the Constitu-
tional Council gave full effect to the maxim 
of the Republic. Until then, only Liberty and 
Equality had been clearly used as parameters 
for assessing the validity of statutes. Frater-
nity was ordinarily regarded as too vague to 
allow proper jurisdictional control. The case 
involved two persons who had been convict-
ed for helping migrants to stay and circulate 
on French territory. Pursuant to sections L. 
622-1 and L. 622-4 of the Code for Entry 
and Residence of Foreigners and Right of 
Asylum, facilitating the irregular entry, cir-
culation and stay of foreigners is an offence. 
The only persons who could benefit from an 
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exemption are close relatives of the foreign-
er and other persons whose help “has not 
given rise to any direct or indirect compen-
sation and consisted in providing legal ad-
vice or catering, accommodation or medical 
care to ensure dignified conditions of life to 
the foreigner, or any other help to preserve 
her dignity or bodily integrity.” The two ac-
tivists contended that their exclusion from 
these categories violated the principle of 
fraternity, which had until then been some-
how under-enforced.1 The Constitutional 
Council accepted the argument, thus clearly 
making the three values of the Republican 
maxim a parameter of constitutional review. 
According to the Council, although no con-
stitutional rule confers any right to enter na-
tional territory and stay on it, “Pursuant to 
Section 2 of the Constitution: ‘The maxim of 
the Republic shall be “Liberty, Equality, Fra-
ternity.”’ The Constitution also refers, in its 
Preamble and in Section 72-3, to the ‘com-
mon ideal of liberty, equality and fraternity.’ 
It follows that fraternity is a principle of con-
stitutional value. From [this] principle fol-
lows the freedom to help another person for 
a humanitarian purpose, irrespective of the 
legality of her presence on the national ter-
ritory.” This principle needs to be balanced 
against others, such as the protection of pub-
lic order. The principle of fraternity imme-
diately proved efficient. First, the Council 
struck down provisions of Section L. 622-4. 
Because they forbade any humanitarian form 
of assistance, they did not strike an adequate 
balance between fraternity and public order. 
Secondly, the Council extended the scope of 
the penal exemption through a reserve of in-
terpretation. Under the Constitution, it could 
not but be interpreted as including every act 
of humanitarian assistance. Once it was read 
this way, the said provisions could not be 
criticised for violating the more traditional 
constitutional principles of criminal law (le-
gality of offences and sanctions, necessity 
and proportionality of sanctions). Both hold-
ings led the Council to exercise legislative 
power, first by quashing a legislative provi-
sion, thereby acting according to Kelsen’s 
idea of a “negative legislator,” and second 
by choosing a new interpretation for the re-
maining provisions, thus engrafting its own 
understanding of the law onto the pre-exist-
ing text. The Council considered that less 
than six months should be given to Parlia-
ment in order to remedy these defects. In the 
meantime, the Council decided to establish 
transitory norms. These made it obligatory 
to consider that penal exemptions should 
apply to all humanitarian acts facilitating 
the circulation and stay of (even irregular) 
foreigners as opposed to their entry on the 
territory, which results in the direct creation 
of an illegal situation. The delay given to 
the legislator may seem to have been shorter 
than usual. That can be explained by the fact 
that when the decision was adopted, Parlia-
ment was already discussing a bill on immi-
gration and asylum. An amendment to meet 
the Council’s demands was thus quite easy 
to introduce. The legislator rapidly obliged, 
and the Council confirmed the validity of the 
new legislation.2 The exemption in Section 
622-4 now includes “any natural or legal 
person whose action has not given rise to any 
direct or indirect compensation and has con-
sisted in providing legal, linguistic or social 
advice or support, or any other aid provided 
for an exclusively humanitarian purpose.” 
This ruling cancelling what activists called 
the “offense of solidarity” was highly com-
PHQWHG XSRQ HYHQ LQ WKH SUHVV :KHUHDV
some vehemently criticised the Council for 
using vague principles to usurp Parliament’s 
power to define the immigration policy, oth-
ers praised the judges for reviving the prom-
ise of French Constitutionalism. In terms of 
normative creation, one might consider that 
this ruling is no more nor less activist than 
many others. It simply makes more explicit, 
from a realist viewpoint, the extent to which 
any constitutional court necessarily contrib-
utes to crafting the parameter, the object 
and the results of its control. The ruling can 
moreover be interpreted as an act of judicial 
communication. The Council had been crit-
icised slightly before for favouring funda-
mental rights that mostly benefit firms and 
taxpayers. More generally, illiberal forms of 
democracy in Europe are being reinforced, 
especially when issues regarding immigra-
tion are at stake. In this context, since it is 
based on the value of solidarity, the Coun-
cil’s decision may be appealing to those who 
believe that another form of constitutional-
ism is possible.3
Another important ruling was Decision No. 
2018-765 DC on the act on the protection of 
personal data. In 1978, France was among 
the first countries to pass laws on the protec-
tion of personal data. It created a new inde-
pendent administrative authority, the Nation-
al Commission for Information Technology 
and Liberties (CNIL), which is in charge of 
enforcing the protection of citizens in that 
area. Since then, the European Union has 
also adopted regulations to that end. On 27 
April 2016, a regulation on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing 
of personal data (General Data Protection 
Regulation) and a directive protecting per-
sonal data when used by the police and crim-
inal justice authorities were adopted. The 
French Parliament passed a law adapting the 
domestic legislation to this regulation and 
transposing the directive. This bill was re-
ferred to the Constitutional Council by sena-
tors who criticised several of its provisions.
One of the main interests of this decision 
lies in the type of control the Constitutional 
Council exercises on this sort of legislation. 
Pursuant to Section 88-1 of the Constitution, 
Parliament has an obligation to transpose 
directives into domestic law or adapt them 
to European regulation. The Constitutional 
Council is responsible for making sure that 
this requirement is fulfilled, except if the Eu-
ropean rules conflict with a principle inher-
ent to France’s constitutional identity, which 
would require a former modification of the 
Constitution.
The Council decided that it should not con-
trol domestic legislative provisions that 
merely draw the necessary consequences of 
the unconditional and precise provisions of a 
1 Michel Borgetto, 3HUV[PVUKLMYH[LYUP[tLUKYVP[W\ISPJMYHUsHPZ3LWHZZtSLWYtZLU[L[S»H]LUPYKLSHZVSPKHYP[t, (LGDJ 1993).
2 Decision no. 2018-770 DC of 6 September 2018,3VPWV\Y\ULPTTPNYH[PVUTHz[YPZtL\UKYVP[K»HZPSLLɈLJ[PML[\ULPU[tNYH[PVUYt\ZZPL
3 For further details, see Guillaume Tusseau, “Le Conseil Constitutionnel et le ‘délit de solidarité’: de la consécration activiste d’une norme constitutionnelle 
ZV\ZHWWSPX\tLnSHYt]tSH[PVUK»\ULZ[YH[tNPLJVU[YHPU[LKLJVTT\UPJH[PVUQ\YPKPJ[PVUULSSL&¹9L]\LJYP[PX\LKLKYVP[PU[LYUH[PVUHSWYP]t, 2019, forthcoming.
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directive, as this would imply that it would 
rule on the directive itself. It only ensures 
that no domestic provision is obviously in-
compatible with the directive. However, it 
exercises full control on the provisions for 
which the directive allows for a more flex-
ible implementation. If there is any doubt 
about the compatibility of domestic law with 
a directive, the Council cannot refer it to the 
European Union Court of Justice because 
of the limited time frame it has to make its 
decisions. It belongs to the administrative or 
judicial courts to review this question and, if 
needed, refer the case to the ECJ. 
European regulations are normally directly 
applicable and require an adaptation of the 
domestic legislation. That is why until now 
the Council has only checked whether leg-
islative provisions were in accordance with 
the regulation. But, unlike this rule, the reg-
ulation on data protection gives Member 
States flexibility in more than fifty areas. 
The Council thus decided to apply the prin-
ciples that apply to directives. Section 21 of 
the act, which extends the cases in which a 
decision having legal effects with regard to a 
person, or significantly affecting her, may be 
based on an automated processing of person-
al data—a so-called “algorithm”—is among 
the most interesting ones. Section 22 of the 
European regulation gave Member States 
flexibility to determine the appropriate mea-
sures to safeguard rights and freedoms and 
the legitimate interests of the persons con-
cerned. The applicants stressed that through 
such a process, the administration would 
renounce its power of assessment over in-
dividual situations, especially in the case of 
“self-learning” algorithms, which can revise 
the rules they apply. This would infringe on 
the principle of constitutional value govern-
ing the exercise of regulatory power. They 
also insisted that such algorithms, the func-
tioning of which cannot be determined in 
advance, would violate the principle of the 
public nature of regulations. Lastly, they 
considered that, due to its complexity, this 
provision contradicted the objective of con-
stitutional value of the accessibility and un-
derstandability of the law. 
It was also important for the Council to check 
whether such a measure threatened rights 
and freedoms. First, the Council considered 
that using an algorithm to take an adminis-
trative decision was only permitted based on 
rules and criteria defined in advance. It could 
not authorise the administration to adopt de-
cisions that would be deprived of any legal 
basis. The Council did not find it incompre-
hensible either. Regarding the guarantees 
provided, the Council highlighted that an 
algorithm could be used only under certain 
conditions, some of them explicitly stated by 
the law, others emphasized by the decision 
itself. First, according to provisions of the 
Code on the relationship between the pub-
lic and the administration, any administra-
tive decision must mention the fact that it is 
based on an algorithm, whose main charac-
teristics must be disclosed, on his request, to 
the person concerned. Since those elements 
cannot be communicated when they could 
imperil national defense or State security 
interests, no administrative decision can be 
exclusively based on an algorithm in such 
matters. Secondly, since any administra-
tive decision was subject to administrative 
review, the Council stressed that, in such a 
case, the administration should rule without 
deciding only on the basis of the algorithm, 
which would then make it obligatory to scru-
tinize the situation with conventional means. 
Furthermore, if the case is submitted to a 
court, the judge may ask the administration 
the main characteristics of the algorithm to 
control its compliance with legal prescrip-
tions. Thirdly, the European regulation, as 
well as the domestic legislation, excluded 
the use of algorithms for sensitive personal 
data that refer to an alleged racial or ethnic 
origin; political opinions; religious or phil-
osophical beliefs; trade union membership; 
and genetic, biometric or health data as well 
as data related to the sexual life or orientation 
of a person. Finally, the Council focused on 
the fact that the capacity to explain how the 
data processing was implemented excluded 
the use of “self-learning” algorithms. These 
conditions appeared sufficient to rule that 
disputed Section 21 did not violate any right 
or freedom protected by the Constitution.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Decision No. 2018-763 DC – Student 
Guidance and Achievement Act
In Decision No. 2018-763 DC, the act re-
ferred to the Constitutional Council provid-
ed that enrollment in undergraduate courses 
taught in public higher educational estab-
lishments were tied to a nationwide pre-en-
rollment procedure which was administered 
via the “Parcoursup” platform. The Constitu-
tional Council dismissed the claim that these 
provisions breached the principle of equal 
access to education because they would al-
low for a differential treatment of candidates 
in the same group, depending on the insti-
tution. In particular, it determined that by 
allowing those establishments to take into 
account course characteristics, which are 
in any case regulated by a “national frame-
work” laid down by ministerial order, and 
the candidates’ prior experience and skills, in 
order, where appropriate, to make their en-
rollment conditional on their acceptance of 
support and training arrangements, the leg-
islature has adopted objective and rational 
criteria, the content of which it has spelled 
out in sufficient detail. The same is true of 
the legislature’s intention to require that en-
rollments be approved with due regard to the 
extent to which the candidate’s training plan, 
experience and prior training are compatible 
with the key aspects of the course to be tak-
en. The Constitutional Council also declared 
that the scope of the information provided 
to candidates during the pre-enrollment pro-
cedure did not undermine the guarantee of 
academic independence, a fundamental prin-
ciple enshrined in the laws of the Republic. 
2. Decision No. 2017-687 QPC Wikimédia – 
Image rights of the national estate
In Decision No. 2017-687 QPC, the Act on 
Freedom of Creation, Architecture and Her-
itage introduced a system of prior authorisa-
tion for the commercial use, on any medi-
um, of images of buildings belonging to the 
national estate. The authorisation issued by 
the operator of the domain may be subject 
to financial conditions, in which case the fee 
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shall take into account any benefits, irrespec-
tive of their nature, accruing to the holder 
of the authorisation. These provisions were 
challenged, mainly with regard to freedom 
of enterprise and property rights. The Con-
stitutional Council found these provisions 
to be in conformity with the Constitution. It 
noted in particular that in adopting them, the 
legislature had pursued a twofold objective 
of general interest, namely the protection 
of image rights of the national estate to pre-
vent any harm being done to the character 
of property having an exceptional link with 
the history of the Nation and owned, at least 
in part, by the State; and the economic en-
hancement of the heritage of these national 
estates. It further noted that the prior authori-
sation of the national domain manager is not 
required where the image is used for com-
mercial purposes and where there is also an 
activity linked to a cultural, artistic, educa-
tional, teaching, research, information, news 
illustration or public-service objective. 
3. Decision No. 2017-694 QPC – Mr. Ous-
mane K.: Statement of reasons for decisions 
in jury trials
In Decision No. 2017-694 QPC, the Con-
stitutional Council ruled that the princi-
ple of the individualisation of sentences, 
which derives from Sections 7, 8 and 9 of 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
the Citizen of 1789, implies that a criminal 
sanction can only be applied if the judge has 
expressly imposed it, taking into account 
the specific circumstances of each case. For 
the first time, the Council inferred from the 
aforementioned constitutional requirements 
an obligation to state reasons for courts’ de-
cisions regarding both guilt and sentencing. 
The Code of Criminal Procedure explicitly 
provides that the reasons underlying a judg-
ment that is handed down by the criminal 
court (cour d’assises) must include, in re-
spect of each of the offences, a statement of 
the main elements of the charges against the 
accused which have convinced the court, at 
the end of its deliberations, that he is guilty. 
However, according to a settled interpre-
tation by the Court of Cassation, the Code 
prohibits the criminal court from stating rea-
sons for the sentence it imposes. For these 
reasons, the Constitutional Council declared 
Section 365-1 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure to be unconstitutional. In view of the 
obviously excessive consequences which the 
immediate application of that decision would 
have had, it postponed the date of that repeal 
to 1 March 2019, while specifying that for 
trials begun after the date of its decision and 
without waiting until 1 March 2019, the law 
should be interpreted as also requiring the 
cour d’assises to indicate, in its statement of 
reasons, the main elements which have in-
fluenced it in relation to the determination of 
the sentence in jury trials.
4. Decisions No. 2018-774 DC and 2018-
773 DC – Act relating to the fight against 
the manipulation of information
In Decisions No. 2018-774 DC and 2018-
773 DC, the Constitutional Council dis-
missed the claims that the provisions of the 
act relating to the fight against the manipu-
lation of information violated the freedom 
of expression and communication and failed 
to respect the constitutional principle of the 
legality of criminal offences and penalties 
and, in particular, that the introduction of 
a new interim proceeding would be neither 
necessary nor appropriate or proportionate. 
However, the Council considered that the 
challenged provisions complied with French 
constitutional principles, provided the inac-
curacy or misleading nature of the alleged 
facts or accusations were obvious.
5. Decision No. 2017-695 QPC – 
Mr. Rouchdi B.: Administrative 
measures against terrorism
In Decision No. 2017-695 QPC, the Consti-
tutional Council found the contested legal 
provisions regarding administrative mea-
sures to combat terrorism constitutional. 
More specifically, the judge held that the 
French prefect, in order to secure a place or 
an event exposed to terrorist risk, is entitled 
to establish a security area, within which 
the freedom of access and movement of in-
dividuals is partly restricted (security pat-
down, visual inspection, search of luggage 
and/or vehicles). The legislator can freely 
determine the criteria according to which 
these operations take place, provided they 
respect the principle of non-discrimination. 
Moreover, whenever private individuals are 
allowed to conduct the aforementioned con-
trol operations, they shall be placed under 
the supervision of a judicial police officer 
who exercises effective control over them. 
Last but not least, the Constitutional Council 
considered that the Constitution permits the 
administration to temporarily close places 
of worship as well as to impose individual 
measures of administrative control, like the 
prohibition to meet certain persons, in order 
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. 
6. Decision No. 2018-706 QPC – Mr. Jean-
Marc R.: Glorification of terrorism
In Decision No. 2018-706 QPC, the Consti-
tutional Council declared the constitutional-
ity of Sections 421-2-5, 422-3 and 422-6 of 
the French Criminal Code, which establish 
and punish the crime of glorifying terror-
ism. Pursuant to the constitutional ruling, the 
contested legal provisions did not violate the 
principles of the legality and proportionality 
of criminal offences and penalties nor free-
dom of expression. Specifically, the provi-
sions were considered to be precise enough, 
and the imposed penalties respectful of the 
nature of the repressed behaviour and thus 
not patently disproportionate. As a conse-
quence, the restriction of freedom of expres-
sion and communication caused by the con-
tested provisions is necessary, appropriate 
and proportionate. 
7. Decision No. 2018-737 QPC – Mr. Jaime 
Rodrigo F.: Granting of the French nation-
ality to legitimate children born abroad
In Decision No. 2018-737 QPC, the Con-
stitutional Council held that the fact that 
the granting of the French nationality to the 
legitimate child of a French mother and a 
foreign father was upon the condition that it 
was born in France, whereas the legitimate 
child of a French father is French whatever 
its place of birth, violates both the principle 
of equality before the law and gender equal-
ity. The children of a French mother born 
abroad between 16 August 1906 and 21 Oc-
tober 1924 to whom French nationality has 
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not been granted yet may claim it as uncon-
stitutional. Their descendants may also claim 
it as unconstitutional in all the proceedings 
that have been started since the date of pub-
lication of this decision.
8. Decision No. 2018-744 QPC – Mrs. Mu-
rielle B.: Juvenile delinquency
In Decision No. 2018-744 QPC, the Consti-
tutional Council found the contested legal 
provisions relative to juvenile delinquency 
unconstitutional. The judge held that the leg-
islator does not offer sufficient guarantees to 
ensure that the human rights of individuals 
who are placed in custody, especially those 
of minors, are respected. The councilors con-
sidered that, with these provisions, the legis-
lature failed to ensure a balanced concilia-
tion between the need to prosecute offenders 
and the respect of constitutional freedoms. 
The legislator thus violated Sections 9 and 
16 of the Declaration of Rights of Man and 
the Citizen of 1789 as well as the constitu-
tional principles relative to juvenile justice. 
The aforementioned lack of constitutionality 
can be claimed in all pending cases.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Since November 2018, huge demonstrations 
and protests have taken place. They have led 
the President to change his political agenda, 
and especially to postpone his institutional 
reforms yet again. In order to restore public 
confidence, the Government resorted to an 
exceptional public consultation from Janu-
ary 15th to March 15th. Four topics should 
be addressed by local popular gatherings, 
which are to be filtered and aggregated into 
proposals: (1) taxes and public spending, 
(2) the organisation of public administration 
and action, (3) the ecological transition, and 
(4) democracy and citizenship. Regarding 
the last topic, many institutional and con-
stitutional propositions will no doubt be 
expressed and debated. Depending on how 
they are taken into account by the Govern-
ment, e.g., leading to a multi-question refer-
endum, they may result in important changes 
regarding, for example, the right to vote, and 
the structure of political assemblies. The re-
sults of the European elections in May 2019 
will also reveal if and to what extent the 
President has managed to regain legitimacy. 
One-third of the Constitutional Council will 
be renewed. 
V. FURTHER READING
Dominique Chagnollaud de Sabouret, Les 60 
ans de la Constitution: 1958-2018 (Dalloz, 
2018)
Antoine Chopplet, Thomas Hochmann 
(eds.), Les anciens Présidents de la Répub-
lique au Conseil constitutionnel (Epure,
2018)
Arnaud Le Pillouer (ed.), La protection de la 
constitution: finalités, mécanismes, justifica-
tions (Université de Poitiers, Presses univer-
sitaires juridiques, 2018)
:DQGD0DVWRUHG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I. INTRODUCTION
:LWK WKH SHDFHIXO WUDQVLWLRQ DIWHU  \HDUV
under an authoritarian regime that began in 
July 1994, 2018 saw the new government of 
The Gambia, headed by President Barrow, 
take measures to restore good governance, 
rebuild public confidence in key institutions 
and uphold human rights in the context of 
transitional justice. 
This is happening twofold: first, dealing 
with past human rights violations and abus-
es; and second, ensuring that the governance 
architecture upholds the highest standards of 
respect for human rights, the rule of law and 
justice. To this end, 2018 saw the activation 
of transitional justice mechanisms: the Truth 
and Reconciliation and Reparations Commis-
sion, Constitutional Review Commission and 
National Human Rights Commission with the 
goal of consolidating democracy and aligning 
governance architecture with regional and in-
ternational human rights standards. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional review process
The formal process of reviewing the 1997 
Constitution and drafting a new one started 
in June 2018 with the appointment of eleven 
members (comprised of 5 women, includ-
ing the vice chairperson) as commissioners 
of the Constitutional Review Commission 
(CRC).  According to section 9(1) of the 
Constitutional Review Commission Act, 
2017,1 the Commission shall be in existence 
for a period not exceeding eighteen months. 
:KHUHWKHQHHGDULVHVWKH3UHVLGHQWPD\H[-
tend the term of the CRC for a period not 
more than six months, upon the recommen-
dation of the chairperson of the CRC. 
In discharging its responsibilities, the Com-
mission is required according to section 6 of 
the Act to seek the opinion of citizens both 
within the country and abroad. Thus, the 
Commission is currently on a lengthy pro-
cess of public consultation and deliberation 
on a number of matters contained in the Is-
sues Document. The CRC, where it deems it 
necessary, can also invite persons, including 
representatives of professional, civic, political 
and other organisations, to appear before it to 
make such presentations as those representa-
tives consider relevant or make presentations 
on topics the Commission may specify. 
The main functions of the CRC are to review 
and analyse the current 1997 Constitution, 
draft a new constitution and prepare a report 
in relation to the new constitution. This re-
port will provide the reasoning for the pro-
visions contained in the new constitution. 
Section 21 of the Act empowers the Com-
mission, upon submission to the President, 
to publish the draft constitution and the re-
port in the Gazette and in such other manner 
as the Commission deems fit. This serves as 
a safeguard against tampering.
Dealing with past human rights violations
Following the enactment of the Truth, Rec-
onciliation and Reparations Commission 
(TRRC) Act 2017,2 the Commission was 
formally launched. The TRRC Act provides 
1 Constitutional Review Commission Act, No. 7 of 2017, available at: https://www.lawhubgambia.com/con-
stitutional-review-commission-act [accessed 5 January 2019].
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for the establishment of the historical record 
of the nature, causes and extent of violations 
and abuses of human rights committed during 
the period July 1994 to January 2017 and for 
the consideration of granting reparation to 
victims. The Commission’s mandate includes 
initiating and coordinating investigations into 
violations and abuses of human rights; iden-
tifying persons or institutions involved in 
such violations; identifying the victims; and 
determining what evidence might have been 
destroyed to conceal such violations.
The hearings, which began on 7 January 2019, 
serve as an initial first step towards securing 
justice, truth and reparations in The Gambia.3
The TRRC provides a foundation, if execut-
ed properly, to not only address the structures 
and causes of violations but also assure vic-
tims of past violations of non-repetition.
Building a human rights culture
Establishment of the National Human 
Rights Commission
After over two decades of authoritarian rule 
characterised by gross human rights viola-
tions including torture, enforced disappear-
ance, arbitrary arrests, detention without tri-
al, and murder perpetrated by state agents, 
the new government has made strides to-
wards building a human rights culture.
Following the enactment of the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 
2017,4 the National Assembly has recently 
approved the nomination of five candidates 
with proven records of respect for human 
rights who are to be sworn into office on 
14 February 2019. The establishment of the 
Commission addresses the need for a legal 
and institutional framework to which a hu-
man rights culture will be anchored. The 
NHRC is authorised to investigate and con-
sider complaints of human rights violations 
in The Gambia committed by the state, pri-
vate persons and entities.
Access to the African Court
In fulfillment of its regional and internation-
al human rights obligations, on 23 November 
2018, The Gambia became the ninth African 
country to make the declaration under article 
34(6) of the Protocol to the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights on the Es-
tablishment of an African Court on Human 
and People’s Rights (African Court) to allow 
individuals direct access to the Court. The 
declaration allows the Court to trigger its ju-
risdictional competency under article 5(3) of 
the Protocol to allow access for non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs).
Ratification of key UN human rights treaties
On 28 September 2018, The Gambia also 
ratified important UN human rights trea-
ties including the Second Optional Protocol 
to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 
the Convention for the Protection of All Per-
sons from Enforced Disappearance (CED) 
and the International Convention on the Pro-
WHFWLRQRIWKH5LJKWVRI$OO0LJUDQW:RUNHUV
DQG0HPEHUVRI7KHLU)DPLOLHV&0:5
:KLOH WKHVH UDWLILFDWLRQVDUHFRPPHQGDEOH
the State is yet to ensure individual access 
to a majority of the UN human rights treaty 
bodies.6 The Gambia has still not abolished 
the death penalty in accordance with its in-
ternational obligations. The last executions 
were carried out on 27 August 2012, when 
nine death row inmates—eight men and one 
woman—were executed, allegedly by a fir-
ing squad.7 According to the news report, 
“all persons on death row have been tried by 
the Gambian courts of competent jurisdic-
tion and thereof convicted and sentenced to 
death in accordance with the law. They have 
exhausted all their legal rights of appeal as 
provided by the law.”8
The executions were the first in The Gambia 
since 1985. The death penalty was abolished 
in 1993 by the Death Penalty (Abolition) Act 
1993 but reinstated in 1995 by Decree No. 
52, entitled the Death Penalty (Restoration) 
Decree, in 1995. Among the reasons given 
for the restoration of the death penalty were 
that “since the abolition of the death penalty 
in The Gambia there has been a steady in-
crease of cases of homicide and treasonable 
offences which, if not effectively checked, 
may degenerate into a breakdown of law 
and order” and that the duty dawned on the 
“State to provide adequate mechanisms for 
the security of life and liberty of its citizenry, 
thereby maintaining law and order and en-
suring greater respect for individual human 
rights.”
Despite section 21 of the Constitution pro-
hibiting torture, inhuman or degrading 
punishment or other treatment and the rati-
fication of CAT, the absence of torture as a 
criminal offence in the Criminal Code inhib-
its the prosecution of perpetrators under the 
transitional justice system. 
Human Rights Committee’s review of the 
state of civil and political rights in The 
Gambia
In July 2018, the Human Rights Committee 
reviewed the implementation of the ICCPR 
in The Gambia. The Gambia submitted a re-
port in response to the list of issues in lieu of 
2 Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Act, No. 9 of 2017, available at: https://www.lawhubgambia.com/truth-reconciliation-reparations-com-
mission [accessed 5 January 2019].
3 ‘TRRC hearings begin today’ ;OL7VPU[7, January 2019.
4 National Human Rights Commission Act (NHRC) Act, No. 8 of 2017, available at: https://www.lawhubgambia.com/national-human-rights-act [accessed 5 January 
2019].
5 <50U[LYUH[PVUHS/\THU9PNO[Z0UZ[Y\TLU[Z9H[PÄJH[PVU:[H[\ZMVY;OL.HTIPHO[[WZ![IPU[LYUL[VOJOYVYNFSH`V\[Z;YLH[`)VK`,_[LYUHS;YLH[ `HZW_&*V\U[Y`-
0+$3HUN$,5BHJJLZZLK1HU\HY` D
6 At the moment, individual access to UN Treaty Bodies is limited only to the Human Rights Committee.
7 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns ‘Mission to The Gambia’, A/HRC/29/37/Add.2 (11 May 2015) para. 25.
8 :5HIHULOº;OL.HTIPH!*VTTLU[HY`»PU9>VSMY\T9.YV[L*-VTIHKLKZ*VUZ[P[\[PVUZVM[OL>VYSK (Oxford University Press, 2017) 10.
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its second periodic report.9 The Committee 
raised concerns that section 18 of the Con-
stitution and sections 15 (A) and 72 of the 
Criminal Code allow for a great deal of dis-
cretion in the use of force by law enforcement 
officials, and that section 2 (a) and (b) of the 
Indemnity Act (as amended in 2001) exoner-
ates all public officials from civil or criminal 
liability for the exercise of their duties with 
respect to unlawful assemblies, riotous situa-
tions or public emergencies.10  The Commit-
tee made recommendations to The Gambia to 
revise its laws with a view to bringing them in 
line with international standards.11
It is important to note that The Gambia is 
yet to withdraw the reservation it made upon 
ratification of the ICCPR on 22 March 1979 
in respect to article 14(3)(d) to the effect 
that “for financial reasons, free legal assis-
tance for accused persons is limited in our 
constitution to persons charged with capital 
offences only.”12 To further promote access 
to justice, The Gambia should take steps to 
withdraw its reservation to the ICCPR, thus 
bringing it in conformity with the spirit and 
intent of the Legal Aid Act, 2008.13
Use of force: The Faraba incident
A deadly clash between personnel of the 
Police Intervention Unit (PIU) and the com-
munity of Faraba Banta on 18 June 2018 led 
to two men being shot dead and nine others 
injured. An outcry led to the swift establish-
ment of a Commission of Inquiry, which was 
mandated to investigate the circumstances, 
deaths, injuries, destruction, those who may 
have ordered the shootings, those who fired 
the shots and any possible failure or break-
down in the police chain-of-command that 
led to the shootings, among others.14
The Commission was mandated to operate for 
a period of one month, but was extended to 
31 August 2018. Upon completion of its work 
on 27 August, the Commission presented its 
findings and recommendations in the form of 
a report to the President.15 The Faraba Report
is particularly important in that it deals with 
the duty to investigate human rights viola-
tions. The Commission held that there was 
no evidence that the police had taken any 
steps to vet and/or screen PIU officers who 
had been involved and/or suspected to have 
been involved in past human rights abuses 
nor were they made aware of any programs 
in place to train and or reorient PIU officers in 
operating under a democratic dispensation.16
It reiterated the urgent need for a security sec-
tor reform. The White Paper on the Report of 
the Faraba Banta Commission of Inquiry has 
since been published, and the government is 
criminally prosecuting the perpetrators.17
:KLOHWKHVHSRVLWLYHVWULGHVDUHHQFRXUDJLQJ
some of the questionable legislative proce-
dures are seen as regressive steps underscor-
ing the need for vigilance. An example was 
the contentious Supplementary Appropria-
tions Bill, which was tabled by the Minister of 
Finance and Economic Affairs on 11 Decem-
ber 2018 after seeking approval of one billion 
dalasis (approximately over 21 million USD) 
from the National Assembly for additional 
payments from the Consolidated Funds.18
Upon presentation of the Bill, a group of cit-
izens dubbed #OccupyNA staged a protest at 
the National Assembly grounds to demand for 
rejection of the government’s controversial 
supplementary appropriation estimates. The 
PIU, in full riot gear, denied the group entry. 
The National Assembly, after extensive delib-
erations and debate, rejected the Bill. 
A revised budget was later tabled in which 
at least 16 parliamentarians rejected it, lead-
ing to a deadlock that was broken by a vote 
from the Speaker of the House in favour of 
the Bill on 20 December 2018.19 Given that 
this approval did not follow the procedure 
laid out in the Constitution and is not fiscally 
prudent, there is urgent need to promote eco-
nomic policies that enhance judicious finan-
cial management.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Bai Emil Touray and Two Others vs. the 
Attorney General: Freedom of speech
In Bai Emil Touray and Two Others vs. the 
Attorney General,20 the Supreme Court con-
9 Human Rights Council, ‘Replies of The Gambia to the list of issues’, CCPR/C/GMB/Q/2/Add.1, 12 June 2018. See also, Human Rights Committee ‘List of issues 
in the absence of the second periodic report of The Gambia’, CCPR/C/GMB/Q/2, 11 December 2017.
10 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on The Gambia in the absence of its second periodic report’, CCPR/C/GMB/CO/2 (30 August 2018), para. 29.
11 As above, 30.
12 <UP[LK5H[PVUZ6ɉJLVM[OL/PNO*VTTPZZPVULY:[H[\ZVM9H[PÄJH[PVUVM0U[LYHJ[P]L+HZOIVHYKO[[W!PUKPJH[VYZVOJOYVYNBHJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` D
13 See Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) Legal Aid in The Gambia: An introduction to law and practice (2012), https://www.ihrda.org/
wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Legal-Aid-in-The-Gambia-layout-2012-website-download.pdf [accessed 11 February 2019].
14 The establishment of the Commission was gazetted on 1July 2018 and all the Commissioners were sworn before his Excellency on Thursday 5 July 2018.
15 Report of the Faraba Banta Commission of Inquiry into the events of Monday 18 June 2018 at Faraba Banta, West Coast Region (2018).
16 As above, p 59.
17 Gambia Government ‘White Paper on the report of the Faraba Banta Commission of Inquiry’ Supplement ‘A’ to The Gambia Gazette No. 33 of 28 Novem-
ber 2018, Legal Notice No. 47 of 2018: 11-12. Supplementary Appropriation is governed by Section 153 of the 1997 Constitution, which reads: (1) Subject 
[VZLJ[PVUPMPUYLZWLJ[VMHU`ÄUHUJPHS`LHY
18 Supplementary Appropriation is governed by Section 153 of the 1997 Constitution, which reads: :\IQLJ[[VZLJ[PVUPMPUYLZWLJ[VMHU`ÄUHUJPHS
`LHYP[PZMV\UK[OH[[OLHTV\U[HWWYVWYPH[LK\UKLY[OL(WWYVWYPH[PVU(J[PZPUZ\ɉJPLU[VY[OH[HULLKOHZHYPZLUMVYHW\YWVZLMVY^OPJOUVHTV\U[OHZ
ILLUHWWYVWYPH[LKI`[OH[(J[HZ\WWSLTLU[HY`LZ[PTH[LZOV^PUN[OLZ\TZYLX\PYLKZOHSSILSHPKILMVYL[OL5H[PVUHS(ZZLTIS`ILMVYL[OLL_WLUKP[\YLOHZ
ILLUPUJ\YYLK>OLYLHZ\WWSLTLU[HY`LZ[PTH[LVYLZ[PTH[LZOH]LILLUHWWYV]LKI`[OL5H[PVUHS(ZZLTIS `HZ\WWSLTLU[HY`HWWYVWYPH[PVU)PSSZOHSSIL
PU[YVK\JLKPU[V[OL5H[PVUHS(ZZLTIS`MVY[OLHWWYVWYPH[PVUVM[OLZ\TZZVHWWYV]LK
19 Salieu Taal, ‘Was the recent Supplementary Appropriation Estimate 2018 presented by the Minister of Finance in accordance with the dictates of the law 
and Constitution?’,3H^/\I.HTIPH)SVN, 20 November 2018, at https://www.lawhubgambia.com/lawhug-net/is-supplementary-appropriation-constitu-
tional [accessed 5 January 2019].
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sidered the constitutionality of various pro-
visions of the Criminal Code (Cap 10:01) of 
the Laws of The Gambia and the Informa-
tion and Communications (Amendment) Act 
2013. The plaintiffs in 2017 sought declara-
tion that sections 178 (defining libel), 179 
(defining defamatory matter), 180 (defining 
publication) and 181A of the Criminal Code 
and section 173(A) (1) (a) & (c) of the Infor-
mation and Communications (Amendment) 
Act 2013 (relating to matters committed 
over the Internet) were inconsistent with nu-
merous provisions of the Constitution and 
therefore void and unconstitutional.
The Court  held that sections 178, 179 and 
180 of the Criminal Code and section 173 (A) 
(1) (a) & (c) of the Information and Commu-
nications (Amendment) Act 2013 were incon-
sistent with the rights and freedoms enshrined 
under sections 25 (freedom of speech, includ-
ing freedom of the press and other media), and 
207 (freedom and independence of the media 
and other information media) and 209 (which 
outlines limitations relative to that guaranteed 
freedom) of the Constitution.21 The Court not-
ed that the restrictions placed by these three 
sections were neither reasonable nor neces-
sary in a democratic society. It subsequently 
declared them ultra viles of the Constitution 
and therefore invalid.22
2. Gambia Press Union and Two Others vs. 
the Attorney General: Freedom of expression
In Gambia Press Union & Two Others v the 
Attorney General,23 filed in 2014, it was ar-
gued that  various sections of the Criminal 
Code, in terms of sections 51 (definition of 
seditious intention), 52 (offence for commit-
ting seditious intention), 52A (power to con-
fiscate printing machine on which seditious 
material is published), 53 (statutory time for 
initiating prosecution), 54 (require evidence 
to warrant conviction), 59 (publishing or re-
producing statement or rumour or report that 
is likely to cause fear or alarm to the public 
or to disturb peace) and 181A (false publica-
tion and broadcasting) violated freedom of 
speech and expression including freedom of 
the press and other media.
On 9 May 2018, the Supreme Court held 
that the protection accorded to the holder of 
the Office of the President is reasonable and 
necessary, while the protection accorded to 
government as an institution is not reasonable 
and not necessary. The Court rejected the ar-
gument with little hesitation on the basis that:
the vicissitudes and trappings of the 
Office of President and as the Office 
serves first and foremost as the founda-
tion for national cohesions and stability, 
coupled with the need for the holder of 
such office to concentrate on State af-
fairs and not to be unduly distracted, it is 
reasonable that the holder of such Office 
is protected. This protection is, in the 
context of The Gambia and the values 
attributed to such leadership position in 
the country, considered necessary and 
thus has a legitimate aim.24
It thus partially limited the scope of the of-
fence of “seditious intention” (section 51(a) 
of the Criminal Code) by removing the 
availed protections for government as an 
institution but leaving the protection for the 
President intact.25
It is submitted that while the decision of the 
Court in limiting the scope of 51(a) of the Crim-
inal Code and consequently the offence of sedi-
tious intention is commendable, in essence, it re-
tains criminal measures for defamation against 
the head of state. Put at its simplest, the Court did 
not show that there is sufficient proportionality 
between the harm done by the law (the infringe-
ment on freedom of speech) and the benefits it 
is designed to achieve (protecting the President 
from hatred, contempt or dissatisfaction). The 
purpose of this limitation does not contribute to 
an open and democratic society that is based on 
human dignity and equality.
The rest of the sections were also maintained 
as they were deemed to be reasonable and nec-
essary in a democratic society for preserving 
the interest of national security and public or-
der insofar as they do not relate to the severed 
first limb of section 51(a) (on sedition applying 
to the government).26 The Supreme Court also 
upheld section 181A of the Criminal Code, 
which proscribes the so-called publication or 
broadcast of “false news,” as well as section 
:LWKWKLVVWDQFHWKH&RXUWPLVVHGDQRWKHU
opportunity to bring its media laws in line with 
accepted regional and international standards on 
free speech, as its limited judgment was directly 
FRQWUDU\WRWKHGHFLVLRQPDGHE\WKH(&2:$6
Court of Justice in Federation of African Jour-
nalists and Others v. The Republic of The Gam-
bia27 three months prior to the GPU case. 
The plaintiffs argued that the state had vio-
lated their fundamental rights by failing to 
protect the rights of citizens in accordance 
with the international instruments that had 
been signed by The Gambia, including the 
(&2:$65HYLVHG7UHDW\WKH$IULFDQ&KDU-
ter and the ICCPR.28 It was submitted that 
security agents of The Gambia arbitrarily ar-
rested, harassed and detained the journalists 
under inhumane conditions, and forced them 
into exile for fear of persecution as a conse-
quence of their work.
The Court upheld the claim, finding that The 
Gambia had violated the journalists’ rights 
to freedom of expression, liberty, freedom of 
movement and prohibition against torture.29
As such, it awarded six million dalasis in 
compensation to the journalists (approxi-
mately 21,352 USD). The Court further or-
20 SC Civil Suit No: 001/2017, 9 May 2018.
21 (ZHIV]LWHYHZ
22 As above, para. 54.
23 SC Civil Suit No: 1/2014, 9 May 2018.
24 As above, para. 52.
25 As above, para. 54.
26 As above, paras. 55-62.
27 -LKLYH[PVUVM(MYPJHU1V\YUHSPZ[ZHUK6[OLYZ];OL9LW\ISPJVM;OL.HTIPH ECW/CCJ/JUD/04/18, 13 March 2018,  https://www.mediadefence.org/sites/default/
ÄSLZISVNÄSLZ-(1HUK6[OLYZ];OL.HTIPH1\KNTLU[WKMBHJJLZZLK 1HU\HY` D
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dered The Gambia to immediately repeal or 
amend its laws on criminal defamation, se-
dition and false news in line with its obliga-
tions under international law.30 The govern-
ment has yet to implement the judgment of 
the Court relating to legislative reform and 
compensation for the victims.
3. Emil Touray v Saikou Jammeh 
(represented by IHRDA & Sagar Jahateh) 
v Republic of The Gambia (2018): Freedom 
of expression association and speech
Following the immensely unpopular decision 
of the Supreme Court on 23 November 2017 
dismissing claims of unconstitutionality of 
section 5 of the Public Order Act, holding that 
the section was reasonable and constitution-
ally legitimate,31 a communication was sub-
sequently submitted to the African Commis-
sion on Human and People’s Rights (African 
Commission).32 The complainants averred 
that the Public Order Act, 1961 unlawfully 
restricted the scope of freedom of expression 
(article 9(2)), freedom of association (article 
10) and freedom of assembly (article 11) as 
protected under the African Charter on Hu-
man and People’s Rights (African Charter).33
They further requested that the African Com-
mission address the communication.34 The 
Commission has accepted the matter and the 
case is now at the admissibility stage. 
In summary, the key constitutional challeng-
es in 2018 concerned freedom of speech, as-
sembly and association. The Supreme Court 
must bear in mind that its approach to the 
application, interpretation and limitation of 
constitutional cases have serious implica-
tions with respect to human rights, rule of 
law and democratic consolidation in The 
Gambia. The change in leadership and Pres-
ident Barrow’s commitment to undertake 
legal reforms to enable greater protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms presents an 
opportunity to revisit existing laws. For in-
stance, the Non-Governmental Organisation 
(NGO) Act  undermines the freedom of as-
sociation in The Gambia through a cumber-
some registration process governed by the 
NGO Affairs Agency. 
Under the law, there is a two-tier system for 
registration. First, if an organisation meets 
the criteria set out, the NGO Affairs Agency 
grants a clearance certificate prior to the en-
tity’s registration with the Registrar of Com-
panies, which is located within the Office 
of the Attorney General. In exchange for an 
annual fee and continued compliance, reg-
istered NGOs receive limited-duty waivers 
and permission to register with The Associ-
ation of NGOs (TANGO). The civic space 
under Jammeh’s regime was very much re-
stricted as the Act placed the Agency firm-
ly under the ambit of the Executive. It was 
located at various times under different gov-
ernment ministries during its operations and 
was finally located, following a decision in 
2010, at the Office of the Presidency. 
In 2013, the government introduced a new 
NGO Bill without any consultation with rel-
evant stakeholders and ignoring TANGO’s 
2010 proposal for an NGO Bill that would be 
consistent with the Constitution.  However, 
the 2013 proposal by the government did not 
progress in the National Assembly. In 2017, 
the NGO Affairs Agency was moved to the 
Ministry of Local Government. It is vital that 
the government repeals the NGO Act and ex-
peditiously enacts a comprehensive measure 
that is in full compliance with international 
standards.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Despite the excitement and enthusiasm that 
greeted the onset of multiparty democracy 
following decades of authoritarian rule, The 
Gambia’s democracy remains fragile. There 
are concerns regarding the absence of com-
prehensive anti-discrimination legislation 
and existing repressive laws.
An important undertaking should be about 
exploring whether the TRRC presents an 
opportunity to discuss the old regime’s at-
titude towards minority groups such as les-
bian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex 
(LGBTI) persons in The Gambia.  As part of 
a deliberate nurturing and consolidation of 
democracy, a key question then arises: does 
the transitional justice process provide space 
to have conversations and chart better legis-
lative protection on controversial issues such 
as sexual minority rights and liberalisation 
RIDERUWLRQ"
28 Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/36/15.
29 As above, pp. 60-61.
30 As above, p. 62.
31 6\ZHPUV\+HYIVL 6[OLYZ]0UZWLJ[VY.LULYHSVM7VSPJL+PYLJ[VY.LULYHSVM5H[PVUHS0U[LSSPNLUJL(NLUJ`[OL([[VYUL`.LULYHSCML SUIT NO: SC 
:LL.:V^L:5HIHULOº;OL.HTIPH!;OLZ[H[LVMSPILYHSKLTVJYHJ`»PU9(SILY[L[HS;OL0Ç*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P-
tutional Law (July 19, 2018) 99-100.
32 Communication 705/18, ,TPS;V\YH`]:HPRV\1HTTLOYLWYLZLU[LKI`0/9+(:HNHY1HOH[LO]9LW\ISPJVM;OL.HTIPH (2018), para. 4.
33;OL.HTIPHYH[PÄLK[OL(MYPJHU*OHY[LYVU1\UL 
34 Communication 705/18 (n. 32 above), para. 12.
35 Cap 50:04, Vol. 7, Revised Laws of The Gambia 2009.
36 (TLUKTLU[Z[V[OL5.6)PSSI`;OL(ZZVJPH[PVUVM5.6ZPU[OL.HTIPHO[[WZ!KYP]LNVVNSLJVTÄSLK(M>7HM2Q88U4F6L9;LRX0T.=I7?]PL^
[accessed 15 January 2019].
37 S Nabaneh, ‘Crusade to root out homosexuality like  malaria’, AfricLaw 7, April 2014 https://africlaw.com/2014/04/07/crusade-to-root-out-homosexuali-
ty-like-malaria/ [accessed 5 February 2019].
38 S Nabaneh, ‘The unspoken: Unsafe abortion in The Gambia and the necessity for legal reform’, AfricLaw 13 March 2018 https://africlaw.com/2018/03/13/the-un-
spoken-unsafe-abortion-in-the-gambia-and-the-necessity-for-legal-reform/ [accessed 5 February 2019].
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Georgia
Malkhaz Nakashidze, Associate Professor – Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University 
I. INTRODUCTION
This report provides a brief introduction to 
the Georgian constitutional system, with a 
SDUWLFXODU HPSKDVLV RQ WKH ¿QDO FRQVWLWX-
tional amendments in Georgia, last direct 
presidential election and main challenges 
of the judiciary. It provides an overview of 
landmark judgments of the Georgian Con-
VWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWLQ7KH¿QDOVHFWLRQ
examines developments expected in 2019 
related to Court vacancies, Constitutional 
Court cases and other related events.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The end of constitutional reform
On March 23, 2018, the Parliament of Geor-
gia adopted constitutional amendments. In 
fact, this was a new edition of constitutional 
amendments adopted in 2017, which was up-
dated according to the Venice Commission’s 
FRPPHQWV:LWKWKHVHFKDQJHVFHUWDLQFRQ-
stitutional deficiencies were corrected in the 
Constitution. Especially significant was an 
amendment related to removing a bonus sys-
tem that impacted the proportional distribu-
tion of votes among parties and participation 
of election blocs in parliamentary elections. 
In addition, in 2018 the Parliament adopt-
ed a new edition of the Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara,1 which 
was based on the new status of autonomy 
adopted by Parliament on 13 October 2017.2
The Constitution of the Autonomous Re-
public determined the rules of forming and 
regulating the authorities of the autonomous 
republic and improved certain procedural 
deficiencies, but there were also important 
issues (e.g., the transition to a fully propor-
tional electoral system) that the autonomous 
constitution did not decide independently. 
The last direct presidential election
The last direct election of the President of 
Georgia was held in 2018. Beginning in 
2024, the President will be elected by an 
electoral collage. This election was import-
ant because it was the first time in the history 
of the country that a second round of presi-
dential elections was utilized. The elections 
were also distinguished by an unprecedented 
number of candidates.
The Central Election Commission registered 
25 presidential candidates, 6 of which were 
independents.3 Acting president Giorgi Mar-
gvelashvili refused to participate in the elec-
tion.4 The ruling party did not nominate a 
candidate and5 supported so-called “indepen-
GEORGIA
1 The Organic Law of Georgia on Approval of the Constitutional Law of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara 
VU[OL¸(TLUKTLU[[V[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM[OL(\[VUVTV\Z9LW\ISPJVM(KQHYH¹;OL3LNPZSH[P]L/LYHSK
of Georgia#O[[WZ!TH[ZULNV]NLRHKVJ\TLU[]PL^&W\ISPJH[PVU$%HJJLZZLK
February 14, 2019  
2*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^VM.LVYNPHVU[OL¸(\[VUVTV\Z9LW\ISPJVM(KQHYH¹;OL3LNPZSH[P]L/LYHSKVM.LVYNPH
 #O[[WZ!TH[ZULNV]NLKVJ\TLU[]PL^ &W\ISPJH[PVU$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
3 Malkhaz Nakashidze, Georgia – The Presidential Election: Candidates and the Campaign, October 3, 
#O[[W!WYLZPKLU[PHSWV^LYJVT&W$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
4 Giorgi Margvelashvili will not take part in the presidential elections, https://www.radiotavisupleba.
ge/a/29463535.html 
5 Ivanishvili: My position is not to nominate a presidential candidate, <http://liberali.ge/news/view/38640/
P]HUPZO]PSPJOLTPWVaP[ZPHHYVTHYKH]HZHROLSV[WYLaPKLU[VIPZRHUKPKH[P%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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dent” candidate Salome Zurabishvili.6 The 
Central Election Commission announced 
that Salome Zurabishvili had won 38.64% in 
the first round and Grigol Vashadze 37.74%. 
Davit Bakradze from the European Union 
came third with 10.97%.7 These results were 
somewhat unexpected for the ruling party, and 
the outcome of the election was thus a protest 
against its policies. On November 28, 2018, 
the second round of the presidential elections 
was held in Georgia, and the so-called “inde-
pendent” candidate, Salome Zurabishvili, was 
elected. The Central Election Commission an-
nounced that Vashadze had won 40.46% and 
Zurabishvili 59.54%.8 The first round showed 
that the opposition had a real chance to win the 
contest in a free and fair election.9 The second 
round campaign was quite tense. Victory was 
a strategic goal for the ruling Georgia Dream 
team and they mobilized all kinds of resourc-
es to win. For example, the government re-
moved bank debt from 600,000 citizens.10
The decision was denounced by international 
observer organizations as voter bribery.11 The 
opposition said that this was not a fair election. 
They do not recognize the results12 and have 
demanded early parliamentary elections with 
a fully proportional electoral system.13 Despite 
the opposition’s protest, the inauguration of 
the President was scheduled for December 16, 
2018, but ruling party changed its location 14 
from Tbilisi to Telavi.15 Thus, the inauguration 
of 2018 was specially designed to prevent op-
position protest in Tbilisi. The police blocked 
the road and opposition supporters were unable 
to enter Telavi. Some people were injured as 
a result of clashes between the opposition and 
police, and one of the leaders of the opposition 
was arrested. National and international organi-
zations indicated that significant violence was 
observed.16 Observers noted that the elections 
were competitive, free, but unfair.17 This elec-
tion has intensified polarization in Georgia and 
also caused significant damage to the country’s 
democratic image internationally.18
Main challenges to the judiciary
In 2018, judicial power was a key topic. Sud-
denly, the chairman of the Supreme Court, 
with whom the new government was rein-
forcing new judiciary reforms, resigned.19
After his resignation, the President of Geor-
gia began extensive consultations to select a 
new chairman of the Court.20 However, the 
parliamentary majority did not participate 
in the discussion, the consensus did not take 
place and the candidate was not named.21
The President’s decision was harshly criti-
cized by the NGO coalition.22   
In 2018, the High Council of Justice came 
to the attention of the public. On December 
24, 2018, the Council chose 10 candidates 
for lifetime judges on the Supreme Court. 
The decision was particularly condemned 
by non-judge members Anna Dolidze23 and 
Nazi Janezashvili,24 who pointed out that the 
Council of Justice chose them through hasty, 
non-transparent procedures. The NGO Coa-
6.LVYNPHU+YLHT^PSSZ\WWVY[:HSVTLAV\YHIPJO]PSPK\YPUN[OLWYLZPKLU[PHSLSLJ[PVUZ#O[[WZ!VUNLZ[VY`ࡅ࠰ࡀ࠷ࡃ࠺࠸࠽ࡊ࠼࠴࠱࠰ࡁ࠰࠾ࡀ࠴࠶࠸࠳࠴࠼ࡂ࠽
࠰ࡀࡉ࠴࠵࠼࠴࠱࠶࠴ࡁ࠰࠺࠽࠻࠴࠶ࡃࡀ࠰࠱࠸ࡈ࠵࠸࠺ࡁ࠳࠰ࡃࡍ࠴ࡀࡁ࠻ࡎ࠰ࡀࡁ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
7 Malkhaz Nakashidze, Georgia – Presidential election: First-round results and expectations for the second round, November 5, 2018, <http://presidential-power.
JVT&W$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
8 According to preliminary results of the presidential elections, Grigol Vashadze - 40.46%, Salome Zurabishvili received 59.54%, 2018-11-29, <http://www.new-
WYLZZNLZHWYLaPKLU[VHYJOL]ULIPZ^PUHZ^HYPZOLKLNLIP[NYPNVS]HZOHKaLTZHSVTLa\YHIPZO]PSTH TPPYV%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
9 4HSROHa5HRHZOPKaL.LVYNPH¶;OLYLZ\S[ZVM[OLWYLZPKLU[PHSLSLJ[PVU+LJLTILY#O[[W!WYLZPKLU[PHSWV^LYJVT&W$ %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
10 Premier: More than 600,000 citizens on black list will be dealt with debts, November 19, 2018 
#O[[W!^^ ^[HI\SHNLNLZ[VY`  WYLTPLYPL[ZZOH]ZPHZOPTRVMaLTL[TVXHSHXLZ]HSLIPNH\U\SKLIH%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
11 4HSROHa5HRHZOPKaL.LVYNPH¶;OLYLZ\S[ZVM[OLWYLZPKLU[PHSLSLJ[PVU+LJLTILY#O[[W!WYLZPKLU[PHSWV^LYJVT&W$ %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
12 .YPNVS=HZOHKaL!>LKVUV[YLJVNUPaL[OLLSLJ[PVUYLZ\S[Z5V]LTILY #O[[WZ!^^ ^YHKPV[H]PZ\WSLIHNLH  O[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
13<UP[LK6WWVZP[PVU»ZTLL[PUNPU7OPSHYTVU `5V]LTILY #O[[WZ!^^ ^YHKPV[H]PZ\WSLIHNLH࠲࠰࠴ࡀ࠷࠸࠰࠼࠴࠱ࡃ࠺࠸࠽࠾࠽࠶࠸ࡊ࠸࠸ࡁࡈ࠴࠹ࡀ࠴࠱࠰
ࡄ࠸࠺࠰ࡀ࠻࠽࠼࠸࠰ࡈ࠸ O[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
14 Zourabichvili’s inauguration: Many versions are discussed, including in the countryside, December 4, 2018, <http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/141002-zurabishvi-
SPPUH\N\YHJPPZHKNPSaLNHUP_PSLIHIL]YP]LYZPHTH[ZOVYPZXHSHXNHYL[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
15 A\YHIPZO]PSP!;LSH]PKPKUV[]V[L0^HU[[VZOV^[OH[L]LY`IVK`PZWYLZPKLU[+LJLTILY#O[[WZ!VUNLZ[VY`࠶ࡃࡀ࠰࠱࠸ࡈ࠵࠸࠺࠸࠷࠴࠺࠰࠵࠻࠰ࡎ࠻࠰࠰ࡀ
࠻࠽࠻ࡊ࠰࠻࠸࠼࠳࠰࠵࠰ࡉ࠵࠴࠼࠽ࡀ࠽࠻ࡇ࠵࠴࠺࠰ࡁ࠾ࡀ࠴࠶࠸࠳࠴࠼ࡂ࠸࠵࠰ࡀ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
16 :LJVUKYV\UKVMLSLJ[PVUZHUKZOHYWWYLSPTPUHY`HZZLZZTLU[ZVMPU[LYUH[PVUHSVIZLY]LYZ5V]LTILY #O[[WZ!^^ ^YHKPV[H]PZ\WSLIHNLH࠰ࡀࡉ࠴࠵࠼࠴࠱࠸ࡁ
࠻࠴࠽ࡀ࠴ࡂࡃࡀ࠸࠳࠰ࡁ࠰࠴ࡀ࠷࠰ࡈ࠽ࡀ࠸ࡁ࠽࠳࠰࠻࠹࠵࠸ࡀ࠵࠴࠱࠺࠴࠱࠸ࡁ࠻࠹࠵࠴࠷ࡀ࠸ࡌ࠸࠼࠰ࡁࡌ࠰ࡀ࠸ࡈ࠴ࡄ࠰ࡁ࠴࠱࠴࠱࠸  O[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
17 0U[LYUH[PVUHSLSLJ[PVUVIZLY]H[PVUTPZZPVUWYLZZJVUMLYLUJL 5V]LTILY;IPSPZP#O[[WZ!^^ ^MHJLIVVRJVTVZJLVKPOY]PKLVZ%
accessed February 14, 2019  
18 4HSROHa5HRHZOPKaL.LVYNPH¶;OLYLZ\S[ZVM[OLWYLZPKLU[PHSLSLJ[PVU+LJLTILY#O[[W!WYLZPKLU[PHSWV^LYJVT&W$ %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
19 The resignation letter of the Supreme Court of Georgia and the Chairman of the High Council of Justice Nino Gvenetadze, 02/08/2018, <http://www.supreme-
JV\Y[NLUL^ZPK %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
20 President of the Supreme Court chairperson’s resignation, 02-08-2018, http://web2.rustavi2.ge/ka/news/110488 
21 The President of Georgia will not presumably nominate a candidate for the Chairperson of the Supreme Court, 24.08.2018, <https://1tv.ge/news/saqartve-
SVZWYLaPKLU[P\aLUHLZPZHZHTHY[SVZ[H]TQKVTHYLVIPZRHUKPKH[ZZH]HYH\KVKHNOHY^HYHKNLUZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
22 The Coalition Calls on President to Change the Decision to Refuse Chairperson of the Supreme Court Decision 31 August, 2018, <https://www.transparency.ge/
NLWVZ[RVHSPJPHTV\JVKLIZWYLaPKLU[ZZOLJ]HSVZ\aLUHLZPZHZHTHY[SVZ[H]TQKVTHYPZRHUKPKH[PZHJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` %
23 The President appointed Ana Dolidze as a member of the High Council of Justice, 08.01.2018 <https://www.president.gov.ge/ka-GE/pressamsakhuri/siakhleebi/
WYLaPKLU[THHUHKVSPKaLP\Z[PJPPZ\THNSLZPZHIJOVZHZW_%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
24 Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on Nazibrola Janezashvili as the Member of the High Council of Justice of Georgia, June 21, 2017, <http://www.parlia-
TLU[NLNLHQH_KV^USVHK-PSL %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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lition25 and Ombudsman26 were against the 
decision. After the protest, the chairman of 
the Parliament stated that the selection of 
the candidates would be conducted in accor-
dance with preset procedures and criteria.27
:KLOH WKH  MXGJHV RI WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
rejected their candidacy,28 it was announced 
that in 2019 the law will set up the selection 
criteria for the list of judges.29
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. LEPL “Evangelical Baptist Church of 
Georgia” and others V. The Parliament of 
Georgia Decision (Judgment No. 1/2/671, 3 
July 2018)
In this case, seven different churches and the 
Muslims Union disputed the words “by or-
der of the Patriarchate of Georgia” of the Tax 
Code of Georgia. According to the Code, the 
construction, restoration and painting of the 
temples and churches ordered by the Patri-
archate of Georgia would be exempt from 
the VAT tax. The claimants were non-en-
trepreneurial (non-commercial) legal enti-
ties and religious organizations registered 
as legal entities of public law engaged in 
religious activities. The applicants claimed 
that the above-mentioned norm of the Tax 
Code is unconstitutional because it estab-
lishes unequal treatment between the Geor-
gian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and 
other religious organizations. In particular, 
unequal treatment is demonstrated since the 
Tax Code of Georgia imposes an exemption 
for the Orthodox Church or in its favor. The 
main purpose of the disputed norm is to cre-
ate a prerequisite condition for the Georgian 
Patriarchate as a representative of a particu-
lar religion, which contradicts the principle 
of a legal state. The respondent referred to 
the legitimate aims of the disputed norm as 
proper legitimacy, maintenance, restoration 
and restoration-conservation of culturally 
and historically valued temples with histor-
ical-cultural and archaeological-architectur-
al value and ecclesiastical treasure. It also 
based its argument on Article 9 of the Con-
stitution of Georgia and on the same article 
on the realization of the normative frame-
work envisaged by the Constitutional Agree-
ment concluded with the Georgian Orthodox 
Church. The Court ruled that the Constitu-
tion does not require the first paragraph of 
Article 9, and since the norm under the dif-
ferentiation has no rational relation to the re-
spondent party by any legitimate objective, 
it is discriminatory and therefore should be 
declared unconstitutional.30
2. LEPL “Evangelical Baptist Church of 
Georgia and others V. The Parliament of 
Georgia” (Judgment No. 1/1/811, 3 July 
2018)
In this case, the claimants were the four 
ecclesiastical and Muslim divisions reg-
istered as legal entities of the Public Law. 
The claimants complained about the norm 
of the Law on “State Property,” according 
to which state property could be transferred 
to the Georgian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church free of charge. The claimants con-
sidered that the disputed norm establishes 
the unequal treatment of the peculiarly eq-
uitable persons—between the Orthodox 
Church of Georgia and other religious or-
ganizations—to enjoy state property free of 
ownership, which is guaranteed only for the 
Georgian Orthodox Church. The respondent 
argued that the legitimate aim of the contro-
versial regulation is to promote the special 
relationship between the state and the Or-
thodox Church and underline the status of 
the Church within these relationships. The 
State of Georgia has a special legal relation-
ship with the Orthodox Church, confirming 
Article 9 of the Constitution of Georgia and 
the constitutional agreement between the 
state and the Orthodox Church. Consequent-
ly, the controversial regulation is based on 
the above-mentioned legal relationship. The 
Court ruled that differentiation was not re-
quired by the Constitution, and it establishes 
differential treatment on religious grounds 
that do not have sufficient, objective and 
reasonable justification. Thus, the provision 
contradicts the requirements of Article 14 of 
the Constitution of Georgia.31
3. Georgian citizen Nana Parchukashvili V. 
The Ministry of Penitentiary and Probation 
(Judgment N2/4 / 665,683, 26 July 2018)
The subject of this dispute was the consti-
tutionality of the provision of instructions 
approved by the Minister of Penitentiary of 
Georgia that the accused/convict shall be 
obliged to expose body parts after an order 
made by an authorized person. The claimant 
believed that such treatment leads to humil-
iation, is insulting and should be used only 
in extreme cases. The claimant noted that 
with the development of technology, elec-
tronic scanning capabilities were also im-
proved and today can detect any items that 
the person has. According to the claim, the 
scanner can detect metal items, plastic, ce-
ramic, explosives and other hazardous items. 
The claimant believed that such a scan of 
the human body, unlike a physical, does 
not cause a person’s humiliation and spiri-
25 *VHSP[PVUMVY 0¸UKLWLUKLU[HUK;YHUZWHYLU[1\KPJPHY`¹YLZWVUKZ[V[OLKL]LSVWTLU[ZPU[OLJV\Y[HUKPUP[PH[LZ[OLJHTWHPNU 0¸^HU[>LUKV*V\Y[¹4HYJO
#O[[WZ!^^ ^[YHUZWHYLUJ `NLNLWVZ[RVHSPJPHKHTV\RPKLILSPKHNHTJO]PY]HSLTHY[STZHQ\SLIPZ[]PZZHZHTHY[SVZOPNHU]P[HYLI\STV]SLULIZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
26 6TI\KZTHUKLTHUKZ[VZ[VW[OLWYVJLZZVMYL]PL P^UNQ\KNLZVM[OLZ\WYLTLQ\KPJPHY `#O[[W!WPY]LSPYHKPVNLPUKL_WOW&UL^ZPK$ %HJJLZZLK
February 14, 2019  
27 7HYSPHTLU[ P^SSKPZJ\ZZH[[OLZWYPUNZLZZPVUVM[OL:\WYLTL*V\Y[1\KNLZ#O[[WZ!JP]PSNLRHHYJOP]LZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
28 The 10th Supreme Court Judge addresses the Parliament and does not consider their candidates, 21.01.2019, <https://1tv.ge/news/uzenaesi-sasamartlos-mosamartle-
VIPZ]LRHUKPKH[PWHYSHTLU[ZTPTHY[H]ZTH[PRHUKPKH[\YLIPHYNHUPROPSVU%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
29 The new criteria will be submitted to the Parliament by the renewed list of judges, January 12, 2019, <https://imedinews.ge/ge/saqartvelo/92748/parlamentshi-akhali-kri-
[LYP\TLIP[TVZHTHY[SL[HNHUHROSLI\SZPHZ[ZHYHKNLULU%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
30 3,73¸,]HUNLSPJHS)HW[PZ[*O\YJOVM.LVYNPH¹HUKV[OLYZ=;OL7HYSPHTLU[VM.LVYNPH+LJPZPVUBD5V#O[[WZ!^^ ^TH[ZULNV]NLRHKVJ\TLU[
]PL^&W\ISPJH[PVU$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
31 3,73¸,]HUNLSPJHS)HW[PZ[*O\YJOVM.LVYNPH¹HUKV[OLYZ=;OL7HYSPHTLU[VM.LVYNPH¹BD5V#O[[WZ!^^ ^TH[ZULNV]NLRHKVJ\TLU[]PL^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tual suffering. The Court partly satisfied the 
claim and established the unconstitutionality 
of the norm in respect of Article 17, para-
graph 2 of the Constitution of Georgia. The 
Court pointed out that the measures taken in 
the Penitentiary Establishment Establishing 
the Rights of Persons Act should not cause 
pain, discomfort, psychological suffering 
and shame more than necessary for a person 
experiencing a penalty or other restrictions. 
Otherwise, the event will violate Article 17 
of the Constitution of Georgia and, there-
fore, will be unconstitutional. Based on all 
the foregoing, it was necessary to determine 
the essence of the measure provided by the 
disputed norm, its legitimate aim and pro-
portionality.32
4. Georgian citizens Marine Mizandari, 
Giorgi Chitidze and Ana Jikuridze V. The 
Parliament of Georgia (Judgment No. 
2/6/1216, 27 July 2018)
This dispute was related to the constitutional-
ity of norms of the law of Georgia on “Cultur-
al Heritage.” The constitutional claim states 
that on the basis of the disputed norm, if the 
owner and/or legitimate beneficiary of the 
monument of cultural heritage is a religious 
entity, the Ministry can not give the owner or 
user an alert or penalty when it violates the 
rules of maintenance of the monument. The 
claimant considered that these norms violate 
the right to guarantee the protection of cul-
tural heritage. The claimants argued that the 
disputed provision does not have a legitimate 
aim, since it is a blanket policy, without any 
criteria and without conditions. In addition, 
in the case of a legitimate aim, the impugned 
norm is a disproportionate way of restrict-
ing the right. According to the representa-
tive of the respondent, the legitimate aim of 
the controversial regulation is to coordinate 
efforts and to distribute responsibilities be-
tween the state and religious confessions in 
the field of cultural heritage protection. It is 
important to note the relationship between 
the state and religion characteristic to Geor-
gia, the legal specifics and the context. In par-
ticular, religious entities have a special legal 
status. The Parliament of Georgia considers 
that the state should interfere with such reli-
gious cultural heritage only if the fact of de-
liberate damage is present. The Court held the 
relevant provisions partially unconstitutional 
based on Article 14 and Article 34, paragraph 
2 of the Constitution.33
5. A citizen of Georgia and Canada, Giorgi 
Spartak Nikoladze V. The Parliament of 
Georgia (Judgment No. 2/10/1212, 7 
December 2018)
The subject of the dispute was a provision 
of the Civil Procedure Code of Georgia that 
constituted the Court’s authority to prohibit 
a parent from withdrawing his child from the 
borders of Georgia under Article 22, para-
graphs 2 and 3 of the Constitution of Geor-
gia by using a temporary decree. According 
to the constitutional claim, the Tbilisi City 
Court issued a temporary decree that held 
Giorgi Spartak Nikoladze was prohibited 
from withdrawing his son from the borders 
of Georgia until the final decision of the fam-
ily dispute in court. According to the claim-
ant, the child thus did not receive a number 
of benefits that he is entitled to as a Canadian 
citizen living in Canadian territory. The re-
spondent noted that the formal basis for lim-
iting the right of movement outside the coun-
try is protected and the legitimate aim of the 
regulation is to protect the rights of children, 
in particular the best interests of children, 
which are derived from paragraphs 2 and 3 
of Article 36 of the Constitution of Georgia. 
The state is responsible for the family and 
well-being of women and children’s rights. 
The Court observed that juveniles cannot de-
cide independently for a short period of time 
to leave Georgia, and so the use of this right 
by juveniles depends on their parents. Thus, 
the impugned norm is not a restriction of the 
right protected by Article 22 (2) of the Con-
stitution of Georgia and the constitutional 
claim is not satisfied.34
6. “Giant Security Ltd.” and “Safety 
Company Tigonisi Ltd.” V. The Parliament 
of Georgia and the Minister of Internal 
Affairs of Georgia (Judgment No. 2/11/747, 
14 December 2018)
The subject of this dispute was the constitu-
tionality of the norms and provisions of the 
law of Georgia on “Private Defenders” and 
regulations of the Security Police Depart-
ment in relation to Article 30, paragraph 2 
of the Constitution. The claimant argued that 
the disputed norms on the Security Police 
Department perform one of the functions of 
controlling private security organizations, 
and themselves carry out defensive activi-
ties. This implies harsh interference by the 
state in private security organizations, which 
makes it impossible to have a free and com-
petitive environment in this sphere and puts 
it in a preferential position in comparison 
with other entrepreneurial entities. The re-
spondent pointed out that the Security Police 
Department is equipped with appropriate 
knowledge and skills as well as the standards 
of independence and impartiality which are 
supported by regulatory legislation. In ad-
dition, in case of disproportionate sanctions 
and subjective decisions, the entrepreneur 
may apply to the Court to protect his or her 
right. The Court pointed out that free com-
petition and market structure threatens any 
event carried out by the state which puts in 
place the advantage of any economic agent 
and creates unequal conditions for market 
participants. Any such intervention should 
be justified by a legitimate public interest. 
The Court has ruled that the implementation 
of the two functions at the same time by the 
Security Police is not a necessary means of 
achieving a legitimate aim of effective con-
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trol of private security, the restriction im-
posed by impugned norms is incompatible 
and obstructs constitutional norms.35
7. Georgian citizens Zurab Japaridze and 
Vakhtang Megrelishvili V. The Parliament 
of Georgia (Judgment N1 / 3/1282, 30 July 
2018)
The subject of this dispute was the consti-
tutionality of the normative contents of Ar-
ticle 45, part 1 of the Code of Administra-
tive Offenses and the use of the term “and/
or without the purpose of the doctor,” which 
provides for the use of drugs for marijuana 
consumption. The claimant pointed out that 
the use of marijuana was not the act of car-
rying out a public threat. Punishment which 
is directed at acts that do not cause danger-
ous consequences for the public has no le-
gitimate purpose. Marijuana consumption 
may only cause damage to the health of the 
customer, who will be responsible if it does. 
In addition, marijuana consumption does not 
create a significant risk for human health. On 
the basis of ethical autonomy, people are not 
obliged to prove the objective value of any 
action taken within their freedom. According 
to the respondent, the legitimate aims of the 
disputed norms are to protect human health 
as a way to protect the individual as well as 
the entire population and public safety, and 
to prevent dependence of the population on 
narcotic drugs. In order to achieve the stated 
goals, the legislator imposes administrative 
responsibility for such actions that are harm-
ful to human health, but it is not character-
ized by a threat that would justify criminal 
liability for the individual. The Court found 
that the prohibition of the general and bloc 
nature of the use of marijuana is a dispro-
portionate interference in the protection of 
personal autonomy, not necessarily for any 
legitimate aim in a democratic society, and 
the impugned rule was declared unconstitu-
tional.36
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
One of the major challenges in 2019 will be 
the independence of the judiciary, the com-
position of the Supreme Court, the lifelong 
appointments of judges and the selection of 
one judge for the Constitutional Court. Also, 
a decision should be announced on Citizen
of Georgia Revaz Lortkipanidze V. The Par-
liament of Georgia, and the Court should 
consider these important cases: Georgia 
Democratic Initiative and citizen of Georgia 
Eduard Marikashvili V. The Parliament of 
Georgia on the law on “accumulative pen-
sions,” Levan Alalishvili and Alapishvili and 
Kavlashvili – Georgian Bar Group V. The 
Parliament of Georgia and the Government 
of Georgia on the constitutionality of provi-
sion “112” on payment of service fees, Tamaz 
Mechiauri V. The Parliament of Georgia on
the no- confidence vote in the Mayor by the 
City Council, Georgia’s Democratic Initia-
tive V. High Council of Justice of Georgia 
on the interviewing of judicial candidates 
in a closed session and Guram Imnadze and 
Mariam Begadze V. The Parliament of Geor-
gia on the initiation of police control without 
adequate grounds. 
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Ghana
Maame AS Mensa-Bonsu, DPhil Student in Law, University of Oxford, UK
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most exciting things about hav-
ing such a constitutionally young state is the 
QXPEHU RI¿UVWV RQHJHWV WRZLWQHVV 
like the year before it, had a number of im-
SRUWDQW¿UVWV ,W LVQRW DW DOO FHUWDLQ WKDW DOO
WKHVH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO ¿UVWV LQXUH WR *KDQD¶V
interests in the long term. Be that as it may, 
WKH\KDYHGH¿QLWHO\SURYLGHGVRPHFRQVWLWX-
tional growth in the form of previously un-
charted territory. As can be expected, the Su-
preme Court was in the thick of it. It received 
new members and is currently—though tem-
porarily—at the largest it has ever been un-
der this Constitution. It grappled with a nov-
HOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOTXHVWLRQ)RUWKH¿UVWWLPH
the executive made use of some of its most 
neglected but, it turns out, contestable pow-
ers. The quality of Ghanaian legislators was 
questioned from within the legislature itself, 
reviving a long-standing debate about the 
separation of powers mechanisms under the 
Constitution. All in all, it was a most event-
ful constitutional year. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
President Akufo-Addo became the first Pres-
ident to use the provisions of Chapter 2 of 
the Constitution. He undertook the not in-
significant task of organizing six separate 
referendums to determine the creation of 
six new regions. Both because the constitu-
tional provisions on how new regions may 
be created are simultaneously over-specific 
and vague, and because there are deep-seat-
ed issues of territory-related resentment dat-
ing perhaps to pre-independence times, the 
process, though completed in a surprisingly 
short time, was fraught and acrimonious. 
Some scholars and critics called the exer-
cise an unnecessary expense. Allegations of 
deliberate exclusion, gerrymandering and 
election rigging were rife. Though threats of 
violence were, by and large, not realized, it is 
worrying how frequent and how earnest they 
were. There was a resurgence of secessionist 
sentiment in the Volta region. The Supreme 
Court was called on to rule whether all per-
sons in the entirety of a region that was to 
be split were entitled to vote; contrary to the 
government’s view that the persons contem-
plated by Chapter 2 were the persons who 
lived in the areas that would become the new 
region. Those remaining in the old regions 
were not considered to be affected. The 
Court endorsed the government’s view and 
Ghana now has a new map. Notwithstand-
ing the derision with which the decision was 
received in some quarters, it is hard to fault 
the Court’s reasoning. Beyond having to re-
orient themselves to the borders of their re-
gion, the people remaining in a region that 
was to be split had no legitimate interest in 
the creation of the region. Ghana is a unitary, 
not a federal, state. So even the argument 
that the source of a resource on which all 
the people in that region are dependent will 
be in the new region is not an argument of 
exclusion. It can be no more than an obser-
vation.  Furthermore, regional borders may 
create new Houses of Chiefs, but they do not 
interfere with traditional territorial allegianc-
es. Indeed, as the case of Republic v Judi-
cial Committee of the Brong Ahafo Regional 
House of Chiefs shows, practice, prudence 
and tradition have worked out a solution in 
cases where the traditional allegiances and 
the House of Chiefs jurisdictions do not so 
tidily overlap. The greater concern this ex-
ercise has raised is that for the first time, we 
have regional boundaries that appear to coin-
cide with sometimes contested ethnic or trib-
GHANA
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al territory. It defeats the integration function 
of the state administrative units for them to 
lend themselves to being used interchange-
ably with ethnicity. It is hoped the execu-
tive will proceed cautiously as it is creating 
precedent of how the state functions in and 
relates to the traditional authorities of these 
new regions. 
The Supreme Court welcomed four new ap-
pointed members: Prof Kotey from the Legal 
Academy, Nene Amegatcher from the Bar 
and Justices Marful-Sau and Agnes Dordzie, 
who were promoted from the Court of Ap-
peal. They fill the vacancies left by Justices 
:RRG$WXJXEDDQG$NDPED7KHIRXUQHZ
appointments brings the current number of 
Supreme Court judges to 15; a larger number 
than the Court has historically had. Howev-
er, a few retirements are anticipated in 2019. 
The number will thus return to 13 shortly. In 
the heat of the aborted Constitutional Review 
exercise a few years ago, there was some 
agitation that the number of Supreme Court 
Justices be capped at 15 to prevent the pos-
sibility of an executive packing the Court. It 
does not appear that a cap is necessary. In the 
three governments since then, the Supreme 
Court has never exceeded 15.
President Akufo-Addo has retreated from a 
decentralisation promise that would have in-
ured to the benefit of the liberal democracy. 
In the lead-up to his election, he promised 
he would willingly limit presidential pow-
ers over local government, and rather than 
appoint all the heads of local assemblies as 
per Article 243, allow them to be elected. 
The self-imposed deadline for the imple-
mentation of this promise was 2018. But 
the year ended with no sign of the promised 
elections. More worryingly, the Minister for 
Local Government announced that it was not 
within the contemplation of the government 
to implement changes in 2019 either. Two 
things made the promise appealing and the 
disappointment crushing. First, the appoint-
ment system breaks important accountability 
loops in terms of the transparency of local 
government. The spending officer of lo-
cal councils is not accountable to the local 
area whose money he is spending. Second-
ly, there was no requirement that the Presi-
dent’s choice to head a local area be in any 
way connected to the area. The difficulties 
involved in having a stranger administer this 
most basic unit of the state are self-evident: 
a lack of understanding of or even concern 
with the issues most pressing to the residents; 
a lack of co-operation from a hostile local as-
sembly, etc. The President’s withdrawal of a 
promise that would have rectified the error 
of the drafters of the Constitution does little 
to advance liberal democracy in Ghana. 
Ghana’s first female electoral commission-
er became the first in that position to be re-
moved by the President in Ghana’s history. 
Ms. Charlotte Osei was accused of flouting 
procurement law in her administering of 
some donor funds. The President set up a 
Commission of Enquiry as required by the 
Constitution and, acting on that commis-
sion’s recommendations—again as per the 
Constitution—removed her from office. The 
editor of a prominent newspaper filed a pub-
lic interest action challenging the work of 
the commission as not meeting the constitu-
tional standards before the Supreme Court. 
A decision is expected on the cases shortly. 
The Majority Leader in Parliament revived a 
debate on the impact of ministerial duties on 
the performance of parliamentary duties and 
vice versa. This is a debate that has been in 
the public sphere since the earliest days of 
the Fourth Republic and is one in which all 
seem to be on the same side but no action to 
address it has actually happened. The Con-
stitution requires that a majority of ministers 
of state be drawn from the legislature. As the 
majority leader pointed out, ministerial du-
ties are so consuming, they compel the MPs 
so appointed to participate only peripherally 
in legislative affairs. Former President Ku-
fuor complained during his tenure that the 
constitutional provision saddled him with 
under-efficient ministers. The Committee of 
Experts, in its report, recommended this ar-
rangement for the purpose of increasing the 
collegiality between the two arms without 
entirely merging them. But it does not ap-
SHDU WR KDYH EHHQ VXFFHVVIXO:KDW LV QHZ
about the Majority Leader’s complaint is the 
effect of having the more senior MPs on his 
side in executive positions. He observed that 
it has weakened the caliber of parliamenta-
ry engagement on the majority side. This is 
worrying since that is who is making a large 
chunk of the decisions. As an entrenched 
provision, it is not an easy one to change. But 
this government has shown by the referen-
dums that it has the ability to achieve difficult 
constitutional changes when it has the will. 
:HKRSH WKH0DMRULW\/HDGHUDQGRWKHUNH\
members of Parliament and the executive will 
act upon this agreed problem and organise the 
necessary referendum to change it. 
One of the most encouraging developments 
of the year was that following the seminal 
case of Occupyghana v Auditor-General dis-
cussed in last year’s report, the Auditor-Gen-
eral, in November, issued for the first time 
in the history of the Constitution a report 
in which he disallowed unjustified charges 
on public accounts and surcharged the pub-
lic officers involved. It will be recalled that 
the Supreme Court acceded to Occupygha-
na’s request to compel the Auditor-Gen-
eral to exercise his power to disallow such 
charges. The Auditor-General had, since 
1993, detailed in every annual report sig-
nificant amounts of money lost to the state 
through the malice or negligence of public 
officers but had never sought to recover any 
of those sums.  The civil society group had 
argued that this was a breach of his constitu-
tional duty. The Auditor-General’s immedi-
ate compliance with the Court’s decision is 
most heartening constitutionally and useful 
financially. According to the Auditor-Gener-
al’s report, over fourteen million USD was 
saved or recovered in this first effort. As 
Occupyghana pointed out in its statement, 
however, the drive cannot be properly called 
completed until the Attorney-General takes 
steps to prosecute those officers whose acts 
amounted to criminal conduct.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASE
Republic v. Baffoe-Bonnie and Ors
(unreported; Decided 7 June 2018)
This far-reaching decision of the Supreme 
Court has yet to draw the attention it de-
serves. The Court clarified the meaning of 
Article 19(2) (e) and (g) of the 1992 Con-
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stitution, which grant an accused person 
the right to “adequate time and facilities” to 
prepare his defence, and the facilities to call 
and examine all necessary witnesses. It held 
that an accused person facing a summary 
trial was entitled to full pretrial disclosures, 
including all documents and evidence the 
prosecution had in its possession as well as 
those that the prosecution did not intend to 
rely on. The only limitation the Court put 
on these rights was in instances such as for 
witness protection, police intelligence pro-
tection, public interest and national security. 
However, the Court hastened to add that the 
state’s determination of these matters was 
not incontestable, and a court could review 
and override such decisions in appropriate 
cases. The practice until this case was for 
the state to only furnish the defence with the 
evidence in its possession in trials on indict-
ment. Since, as the Court noted, the majority 
of criminal trials are actually summary trials, 
the state has wielded an unhealthy and unfair 
surprise power in most criminal trials. 
This decision does much to engrave fair trial 
rules into the ethos of a country with a long 
history of unfettered executive power. The 
practice this decision ends predates this Con-
stitution and its two immediate predecessors 
and is therefore deeply ingrained. It is most 
heartening to see it abolished. The Court 
must be commended also for preventing the 
state from using what is an unquestionably 
reasonable limitation on a right to defeat that 
right by retaining unto the courts the power 
to determine finally when disclosure ought 
not to be made. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Government has begun the largest compul-
sory acquisition of real property thus far 
endeavoured under the 1992 Constitution: 
a 13,000-acre parcel of land at Afienya. De-
parting from previous regimes on the mat-
ter, the 1992 Constitution mandates “prompt 
payment of fair and adequate compensation” 
for property compulsorily acquired. Such 
a large acquisition will no doubt be very 
costly. All eyes will be on the government 
to see if it will abide by the constitutional 
provisions willingly or whether the Court’s 
assistance will be required to leave behind 
the dark days of the state seizing property 
without payment 
Chief Justice Akuffo will retire in 2019 and 
Ghana will once again be looking for a chief 
justice.
Meanwhile, the legal community will be 
eagerly awaiting the Supreme Court’s judg-
ment in the National Cathedral case, in 
which some citizens are contesting the con-
stitutionality of the president’s proclaimed 
project: the building of a 5,000-seat na-
tional cathedral. It triggers some unease in 
scholars of constitutionalism that the sitting 
President—himself a lawyer and former at-
torney-general—had no hesitation about the 
constitutional compatibility of the project, 
such as singling out his religion for state en-
dorsement under a constitution forbidding 
discrimination and guaranteeing equal reli-
gious rights. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Reflection on the constitutional develop-
ments in Greece during 2018 is closely in-
terrelated to the anticipation of what 2019 
will bring. The initiation of the revision pro-
cess marks 2018. Throughout the financial 
crisis, the Constitution was at the heart of 
public constitutional dialogue, malfunctions 
surfaced under the stress, and yet no formal 
changes were made. The amending formula 
demands an exceptional degree of consen-
sus and provides for a five-year mandatory 
time lapse between the completion of one 
revision process and the initiation of a new 
one. Many factors shall determine whether 
this revision process shall be concluded, and 
if so whether it shall be a limited corrective 
intervention or long-discussed issues shall 
also be addressed. 
At the moment, a heated dialogue on the in-
terpretation of formal amendment rules with 
regard to whether and how the decision of 
the first Parliament is binding upon the sec-
ond, which is mandated to amend the Con-
stitution following the intervening general 
elections, is characteristic of the political cli-
mate. Jurisprudence is faced with the reper-
cussions of the financial and  refugee crises. 
The Council of State (Supreme Administra-
tive Court) is still trying to tackle the consti-
tutionality of salary and pension cuts. Setting 
precedent for future decisions, rulings with 
retroactive effect may add strain on the state 
budget. A second line of decisions deals with 
the rights of refugees. The refugee crisis 
challenges pre-conceptions of the rule of law 
guarantees in multiple ways. Lastly, a ruling 
of the Council of State, according to which 
the Constitution dictates that religious edu-
cation in primary and secondary education 
must be an indoctrination in the Orthodox 
Christian dogma, is a reminder that the fight 
for rights is a never-ending project. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Ever since the financial crisis erupted, many 
calls for constitutional reforms were made 
from all political parties. Still, although the 
consensus that changes must be made exist-
ed, there was little agreement with regard to 
their content. The Constitution underwent 
important informal change, and yet, even af-
ter a formal revision was procedurally possi-
ble in 2013, a long time of inertia followed. 
In March 2017, a “dialogue committee on the 
constitutional reform” launched an electron-
ic deliberation process attempting to involve 
the citizens, who were invited to complete 
multiple-choice questionnaires and/or make 
amendment proposals. This process, which 
was not provided for by the Constitution, did 
not become central in political life, nor is it 
clear whether and how it shall impact the re-
vision process. The initiation in November 
of the long-awaited constitutional revision 
process marks 2018. Nonetheless, it is far 
from certain that it shall be successfully con-
cluded. The ratio of the amending formula, 
which is expressed through the way the re-
quired majorities are laid down, demands a 
degree of consensus which is very difficult 
to reach within a polarized political system. 
Article 110, para. 2-6 of the Greek Consti-
tution sets out very strict procedural limits.
Constitutional revision takes place in two 
phases, between which general elections are 
held. The amending process has no influence 
over the timing of general elections. During 
the first phase, the need for a constitutional 
revision is ascertained by resolution of Par-
liament, adopted following the proposal of 
GREECE
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at least one-sixth of the members of Parlia-
ment either by a three-fifths majority or by 
an absolute majority of its members in two 
ballots, held at least one month apart. This 
resolution defines specifically the provisions 
subject to revision. During the second phase, 
the next Parliament amends the provisions 
that are to be revised. In case a proposal for 
amendment of the Constitution receives the 
absolute majority of the votes of the total 
number of members but not the three-fifths 
majority, the next Parliament shall proceed 
with the revision of the proposed provisions 
by a three-fifths majority of the total number 
of its members, and vice versa. Revision of 
the Constitution is not permitted before the 
lapse of five years from the completion of 
a previous revision.1 Several eternity clauses 
exist excluding from revision (among other 
material limits) the provisions defining the 
form of government. 
The ruling SYRIZA party proposal puts 
forth four axes targeting the architecture of 
the form of government, the relationship be-
tween state and church, the enhancement of 
popular participation through referenda and 
the enhancement of social rights protection. 
Of crucial importance is that proposals do not 
include certain provisions whose change is 
considered a priority by the center-right op-
position party, which according to polls will 
probably win the intervening elections. For 
example, a much-contested provision estab-
lishes a ban of private universities, triggering 
tensions with EU law. The largest opposition 
party has issued its own proposals, which 
includes numerous articles and has different 
DLPVWKDQWKHSURSRVDOVE\6<5,=$:KHUH
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Formal amendment rules are the basic deter-
minant. As a rule, the first Parliament avoids 
giving proposals a supermajority, since this 
would give carte blanche to the second Par-
liament, and therefore to a different political 
landscape. It is thus not coincidental that the 
opposition party would prefer that a wide 
range of articles would be proposed for re-
vision (preferably voted on by an enhanced 
majority). By contrast, SYRIZA, which will 
probably be the opposition in the Revision 
Parliament, insists that the decision of the 
first Parliament is binding upon the second 
not only with regard to the provisions to be 
revised but also with regard to the content of 
the future amendment.
The mandatory time lapse is also an important 
factor. If the second Parliament reaches con-
sensus only on very few articles, this excludes 
from change the rest of the provisions for the 
next 10 years. This can be used as a strategy: 
in case the basic aim of a political party is to 
shield certain articles from future revision, it 
may deliberately try to put forth a mini-revi-
sion in order to exploit the mandatory time 
lapse. The revision process is in this case used 
(or manipulated) in order not to effect change 
but adversely to fetter change. 
An interesting aspect is that in parallel with 
the discussion on the substance of the pro-
posed amendments, a debate on the extent to 
which the first Parliament can bind the sec-
ond Parliament is ongoing, centered around 
the interpretation of the formal amendment 
rules, and more precisely how binding the 
decision of the first Parliament is upon the 
second. The landscape is not clear. As there 
has never been a case of a court annulling a 
constitutional amendment deemed unconsti-
tutional, the only existing precedent is one 
thought expressed in Judgment no. 11/2003 
of  the Supreme Special Court.2 According to 
this isolated thought, in view of the limits of 
judicial review of the constitutional revision 
process, the direction towards which a pro-
vision was to be amended was not binding 
because it was not included in the final deci-
sion of the Parliament following the two par-
liamentary votes provided for in Article 110, 
para. 2 of the Constitution. According to the 
Court, in the contested decision of the Par-
liament, the constitutional provisions to be 
revised were only enumerated without any 
limitation with regard to their content. This 
thought seems to imply two things: firstly, 
that the courts have competence to review 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments 
and secondly, that in case the decision of the 
first Parliament includes the direction to-
wards which a specific provision should be 
amended, this direction is binding and there-
fore reviewable. 
This discussion on procedure betrays the deep 
divide between the political parties in a climate 
of deep polarization. Revision becomes a pow-
er game instead of the envisaged consensual 
procedure. Scenarios include the possibilities 
that the second Parliament does not conclude 
the procedure, opting to initiate a new one, or 
that a minimal revision takes place, amend-
ing the few articles where consensus can be 
reached, which would freeze the rest of the 
amendments for another decade. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Decision 431/2018 Council of State (Plena-
ry Session): retroactivity and salary cuts
Decision 431/2018 of the Council of State 
ruled that provisions introducing retroactive 
salary reductions of National Health System 
doctors were in violation of the Constitution. 
According to the Court, such reductions vi-
olate Article 21 (3) GrConst, according to 
which the State must take care for the health 
of citizens, of the principle of a special wage 
regime for doctors serving in the NHS, and 
the principles of proportionality and equal-
ity in public burdens. Doctors who work in 
the NHS are subject to a special regime and 
special conditions compared with other civil 
servants, since they start working at an old-
er age and have exclusive employment. The 
State has the obligation to provide a special 
wage regime for NHS doctors as well as the 
obligation to provide high standard health 
care for citizens, for which NHS doctors are 
responsible. The extend of wage cuts brings 
about a reversal of the current wage regime 
and cannot be effected without prior assess-
ment of the financial benefit in relation to the 
impact that this reduction will have on the op-
eration of the National Health System and in 
particular without assessing if the reduction is 
necessary, or could be achieved through other 
1 See Xenophon Contiades and Alkmene Fotiadou ‘Models of Constitutional Change’, in  Xenophon Contiades (ed.), ,UNPULLYPUN*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*OHUNL
(*VTWHYH[P]L7LYZWLJ[P]LVU,\YVWL*HUHKHHUK[OL<:( (Routledge, 2013) 417.
2 Judgment no. 11/2003, the Supreme Special Court, Thought 6. 
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measures that have a similarly effective result 
burdening less the medical staff. Due to the 
severe financial crisis and budgetary prob-
lems faced by the Greek State, this decision is 
applicable only to the plaintiffs and to hospital 
doctors who have already brought their cases 
before the courts. Retroactive remuneration 
and the return to salary status before August 
1, 2012, applies only to them. For all other 
doctors of the NHS, salaries shall be adjusted 
for the future. 
This is an important precedent with regard 
to future decisions pending before the Coun-
cil of State and other courts with regard to 
salary and pension cuts and the issue of 
retroactivity. Underlying it is an important 
question with regard to the extent to which 
the judiciary should intervene in state bud-
getary policy. As Greece is still facing a fi-
nancial crisis, such decisions have a poten-
tially immense impact on the State budget. 
On the other hand, in case the State does not 
abide by court decisions, rule of law issues 
are raised. Such constitutional dilemmas are 
interrelated with the role of the judiciary and 
are quite difficult to address. Having entered 
a more “mature” era of crisis litigation, the 
courts show less self-restraint, yet the degree 
in which they should interfere with budget-
ary issues, striking down law as unconstitu-
tional, is contested. 
2. Decision 1694/18 Council of State (Plenary 
Session – pilot judgment): granting asylum to 
Turkish officers 
The story of the eight Turkish military of-
ficers who had fled to Greece seeking asy-
lum after the July 2016 failed coup is still 
unfolding. In 2017, the Court of Cassation 
(Areios Pagos) had turned down an extra-
dition request by Turkey, concluding that a 
fair trial and the protection of fundamental 
human rights could not be guaranteed there. 
In Decision 1694/18, the Council of State 
rejected the petition made by Greece’s mi-
gration minister to rescind the asylum that 
had already been granted to Suleyman Oz-
kaynakci.
The rationale of this decision is also applica-
ble to the other seven officers, since this was 
a pilot judgment. In its decision, the Plenary 
Session of the Supreme Court of Cassation 
invoked the Geneva Convention, according 
to which to establish a legitimate fear of be-
ing persecuted for his political beliefs, it is 
not necessary for the applicant to express 
those beliefs; it suffices that the persecutor, 
in this case Turkey, holds the applicant re-
sponsible for such beliefs. According to the 
Court, it was not proved that the officer in 
question participated in the coup of July 15, 
2016, nor that he belonged to the movement 
to which the Turkish Government attributes 
the organization of the coup. The officer is 
therefore eligible to receive travel docu-
ments. According to the Court, the contested 
decision of the Asylum Committee, which 
had granted asylum to the Turkish officer 
was sufficiently justified, as there exists a 
causal link between the fear of persecution 
of the officer, in his country of origin and the 
beliefs attributed to him there.
Following this decision, the ruling Turkish 
party spokesman tweeted that it is “Crystal 
clear that Greek judiciary sided with Tur-
key’s enemies and coup plotters with this de-
cree. This is much more serious and shame-
ful than supporting terrorism.”3 The courts 
in this developing situation are challenged to 
uphold the rule of law guarantees regardless 
of repercussions. 
3. Decision 805/2018 Council of the State: on 
the restriction of movement of refugees
The Council of State annulled the Decision 
of the Director of the Asylum Service impos-
ing restrictions on the free movement within 
Greece to applicants for international protec-
tion entering the Greek islands after the date 
of the publication of the judgment.4
According to the Court, the disputed restric-
tion on free movement by the Greek State 
is not prohibited by the Constitution or by 
other supra-constitutional laws; however, 
the restrictive measures must be justified by 
specific reasons. This restriction results in 
the concentration of refugees in specific re-
gions, not allowing their distribution across 
the entire Greek territory, which excessively 
burdens those regions. Indeed, the islands of 
Lesbos, Samos, Chios, Leros, Rhodes, and 
Kos are expected—in the midst of the severe 
financial crisis—to manage the entry and 
accommodation of a significant number of 
persons applying for international protection 
using the existing infrastructure. This may 
lead to social upheavals, and creates public 
order problems in areas that are also tourist 
destinations.
The Court referred also to Article 31(2) of 
the Geneva Convention, which permits the 
imposition of only the necessary restrictions 
on applicants for international protection. 
The Court ruled that no serious and impera-
tive reasons of public interest and migration 
policy that could justify the imposition of re-
striction on the freedom of movement of ap-
plicants for international protection entering 
the Greek territory were established.
4. 470/2018 Council of State (Third Section): 
refugee child education
In an important decision, the Council of State 
had to face xenophobic populist activism 
triggered by the refugee crisis. Parents and 
parental associations sought the annulment 
of a decision by the Minister of Education 
on the designation of school units of the Pri-
mary and Secondary Education Departments 
of the Prefectures of Central Macedonia, 
Attica, and Sterea Ellada for the school year 
2016-2017, where the Reception Facilities 
for Refugee Education operate. The Court 
held that applicants lacked a legitimate in-
terest as they invoked only their status as 
residents of the district of the schools where 
the impugned decision was enforceable and 
because the application of the decision with 
regard to the education of refugee children 
does not affect them. 
The Court stressed that the Greek State, tak-
ing into account the 2016 report of the Sci-
entific Committee to assist the work of the 
Committee for the Support of Children of 
3 http://www.ekathimerini.com/231922/article/ekathimerini/news/turkish-ruling-party-lashes-out-at-greek-judiciary, accessed on 5 February 2019
4 https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/case-law/greece-council-state-fourth-section-decision-8052018-17-april-2018s, accessed on 7 February 2019
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Refugees, considered that the optimal solu-
tion for the education of refugee children 
at the present stage is the establishment of 
special facilities aimed at the smooth inte-
gration of refugee children in Greek schools. 
Thus, existing structures were not used, nor 
was the direct integration of these children 
into the Greek schools opted for because the 
children’s emotional and psychological con-
ditions, after their many months of suffering 
and war experience, created difficulties to 
their integration in a new social environ-
ment. For these reasons, the Greek State, 
through the Ministry of Education, created 
educational programs that ran in the after-
noon hours in existing schools, where the 
children of the applicants go earlier in the 
day. Refugee children could then learn the 
Greek language in a school environment and 
in classes made for them that also conveyed 
a feeling of normal school life, with the ul-
timate aim being their smooth reintegration 
into the scholastic social environment. The 
choice of the school units hosting the re-
ception classes had taken into account both 
the number of children and the availability 
of rooms, and also the precondition that the 
vaccination program for these children had 
been followed.
It is clear that courts can play a distinct role 
in handling the delicate side effects of the 
refugee crisis by maintaining a firm stance 
in matters of human rights protection. 
5. 660/2018 Council of the State (Plenary 
Section): religious education in schools
The Church and State relationship in Greece 
is not an easy one. Greece has been convict-
ed several times by the European Court of 
Human Rights for violations of freedom of 
religion. The Constitution refers to the pre-
vailing religion of Greece—which leaves the 
door open to interpreting Article 16, which 
renders the State responsible for the “devel-
opment of religious conscience,” to dictate 
that religious education in schools should 
take the form of indoctrination. Over the 
years, a discussion about amending the Con-
stitution to rule out the possibility of such in-
terpretation has been ongoing; still, the nec-
essary consensus does not seem to exist. The 
following decision is characteristic of this 
type of interpretive approach. The Plenary of 
the Council of State (with a minority of five 
members out of 17) found unconstitutional 
the decision of the Minister of Education 
with regard to religious education in Primary 
and Middle Schools. According to the major-
ity opinion, the contested decision violates: 
(a) the provision of Article 16 (2) Gr-
Const, because the curriculum distorted 
the purpose of religious education set by 
this provision, which is to develop the 
orthodox Christian conscience of the 
students belonging to the prevailing re-
ligion of the Eastern Orthodox Church;
(b) the provision of Article 13 (1) Gr-
Const, which enshrines the freedom of 
religious conscience; [According to the 
Court, the curriculum encouraging pu-
pils (ages 8 to 15) to reflect on religious 
matters may unsettle faith in the ortho-
dox Christian religion, formed by the 
students in the context of their family 
environment before they began school. 
This constitutes proselytism, as it could 
interfere with students from orthodox 
Christian conscience.] 
(c) the provision of Article 2 of the 
ECHR, because it violates the right of 
Orthodox Christian parents to ensure the 
education and training of their children 
in accordance with their own religious 
beliefs; and 
(d) the constitutionally guaranteed au-
thority (Article 4 (1) S) and Article 14 
(in conjunction with Article 9) of the 
ECHR, since it deprives students of the 
Orthodox Christian doctrine of the right 
to be taught exclusively the doctrines, 
moral values, and traditions of the East-
ern Orthodox Church, whereas the leg-
islation provides that Roman Catholic, 
Jewish, and Muslim students may be 
taught exclusively the doctrines of their 
faith by teachers proposed by their own 
religious community.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In May 2019, municipal elections and elec-
tions for the European Parliament will be 
held while general elections will also take 
place within 2019, as dictated by the Con-
stitution. This will bring about alterations 
in the political landscape. It is in this con-
text that the revision process shall continue, 
since the new Parliament will be a revision 
Parliament. So far, the revision process is in 
the first stages, and there seems to be a con-
vergence between the two major parties on 
6 points: 
(a) Article 96, which renders the guar-
antees of judicial independence for the 
military courts the same as those in 
place for ordinary courts,
(b) Article 32, amending the President 
of the Republic election process and 
abolishing the possibility of  early dis-
solution of the Parliament, 
(c) Article 54, which provides for the 
election of up to five MPs by Greek em-
igrants,
(d) Article 86 on the liability of min-
isters abolishing the limitation period 
within which prosecution is allowed, 
(e) Article 62 on parliamentary immu-
nity limiting the scope of protection to 
offenses directly related to the exercise 
of parliamentary duties, and 
(f) Article 101A on the election of mem-
bers of Independent Authorities.
Does this suffice for reaching the wider con-
VHQVXVUHTXLUHGIRUDUHYLVLRQ",W LVKDUG WR
tell how the process will unfold. Given the 
stringency of the amending formula, if dis-
agreement results in a limited revision in 
scale, the possibility of formally changing 
other constitutional provisions will be post-
poned for a long time.
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The 2017 report on Guatemala highlighted 
the role of the International Commission 
Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) 
and the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
in moving towards greater accountability of 
those holding power. However, this report 
shows how 2018 was marked by the backlash 
against the CICIG and Constitutional Court 
by Guatemala’s Executive. Part II shows 
how the President of Guatemala launched a 
series of political and legal attacks against the 
CICIG and Constitutional Court, including 
denouncing the treaty that created the CICIG 
and launching impeachment proceedings 
against the judges of the Constitutional Court 
for their “unconstitutional” judgments that 
sought to limit the Executive’s powers to act 
against the CICIG. These actions provoked 
a constitutional crisis that is still unresolved. 
Moving away from the year’s relevant 
constitutional events, Part III discusses three 
of the most important constitutional cases 
of the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
since its establishment in 1986. In the first 
case, the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional an attempted self-coup in 
1993 in which the then-President attempted, 
through emergency powers, to dissolve the 
Congress and Courts. The second case regards 
how in 2003 the Constitutional Court failed to 
apply the constitutional prohibition on people 
who have led a coup running for election 
to the presidency, allowing dictator Efraín 
Rios Montt to run for president even though 
previous judgments of the Constitutional 
Court and Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights had forbidden him from 
doing so. The third and last case this report 
reviews is the introduction of the doctrine 
of the “Constitutional Block” (Bloque de 
Constitucionalidad), which marked a new 
era for the litigation and promotion of human 
rights in Guatemala. Finally, Part IV looks 
ahead to future events in the country, such 
as the presidential and congressional general 
elections in October 2019 and the election of 
judges to the Supreme Court of Guatemala.  
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
This part details the backlash against the 
CICIG and the Constitutional Court by 
the Guatemalan Executive. The CICIG is 
an independent body created by a treaty 
between Guatemala and the UN.2 It is 
led by a commissioner appointed by the 
UN Secretary-General, with a mandate to 
investigate and prosecute corruption.3 As 
discussed in last year’s report, in August 
2017, the Constitutional Court declared 
unconstitutional the Executive’s decision 
to declare the CICIG Commissioner “non-
grata” and deport him. Following this, the 
President announced his decision to revise 
the treaty creating the CICIG.4
1 We would like to thank Anna Dziedzic for her fantastic edits and comments in the realization of this report
2 Carlos Arturo Villagrán Sandoval, ‘Guatemala: The State of Liberal Democracy,’ eds. Richard Albert, et al, 
.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy, 2018) 126.
3,4 Ibid. 
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On 1 February 2018, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs met with the UN Secretary-
General to discuss the CICIG’s mandate.5
The Guatemalan Government accused 
the CICIG of exceeding its mandate, 
violating the human rights of the people it 
investigated, and threatening the judicial 
system.6 The UN Secretary-General’s 
response to these accusations came on 
23 May 2018 at the Debate Marking 
15th Anniversary of Adoption of United 
Nations Convention Against Corruption, 
held in New York. The Secretary-General 
stated: “There are several ways the [UN] 
Organization can support Member States 
to combat corruption, from sharing good 
practices to supporting the capacity of 
national anti-corruption institutions. The 
International Commission against Impunity 
in Guatemala is a case in point”.7
After this response from the UN Secretary-
General, the Guatemalan Executive started 
lobbying strongly against the CICIG’s main 
financial donors: the United States and 
Sweden. The result came in early May 2018, 
when US Senator Marco Rubio delayed 
funding for the CICIG8 in the belief that it 
had been “manipulated and used by radical 
elements and Russia”.9 The second move 
came against the Swedish ambassador to 
Guatemala. On 11 May 2018, the Guatemalan 
government requested the removal of the 
Swedish ambassador, accusing him of 
interfering with domestic issues.10 The 
Swedish ambassador had announced a large 
donation to the CICIG in January 2018.11 In 
response, the Human Rights Ombudsman 
filed a constitutional injunction against the 
Executive proceeding with the removal. 
On 29 May 2018, the Constitutional Court 
granted the injunction on the grounds that the 
decision of the Ministry of Foreign Relations 
to remove the ambassador had violated 
principles of international law protected by 
the Guatemalan Constitution.12
On 31 August 2018, the Guatemalan 
President made public his decision not 
to renew the CICIG’s mandate, which 
expires in September 2019. On this day, the 
Government displayed its military force, 
which surrounded the CICIG’s compound 
and the US Embassy.13 On 14 September 
2018, the Government decided that it was in 
the “interests of the nation” that the CICIG 
Commissioner, Ivan Velásquez  should not 
be allowed back into the country.14 However, 
on 16 September 2018, the Constitutional 
Court declared the executive’s decision to 
forbid the CIGIC Commissioner entry to 
Guatemala unconstitutional.15 The following 
day the Ministers of Interior and Foreign 
Relations and Solicitor-General resisted the 
Constitutional Court’s ruling by demanding 
the UN Secretary-General to designate a 
new CICIG Commissioner.16  However, on 
19 September 2018, the Constitutional Court 
issued a clarification, requiring that the 
government permit Ivan Velásquez as CICIG 
Commissioner to re-enter the country.17
The government’s response to these rulings 
of the Constitutional Court came on 11 
October 2018, when it announced that the 
working visas of the CICIG’s personnel 
would not be extended. Between 21 and 27 
December 2018, the Constitutional Court 
delivered a series of judgments that ordered 
all government institutions to allow the re-
entry of the CICIG’s personnel.18 However, 
on 5 January 2019, CICIG personnel were 
detained in the airport by immigration 
officials, acting on direction from the 
executive. In response, the Constitutional 
Court issued an order making known that 
non-compliance with its rulings are criminal 
offences and public officials are liable to 
removal from office for non-compliance.19
On 7 January 2019, the Guatemalan Executive 
announced its decision to denounce the treaty 
that established the CICIG. The Executive 
claimed that the CICIG, in its 11 years of 
existence, had violated national sovereignty 
and the human rights of the people that it 
had investigated for corruption, and that 
the UN Secretary-General was ignoring the 
petitions of the Guatemalan Government. 
5 El Periódico, Ayuda de Memoria Reunión de Ministra de Relaciones Exteriores de la República de Guatemala con el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, 
1\L]LZKL-LIYLYVKLO[[WZ!KYP]LNVVNSLJVTÄSLKP.5T2> >[>2J@a]>=7:LP,@82_:]PL^
6 See: Carlos Arturo Villagrán Sandoval, Cancillería versus el sistema de justicia: Análisis de las críticas del Gobierno a la Cicig ante la ONU, Plaza Pública, https://
www.plazapublica.com.gt/content/cancilleria-versus-el-sistema-de-justicia-analisis-de-las-criticas-del-gobierno-la-cicig 
7 United Nations Secretary-General, Remarks at High-level Debate Marking 15th Anniversary of Adoption of United Nations Convention Against Corruption, https://
www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2018-05-23/15th-anniversary-adoption-un-convention-against-corruption-remarks 
8 Elisabeth Malkin, Guatemala Corruption Panel Has New Foe: U.S. Senator Marco Rubio, the 5L^@VYR;PTLZ, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/world/ameri-
cas/guatemala-corruption-marco-rubio.html 
95PUH3HROHUP*VYY\W[.\H[LTHSHUVɉJPHSZÄUKOLSWMYVTHU\USPRLS`ZV\YJL!4HYJV9\IPV;OL.\HYKPHU https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/17/gua-
temala-marco-rubio-corruption  
10 Reuters, Guatemala asks Sweden, Venezuela to remove ambassadors over ‘interference’, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-diplomacy/guatema-
la-asks-sweden-venezuela-to-remove-ambassadors-over-interference-idUSKBN1IC06Y 
11 Ibid. 
12 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expedientes Acumulados 2198-2018 y 2201-2018, 29 Mayo 2017, 7. 
13 Carlos Arturo Villagrán Sandoval and Héctor Oswaldo Samayoa Sosa, ‘Investigaciones de corrupción y disminución de la impunidad en delitos contra la admin-
istración del Estado y de la Justicia’ (Informe de situación en Guatemala) (2018) 150 9L]PZ[H(UmSPZPZKLSH9LHSPKHK5HJPVUHS 28, 37.
14 Ibid, 43.
15 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expediente 4207-2018, 16 Septiembre 2018.
16 Villagrán Sandoval and Samayoa, (n 13) 43.
17 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expediente 4207-2018, 19 Septiembre 2018.
18 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expediente 5443-2018, 21 Diciembre 2018.
19 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expediente 5346-2018, 6 Enero 2019.
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The UN Secretary-General strongly rejected 
the Government’s action against the 
CICIG.20 The Guatemalan Constitutional 
Court has accepted a constitutional amparo 
challenging the denouncing of the treaty 
and suspending its effects pending a final 
determination.21 On 12 January 2018, the 
CICIG Commissioner made public a letter 
addressed to the UN Secretary-General that 
rebuts all of the Government’s allegations.22
Today, CICIG personnel have left the country 
and its commissioner, Ivan Velásquez, is still 
not allowed back.
In a parallel move, the Executive and 
its supporters in Congress have sought 
to impeach judges of the Constitutional 
Court. On 9 January 2018, the Supreme 
Court of Guatemala resolved that there are 
grounds for impeaching the judges of the 
Constitutional Court on the basis that they 
exceeded their constitutional mandate in the 
Swedish ambassador case and the CICIG 
matters, unconstitutionally intruding on 
issues within the sole competence of the 
Executive, such as foreign relations.23 The 
judges face the prospect of impeachment in 
Congress, where the President’s party holds 
a majority. The impeachment attacks the core 
of judicial independence. These events are 
leading Guatemala towards a constitutional 
crisis, sparking public protests but with no 
clear resolution in sight. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The Guatemalan Constitution of 1965 
established a Constitutional Court that 
served as a non-permanent tribunal, 
convening only when necessary. This 
Court was composed of members of the 
Supreme Court. The model proved to have 
little success at hearing constitutional 
disputes, as it lacked independence from 
the Judicial Branch.24  This is why the new 
Constitution of 1986 created a permanent 
and independent Constitutional Court to be 
the highest court in constitutional matters. 
The Constitutional Court of Guatemala 
has played a pivotal role in the country as 
guardian of the constitutional order and as 
promoter and protector of human rights. It 
is because of the Court’s jurisprudence that 
international labor law standards, women’s 
rights, and indigenous people’s rights, 
among other relevant topics, have been 
able to progress in Guatemala. However, its 
history has not been without pitfalls. Among 
its landmark decisions, it is important to note 
the following three cases that have shaped 
Guatemala´s constitutional development.
Re-establishment of constitutional order after 
attempted self-coup
Jorge Serrano Elias was elected President 
of Guatemala in 1991, becoming the second 
President democratically elected under the 
current Constitution after a history of recurring 
authoritarian and military governments. The 
official party did not have high representation 
in the legislative branch and the alliances that 
were initially made in Congress did not last. 
This, coupled with public discontent due to 
rising living costs and poorly planned public 
policies, led to a difficult scenario for the 
President, who decided to take extreme and 
anti-democratic measures. In 1993, Serrano 
Elias attempted a self-coup. By a presidential 
decree under the name of “Temporary Rules 
of Government”, Elias suspended certain 
constitutional provisions that protected 
individual rights and ordered the dissolution 
of Congress to assume legislative powers 
himself. In addition, he ordered the removal 
of the Justices of the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court of Guatemala, to 
be able to unilaterally name new members 
of these courts. He also ordered the removal 
of the Attorney General and Ombudsman of 
Guatemala.
These measures were an evident rupture 
of Guatemala’s constitutional order and an 
authoritative move in order to expand his 
powers. The Constitutional Court played 
a pivotal role in the re-establishment of 
constitutional order. In an unprecedented 
manner,25 and risking their personal safety 
at the time,26 the Justices of the Court 
decided to review the decree on the same 
day that it was passed and declared that 
its provisions were unconstitutional.27 In 
this ruling, the Court determined that the 
order to dissolve Congress was contrary to 
the Constitution and that members of the 
judicial branch cannot be removed from 
their position during their tenure, except 
in the specific situations established by the 
law.28 Moreover, the President does not 
have the faculty to remove serving judges 
unilaterally, which rendered his decree 
unconstitutional, evidencing a breakdown of 
Guatemala’s constitutional order, which the 
Court could not let happen. It is important 
to note that the Court’s decision to act ex 
officio, which is not expressly allowed in 
the Constitution or laws of Guatemala, 
reflected the Court’s understanding of the 
gravity of the situation and its duty to act in 
an unequivocal and compelling manner in 
defense of the Constitution and Guatemala’s 
young democracy. There has been no other 
issue since that has forced the Court to act 
ex officio.  
20 UN News, Guatemala: UN anti-corruption body will continue working, as Constitutional Court blocks Government expulsion, https://news.un.org/en/sto-
ry/2019/01/1030142 
21 Corte de Constitucionalidad, Expedientes Acumulados 96-2019, 97-2019, 99-2019, 106-2019 y 107-2019, 09 Enero 2019.
22 UN News, UN anti-corruption body in Guatemala rebuts government’s reasons for expulsion order  https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1030372 
23 Los Angeles Times, Crisis builds in Guatemala as its legislature seeks to impeach judges, https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-guatemala-corruption-cri-
sis-20190110-story.html 
24 Adolfo Gonzalez Rodas, La Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala, https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/1/219/3.pdf, p. 20.
25 ElPeriódico, A 25 años del Serranazo, https://elperiodico.com.gt/opinion/2018/05/25/a-25-anos-del-serranazo/ 
26 Rodolfo Rohrmoser Valdeavellano, De cómo viví el Serranazo, XV Opus Magna Constitucional, 2018.
27 Prensa Libre, 1993: Guatemala retorna a la institucionalidad, https://www.prensalibre.com/hemeroteca/serrano-abandona-la-presidencia-de-guatemala/ 
28 Corte de Constitucionaldidad, Expediente 225-93, 25 May 1993.
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During the days that followed the Court’s 
ruling, Serrano Elías was still in power, but 
the strong social opposition to the attempted 
self-coup and the backing of Guatemala’s 
Army and economic sector allowed the 
Court’s decision to be enforced. On 31 May 
1993, the Minister of Defense addressed 
the nation to announce that following the 
Court’s ruling, President Elías had stepped 
down.29 This ruling has been analyzed and 
applauded at a domestic and regional level 
as the single most transcendent decision of 
Guatemala’s Constitutional Court. 
Acceptance of Rios Montt’s presidential can-
didacy despite constitutional prohibition
Efrain Rios Montt was a military leader, 
politician, and founder of the right-wing 
Frente Republicano Guatemalteco party. 
After the 1982 coup that struck down the 
then-President Romeo Lucas Garcia, Rios 
Montt was proclaimed the new President of 
*XDWHPDOD :KHQ WKH FXUUHQW &RQVWLWXWLRQ
was passed in 1985, it established different 
prohibitions to run for President to prevent 
a return to authoritarian governments 
and anti-democratic events. Among these 
prohibitions, Article 186 of the Constitution 
provides that no former leader of a coup 
d’etat or anyone who has “significantly 
altered the constitutional order” of the 
country by a similar movement can be 
a presidential candidate.30 Given this 
prohibition, when Efraín Rios Montt decided 
to run for President31 in the 2003 elections, 
his candidacy was denied by the Guatemalan 
electoral authorities. 
Ríos Montt filed a writ of amparo to have this 
decision reviewed. The Supreme Court of 
Guatemala upheld the denial of his candidacy 
due to the constitutional prohibition. This 
ruling caused much unrest among Rios 
Montt’s followers and on 24 July 2003, 
party leaders and members led a massive 
protest, which turned violent and resulted 
in the unfortunate death of reporter Hector 
Ramirez. A week later, the Constitutional 
Court, on appeal, overturned the Supreme 
Court’s decision, allowing Rios Montt to 
run for the presidency. In its judgment, the 
Court recognized that it is publicly known 
that Rios Montt assumed the presidency of 
Guatemala after the coup that overthrew 
President Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1982. 
However, the Court centered its analysis 
on determining whether the constitutional 
prohibition that would apply in Rios Montt’s 
case would produce retroactive effects, given 
that the facts that caused him to be barred 
from being a presidential candidate happened 
before the Constitution was passed in 1985. 
The Court acknowledged the constitutional 
history of Guatemala and the authoritarian 
governments and events that led Constitution-
makers to include such a prohibition, but 
it also cited Article 15 of the Constitution, 
which establishes that the law shall not have 
retroactive effects. The majority of the Court 
concluded that constitutional norms were 
made to have effect only in the future, and 
so applied only to events that occurred after 
1985, when the Constitution was passed. 
Thus, Article 186(a) could not be applied 
to Rios Montt’s presidential candidacy, as 
this would mean that it has unconstitutional 
retroactive effects.32 The Court’s decision 
that Rios Montt should be allowed to run for 
the presidency was contrary to a previous 
ruling33 by the Constitutional Court that had 
determined that he could not run for President 
in the 1990 elections and was contrary to 
the interpretation of this issue by the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights.34
The decision was very polarizing. The 
Court’s resolution was not unanimous as 
three of the seven members of the Court 
presented dissenting votes. This became 
relevant in 2006, when a petition to annul 
the ruling was presented to new members 
of the Constitutional Court. It is important 
to note that the Guatemalan legal system 
does not contemplate any proceeding by 
which a citizen, who was not a party in 
the original case, can ask a Court to annul 
a ruling after it has been decided and duly 
executed. However, the Court indicated, in a 
far-reaching interpretation of the principle of 
pro actione, that a citizen should be allowed 
to seek access to constitutional justice, even 
through procedures that are not expressly 
established in the Constitution or applicable 
law. Thus, the Court proceeded to analyze 
the petition and determined that the Court’s 
ruling on the presidential candidacy of Rios 
Montt was wrongly decided, not only because 
the textual interpretation of the constitutional 
prohibition was inadequate but also because 
the decision failed to adhere to precedents 
in other cases on retroactive application. 
Consequently, the Court declared that the 
ruling should have no jurisprudential effect. 
This resolution constitutes the only one of 
its kind in the history of the Guatemalan 
Constitutional Court.
Recognition of the “Constitutional Block”
In 1985, Guatemalan Constitution-makers 
established two articles to give wide 
recognition to human rights. Article 44 
provides that the rights expressly established 
in the Constitution do not exclude other 
rights that are inherent to human beings. 
Article 46 indicates that International Human 
Rights Treaties have a special place in the 
hierarchy of legal norms, prevailing over 
“internal law”. This provision represents a 
clear intention of give special prominence 
to International Human Rights Law, a 
shared characteristic among many other 
Latin American Constitutions. However, its 
meaning has been subject to much academic 
debate over the years, and the Guatemalan 
Constitutional Court, in many of its rulings 
since the 1990s, has interpreted the phrase 
29 Midori Papadópolo, Del 25 de Mayo hasta las reformas a la Constitución, http://biblio3.url.edu.gt/Publi/Libros/2013/papadopolioo.pdf, 4. 
30 Constitution of Guatemala, article 186.
31 See: ElPeriódico, Efraín Ríos Montt: una historia controversial y polémica, https://elperiodico.com.gt/nacion/2018/04/02/efrain-rios-montt-una-historia-controver-
sial-y-polemica/
32 La Nacion, Efraín Ríos Montt ya es candidato, https://www.nacion.com/el-mundo/efrain-rios-montt-ya-es-candidato/2MXJLHTHAND5FN6NDQ76JEYKB4/story/ 
33 Corte de Constitucionalidad, expediente 280-90, 19 Octubre 1990.
34 Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Informe No. 30/93-Caso 10.804 Guatemala, 12 Octubre 1993.
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“shall prevail over internal law” to mean 
that Human Rights Treaties are superior to 
ordinary Guatemalan legislation, but inferior 
to the Constitution.35
The doctrine of the Constitutionality 
Block, which originated in Europe, gained 
importance among academics in the Latin 
American region and slowly obtained 
recognition among courts in some countries, 
including Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
and Peru.36 This, coupled with the strong 
influence of the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’ jurisprudence, made way in 
2012 for the Guatemalan Constitutional Court 
to recognize the doctrine of the Constitutional 
Block, and thus to overturn its original 
interpretation of Article 46. Up to this point, 
the Court had held that since Human Rights 
Treaties were inferior to the Constitution, 
they could not be used as a parameter to 
determine the validity of ordinary legislation. 
In other words, inconsistency with a Human 
Rights Treaty was not a ground to strike 
down a law. In this leading case,37 the Court 
overturned this previous interpretation and 
acknowledged that Human Rights Treaties 
should be at the same hierarchical level 
as the Constitution. Consequently, they 
should also be a constitutional parameter 
for judicial review. The case that allowed 
for this recognition involved the review of a 
legislative omission in the Guatemalan penal 
code in which the article establishing the 
crime of torture omitted certain important 
elements mandated by treaties ratified by 
Guatemala, notably the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the 
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture. This decision was innovative 
from a procedural perspective as well, since 
it was the first ruling in which the Court 
decided that it was feasible to review not only 
norms passed by Congress but also legislative 
omissions.
In its decision, the Constitutional Court 
determined the extent of the Constitutional 
Block that allows for incorporation into 
the Constitution those international norms 
that refer to human rights, even when the 
rights and liberties guaranteed by them do 
not figure expressly in the Constitution. 
This interpretation is based on the 
acknowledgment of the difference between 
a formal Constitution, limited to what is 
expressly written in the text, and a material 
Constitution, encompassing other rights and 
liberties that seek to protect human dignity 
and place individuals at the Constitution’s 
center and reason of being. Moreover, this 
ruling established that the Constitutional 
Court of Guatemala, as the highest tribunal 
in constitutional matters, is competent to 
determine the international instruments that 
are part of the Constitutional Block.
By recognizing the Constitutionality Block, 
the Constitutional Court of Guatemala made 
way for a new era in its jurisprudence, 
allowing for rigorous conventionality control 
and a broader protection of human rights 
through international law standards.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The tension between the Guatemalan 
Government, the CICIG, and the 
Constitutional Court of Guatemala is set 
to continue in the near future. Despite the 
Court’s recent ruling, which stated that the 
Commission must be allowed to end its 
mandate without Government interference, 
CICIG officials have left the country, and 
the Commission will surely be limited 
in its work until the termination of the 
agreement between Guatemala and the 
UN. The Constitutional Court will face 
different challenges. Five judges are facing 
impeachment charges in Congress. The 
Court will need to strengthen institutionally 
in the face of a highly divided society. The 
enforcement of its decisions is proving to be 
another important challenge for the Court at 
the hands of a government with authoritarian 
tendencies that places the obtainment of its 
objectives over the respect and promotion of 
the rule of law. 
2019 is an election year in Guatemala. 
Citizens will elect the next President, 
municipal authorities, and members of 
Congress. The outlook is grim in regards 
to a true renovation of the political elite 
in Guatemala that can allow for a process 
of transformation in governance and the 
eradication of corruption. The Constitutional 
Court will have to be prepared to hear cases 
regarding electoral issues. One such issue will 
be whether members of Congress who have 
switched political parties will be able to run 
for re-election, as a reform to the legislative 
branch’s laws resulted in the prohibition of 
transferring to different parties. Party hopping 
has been a strategy used to advance personal 
and political objectives and had become a 
systemic issue among members of Congress 
who seek to align with the party that best 
serves them at any one moment, without 
regard for the party’s ideology or stance on 
important issues. Another issue that may come 
before the Court concerns the candidacy of 
Zury Rios, daughter of former General Rios 
Montt. Rios will seek the presidency through 
a newly established conservative party that 
aligns with the same values and ideology that 
her father’s Frente Republicano Guatemalteco 
once did. However, she is also subject to a 
constitutional prohibition, as Article 186(c) 
establishes that close relatives of people in 
her father’s situation may not be presidential 
candidates either. 
From a procedural point of view, the Court 
will seek to continue recent efforts to control 
the rising number of writs of amparo that 
come before it by strengthening its procedural 
requirements. Many of these actions are filed 
in an attempt to delay the underlying issues, 
and the Court cannot formally dismiss cases 
35 Corte de Constitucionalidad, expediente 280-90, 19 octubre 1990; Corte de Constitucionalidad, expediente 199-95, 18 mayo 1995; Corte de Constitucionalidad, 
expediente 334-95, 26 marzo 1996.
36 Manuel Eduardo Góngora Mera, La difusión del Bloque de Constitucionalidad en la Jurisprudencia Latinoamericana y su Potencial en la Construcción del 
Ius Constitutionale Commune Latinoamericano, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r31277.pdf, p.303.
37 Corte de Constitucionalidad, expediente 1822-2011, 17 Julio 2012.
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that it deems unworthy of an analysis on the 
merits. Thus, by applying criteria reiterated 
in previous cases, it will continue to seek to 
decongest the extremely heavy load of issues 
that come before it.
V. FURTHER READING
Villagrán Sandoval, Carlos Arturo, and Héctor 
Oswaldo Samayoa Sosa, “Investigaciones de 
corrupción y disminución de la impunidad en 
delitos contra la administración del Estado 
y de la Justicia” (Informe de situación en 
Guatemala) (2018) 150 Revista Análisis de 
la Realidad Nacional, 28.
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region 
of the People’s Republic of China governed 
under a Basic Law adopted pursuant to the 
Chinese Constitution. In this report, we will 
report on developments in three main areas: 
1) the constitutional relationship between 
China and Hong Kong; 2) sexual minority 
rights; and 3) political rights.
II. Major Constitutional Developments: 
Constitutional relationship between Central 
Authorities and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region
Two events in 2018 had important 
implications on the constitutional relationship 
between the Central Authorities and Hong 
Kong. One concerned the application of 
Chinese laws and jurisdiction in Hong Kong 
and the way the Central Authorities may 
issue binding decisions on the territory. 
The other concerns the disqualification of 
candidates or legislators for their inability 
(actual or perceived) to observe the ritual of 
oath-taking. In both cases the matter found 
its way to the courts.
The first event concerned the co-location 
of immigration, customs and quarantine 
clearance facilities of both Hong Kong and 
Mainland China at a newly built train station 
in Hong Kong. 
The train station and the associated railway 
were constructed to connect Hong Kong with 
China’s high-speed rail network.1 The Hong 
Kong Government announced in 2017 the 
implementation of a co-location arrangement 
that would deploy Mainland Chinese officers 
at a “Mainland Port Area” of the Hong Kong 
station to conduct clearance procedures for 
passengers in accordance with Mainland 
Chinese laws.2   
This ignited an intense debate in Hong 
Kong on the validity of the co-location 
arrangement, not least because the Basic 
Law states that Chinese laws shall not 
apply to Hong Kong except for those listed 
in Annex III of the Basic Law (the latter to 
be limited to defence, foreign affairs and 
other matters outside of the autonomy of 
Hong Kong 3  On 18 November 2017, Hong 
Kong’s Chief Executive and the Governor 
of Guangdong Province signed the Co-
operation Arrangement for implementing the 
1 Information Service Department, ‘10 projects to boost economy, add jobs’ (10 October 2007) 
(at: https://www.news.gov.hk/isd/ebulletin/en/category/infrastructureandlogistics/071010/htm-
l/071010en06002.htm) (last accessed on 26 February 2019).
2 See Department of Justice, Transport and Housing Bureau and Security Bureau of the HKSAR 
Government, ‘Customs, Immigration and Quarantine Arrangements of the Hong Kong Section of the 
Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link’ (LC Paper No CB(2)1966/16-17(01)) (July 2017) 
(at: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr16-17/english/hc/papers/hccb2-1966-1-e.pdf) (last accessed on 26 
February 2019).
3-VYKPZJ\ZZPVUZZLL7@3Vº/VUN2VUN»Z<UPX\L¸*V3VJH[PVU¹(YYHUNLTLU[»0U[»S1*VUZ[3
Blog, Oct. 17, 2017 (at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/10/hong-kongs-unique-co-location-ar-
rangement) (last accessed on 26 February 2019); Lin Feng, ‘Constitutionality of the Co-Location Ar-
rangement at the West Kowloon High-Speed Rail Terminus’ (2017) 47 /231 499; Po Jen Yap and Jiang 
Zixin, ‘Co-Location is Constitutional’ (2018) 48 HKLJ 37.
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co-location arrangement.4 On 27 December 
2017, the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) adopted 
a decision to approve the Co-operation 
Arrangement. In June 2018, Hong Kong’s 
Legislative Council passed the implementing 
local legislation.
Section 6 of the Ordinance states: ‘‘(1) 
Except for reserved matters, the Mainland 
Port Area is to be regarded as an area 
lying outside Hong Kong but lying within 
the Mainland for the purposes of: (a) the 
application of the laws of the Mainland, 
and of the laws of Hong Kong, in the 
Mainland Port Area; and (b) the delineation 
of jurisdiction (including jurisdiction of the 
courts) over the Mainland Port Area; and (2) 
Sub-section (1) does not affect the boundary 
of the administrative division of the [Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region] …”.
Legal challenges against the Ordinance 
were lodged.5 Two of the applicants applied 
unsuccessfully to halt the commencement of 
the Ordinance.6 The co-location arrangement 
came into operation on 22 September 
2018. The hearing of the challenges came 
afterwards in October 2018. 
The Court of First Instance dismissed all 
these applications.7 Although the judge 
outlined the main arguments on why the 
Ordinance was inconsistent with Basic Law 
provisions, he ruled in favour of consistency 
without evaluating them, preferring to say 
that on a fair reading of the Basic Law and 
having regard to its context and purpose, it 
was open to the Hong Kong legislature to 
enact the Ordinance. He also considered the 
NPCSC’s Interpretation to be of conclusive 
weight, despite there being no specific 
basis in the Basic Law for the NPCSC to 
issue such a decision. Further, he refused to 
entertain arguments based on the doctrines 
of “basic structure” and “unconstitutional 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODPHQGPHQWV´:HVXJJHVWWKDW
this judgment failed in two respects. First, 
the judge “fails to notice the fundamental 
breach of Article 11 of the Basic Law … 
that no law enacted by the legislature of 
the HKSAR shall contravene [it], whose 
provisions form the basis of the systems and 
policies practised in [Hong Kong], including 
the system for safeguarding the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of its residents, the 
judicial system, and the relevant policies.”8
Second, he did not grapple with the Central 
Authorities’ de facto suspension of the 
operation of Basic Law provisions by the 
NPCSC decision purporting to endorse the 
co-location arrangement. The implication 
of this, when considered alongside the 
NPCSC’s final power of interpreting the 
Basic Law under Article 158 of the Basic 
Law, is that the Basic Law does not pose any 
constraints on the Central Authorities.9
The other controversy related to the 
disqualification of candidates and elected 
legislators who supported or did not 
dismiss the idea of Hong Kong becoming 
an independent state, or the idea of self-
determination, on the ground that they failed 
to observe, or could not satisfy an official 
that they intended to observe, the promissory 
oath they were or would have been required 
to take on assuming office. 
The NPCSC issued an interpretation of Article 
104 of the Basic Law (“Interpretation”) on 7 
November 2016 to deal with the disrespectful 
actions of two elected legislators in taking 
their oaths to assume office. Article 104 
provides that certain officers shall take an 
oath to swear to uphold the Basic Law and 
bear allegiance to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region when assuming 
office. The Interpretation went beyond the 
usual interpretative function of clarifying 
or explaining the terms of a provision; it 
stipulated the manner of taking an oath and 
the consequences of failing to take one, 
matters that had previously been provided for 
in local legislation. The Interpretation also 
added that persons standing for election in 
Hong Kong must meet the legal requirements 
and preconditions of upholding the Basic 
Law and bearing allegiance to the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region. The 
Court of Appeal held that this Interpretation 
was “unquestionably binding”, refusing to 
entertain a request to consider whether it 
went beyond the limits of an interpretation 
allowed by the Basic Law. The Court of Final 
Appeal declined to grant leave to appeal. 
The implications of this on political rights 
of access to participate in public affairs is 
discussed in Section III(2) below.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Sexual Minority Rights
Recent years have seen an increasing 
number of individuals challenging the Hong 
Kong government on sexual minority rights 
issues through judicial review. This section 
summarizes two key judgments in 2018—QT 
v Director of Immigration10 and Leung Chun 
Kwong v Secretary for Civil Service11—and
makes observations that will be relevant 
to the numerous pending cases on sexual 
minority rights, including one that challenges 
the non-availability of civil partnership 
and marriage to same-sex couples. Given 
the government’s unwillingness to offend 
majoritarian views on sexual mores, it 
is expected that affected individuals will 
continue to take the government to court.
4 See the HKSAR Government’s press release on 18 November 2017 (at: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201711/18/P2017111800419.htm).
5 Namely, HCAL 1160, 1164, 1165, 1171 and 1178/2018. 
6 See 9L3L\UN*O\UN/HUN:P_[\Z6YZ[2018] HKCFI 1869 [2018] 5 HKC 138 (CFI).
7 See9L3L\UN*O\UN/HUN:P_[\Z6YZ(No 2) [2018] HKCFI 2657 [2019] 1 HKC 104 (CFI).
8 Ibid
9 See Cora Chan, ‘Thirty years from Tiananmen: China, Hong Kong, and the ongoing experiment to preserve liberal values in an authoritarian state’ (2019) 
17(2) 0U[LYUH[PVUHS1V\YUHSVM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (forthcoming).
10 [2018] HKCFA 28 (2018) 21 HKCFAR 324.
11 [2018] HKCA 318 [2018] 3 HKLRD 84.
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Leung is a civil servant who has entered into 
a foreign registered marriage with his same-
sex partner. He challenged the government’s 
existing policy on tax and other benefits for 
the spouses of civil servants. This policy 
recognizes only spouses in marriages that 
are given legal status in Hong Kong, i.e., 
heterosexual and monogamous marriage. 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the two-stage 
approach to finding discrimination: first, is 
the applicant in a comparable position to the 
FRPSDUDWRU WKH FRPSDUDWRU VWDJH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then the court proceeds to assess whether the 
differential treatment passes the four-stage 
proportionality test that asks whether the 
differences in treatment pursue a legitimate 
aim, are rationally connected to the aim, are 
no more than necessary for achieving the aim 
and strike a fair balance between the harm to 
the individual right and the benefit to society 
(the justification stage).12 More importantly, 
the court affirmed the “core rights and 
obligations” approach that one of its judges 
(Cheung CJHC, as he then was) previously 
developed in the Court of Appeal judgment 
of QT. According to this approach, insofar 
as differences in treatment between married 
and non-married couples are concerned, 
the comparator stage enquires whether the 
benefit denied goes to the “areas of life which 
are, whether by nature or by tradition or long 
usage, closely connected with marriage” 
such that any denial of such benefits to non-
married couples need not go through the 
justification stage.  Divorce, adoption and 
succession were given as examples. The 
Court of Appeal held that although tax and 
other spousal benefits are not rights that are 
core to marriage, the denial of such benefits 
to same-sex spouses is a proportionate 
measure to protect the uniqueness of the 
status of marriage in Hong Kong, which the 
court deemed to be a legitimate aim.
Shortly after the Court of Appeal handed 
down its judgment in Leung, the Court 
of Final Appeal in QT held that the 
government’s policy of denying dependent 
visas to spouses in foreign registered same-
sex partnership was discriminatory. The 
Court of Final Appeal rejected the Court 
of Appeal’s “core rights and obligations” 
approach. It reiterated a point that Ma CJ 
previously made in Fok Chun Wa v Hospital 
Authority:13 that the two-stage approach 
was not a strait-jacket—it would be rare for 
the court to be able to rule whether the two 
persons have enough of a relevant difference 
to justify the differential treatment without 
going through the proportionality test.14 
The court criticized the “core rights and 
obligations” approach as being circular and 
subjective. It was not clear, for example, why 
adoption or succession should be exclusively 
reserved for married couples. The correct 
approach should be to subject “every alleged 
case of discrimination” to the proportionality 
test.  Applying this approach, the court found 
that the denial of dependent visas to spouses 
in same-sex partnerships was not rationally 
connected to the aim of striking a balance 
between attracting talent to Hong Kong and 
maintaining stringent immigration control.
A number of observations regarding these 
two cases are worth highlighting. First, 
although the Court of Final Appeal stated 
that all alleged cases of discrimination have 
to go through the proportionality test, hence 
seemingly doing away with the comparator 
stage, it is clear that the court still has to 
apply some test to see if the comparators 
are in an analogous position such that a 
prima facie case of discrimination has 
been made out. In fact, the court itself 
assessed that homosexual civil partners 
and heterosexual married couples were 
analogous because they were capable of 
“having equivalent interdependent and 
interpersonal relationships”. The judgment’s 
rejection of the “core rights and obligations” 
approach should therefore not be taken to 
have overruled the two-stage approach to 
finding discrimination altogether. To show 
a prima facie case of discrimination, the 
applicant would still need to show that there 
is a relevant similarity between him and the 
FRPSDUDWRU:KDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWFDQQRWGR
is defend differences in treatment between 
married and unmarried couples simply on 
the basis that the former are unmarried. 
Second, although the courts in QT, Leung and
a previous landmark case, W v Registrar of 
Marriages15 (which allowed post-operative 
transsexual persons to marry in their post-
operative gender), all accepted that the right 
to marry under the Basic Law extends only 
to heterosexual couples, and the court in 
Leung stated that protecting the traditional 
concept of marriage is a legitimate aim, 
these propositions were in fact common 
ground between the parties in these cases. It 
is open to applicants in the future—including 
Leung in his final appeal—to dispute these 
propositions, which are not uncontroversial. 
Third, the Court of Appeal stated that whether 
a right is core to marriage is determined by, 
inter alia, tradition and social usage, and 
would often be a matter of “common sense”, 
“representing nothing other than one’s 
‘intuition’ or ‘instinct’”.16  One problem 
with this approach is that the court allowed 
social views to define minority rights and 
may enable entrenched social prejudices 
against minority groups to persist, contrary 
to it’s role to guard minority rights against 
majoritarian intrusion. Despite the Court of 
Final Appeal’s rejection of the core rights 
approach, the jurisprudence shows that 
social views will continue to play key roles 
in determining what rights sexual minorities 
enjoy. In Leung, social views were relevant 
in determining whether the second to fourth 
stages of the proportionality test were passed: 
second stage – the court reasoned that if a 
non-core right has nevertheless been long 
associated with married couples, opening it 
up to non-married couples may weaken the 
status of marriage; third and fourth stages 
– the court held that given the societal 
preference for heterosexual marriage, courts 
should be slow to conclude that these stages 
12 At [96]. QT v Director of Immigration [2017] 5 HKLRD 166 at [14].
13 (2012) 15 HKCFA 409 at [58].
14 At [83].
15 (2013) 16 HKCFAR 112.
16 QT v Director of Immigration [2017] 5 HKLRD 166 at [14] [16] [18].
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were not passed. These propositions survived 
QT, where the court did not have to assess 
the measure at stake against the legitimate 
aim of protecting the traditional concept 
of marriage. Indeed, the Court of Appeal 
and Court of Final Appeal in QT refused to 
speculate on what the outcome of the case 
would be if the legitimate aim had been 
phrased as such. Social views would also 
be relevant in determining who is entitled 
to get married. All of the jurisprudence on 
sexual minority rights so far (including the 
judgments that extended sexual minority 
ULJKWVVXFKDV47DQG:HPSKDVL]HGWKDW
it is for society, not the court, to determine 
whether same-sex couples may get married. 
Hence, despite the overruling of the “core 
rights and obligations” approach, social 
views will continue to play a crucial role in 
determining sexual minority rights.
This brings us to the fourth point. Despite the 
Court of Final Appeal’s recent liberalisation 
of rights for sexual minorities (that fall 
short of granting same-sex marriage), it has 
remained extremely cautious in extending 
the definition of marriage to cover same-sex 
couples. It is clear that unless there is clear 
evidence of changes in societal views in 
favour of same-sex marriage, the court will 
not affirm and uphold such right. The courts 
have been careful to avoid the core issue of 
same-sex marriage, but they will have to 
face this issue head-on in the pending cases 
of MK v Government of HKSAR,17 TF v 
Secretary for Justice18 and STK v Secretary 
for Justice.19
2. Political Rights: Right to Participate in 
Political Affairs
Article 26 of the Basic Law sets out that all 
residents “shall have the right to vote and to 
stand for election in accordance with law”. 
In the past year, there have been a number of 
high-profile restrictions imposed on access 
to elections. As discussed in Part I, one of 
these incidents involved the disqualification 
of duly- elected members of the Legislative 
Council (LEGCO) on the basis that they 
had improperly taken the oath required to 
confirm their office. Following those cases, 
the Court of First Instance adjudged that four 
more legislators were disqualified because 
of their inappropriate oath-taking manner.20
Subsequently, the Court of First Instance 
dismissed the election petition of a pro-
independence individual whose nomination 
was invalidated because the returning officer 
was not satisfied that he intended to uphold 
the Basic Law (including Article 1, which 
states that Hong Kong is an inalienable part 
of China).21
Candidates standing in Hong Kong elections 
that were held during the reporting period 
had their nominations scrutinized by 
returning officers who “took account” of the 
Interpretation by the NPCSC discussed in 
Part I. 
This section focuses on a newer restriction on 
access to the political arena: restrictions on 
political parties and their members because 
they are advocating self-determination. As 
a result of the oath-taking decisions, Agnes 
Chow, Lau Siu-lai and Eddie Chu all had 
their respective nominations for standing 
for election ruled invalid because each had 
previously expressed support for “self-
determination” of the Hong Kong people.22
All three are seeking to challenge the returning 
officer’s decision by election petition.  Eddie 
Chu’s case was the most curious, since he 
was a sitting legislator who sought to run for 
election as a rural representative of a village 
in a locally governed district in Hong Kong, 
which was not one of the offices referred to 
in Article 104 (which was the subject of the 
NPCSC’s interpretation referred to in Part I).
In the case of Chan Ho Tin v Lo Ying Ki Alan 
& Ors,23 the petitioner challenged—by way 
of an election petition—the decision of the 
returning officer to invalidate the nomination 
of the petitioner, who was the convenor of the 
Hong Kong National Party. The invalidation 
was done on the grounds that the petitioner —
and his party—advocated the independence 
of Hong Kong from the People’s Republic 
of China, which had the aim of nullifying the 
Basic Law. Pursuant to Section 40(1)(b)(i) 
of the Legislative Council Ordinance (Cap. 
542), a valid nomination by a candidate 
requires a declaration that they will uphold 
the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
The petitioner did not provide confirmation 
of his declaration. The returning officer 
accordingly decided that his nomination was 
invalid and that, based on the publicly held 
views of the petitioner, he was not going 
to uphold the Basic Law. The petitioner 
challenged this decision on the basis that the 
returning officer’s invalidation was unlawful. 
Specifically, that the returning officer took 
into account irrelevant considerations. The 
consequence of the petitioner’s application 
was the invalidation of the subsequent 
election of various candidates to their relevant 
seats in the LEGCO. The petitioner further 
argued that the appropriate remedy was not 
to invalidate his nomination, but to subject 
him to relevant criminal consequences under 
the Electoral Affairs Commission (Electoral 
Procedure) (Legislative Council) Regulation 
17 HCAL 1077/2018.
18 HCAL 2648/2018.
19 HCAL 2682/2018.
20 One of the four, Leung Kwok Hung, appealed unsuccessfully against the judgment appeal ([2019] HKCA 173).
21:LL7@3Vº,UMVYJPUNHU<UMVY[\UH[L<UULJLZZHY`HUK¸<UX\LZ[PVUHIS`)PUKPUN¹57*:*0U[LYWYL[H[PVU!;OL/VUN2VUN1\KPJPHY`»Z+LJVUZ[Y\J[PVUVM
Its Construction of the Basic Law’ (2018) 48 HKLJ 399.
22 See *OV^;PUN];LUN@\`HU(UUL(UVY(HCAL 804/2018) (at: 
O[[WZ!^^ ^ZJYPIKJVTKVJ\TLU[(NULZ*OV^LSLJ[PVUWL[P[PVU
KV^USVHKMYVTFLTILK"/VSTLZ*OHUº/VUN2VUNIHUZKLTVJYH[3H\
Siu-lai from standing in legislative by-election’, Hong Kong Free Press (12 October 2018) (at: https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/10/12/breaking-hong-
kong-bans-democrat-lau-siu-lai-standing-kowloon-west-election/); and Tom Grundy, ‘Hong Kong bans pro-democracy lawmaker Eddie Chu from running in 
village election’, Hong Kong Free Press (2 December 2018) (at: https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/10/12/breaking-hong-kong-bans-democrat-lau-siu-lai-
standing-kowloon-west-election/) (last accessed on 3 March 2019).
23 [2018] 2 HKC 213.
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(Cap. 541D) for making a false declaration. 
If convicted under this regulation, a returning 
officer has the power to retroactively 
disqualify a candidate pursuant to Section 
42(B)(4) of the Legislative Council 
Ordinance. The petitioner also argued that 
the returning officer lacked the power to 
disqualify a nomination on grounds of formal 
versus substantive validity. It would, in fact, 
be unlawful for the returning officer to look 
into substantive matters, such as whether the 
nominee had a genuine intention to uphold 
the Basic Law. Finally, the petitioner raised 
various constitutional grounds, including 
the fact that the returning officer’s decision 
infringed on his right to stand for election 
and the voters’ right to vote on the basis of 
their beliefs.
In response to the petitioner’s arguments, 
the Court of First Instance held that the 
Interpretation by the NPCSC issued under 
Article 104 of the Basic Law clearly 
indicated that the declaration for nomination 
as an electoral candidate was a substantive 
requirement. The substantive purpose of 
the declaration was plain: members of the 
LEGCO were to serve Hong Kong within 
the constitutional framework established 
by the Basic Law. Fundamental to this duty 
was the upholding of the establishment 
of Hong Kong as a special administrative 
region of China and the maintenance of 
the “one country, two principles” ideal.24
Interpreting the requirements of the Section 
40(1)(b)(i) nomination as just a formal 
requirement would also result in an “absurd” 
interpretation of the provision. It would be 
absurd for a nominee to submit a formally 
valid declaration but act in a way that 
indicated they had no intention of upholding 
the Basic Law. Such irrationality could not 
have been intended by the drafters of the 
legislation. The returning officer accordingly 
did have the power to assess the substantive 
compliance of any nomination as well as its 
formal compliance.
More so, any constitutional arguments 
(based on the right to stand for election) 
must be read in light of the requirements of 
Article 104 (as interpreted by the NPCSC). 
The relevant rights relied on by the petitioner 
were not absolute and could be subject to a 
proportionality assessment. This required 
assessing: (a) whether any restriction on the 
right to stand for election was legitimate; (b) 
the restriction was rationally connected to 
a legitimate aim; (c) the restriction was no 
more than reasonably necessary or was not 
manifestly without reasonable foundation 
to achieve the aim; and (d) a reasonable 
balance had been struck between the benefits 
of the restriction and the encroachments on 
the relevant rights.25 This test was satisfied 
in the present case. The legitimate aims of 
the restrictions (imposed by the declaration 
for a valid nomination that the candidate will 
uphold the Basic Law) were to protect the 
overall constitutional order, maintain public 
confidence in LEGCO and maintain public 
order. The requirement for a candidate to 
make a truthful declaration only denied 
candidacy to those who advanced the 
negation of constitutional order, and there 
was thus a rational connection between the 
restriction and legitimate aim of the former. 
In these circumstances, the court was unable 
to imagine alternative modes of achieving the 
legitimate aim and it was, in fact, consistent 
with the constitutional order of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region that 
such a restriction should be maintained.
For the benefit of the petitioner, the court 
did hold that any nominee must generally be 
accorded a reasonable opportunity to respond 
to any materials that the returning officer 
was relying on as negating the nominee’s 
intention to uphold the Basic Law.
The development of a system of direct 
elections was a significant focus during 
the Sino-British negotiations prior to Hong 
Kong’s handover to China.26 The provisions 
of the Basic Law set out the parameters for 
reforming the mode of electing the Chief 
Executive and the members of the LEGCO, 
respectively. The process for reform (in 
terms of the requisite majority in LEGCO, 
the consent of the Chief Executive and the 
role of the legislative body of the People’s 
Republic of China (NPCSC) is also set out 
in the text. Annexes I and II of the Basic Law 
state that any changes should “be reported 
to the [NPCSC] for the record” (in the case 
of the election of members of LEGCO) or 
“for approval” (in the case of the election 
of the Chief Executive).27 :KLOH$QQH[HV ,
and II make clear that the NPCSC has a role 
to play in political reform, this is only at the 
end of the reform process once any reform 
package has been voted on by LEGCO and 
approved by the Chief Executive. Paragraph 
7 of Annex I states that any amendments to 
the method for selecting the Chief Executive 
“shall be reported to the [NPCSC] for
approval” (emphasis added). Paragraph (III) 
of Annex II states that any amendments to 
the method for selecting LEGCO “shall be 
reported to the [NPCSC] for the record”
(emphasis added). The political reform 
process was therefore envisaged as one 
that would be primarily locally initiated, 
driven and led. However, through various 
interpretations and decisions relating to the 
relevant provisions of the Basic Law, the 
NPCSC created a new role for itself at the 
inception of the reform exercise and then 
exercised this role in problematic ways. 
The distinction between a “decision” and an 
“interpretation” by the NPCSC is unclear. 
The NPCSC has provided no indicators or 
guidance on when it will issue one over the 
other on a particular issue, but the purported 
effect of both instruments appears to be the 
same from their texts: they are promulgated 
as authoritative positions on a particular 
provision of the Basic Law. These various 
interpretations and decisions on the meaning 
and implementation of provisions of the 
Basic Law arguably augment and amend the 
provisions outside the proper constitutional 
amendment procedures set out in the Basic 
24 Relying on *OPLM,_LJ\[P]LVM[OL/VUN2VUN:WLJPHS(KTPUPZ[YH[P]L9LNPVU]7YLZPKLU[VM[OL3LNPZSH[P]L*V\UJPS [2016] 6 HKC 541, [2017] 1 HKLRD 460 
considered (paras 53-56).
25 Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board [2016] 6 HKC 58 at [152].
26 See Michael Davis, *VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*VUMYVU[H[PVUPU/VUN2VUN¶0ZZ\LZHUK0TWSPJH[PVUZVM[OL)HZPJ3H^ (Palgrave Macmillan, 1990) especially 27-29. See 
also, Swati Jhaveri, ‘Reconstitutionalizing Politics in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region’ (2018) 13(1) Asian 1V\YUHSVM*VTWHYH[P]L3H^ 27-57.
27 Annex II, Part III and Annex I, para 7, Hong Kong Basic Law. 
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Law. The gradual increase in input from 
the NPCSC on the interpretation of the 
Basic Law could be detrimental from the 
perspective of furthering interpretations 
that are sensitive to the rule of law as 
practiced and understood in Hong Kong.28
Dissatisfaction with the progress of electoral 
reform towards universal suffrage has led 
to mass movement—such as the Umbrella 
Movement and the establishment of pro-
independence parties.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
First, in the area of sexual minority rights, 
how the mentioned cases and those pending 
will play out concerning rights that fall short 
of marriage and civil union (e.g., challenging 
the ineligibility of same-sex couples for 
public housing,29 decision to remove some 
LGBT-themed children’s books from public 
libraries30 and Leung’s final appeal) may be 
affected by, inter alia, changes on the bench 
of the highest court. Tang PJ has been replaced 
by Cheung, the judge who developed the “core 
rights and obligations” approach and who 
elaborated extensively on why the relaxation 
of some rights would undermine the special 
status of marriage. It will be interesting to see 
how Cheung PJ will rule in these cases as a 
member of the highest court.
A recent study shows that Hong Kong 
courts are generally less deferential on 
issues of moral controversy and more so 
in politically sensitive cases.31 :KHWKHU
there is a causal connection between these 
two observations has yet to be tested, but a 
plausible hypothesis is that courts are more 
activist in sexual minority cases in order 
to compensate for the legitimacy they lost 
by being deferential in politically sensitive 
cases (e.g., the oath-taking cases and co-
location case, outlined elsewhere in this 
report). It would be interesting to test this 
hypothesis empirically.
In terms of rights of access to the political 
arena, the constitutional issues will largely 
be more systemic in their impact on political 
parties generally. The barriers on Hong Kong 
National Party members from running for 
election in the LEGCO were subsequently 
felt on the party as a whole. In July 2018, 
they received a notice under the Societies 
Ordinance that the police were likely to 
ban the party. This was on the grounds 
that they were (or likely to be) engaging in 
seditious activity due to their beliefs. Key 
members of the party appealed the ban to 
the Chief Executive of Hong Kong and the 
Executive Council. The bans were officially 
upheld by the Executive Council (Cabinet) 
of Hong Kong in February 2019. The issue 
of party-wide bans is likely to become an 
increasingly live one. Article 23 of the 
Basic Law of Hong Kong mandates the 
enactment of national security legislation 
to prohibit, among other things, treason, 
secession, sedition and subversion against 
the Central People’s Government. Earlier 
attempts to introduce this legislation were 
highly unpopular, leading to the shelving of 
the government’s proposals.32 However, the 
enactment of such legislation is inevitable. 
Indeed, the issue has recently become a live 
one, with local government coming under 
increasing pressure to enact national security 
legislation.33
Ultimately, controlling the scope and 
operation of national security legislation and 
its impact on political participation rights 
will need to be a multi-event and multi-actor 
effort. This will include upstream efforts 
during legislative debates on any proposed 
legislative restrictions and associated civil 
society movements to, for example, lobby 
members of the LEGCO to raise questions 
during debate. There will also need to be a 
concerted effort on the part of administrative 
authorities (such as the police and returning 
officers) to be cautious in the exercise of 
their discretion to restrict access to the 
political arena.
More broadly, it has to be recognised 
that the court’s position on matters that 
implicate the role of the Central People’s 
Government’s role in relation to Hong 
Kong may ultimately be precarious. As 
a matter of political reality, the NPCSC 
and the Central People’s Government are 
unlikely to be invisible in the interpretation 
of the Basic Law. This is not the direction 
in which local-central government relations 
are going, with ever-increasing involvement 
in the political governance and autonomy of 
Hong Kong. If the courts take a stronger role 
in pushing back against or re-interpreting 
NPCSC interpretations, they might lose 
their perceived legitimacy and influence 
once they are viewed as being more active in 
constitutional adjudication in this area. This 
could lead to pushback from the NPCSC, 
who may issue retaliatory interpretations 
RI WKH %DVLF /DZ:RUVH VWLOO WKH 13&6&
may issue a “clarifying” and perhaps 
contrary interpretation of Article 158 on the 
conditions for their interpretation of it. This 
could ultimately lead to the diminishment of 
the judicial role, as the courts would become 
bound by more interpretations of the Basic 
Law from the NPCSC in future cases. The 
result might be an irreversible position in the 
absence of any democratic or constitutional 
mechanisms to combat any unilateral 
constitutional usurpation by the NPCSC.
28:LL(SILY[*OLUº5H[PVUHSZLJ\YP[`HUK[OLY\SLVMSH^\UKLY¸6UL*V\U[Y `;^ V:`Z[LTZ¹»PU-PVUH+L3VUKYHZHUK*VYH*OHULKZ*OPUH»Z5H[PVUHS
:LJ\YP[`!,UKHUNLYPUN/VUN2VUN»Z9\SLVM3H^&(Hart Publishing, forthcoming).
29 5PJR0UÄUNLY]/VUN2VUN/V\ZPUN(\[OVYP[ ` HCAL 2647/2018.
30 3LL;HRO\UN HCAL 1196/2018.
31 Cora Chan, ‘Rights, Proportionality and Deference: A Study of Post-Handover Judgments in Hong Kong’ (2018) 48(1) /VUN2VUN3H^1V\YUHS51.
32 See Fu Hualing, Carole J Petersen and Simon NM Young, 5H[PVUHS:LJ\YP[`HUK-\UKHTLU[HS-YLLKVTZ!/VUN2VUN»Z(Y[PJSL<UKLY:JY\[PU` (Hong 
Kong University Press, 2005).
33 See, for example: ‘National security law looms over Hong Kong freedoms’, 27 September 2018, :V\[O*OPUH4VYUPUN7VZ[ <last accessed 23 October 
%
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In 2018, for the third time, the Fidesz-KDNP 
party coalition secured a two-thirds majority 
in the Hungarian Parliament in the general 
parliamentary elections. The old-new Gov-
ernment, led by Prime Minister Viktor Or-
bán, adopted the Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law that obstructs the accom-
modation of migrants, limits the freedom of 
assembly and establishes the High Admin-
istrative Court, outsourcing administrative 
justice from the ordinary judiciary to special 
courts administered partly by the Minister of 
Justice. These constitutional developments 
point towards creating a non-reversible po-
litical system based on authoritarian rule. 
The autonomy of the social subsystems is 
gradually being eliminated: media, culture, 
science, education, etc., are captured by the 
State. In 2018, the Government continued to 
reorganize education and science, the Cen-
tral European University was forced to give 
up a part of its activities in Budapest and the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, which is 
an autonomous institution according to the 
Fundamental Law, is under forced restruc-
turing. Some education programmes, such 
as the gender programmes, were prohibit-
ed at universities. Research activities will 
be influenced by centrally defined research 
projects. State capture extends to the princi-
ples of liberal constitutionalism, such as the 
separation of powers, the independence of 
the judiciary or legal certainty. Legislation is 
not introduced duly in advance, official ne-
gotiations do not influence the outcome of 
political decisions and implemented law is 
often not clear and consequent. Independent 
State institutions, such as the Constitutional 
Court, are losing power and relevance. Due 
to the transformation of its competences and 
the lack of petitions from State authorities, 
as well as the appearance of loyalty regard-
ing certain politically sensitive questions, 
the Constitutional Court is not the watchdog 
of constitutionalism any more. This report 
describes the Seventh Amendment to the 
Fundamental Law as the major constitution-
al change, and explains important cases from 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence to show 
the lack of outstanding decisions that would 
balance the Government’s policy.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The Government, using its two-thirds majori-
ty in Parliament, adopted the Seventh Amend-
ment to the Fundamental Law in 2018. 
The original 2011 text of the Fundamental 
Law used the concept “historical constitu-
tion” as a reference point to constitutional-
ism in the National Avowal (Preamble) and 
also as a method of interpretation. However, 
as Hungary has a written constitution, the 
role of these provisions were still not clear, 
and many scholars attributed a purely sym-
bolic force to this, although there were Gov-
ernment attempts to emphasize its central 
role. Finally, the Seventh Amendment de-
FODUHGWKDWWKHRULJLQDOWH[WZKLFKVD\V³:H
honour the achievements of our historical 
constitution and we honour the Holy Crown, 
which embodies the constitutional continu-
ity of Hungary’s statehood and the unity of 
the nation,” shall be supplemented in the Na-
WLRQDO$YRZDOZLWK WKHIROORZLQJWH[W³:H
hold that it is a fundamental obligation of the 
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State to protect our self-identity, rooted in 
our historical constitution.” As explained in 
our 2016 report, the concept of constitutional 
identity was introduced by the Constitution-
al Court (CC) in its Decision 22/2016 (XII. 
5). The CC primarily functions as a shield 
against the implementation of EU Law by 
protecting the fundamental rights laid down 
in the Fundamental Law as well as Hunga-
ry’s inalienable right of disposal related to its 
territorial integrity, form of government and 
governmental organisation. Furthermore, 
since the Amendment, all state organs shall 
protect the constitutional self-identity of 
Hungary. The Seventh Amendment, and also 
the new case law of the Constitutional Court, 
highlights that constitutional self-identity 
is to be protected through respect for the 
achievements of the historical constitution. 
This blurs the boundaries of the concept of 
the written constitution.
As to the development of fundamental 
rights, privacy received elevated protection 
by the Seventh Amendment by prescribing 
that the exercise of freedom of expression 
and the right of assembly shall not harm oth-
ers’ private and family life and their homes. 
This provision, however, limited the freedom 
of assembly that also appeared in the codifi-
cation of the new act on freedom of assem-
bly. It is problematic that the original raison
d’être of this new regulation might have been 
a personal demand of leading politicians not 
to be disturbed by assemblies in front of their 
homes. New case law has yet to be born, but 
this constitutional environment undoubtedly 
changes the attitudes of the people.
The Government also reacted to the most topi-
cal issue of migration by amending the Funda-
mental Law to declare that no alien population 
will be settled in Hungary, and that immigra-
tion will be based only on individual applica-
tions. A major human rights controversy is the 
challenge of migration. Hungary has decided 
to respond to it with a constitutional amend-
ment that is contradictory at least to the spirit 
of European human rights standards by being 
clearly exclusive and paternalist towards Hun-
garian inhabitants.
 Concerning the separation of powers, a great 
change has been introduced into the Hungar-
ian legal system by the Seventh Amendment. 
This is the introduction of separate admin-
istrative courts. At the end of 2018, a new 
act was adopted by the two-thirds majority in 
Government. Separate administrative courts 
have their roots in Hungarian constitutional 
history, but the safeguards of independence 
are quite weak in the new system to be in-
troduced in 2020. The administration of this 
branch of judiciary is, e.g., separate from 
ordinary administration and the Minister of 
Justice has competencies in the appointment 
and removal of judges. 
Finally, the Seventh Amendment that pro-
vided for a new constitutional framework in 
2018 introduced not only structural changes 
in matters of adjudication but also influenced 
matters of interpretation. It is quite rare that 
constitutions provide for specific clauses on 
the mandatory methods of interpretation. In 
Hungary, the Fundamental Law contained 
such provisions and these were supplement-
ed with others in 2018.
According to the new rule, “In the course of 
the application of law, courts shall interpret 
the test of the legal regulations primarily in 
accordance with their purposes and with the 
Fundamental Law. Primarily, the preamble 
of the legal regulation, and the reasoning of 
the legal regulation or its amendment, shall 
be taken into account when the purposes of 
WKH OHJDO UHJXODWLRQV DUH HVWDEOLVKHG:KHQ
interpreting the Fundamental Law or legal 
regulations, it shall be presumed that they 
serve moral and economical purposes which 
are in accordance with common sense and 
the public good.” [Article 28]
In sum, the Seventh Amendment to the Fun-
damental Law adopted in 2018 by the two-
thirds Government majority in Parliament 
changed the constitutional framework of 
human rights and the separation of powers 
DQGUXOHRIODZVLJQLILFDQWO\:HZLOOFRQVLG-
er the case law of the Constitutional Court 
in this changing constitutional environment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. 3199/2018. (VI. 21.) CC order and 
3200/2018. (VI. 21.) CC order: postponing the 
decision-making on lex CEU
The Amendment of the National Tertiary 
Education Act, adopted in one week, intro-
duced new conditions for the operation of 
universities accredited outside the Europe-
an Economic Area (EEA) in Hungary and is 
applicable also to existing higher education 
institutions, including the Central European 
University (CEU). It has given rise to much 
criticism, both domestically and internation-
ally, including by the Council of Europe Par-
liamentary Assembly and the Venice Com-
mission. In our report of 2017, we explained 
that the constitutional complaint of the CEU 
and the ex-post review initiated by one-
fourth of the MPs had been before the court 
for months and it applied procedural tools 
(otherwise very rare) to postpone the deci-
sion: it created an ad hoc committee consist-
ing of the law clerks of the court to “prepare 
the decision-making procedure” of the case. 
On the proposal of the committee, the court 
asked further clarification from the claim-
DQWV DQG VHYHUDO VWDWH LQVWLWXWLRQV:H DOVR
predicted that the court would have to decide 
this case in 2018, even if it is politically sen-
sitive. It has decided—but not in an expected 
way. In June 2018, the Constitutional Court 
suspended its procedure until the decision on 
the infringement procedure against Hungary 
at the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). The court justified its decision by 
the obligation of the cooperation of courts 
within the European Union: as the funda-
mental rights in the Fundamental Law that 
were violated according to the motions are 
closely related to the fundamental rights en-
shrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, the court had to post-
pone its decision. This reasoning, which may 
otherwise be well founded, begs questions in 
that the practice of the Constitutional Court 
usually does not follow the practice of the 
CJEU, and did not find it necessary to make 
similar steps in previous cases when pro-
cedures before the CJEU were in progress. 
As Justice Stumpf stated in his concurring 
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opinion, the requirement of the suspension 
was not fulfilled, as the case did not depend 
on the decision of the CJEU, and it was not 
justified by legal certainty, a particularly im-
portant interest of the petitioner or any other 
particularly important reason, as the Act on 
Constitutional Court requires. Therefore, it 
seems that the court rather wanted to avoid 
political conflict with the Government, or at 
least postpone it again.
2. 23/2018. (XII. 28.) CC decision: constitu-
tional complaint of a state institution
:KLOHWKLVGHFLVLRQVHHPVWRGHDOZLWKDPHUH
bagatelle case, it shows that to favor a State 
institution, the Constitutional Court is ready 
to confront the ordinary courts, overcome 
its decades-long practice, internal rules, and 
even the logics of reasoning. 
The topic of the 8:7 decision is a simple in-
terpretation of a statutory provision that pre-
scribes the decision on the board of directors 
of the Hungarian National Bank (HNB) in an 
investigation but makes it possible to delegate 
the “issuance”—the question is whether this 
issuance means only signing or also delegated 
decision-making (the vice president decided 
in this case). The ordinary courts, and in the 
end the Curia as the highest forum, decided 
that it was clear from systematic interpreta-
tion that it meant only signing, so it annulled 
the decision of the HNB and ordered a new 
procedure. The HNB submitted a constitu-
tional complaint, stating that by not looking 
at the reasoning of the bill (which suggests 
the opposite interpretation of the statutory 
provision), the Curia did not follow Article 
28 of the Fundamental Law that prescribes 
that courts shall interpret the acts primarily by 
their purposes. 
The decision is problematic in many ways. As 
some of the dissenting opinions pointed out, 
the Constitutional Court set itself against its 
previous practice (and even its Rules of Pro-
cedure) by deciding in a case where the Curia 
annulled the judgment and ordered a new pro-
cedure. This not only made the CC decision 
premature but also interfered with the normal 
decision-making of the ordinary judicial sys-
tem by excluding the possibility of changing 
its decision. The other aspect of the interfer-
ence with the ordinary courts’ function is that 
the court reviewed the decision based on the 
interpretative methods used by the judge. As 
Justice Czine concurred, this is contrary to the 
principle that the courts interpret the statutes 
independently, and the Constitutional Court 
has to limit itself to establishing the consti-
tutional limits of the interpretation instead of 
deciding the case on its merits. Finally, the 
most problematic point is guaranteeing the 
right of initiating a constitutional complaint 
about State institutions. Previously, the deci-
sions of the Constitutional Court, based on 
the dogmatical standpoints elaborated by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, made it 
clear that State institutions do not have funda-
mental rights, as these rights are guaranteed 
to individuals against the State. This decision 
ignores this dogmatical clarity and opens a 
way for the Constitutional Court to become 
a guardian of the interest of State institutions 
instead of protecting the fundamental rights 
of individuals.
3. 13/2018. (IX. 4.) CC decision: real constitu-
tional standards in a neutral case
The Constitutional Court declared uncon-
stitutional the amendment to the “Act on 
:DWHU´ $FW /9,, RI  EDVHG RQ WKH
proposal for preliminary norm control of 
the President (the head of the State). The 
purpose of the challenged provisions was to 
facilitate private water well drilling up to 80 
m in depth. In the case of private consump-
tion, such works could be performed without 
State authorization—contrary to the previous 
regulation, which required an official permit. 
The new provisions of the act authorized the 
Government to enact a decree regulating this 
field and prescribing those activities which 
do not require State authorization. The court 
asked for the opinion of the Hungarian Acad-
emy of Sciences, the ombudsman for future 
generations (deputy commissioner for fun-
damental rights) and the minister of interi-
or. The court also referred to the opinions of 
other professional organizations (university 
departments, associations, etc.).
The court accepted the arguments expressed 
by the President, finding the duty of the 
State to protect the environment follows 
from the provisions of the Fundamental 
/DZ:KHQLQWHUSUHWLQJWKHVHSURYLVLRQVWKH
court referred to international standards of 
environmental protection (non-derogation, 
precautionary principle) and reached the 
conclusion that the proposed change of the 
regulation is in conflict with the right to a 
healthy environment, as the State intends to 
play a more limited role in the protection and 
conservation of groundwater. The court did 
not examine the second question expressed 
by the President, namely whether the bianco 
authorisation of the Government to regulate 
this field is in accordance with the rule of 
law principle. Five justices attached dissent-
ing opinions to the decision.
Two comments should be added. First, the ex 
ante review initiated by the President (pres-
idential veto on constitutional ground) al-
ways has special relevance in the Hungarian 
governmental system. As we emphasized in 
our reports on 2017 and 2016, there is a trend 
that shows that the President turns to the 
Constitutional Court in politically less-sen-
sitive cases. This case is part of this trend as 
environmental protection is not part of the 
daily political agenda but rather a personal 
commitment of the President. Second, in 
this case, the court used, in an open manner, 
procedural techniques which can promote 
the deliberation of the concurring arguments 
of the debate (requesting opinions from the 
stakeholders and referring to the opinions of 
other professional organizations)—a prac-
tice which is not common in politically sen-
sitive cases.
4. 3130/2018. (IV. 19.) CC decision: permissive 
approach towards the political majority
The Constitutional Court declared unconsti-
tutional the Resolution of the Curia taken in 
an electoral dispute related to the 2018 par-
liamentary elections. The original case relat-
ed the placement of a billboard during the 
electoral campaign that depicted the prime 
minister and contained the slogan, “For us 
Hungary is the first!” The billboard was pub-
lished by the governing party (Fidesz), one 
of the electoral contestants. This fact was 
not evident, as it was indicated in extreme-
ly small letters that were visible only from a 
distance of one meter. Moreover, all the visu-
al elements of the billboard were identical to 
those used by the Government in its commu-
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nication. According to the objection filed by 
another party that took part in the electoral 
contest, the billboard was misleading and 
contrary to the procedural electoral princi-
ples of fairness and exercising rights in good 
faith, in accordance with their purpose. The 
Curia declared infringement in its decision, 
but only in the case of one billboard, placed 
near a highway. Identical billboards were 
placed at public spaces across the country.
The publisher of the billboard in question, the 
Fidesz party, filed a constitutional complaint 
against the decision of the Curia, claiming 
that the decision caused a disproportionate 
limitation of its freedom of speech in relation 
to the electoral campaign. The claimant also 
emphasized that the “visibility requirement” 
related to billboards and other electoral ma-
terials is not explicitly prescribed by law. 
The Constitutional Court did not include a 
detailed argumentation in the reasoning part 
of its decision. There is no substantive as-
sessment of the proportionality requirement 
related to the possible limitation of freedom 
of speech and of the similarities between the 
Government’s and governing party’s mes-
sages. The Constitutional Court declared 
that the Act on Electoral Procedures contains 
limitations on the publication of posters and 
billboards during electoral campaigns based 
on timing and their physical placement. In 
the court’s argumentation, it is a decisive 
argument that the act does not explicitly 
prescribe the “visibility” requirement of the 
imprints on billboards. It declared that the 
visibility requirement does not follow from 
the principle of the fairness of elections, and 
neither does the placement of the imprint on 
billboards. According to the court, if voters 
are in a position to identify the political ac-
tor whose interests are supported by the bill-
board, the principle of fairness is respected. 
The latter statement was criticized by one of 
the six concurring opinions.
Based on the decision, one can question 
whether the Constitutional Court accords 
due significance to procedural electoral prin-
ciples by maintaining a misleading commu-
nication practice which blurs the differences 
between the Government and the governing 
party. The latter is one of the electoral con-
testants, which therefore is in an overwhelm-
ingly advantageous position compared to 
other parties. The blurry dividing lines be-
tween the Government and the governing 
party also raise questions on the legal enti-
ties who are entitled to submit constitutional 
complaints. The decision can be evaluated 
also in the light of the debates between the 
Constitutional Court and the Curia, referred 
to in our report on 2017.
5. 3029/2018. (II. 6.) CC and 19/2018. (XI. 12.) 
CC decisions: protecting the interests of the 
State
In Decision 3029/2018. (II. 6.) CC, the Con-
stitutional Court rejected a constitutional 
complaint claiming the limitation of the 
right to property and other related rights in a 
case in which the Hungarian National Bank 
refused to issue a permit for a natural person 
living outside Hungary to acquire a quali-
fying holding in a financial enterprise. The 
reason for the refusal was the interpretation 
of the act regulating this field, which pre-
scribes that in the case of such acquisitions 
the source of the payment must be certified. 
Even though the claimant presented certifi-
cations issued by her personal bank and the 
tax authority indicating the sources of her 
income, the HNB (as the state organ respon-
sible for financial supervision) required a 
continuous certification of all transactions 
from the previous years that indicated the 
utilization of the specific amount of money 
planned to be used as payment for the ac-
quisition. The decision of the HNB was up-
held by the Administrative and Employment 
Court of Budapest and later by the Curia.
The claimant based her petition on three 
arguments: the limitation of the right to 
fair trial in relation to the ambiguity of the 
regulation, the limitation of the freedom of 
enterprise and the limitation of the right to 
property. In her view, the law prescribes only 
a single certification of the source of the pay-
ment, while requiring the certification of all 
transactions beginning from the time of en-
try of the amount of money in question into 
one’s property until the proposed acquisition 
is a contra legem interpretation and impos-
sible to comply with. The Constitutional 
Court did not accept these arguments. In the 
longest part of the reasoning, the court ex-
pressed that the right to property in private 
relations does not protect assets which are 
not acquired at present. The court accepted 
the interpretation of the law of the HNB and 
other judicial instances stating that these are 
in accordance with the possible purpose of 
the law (stable and prudent functioning of 
financial enterprises and lowering business 
risks). The court thus did not accept the ar-
guments related to the limitation of fair trial 
in this case. In relation to the freedom of en-
terprise, the court stated that starting certain 
business activities is not limited by law in 
this case.
One of the justices attached a concurring 
opinion to the decision, arguing that the 
court should have examined the limitation 
of the affected fundamental rights in detail 
based on substantive standards.
In Decision 19/2018. (XI. 12.) CC, the Con-
stitutional Court declared certain provisions 
of the Act on National Security unconstitu-
tional based on the proposal for ex post re-
view of the prosecutor general. Based on the 
challenged regulation, certain public profes-
sions and positions (including prosecutors) 
can only be held after the preliminary ex-
amination of national security risks. In this 
case, as was stated by the national security 
services, the given position can be occupied 
or sustained only with the individual approv-
al of the leader of the State organ in question. 
According to the prosecutor general’s view, 
it is problematic that the leaders of State or-
gans are not informed of this and of the facts 
that cause national security risk, and that 
the law does not contain any aspects to be 
considered when deciding on appointments 
or sustaining the appointments of those per-
sons affected by such examination. These 
controversies could cause a conflict with the 
requirement of clarity of norms (as part of 
the rule of law principle) and the freedom 
of occupation as well as the separation of 
powers, as the regulation limits the sphere of 
action of the prosecution service as an inde-
pendent state organ. Moreover, the prosecu-
tor general claimed that the system of appeal 
against the statements of the national securi-
ty service is not in accordance with the right 
to legal remedy.
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In the last question (system of appeal), the 
Constitutional Court recalled the arguments 
expressed in a very similar former case (initi-
ated by the president of the Curia), and based 
on these, annulled certain provisions of the 
examined act. In the given case, it is much 
more relevant that the court declared certain 
provisions of the examined act unconstitu-
tional due to the fact that these contradicted 
the independence of the prosecution service, 
ensured in the Fundamental Law. However, 
the court did not refer to other provisions of 
the Fundamental Law and did not examine 
the position of the prosecution service within 
the system of the separation of powers.
As a result of both decisions described above 
(constitutional complaint regarding the deci-
sion of the Hungarian National Bank; poste-
rior norm control initiated by the prosecutor 
general), the Constitutional Court played a 
significant role in protecting the interests of 
state organs—a controversial issue, taking 
into consideration the function of consti-
tutional courts in protecting constitutional 
principles and individual rights.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Recently, the decisions of the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court have become quite un-
predictable. Nevertheless, two interesting 
cases are foreseen in 2019. The court should 
decide on the initiatives of four judges who, 
suspending the cases before them, chal-
lenged the statutory amendments penalizing 
homelessness. One-fourth of the MPs initi-
ated an ex post review of the amendment of 
the Labor Act because it was adopted among 
critical circumstances in the Parliament 
(MPs of the opposition managed to hinder 
the regular procedure). 
:KLOH WKH SROLWLFDOO\ UHOHYDQW (XURSHDQ
parliamentary elections do not promise too 
much constitutional upheaval, an upcoming 
vacancy in the court may. Considering the 
high number of 8:7 decisions, the election 
of the new member will have a crucial im-
pact. As the governmental coalition has the 
two-thirds majority in the Parliament to elect 
the justice without the opposition, we do not 
have many illusions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite being a parliamentary democracy, 
the legislature in India is not supreme; the 
executive, legislature, and Indian Supreme 
Court manage a complex and delicate bal-
ance of powers that rests on the basis of a 
written Constitution. The Supreme Court of 
India is the custodian of the Constitution, 
with wide-ranging powers to hear appeals 
on civil and criminal matters, to exercise 
judicial review over administrative and ex-
ecutive action and over legislation, and to 
enforce fun-damental rights. It sits at the top 
of a federal judicial structure, and acts as an 
arbiter of disputes between federal units as 
well. The Constitution that it guards, imple-
ments, and interprets is long and detailed, and 
its drafters have justified this on the grounds 
that the textual foundation is fun-damental 
to the ‘diffusion of constitutional morali-
ty.’1 Although it has been amended over 100 
times, the Constitution’s core, i.e., its ‘basic 
structure,’ remains unamendable by virtue of 
the Court’s jurisprudence over decades. 
In 2018 Indian constitutional law was the 
subject of deep public interest, as the Su-
preme Court sat in large benches of five 
judges or more to pronounce on multiple 
and significant constitu-tional questions. 
Progressive opinions resulted in tremendous 
advancements in the field of indi-vidual 
rights, with the Court finally decriminalizing 
‘intercourse against the order of nature’ and 
thereby affirming basic freedoms for India’s 
LBGT+ population. The offence of adultery, 
de-fined to deny married women any agen-
cy or remedy, was also struck down, and the 
Court ruled in a controversial opinion that re-
ligious authorities had to allow menstruating 
women access to worship at the Sabarimala 
Temple in India. At the same time, the Court 
chose to uphold the gov-ernment’s controver-
sial biometric identification system, Aadhar, 
despite procedural and legal concerns about 
how the system was implemented as well as 
deeper substantial concerns regard-ing pri-
vacy and surveillance. This review outlines 
key developments in 2018. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
2018 saw a rich legacy of major constitution-
al pronouncements from the Supreme Court. 
The Indian Supreme Court may consist of up 
to 31 judges, but never sits en banc; rather, 
judges sit in disparate benches of twos and 
threes to hear questions related to civil and 
criminal appeals, federal disputes, and ques-
tions of statutory interpretation. In cases of 
conflicting opinions be-tween benches, the 
judicial practice is to refer the dispute to a 
larger bench; precedent establishes that larg-
er benches’ opinions bind smaller benches, 
and smaller benches may not overrule larger 
ones.
:KHQLWFRPHVWRLVVXHVWKDWLQYROYHµDVXE-
stantial question of law as to the interpretation 
of [the] Constitution,’ Article 145(3) requires 
the Court to sit in benches of a minimum of 
five judges, i.e., Constitution benches, in or-
der to provide authoritative pronouncements. 
In practical terms, the creation of a Consti-
tution bench is fraught with difficulty, as an 
overburdened Court struggles with a massive 
1)9(TILKRHY:WLLJO5V]LTILY 6ɉJPHS9LWVY[ZVM[OL*VUZ[P[\LU[(ZZLTIS`+LIH[LZ
vol VII (Lok Sabha Secretariat, 5th reprint, 2009) 38
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docket that must be managed in order to per-
mit a Constitution bench to sit.2  2018 was 
significant, chiefly because a semi-permanent 
Constitution bench headed by the then-Chief 
Justice of India, Justice Dipak Misra, sat from 
January 2018 right until the end of his tenure 
in October 2018 to hear and decide on a num-
ber of significant constitutional questions that 
had been awaiting judgment. The consequent 
legacy of six major Constitution bench de-
ci-sions in 2018 will form binding precedent 
not only on all equal and smaller benches in 
the Indian Supreme Court but also on every 
other court in India. 
:KLOHWKH&RXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWRKHDUDQG
address questions of constitutional signif-
icance is undoubtedly positive, procedural 
concerns about the Chief Justice’s unilateral 
power to deter-mine bench composition were 
raised within the Court itself, with judges of 
the Court publicly protesting in 2018 about 
being excluded from hearing matters of 
constitutional significance.3 These and oth-
er procedural irregularities in establishment 
of the Constitution benches have been crit-
icized as unfairly burdening the parties to 
the cases,4 and have been accompanied by 
calls for a permanent Constitution bench in-
stead.5 Moreover, procedural concerns were 
not limited to the creation of the Constitution 
benches alone but to the manner in which 
they determined cases as well. In two of the 
six Constitution bench judgments, the Court 
disregarded precedent and over-ruled a bench 
of co-equal strength, which would ordinarily 
set a troubling precedent if it were not for the 
fact that it effectively constitutes a disregard 
for precedent. In Common Cause v Un-ion 
of India6 the Court legalized passive eutha-
nasia, but in doing so, attempted to overrule 
a pre-vious decision also decided by a Con-
stitution bench. Similarly, in Jarnail Singh 
v Lachhmi Na-rain Gupta and others,7 the 
Court was specifically faced with the ques-
tion of whether it needed to refer a matter to 
a larger bench for reconsideration. It refused 
to do so, but nonetheless still attempted to 
overrule a bench of co-equal strength. 
Despite these concerns, the Supreme Court’s 
consideration of significant constitution-
al questions in some of these Constitution 
bench cases has been timely with regard to 
long-pending disputes. A notable decision is 
the Court’s ruling upholding India’s biomet-
ric identification system, known as Aadhar, 
in the Puttaswamy case.8 Despite claims that 
the government had misused par-liamentary 
procedure to implement Aadhar as a money 
bill and not ordinary legislation, the Court 
held that the Aadhar law withstood judicial 
scrutiny for the most part. The Court arti-
cu-lated a new standard of proportionality, 
applying it to strike down certain limited 
provisions of the Aadhar legislation that 
infringed on the right to privacy while up-
holding the law in general terms. A powerful 
dissent from Justice Chandrachud, however, 
articulated concerns about pri-vacy, surveil-
lance, and the proportionality standards that 
the Supreme Court had sought to im-plement 
in Puttaswamy. 
Additionally, in three cases, the Court grap-
pled with India’s colonial legal legacy, 
choosing to adapt it in one instance, and 
wholly reject it in two others. In Navtej Singh 
Johar v Union of In-dia,9 the Indian Supreme 
Court decriminalized carnal intercourse 
‘against the order of nature’ and in doing so, 
effectively decriminalized sexual relations 
for India’s LBGT+ citizens. Section 377 of 
the Indian Penal Code, framed in 1860 on the 
recommendations of Lord Thomas Babing-
ton Macaulay, was read down in Navtej
Singh so that it no longer covered consensual 
sexual acts between adults. This decision un-
did a historical harm, as well as a new one: in 
2014, the Indian Supreme Court had refused 
to decriminalize this provision, with a bench 
of two judges refusing to address a legal in-
equality that in their words, only affected 
a ‘minuscule fraction’ of the popu-lation.10
Navtej Singh Johar’s case articulated a test 
of direct as well as indirect inequality under 
the Indian Constitution, and affirmed person-
al liberties that had been previously framed 
as part of the right to privacy. A Constitution 
bench in Joseph Shine v Union of India11
also decriminal-ized adultery: Section 497 of 
the same penal code allowed a husband legal 
remedy against an-other man for having con-
sensual intercourse with his wife. The text of 
the provision effectively treated women as 
their husband’s chattel, and was struck down 
on grounds of equality under the Indian Con-
stitution. Finally, in Govt. of NCT of Delhi 
v Union of India & another,12 the Supreme 
Court tackled the legacy of the institution of 
the Lieutenant-Governor—a former colonial 
post designed with powers to allow the em-
pire control over the colony—and reframed 
its position within the Democratic Republic 
of India to allow the elected government in 
Delhi to conduct its work.
2 See Nick Robinson and others, ‘Interpreting the Constitution: Supreme Court Judges since Independence’ [2011] 46(09) Economic and Political Weekly 27
3 Bhadra Sinha, ‘Supreme Court crisis: Senior Judges not in bench for key cases’, Hindustan Times (Delhi, January 15, 2018) < https://www.hindustantimes.
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4 See Shreya Munoth, ‘Constituting Constitution Benches: The Dipak Misra year(s)’, Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy (30 October 2018) <https://
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9 (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (6 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
10 Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 S.C.C.1, para 66 (per Justice G.S. Singhvi)
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The focus on constitutional developments 
in 2018 has accordingly been on the Indian 
Supreme Court and its pronouncements, but 
in public institutions, the Constitution con-
tinues to be con-tested as well. The 102nd 
Constitutional Amendment13 was passed by 
Parliament in August 2018, giving constitu-
tional status to an executive body known as 
the National Commission for the Backward 
Classes (NCBC). The function of the NCBC 
is to protect the interests of ‘socially and ed-
ucationally backward classes’ of people, to 
investigate legal safeguards for them, and 
ex-amine specific complaints about depri-
vations of their rights as well as advise the 
government on steps to implement these 
safeguards and improve their socio-econom-
ic development.14 :KLOH DSSURYDO IRU WKLV
constitutional amendment was nearly unan-
imous, a fierce debate continued through 
2018 about proposed amendments to India’s 
constitutional provisions concerning citizen-
ship, with the bill currently being reviewed 
by a joint parliamentary com-mittee.15
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Justice KS Puttaswamy and another v 
Union of India and others:16 Judicial Re-
view, Pri-vacy
A long legal contestation over the legality 
of India’s biometric identification system, 
Aadhar, drew to a close in September 2018. 
The Indian Supreme Court ruled by a Con-
stitution bench that the legislation on which 
this biometric system stood was validly en-
acted, despite challenges raised to the use of 
a financial (money) bill (usually intended for 
budgetary purposes) instead of ordinary leg-
islation to establish Aadhar. The Court tested 
the Aadhar legislation on various grounds, 
including proportionality, before striking 
down certain limited provisions, particularly 
those that allowed private parties access to 
Aadhar data and those that restricted legal 
remedies for individuals whose rights under 
the Aadhar legislation had been violated. An 
extensive dis-senting opinion by Justice D.Y. 
Chandrachud continued to voice concerns 
about surveillance and exclusion, holding at 
variance from the majority on proportionali-
ty, equality, and privacy. 
The Court’s holding that Parliament may, 
in fact, use money bills to pass substantive 
legislation is one that raises significant con-
cerns for the functioning of the Indian leg-
islature in the future, as money bills stand a 
lower test of legislative scrutiny than ordi-
nary legislation, and can be used accordingly 
to avoid safeguards built into the parliamen-
tary process. More generally, the major-ity in 
Puttaswamy articulates a modified propor-
tionality test to be applied when evaluating 
claims to privacy rights in India, but there 
remains some lack of clarity about the legal 
basis for this modified test as well as on the 
precise manner of its application. 
2. Indian Young Lawyers’ Association v 
State of Kerala and others:17 Freedom of 
Religion, Equality)
The Sabarimala Temple in the State of Ker-
ala traditionally prohibited entry to female 
worship-pers between the ages of 10 and 
50, an exclusionary practice based on be-
liefs linking menstrua-tion and impurity. 
This practice was permitted first under state 
legislation, and later by a ruling by the state 
High Court as well. It was challenged on the 
grounds that it infringed on the relig-ious 
rights of female devotees who wished to 
worship at the temple. In opposition, tem-
ple authorities argued that the exclusion of 
menstruating women from the temple was an 
‘essential religious practice’ and was so pro-
tected under their religious rights. The Su-
preme Court heard and allowed a challenge 
to this prohibition, holding by a majority of 
4:1 that the right of female devotees to wor-
ship at the temple must be upheld. In con-
sidering the conflict between the relig-ious 
rights of a group of worshippers against the 
religious rights of the individual, the Court 
ruled, in this case, that the legal rights of fe-
male devotees to worship at the temple had 
greater weight than the customary right of 
the temple authorities to exclude them.
3. Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India:18
decriminalization of homosexuality
In 2014, the Indian Supreme Court refused 
to strike down a colonial-era legal provision 
criminal-izing ‘carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature,’19 noting that only a ‘minus-
cule fraction’ of the population was affected 
by this discriminatory law.20 Following great 
contestation, in 2018, the Court took the step 
of overruling their own decision in this case. 
The Supreme Court held unambiguously 
in Navtej Singh Johar that LBGT+ citizens 
were equally entitled to all funda-mental 
rights under the Indian Constitution, and 
ruled that Section 377 of the Indian Penal 
Code, insofar as it criminalized consensual 
acts between adults, was unconstitutional as 
it violated the rights to equality as well as to 
OLIHDQGSHUVRQDOOLEHUW\:KLOHWKHEDVLVRI
the ruling lies in judi-cial review triggered 
by the enforcement of constitutional rights, 
concurring opinions addition-ally held that 
a presumption of constitutionality could not 
be upheld for laws enacted before the Indian 
Constitution was adopted,21 and recognised 
that the constitutional right to equality must 
13 The Constitution (One Hundred and Second Amendment), Act 2018 (India) 
14 Constitution of India 1950, art 338B
15 ‘Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016: Joint Parliamentary Committee fails to reach consensus’ Economic Times (28 November 2018) < https://economictimes.
PUKPH[PTLZJVTUL^ZWVSP[PJZHUKUH[PVUJP[PaLUZOPWHTLUKTLU[IPSSQVPU[WHYSPHTLU[HY`JVTTP[[LLMHPSZ[VYLHJOJVUZLUZ\ZHY[PJSLZOV^ JTZ%
16 (2019) 1 S.C.C. 1 (26 September 2018, Supreme Court of India) 
17 (2018) S.C.C. Online 1690 (28 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
18  (2018) 10 S.C.C. 1 (6 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
19 Indian Penal Code 1860, sec 377
20 Suresh Kumar Koushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 S.C.C.1, para 66 (Supreme Court of India, per G.S. Singhvi J)
21 Navtej Johar (n ), para 361 (per R.F. Nariman J., concurring)
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protect against indirect as well as direct dis-
crimination.22
4. Joseph Shine v Union of India:23
decriminalization of adultery 
In Joseph Shine, the Indian Supreme Court 
decriminalized the offence of adultery and 
struck down as unconstitutional another 
colonial legal provision: Section 497 of the 
Indian Penal Code. Section 497 criminalised 
adultery for men who had sexual intercourse 
with a married woman, and did so without 
the ‘consent and connivance’ of the husband. 
In striking down this provision as violating 
the constitutional guarantee to equality, the 
Court ruled that this section had the ef-fect 
of treating married women as subordinate to 
their male spouses, and failed to recognize 
them as equal citizens. Testing this against 
the constitutional right to equality under 
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, the 
Court struck down Section 497, holding it to 
be ‘manifestly arbitrary.’24
5. Common Cause v Union of India:25
euthanasia
The Supreme Court in Common Cause 
ruled that passive euthanasia for terminally 
ill patients was legally permissible, laying 
down extensive guidelines for the framing 
and execution of ad-vance directives con-
cerning medical treatment and withdrawal 
of care for such patients. The Court upheld 
the right to choose a dignified death as a 
facet of the right to life and personal lib-erty 
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, 
and in doing so, continued to prohibit active 
euthanasia, defined as a positive intention-
al act to cause death, as opposed to passive 
euthanasia, defined by the withdrawal of 
life-prolonging care and resources. In do-
ing so, the Court referred to, but diverged 
from a previous decision by a bench of equal 
strength: it had previously held in Gian Kaur 
v Union of India26 that the ‘right to life’ did 
not include within its ambit the ‘right to die.’ 
Although the ruling in Common Cause was 
unanimously in favour of permitting passive 
euthanasia, it creates no little amount of am-
biguity on what passive euthanasia entails, 
particu-larly as five judges chose to express 
their unanimous decision in four separate 
opinions, all of which contain minute vari-
ance on specific aspects of the enforcement 
of this right. 
6. Jarnail Singh v Lachhmi Narain Gupta 
and others:27  affirmative action 
To address historical inequalities perpetrated 
by the system of segregation and discrimina-
tion on the basis of caste in India, the Indian 
Constitution provides for affirmative action 
in various forms, including reservations in 
matters of public employment under Article 
16 of the Indian Constitution. The imple-
mentation of this affirmative action, and in 
particular, the identification of the groups of 
castes and tribes who are eligible for reser-
vations, has resulted in a complex his-tory of 
litigation. In Jarnail Singh v Lacchmi Narain 
Gupta, the Indian Supreme Court was asked 
to refer to a previous decision in Nagaraj v 
Union of India28  for reconsideration. Naga-
raj re-quired two conditions for granting af-
firmative action to certain groups: first, that 
the government would have to collect quan-
tifiable data proving disadvantages before 
providing affirmative ac-tion, even if the 
groups had already been found eligible for 
reservation, and second, that within groups 
entitled to reservation, the most advantaged 
members of these groups (the ‘creamy lay-
er’) should be identified, and denied, affir-
mative action. The Court declined to refer 
Nagaraj for re-consideration by a larger 
bench, holding that the Court’s precedents 
were sufficiently clear on both points of law. 
Relying on these precedents, it did not differ 
with Nagaraj on the question of the ‘creamy 
layer’; however, it overruled Nagaraj on the 
requirement of gathering quantifiable data 
for eligible categories. In overruling Naga-
raj, the Supreme Court in Jarnail Singh en-
countered, but failed to address, a significant 
issue. Nagaraj and Jarnail Singh were both 
decided by benches of equal strength, and 
so it was not open to the Supreme Court to 
overrule Nagaraj on any point at all. 
7. Shafin Jahan v Asokan KM:29
personal liberty 
In Shafin Jahan’s case, the Supreme Court 
closed a chapter in an extraordinary case of 
curtail-ment of personal liberty. Hadiya, a 
medical student aged 24 years, married Sha-
fin Jahan, a Mus-lim man, and converted to 
Islam following her marriage. Her father, 
opposing the marriage and her conversion, 
approached the Kerala High Court with a ha-
beas corpus petition, alleging a criminal plot 
to abduct, confine, and convert his daugh-
ter.30 The Kerala High Court granted this 
petition, annulled the marriage, and removed 
the adult Hadiya from her marital home to 
parental custody, against her consent. On ap-
peal by her husband to the Supreme Court, 
the Court over the course of a year held mul-
tiple hearings, overseeing a national security 
investigation into her fa-ther’s claims, and 
later transferring her to the custody of her 
medical institute to allow her to con-tinue 
her education.31 Following much public crit-
icism, the Supreme Court finally ruled in 
22 Navtej Johar (n ), para 438-9 (per DY Chandrachud J., concurring)
23 (2018) S.C.C. Online 1676 (27 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
24 Joseph Shine (n 23) para 32 
25 (2018) 5 S.C.C. 1 (9 March 2018, Supreme Court of India) 
26 (1996) 2 S.C.C. 648 (Supreme Court of India) 
27 (2018) 10 S.C.C. 396 (26 September 2018, Supreme Court of India) 
28 (2006) 8 S.C.C. 212 (Supreme Court of India) 
29 (2018) S.C.C. Online 343 (9 April 2018, Supreme Court of India) 
30 MS Asokan v Superintendent of Police (2017), SCCOnline Ker 5085 (Kerala High Court, India)
31 :OHÄU1HOHU](ZVRHU:37*YS:\WYLTL*V\Y[VM0UKPH5V]LTILY#O[[W!Z\WYLTLJV\Y[VÄUKPHUPJPUZ\WYLTL-
court/2017/19702/19702_2017_Order_27-Nov-2017.pdf
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2018 that the annulment of Hadiya’s mar-
riage and her removal to parental custody 
was unlawful. The Supreme Court upheld 
the right to choice in religion as well as in 
marriage as being essential to the right to life 
and personal liberty under Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution. In a concurring opinion, 
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud noted that the cur-
tailment of liberty through the exercise of 
state power could have a chilling effect on 
freedoms, and further called for restraint by 
judicial authorities when exercising powers 
in the guise of acting as parens patriae while 
dealing with competent adults.32
8. Govt. of NCT of Delhi v Union of India & 
another:33  federalism
The National Capital Territory (NCT) of 
Delhi occupies a unique place within the 
federal struc-ture: Delhi is neither an in-
dependent state nor a federally controlled 
territory. Constitutionally allocated powers 
are distributed between a locally elected 
government and the Union Govern-ment 
at the Center, which exercises its authority 
through an appointed Lieutenant-Governor. 
The Constitution provides that the Lieu-
tenant-Governor, although the nominal head 
of the state, is to act on the aid and advice 
of the elected government and their cabi-
net, and in cases of any matter of dispute or 
conflict is empowered to refer the matter to 
the President for a binding decision.34 The 
matter before the Supreme Court concerned 
the scope of these constitutional provisions. 
The Court’s judgment established two clear 
principles. Firstly, the Lieutenant-Governor, 
as the titular head of the state, was bound to 
act on the aid and advice of the cabinet of 
ministers constituted by the elected govern-
ment. This, the Court held, was in keeping 
with constitutional provisions but also un-
derlying constitutional principles of repre-
sentative democracy. Secondly, in situations 
where the Lieutenant-Governor was in con-
flict with the advice of the council of minis-
ters, he could refer to the President—but the 
Court was unanimously of the view that ‘any 
matter’ did not mean ‘every matter.’ It held 
that the practice of referring every decision 
of the elected gov-ernment to the President 
would have the effect of entirely obviating 
democratic governance in Delhi. However, 
the bench of five judges, in three different 
opinions, had different views on what cir-
cumstances would, in fact, justify a refer-
ence to the President. 
9. Public Interest Foundation v Union of 
India:35 separation of powers 
The Indian Constitution provides disquali-
fications for membership to Parliament and 
state legis-latures, and empowers Parliament 
to frame laws with additional disqualifica-
tions. The Represen-tation of People Act 
1950, therefore, disqualifies candidates on 
various additional grounds, in-cluding those 
who have been convicted of certain offences. 
The petitioners in Public Interest Founda-
tion approached the Supreme Court, seeking 
a ruling that such disqualification should op-
erate not only when a candidate was convict-
ed but prior to that, when such candidate was 
charged with a disqualifying offence. In their 
support, they cited a number of scholarly and 
pub-lic comments advocating this position, 
including a report from the Law Commis-
sion of India. The Court, sitting in a Consti-
tution bench, accepted that the petitioners’ 
concerns about the criminalization of pol-
itics had weight, but nonetheless ruled that 
it could not go beyond the text of the Con-
stitution and statutory law to create an addi-
tional ground of disqualification. Citing the 
principle of separation of powers, the Court 
refused to infringe upon legislative territory, 
noting that it was the responsibility of Parlia-
ment to frame appropriate legislation on this 
subject. None-theless, the Court did concede 
part of the petitioners’ claims and directed 
the Election Commis-sion of India to im-
plement limited reforms that would improve 
documentation and transparency concerning 
pending criminal charges against electoral 
candidates.
10. Swapnil Tripathi v Supreme Court of 
India:36  transparency
In response to a public interest petition filed 
by a group of citizens calling for greater ac-
cess and transparency in Supreme Court pro-
ceedings, a bench of three judges agreed to 
direct the Su-preme Court Registry to allow 
live-streaming of judicial proceedings. It laid 
out guidelines for this, initially agreeing only 
to stream certain cases that it deemed to have 
‘national importance,’ with prior approval of 
the Court, along with a time-delay to allow 
the Court to edit broadcasts if necessary. 
:KLOHWKHDFWXDOVWUHDPLQJRISURFHHGLQJVLV
still being implemented, this is an impor-tant 
step in providing greater access to the Su-
preme Court as well as towards providing 
accessi-bility to its proceedings. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2019, scholars of Indian Constitutional 
law will be closely watching the progress 
of constitu-tional amendments proposed to 
India’s citizenship provisions as well as the 
hearings in several ongoing Constitution 
bench cases, including a politically sen-
sitive one concerning the demolition of a 
mosque.37 Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi began 
his tenure in October 2018 as India’s 46th 
chief justice, and will continue to hold office 
until November 2019. He faces the challenge 
of settling controversies that arose during his 
predecessor’s tenure. Most significantly, in 
April 2019, India will hold its next general 
election to elect members to Parliament, and 
the formation of a new government will un-
doubtedly transform constitutional politics 
in the immediate future. 
32 :OHÄU1HOHUUWHYH  WLY+@*OHUKYHJO\K1
33 (2018) 8 S.C.C. 501 (4 July 2018, Supreme Court of India) 
34 Constitution of India 1950, art 239AA(3)(a), art 239AA(4)
35 (2018) S.C.C. Online 1617 (25 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
36 (2018) 10 S.C.C. 639 (26 September 2018, Supreme Court of India)
37 ‘CJI Ranjan Gogoi-led Constitution bench on Ayodhya, hearing starts Jan 10’, Indian Express (9 January 2019) < https://indianexpress.com/article/india/cji-ran-
QHUNVNVPSLKJVUZ[P[\[PVUILUJOVUH`VKO`HOLHYPUNZ[HY[ZQHU  %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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Indonesia
6WHIDQXV+HQGULDQWR$I¿OLDWH6FKRODU– Boston College
Fritz Edward Siregar, Lecturer – Indonesia Jentera School of Law
INDONESIA
I. INTRODUCTION
This report offers an overview of the Indo-
nesian Constitutional Court’s case law in the 
term of 2017/2018.1 The term also marked 
the transition of leadership from the fifth 
chief justice, Arief Hidayat, to the sixth, 
Anwar Usman. Usman won the election by 
a 5 to 4 majority vote on April 2, 2018.2
The 2011 Amendment to the Constitutional 
Court Law prescribes that the chief justice 
has a limited term of two and half years, 
which means that Anwar Usman will be a 
chief justice until 2020. 
The last term also marked the complete tran-
sition from the second-generation Court to 
the third-generation Court with the departure 
of Justice Maria Farida Indrati. Justice Indra-
ti was appointed as the first female justice of 
the Constitutional Court in August 2008. She 
was appointed with five other justices to re-
SODFHWKHILUVWJHQHUDWLRQMXVWLFHV:KLOHDOO
of her colleagues either retired or resigned in 
disgrace, Justice Indrati served her two full 
five-year terms until her retirement in August 
2018. On August 13, 2018, President Jokowi 
appointed Erni Nurbanigsih, a law professor 
from Gadjah Mada University, as an associ-
ate justice to succeed Justice Indrati. 
Most of the decisions of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court have not been official-
ly translated into English. This report offers 
a quick overview of the Court’s decisions 
for comparative judicial scholars who are 
interested in the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court’s case law. The primary focus of the 
report will be on statutory review, in which 
seven cases are examined, mostly centered 
on the judicial review of electoral laws, judi-
cial review of marriage law, and religion-re-
lated cases.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In recent years, the Indonesian Constitu-
tional Court has transitioned from an inter-
ventionist Court, especially the first- and 
second-generation Courts, to a non-interven-
tionist Court. But it has not retreated under 
pressure or chosen to compromise to avoid 
clashes with other branches of government. 
Rather, the Court’s judges see its role as be-
ing more limited, following the orders of the 
Constitution and the political branches of 
government.
The Court’s non-interventionist approach 
is evident in the Presidential Threshold XV
case. Blame may lie with the Court because 
it issued a decision that precipitated the cur-
rent crisis of the presidential election, and, 
moreover, it refused to intervene when the 
constitutional stakeholders asked the justices 
to resolve the crisis.3 It arose when the Joko 
:LGRGR DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ SDVVHG WKH *HQHUDO
Election Law, which states that a presidential 
candidate could be nominated by a political 
party or a coalition of political parties who 
hold at least 20 percent of seats in the House 
1 A Term of the Constitutional Court begins in mid-August, and usually Court sessions continue until early 
August in the following year.
2 Marguerite Afra Sapiie, ‘Anwar Usman elected as new Constitutional Court chief justice,’ The Jakarta Post, 
April 2, 2018. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/04/02/anwar-usman-elected-as-new-constitu-
tional-court-chief-justice.html.
3 For a detailed analysis of this issue, please see Stefanus Hendrianto, ‘The Indonesian Constitutional Court 
and the Crisis of the 2019 Presidential Election’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Sept. 19, 2018. http://www.iconnect-
blog.com/2018/09/the-indonesian-constitutional-court-and-the-crisis-of-the-2019-presidential-election/
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of Representatives or have obtained at least 
25 percent of the popular vote in the last gen-
eral election.4  Considering that the law stipu-
lates that the 20 and 25 percent requirements 
must be based on the 2014 general election 
result, no political parties are able to nomi-
nate candidates unilaterally. That the Court 
refused to resolve the crisis and condoned 
the presidential nomination system, which is 
based on outdated legislative election results 
rather than new ones, makes little sense.
Lack of command and reasoning also char-
acterized the Court’s performance in the last 
term. For instance, in the DPD membership 
case, it declared that a candidate for Regional 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah - DPD) must not be a member of a 
political party. Some DPD candidates who 
held positions in political parties refused 
to comply with the Court’s decision. In re-
sponse to the decision, the General Election 
Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum - 
KPU) issued Regulation No. 26/2018, in 
which it canceled the candidacy of several 
DPD candidates who were members of po-
litical parties, including the DPD speaker, 
Osman Sapta Odang.5
Odang objected to the decision and chal-
lenged the KPU regulation in the Supreme 
Court. The Constitution maintains that the 
Constitutional Court has the authority to re-
view the constitutionality of statutory regu-
lations, and the Supreme Court has the au-
thority to review ordinances and regulations 
made under statutes. So Odang filed a judi-
cial review against the KPU regulation to the 
Supreme Court, and the Court, surprisingly, 
accepted his petition and nullified the KPU 
regulation.
As of this writing, there has been no resolu-
tion to the conflict, and it continues to esca-
late. Odang remains defiant, and will neither 
resign from his party, Hanura, nor step back 
from his candidacy. In the meantime, the 
KPU insisted on following the Constitution-
al Court ruling, pushing Odang to tender his 
resignation with the party in order to be listed 
DVDFDQGLGDWH:KDWZDVPRVWMDUULQJDERXW
this conflict was that the Constitutional Court 
was content to let the conflict evolve without 
any attempt to clarify the effect of its decision. 
Apart from the Supreme Court’s decision, the 
Administrative Court and the Election Super-
visory Board (Bawaslu) have also issued fa-
YRUDEOHGHFLVLRQVWR2GDQJ:KLOHWKHVHFDVHV
concerned the administrative violations relat-
ed to Odang’s nomination, in some ways the 
decisions also undermined the Constitutional 
Court’s decision. 
From the second-generation Court, there 
has been decreasing reasoning behind the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions.6 The trend 
seems to be continuing in the current Court 
under the chairmanship of Anwar Usman. It 
continues to overrule its previous rulings, 
with questionable reasoning. An apt example 
is the Marriageable Age II case, in which the 
Court overruled its previous ruling without 
a convincing argument. The circumstances 
of the two cases are different, but in essence 
both involved the constitutionality of simi-
lar provisions, namely the marriageable age 
for women. In the Marriageable Age I case,
the Court ruled that it will not intervene in 
religious domain on the requirement of mar-
riage, especially on the age limit. But in the 
Marriageable Age II case, the Court reversed 
its previous ruling and moved to declare the 
provision unconstitutional.
The last term also marked the new era of the 
chairmanship of Anwar Usman. Usman was 
sworn in as the sixth chief justice on April 
2, 2018, and has faced a tough job restoring 
public confidence in a Court that has been 
hit by controversies and doubts, and is seen 
to be increasingly non-interventionist. Us-
man was appointed by the Supreme Court in 
2010 to be an associate justice of the Consti-
tutional Court. Looking at his background, 
he is not a lifelong constitutional scholar or 
lawyer. He served as the administrative clerk 
for the Supreme Court justices (1997–2003), 
and then became head of the Bureau of Per-
sonnel of the Supreme Court (2003–2006). 
In 2005, he had the same position at the Ja-
karta High Court. Clearly, Usman’s long ad-
ministrative career in the judiciary equipped 
him only with an understanding of the legal 
technicalities and internal mechanisms of 
the Court, not sufficient knowledge of con-
VWLWXWLRQDOPDWWHUV:KHWKHUKHZLOOEHDEOH
to show strong intellectual and social leader-
ship remains to be seen. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. The Presidential Threshold XV case (De-
cision No. 49/PUU-XVI/2018)
In this case, the Court was reviewing the 
constitutionality of Article 222 of Law No. 
7 of 2017 on General Election, which states 
that a presidential candidate could be nomi-
nated by a political party or a coalition of po-
litical parties who hold at least 20 percent of 
seats in the House of Representatives or have 
obtained at least 25 percent of the popular 
vote in the last general election (in this case, 
the 2014 general election). Since 2008, the 
Court has reviewed the presidential thresh-
old requirement multiple times (14 cases) 
and it has consistently argued that the policy 
is constitutional as it is considered the legal 
policy of legislators.7 The petitioners in this 
case, however, came out with a different ar-
gument, pointing to the fact that the result of 
the previous election could not be used as a 
reference or requirement for the presidential 
threshold. The Court, however, rejected the 
claimants’ argument entirely and reaffirmed 
its precedent that the presidential threshold 
was an open legal policy and there was no 
compelling reason for the Court to undo its 
previous decisions. 
4 Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Election, art. 222.
5 4HYN\LYP[L(MYH:HWPPLHUK5\Y\S-P[YP9HTHKOHPº+7+ZWLHRLYPUOV[ZLH[MVYJHSSPUN*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[¸Z[\WPK¹»;OL1HRHY[H7VZ[(\N\Z[O[[WZ!
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/08/02/dpd-speaker-in-hot-seat-for-calling-constitutional-court-stupid.html
6 See Theunis Roux and Fritz Siregar, ‘Trajectories of Curial Power: The Rise, Fall and Partial Rehabilitation of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’, 16 (2) Australian 
Journal of Asian Law, Article 2 (2016). 
7 Constitutional Court Decision No. 49/PUU-XVI/2008 (hereinafter the Presidential Threshold XV case), page 43, para. 3.13. 
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2. The DPD Membership case (Decision No. 
30/PUU-XVI/2018)
The crux of the matter in this case is Arti-
cle 182 §1 of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General 
Election, which provides that a member of 
the Regional Representative Council (De-
wan Perwakilan Daerah - DPD), the second 
chamber of Parliament, must not be a prac-
ticing lawyer, public accountant, public no-
tary, or provide any services related to state 
finance, or be a member of another profes-
sion that creates a conflict of interest. The 
issue is whether the term “other profession” 
is considered to include a member of a po-
litical party. The Court ruled that based on 
its original intent, the DPD was established 
as an institution that could represent the as-
pirations of people at the regional level. The 
Court held further that it was not appropriate 
for members of a political party to become 
members of DPD because there would be 
binary representation if party members were 
allowed to participate as members of DPD 
while the parties already had their repre-
sentatives in the House of Representatives 
(DPR). The Court finally declared that a 
candidate for DPD must not be a member of 
a political party.
3. The Congressional Summons case (Deci-
sion No. 16/PUU-XVI/2018)
This case involved the constitutionality of 
several provisions of the so-called MD3 
Law:8 first, the provision that stated the 
House of Representatives has authority to 
compel anyone before it and give testimony 
as needed, and to have them detained for up 
to 30 days if they failed to comply with the 
summons.9 Second, the Court also reviewed 
the constitutionality of the provision that 
allows the House Honorary Council (Mah-
kamah Kehormatan Dewan - MKD) to take 
any legal action against individuals, groups, 
or legal entities that insult the House or 
members of the House.10 The Court first held 
that the House does not have the authority 
to compel someone to testify nor to detain 
someone for 30 days; that it only has legis-
lative and budgeting authority. Second, the 
Court held that the Honorary Council is part 
of an internal mechanism within the House, 
so it has no authority to take any legal action 
against anyone. The Court then declared the 
challenged provisions unconstitutional. In-
terestingly, in the Susduk Law case,11 which 
was decided over a decade ago, the Court is-
sued an advisory opinion that the act of com-
pelling someone to testify before the House 
was still within the corridors of legislative 
power as long as it was carried out through 
a legal mechanism and due process. But the 
current Court did not seem obliged to follow 
this opinion because the previous Court had 
already rejected the petition on the ground of 
the claimant’s lack of standing, but it insert-
ed advisory opinion in its decision.
4. The Congressional Oversight case 
(Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017)
This case originated from the provision on 
congressional oversight power under the 
MD3 Law. Article 79 (3) provides that the 
DPR (House) has oversight power to inves-
tigate the implementation of a statute and/or 
governmental policy that relates to essential 
and strategic aspects, and the broader impli-
cation to society at large.
The issue arose when the DPR formed a spe-
cial oversight committee to investigate the 
Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pem-
berantasan Korupsi - KPK) in retaliation for 
the KPK’s investigation of several members 
of the DPR concerning the corruption case 
of Electronic ID’s project (e-KTP). The issue 
was whether the KPK was part of the exec-
utive branch and if the DPR had authority to 
investigate the KPK.
The Court majority declared that the KPK 
is part of the executive,12 and, therefore, 
the KPK is not immune from congressional 
oversight as part of the checks and balances 
mechanism.13 There were four Constitution-
al Court justices who wrote dissenting opin-
ions, namely I Gede Palguna, Maria Farida 
Indrati, Saldi Isra, and Suhartoyo. The Court 
minority argued that the original scope of the 
congressional oversight was intended for the 
President, Vice President, Cabinet ministers, 
Attorney General, Chief of National Police, 
and the head of a non-ministerial govern-
mental department.14 It argued further that 
the KPK was not part of the executive be-
cause it was an autonomous governmental 
institution.15 Justice Maria Farida Indrati, 
however, issued a separate dissenting opin-
ion, in which she argued that the KPK was 
part of the executive. Nevertheless, Justice 
Indrati opined that the KPK must file an an-
nual report to the President, the DPR, and the 
Auditor General’s office. Thus, the KPK it-
self can be held accountable by the DPR, and 
there is no need to investigate the institution.
5. The Blasphemy IV case (Decision No. 76/
PUU-XVI/2018)
This case involved the constitutionality of 
anti-blasphemy provisions16 in the Criminal 
Code (Articles 156 & 157) and Law No. 1 
of 1965 on the Prevention of the Misuse/In-
sulting of Religion (Blasphemy Law). The 
8 Law No 2 of 2018 regarding the Amendment to Law No. 17 Year of 2014 on Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – People’s Consultative Assembly, People’s Representative Council and Regional Representative Council, and 
Regional People’s Representative Council (commonly known as ‘MD3 Law’).
9 Ibid., art 73 (3), (4), and (5).
10 Ibid., art 122 (I).  
11 Constitutional Court Decision No. 014/PUU-I/2003 (hereinafter the Susduk Law case).
12 Constitutional Court Decision No. 36/PUU-XV/2017 (hereinafter the Congressional Oversight case), para. 3.23.1.
13 Ibid., para. 3.23.2. 
14  Ibid., page 120. 
15 Ibid., page 125. 
16 Constitutional Court Decision No. 140/PUU-VII/2009 (the Blasphemy Law I case), Constitutional Court Decision No. 84/PUU-X/2012 (the Blasphemy Law 
II case), and Constitutional Court Decision No. 56/PUU-XV/2017 (the Blasphemy III case). 
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Court has issued three decisions related to 
the challenged anti-blasphemy provisions 
and rejected the petitions to nullify them.
The petitioners in this case challenged the pro-
visions on the ground of religious diversity, in 
which there is a diversity of religious beliefs 
in Indonesia, and, therefore, the anti-blasphe-
my law can be misused or abused for personal 
and political gain. The petitioners argued that 
the blasphemy charges are routinely abused 
and the Court must end such manifest injus-
tice. The Court addressed the petitioners’ con-
cern based on the religious freedom clause in 
the Constitution (Art. 29 § 2). It argued that 
the provisions are necessary to guarantee re-
ligious freedom because they do not allow 
any insults or defiling of religious teachings 
or books, which become a source of religious 
beliefs.17 Regarding the petitioner’s concern 
on the potential abuse of the application of the 
blasphemy provisions, the Court believed that 
such concerns were not a matter of the con-
stitutionality of the law but instead about the 
application of laws.18
6. The Blasphemy III case (Decision No. 56/
PUU-XV/2017)
In this case, some members of Ahmadiyah 
challenged the constitutionality of some pro-
visions of the Blasphemy Law. Ahmadiyah 
is a religious movement that originated from 
India in the mid-1880s as part of the revival 
of Islam and Islamic missionary efforts. The 
teachings, however, differ from traditional 
Islamic doctrine in several important ways. 
The Ahmadiyah movement has been present 
in Indonesia since the 1920s.
In the past decade, the Ahmadi often get in-
appropriate treatment from other Muslims. 
Moreover, many administrative regulations 
prohibited any Ahmadiyah activity based on 
the Blasphemy Law.19 The claimants argued 
that their religious practice had been ham-
pered by many administrative regulations 
based on the allegation that Ahmadiyah is a 
deviant sect of Islam. The Court, however, 
utterly rejected the claimants’ petition and 
argued that the main problems were related 
to the implementation of these administra-
tive regulations and not the constitutionality 
of the challenged statute. The Court held that 
Cabinet ministers and local governance have 
the authority to issue administrative reg-
ulations related to Ahmadiyah. It then sec-
ond-guessed the claimants’ main concern of 
vigilantism or persecution against the Ahma-
di instead of the constitutionality of the Blas-
phemy Law. The Court then recommended 
that the issue be addressed by revising the 
Blasphemy Law so that it can provide better 
protection for citizens.
7. The Marriageable Age II case (Decision 
No. 22/PUU-XV/2017)
In the Marriageable Age II case, some wom-
en challenged the constitutionality of  Mar-
riage Law No. 1 of 1974’s provision that pro-
vides the minimum marriageable age of 16 
years for women.20 They argued that the pro-
vision discriminated against girls due to the 
different minimum age of marriage for boys 
(19 years old). They argued that their mar-
riage age was also inconsistent with the stat-
utory regulation on child protection, which 
defines a child as being a person below the 
age of 18 years.21 The Court granted the pe-
tition by stating that the phrase “age 16 (six-
teen) years” in Article 7, paragraph (1) of the 
Marriage Law is unconstitutional and must 
be changed, especially on the minimum age 
requirement for women, within a maximum 
period of 3 years after the case is decided.22
In its decision, the Court moved to overrule 
its own precedent in the Marriageable Age 
I case,23 in which it rejected the petition to 
invalidate the minimum age requirement 
for women to marry. Basically, in the Mar-
riageable I case, the Court ruled that it will 
not intervene in  religious domain on the 
requirement of marriage, especially on the 
age limit.24 Moreover, the Court ruled that 
there was no guarantee that with increasing 
the age from 16 to 18 there will be a reduc-
tion of divorce rates, health improvements, 
and reduction of other social problems.25 At 
that time, the Court ruled that it was not the 
domain of the judiciary to increase the age 
limit of marriage but rather the domain of the 
legislative branch.26
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
:LWKWKHJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQORRPLQJWKH
Court’s docket will be filled with disputes, 
even likely presidential election disputes. As 
the justices may well be preoccupied with re-
gional election controversies, the Court has 
to face the challenge of focusing its time and 
energy to solving statutory reviews rather 
than delaying its ruling on many important 
statutory review cases.
Finally, at the end of March 2019, two Con-
stitutional Court justices, Aswanto (one name 
RQO\DQG:DKLGXGGLQ$GDPVZLOOFRPSOHWH
their first five-year term. They have both de-
cided to re-seek nomination from the House, 
where they have to compete with other can-
didates through the selection process in the 
House Judiciary Committee. So there is a 
high probability that the House will appoint 
two new justices by spring 2019. 
17 Constitutional Court Decision No. 76/PUU-XVI-2018 (the Blasphemy IV case), para. 3.15.
18 Ibid., para. 3.17.
19 0IPKWHNLZ¶ ;OL(OTHKPZHYLWYVOPIP[LKMYVTWLYMVYTPUNHU`YLSPNPV\ZHJ[P]P[`HJJVYKPUN[VWVSPJ`YLN\SH[LKI`[OL4PUPZ[LYVM9LSPNPV\Z(ɈHPYZ([[VYUL`
.LULYHSHUK4PUPZ[LYVM/VTL(ɈHPYZ:L]LYHSKLJYLLZHYLHSZVW\ISPZOLK[VWYVOPIP[(OTHKP`HOHJ[P]P[ `
20 Law No. 1 of 1974 on Marriage, Article 7 (1).
21 Law No. 23 of 2002 on Juvenile Protection. 
22 Constitutional Court Decision No. 22/PUU-XV/2017 (the Marriageable Age II case), pages 58–59 para. 3.17. 
23 Constitutional Court Decision No. No. 30-74/PUU-XII/2014 (the Marriageable I case).
24 Ibid., para. 3.13.2.
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The hybrid constitution of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran (1979, rev. 1989) finished 
its 39th year of endurance. In the fusion of 
Islamic, liberal and democratic tendencies 
and also as a consequence of malfunctions, 
it is reaching crucial points of disharmony. 
This report highlights detailed aspects of 
the jurisdiction. 
The constitution has borrowed democratic 
concepts in a complexity of Arabic and Per-
sian wording. E.g., “The powers of govern-
ment in the Islamic Republic are vested in the 
legislature, the judiciary, and the executive 
powers, functioning under the supervision of 
the absolute wilayat al-’amr and the Leader-
ship of the Ummah.”1 The article camouflag-
es a set of independent powers functioning 
under the absolute supervision of an indirect 
elected leader who is defined as the leader of 
not only the national community but also the 
international one. This allows for the forma-
tion of a single world community referred to 
by Quranic verse, stated in the preamble. The 
camouflage has negated the constitution’s re-
publican foundations since its establishment. 
Iran is a republic by way of constituting the 
government but not in the choice of govern-
ing; this has been noted in the drafters’ de-
bates and books along with current Assembly 
of Experts (AE) member courses.2
Section II below covers the example of a 
long-awaited interpretation to let women 
be presidential candidates, and later in the 
constitutional cases, Special Courts on Fi-
nancial Crimes and Edict on a Law Revision 
are practical examples of the constitutional 
camouflage.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in Iran’s jurisdiction included 
improvements in interpretation and legisla-
tion. The first in regard to presidential elec-
toral law, and the second in favor of religious 
minorities. Interpretation took a small step 
towards clarification of women’s status in 
presidential elections and the reform towards 
the republican rather than the Islamic side of 
the constitution.
The first development was a long-awaited 
interpretation of article 115 of the consti-
tution, particularly on a term to determine 
the sex of the presidential candidate. It hap-
pened in March 2018, following one and a 
half years of announcing general election 
policies by the leader. Art. 115 defines the 
candidate as a religious and political person-
ality, which in written language is the term 
“Rijal.” The word comes from Arabic, and 
now is in use in both Arabic and Persian le-
gal and especially constitutional language. 
It brought conflicts in translation and in-
terpretation about the sex of the candidate 
and whether female candidates are allowed. 
Some referred to it as only for a male, and 
others hoped an interpretation might expand 
its jurisdiction. Since its establishment, the 
Guardian Council (GC) has never approved 
a female candidate.
:KLOHWKLVTXDOLILFDWLRQIRUWKHVHFRQGKLJK-
est office has been conflicted since its draft-
ing, it has never resulted in a constitutional 
interpretation. Moreover, in practice, there 
has never been a female candidate in the 
election debates, although in registrations 
some have applied for candidacy.
1 Article 57 of the constitution.
2 Seyed Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti, Wilayat, Leadership, Clergy, Boqeh publication, 2009, 400. Persian.
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However, ordinary laws under the current 
jurisprudence outlawed women from promi-
nent decision-making positions such as judg-
es and severely underrepresented them in 
senior government posts. The constitution, 
instead of using an explicit expression to 
ban female candidates, used exclusions that 
relied on other means. During the past 40 
years, the GC found female applicants un-
qualified and kept them out of races, avoid-
ing significant backlash.
The first interpretation in this regard defeated 
expectations for a timely change for transpar-
ent application of the constitution. It defines 
the term through the quote “Rijal are those 
Rijals” and thus passes over the key question. 
The determination of specific details, includ-
ing the exact age of presidential candidates, 
should be determined in the law approved by 
the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA). 
The second development of Iranian jurisdic-
tion was a balance concerning the democrat-
ic side of the constitution. A reform of the 
electoral law of the city councils had been 
made after disputes between the ICA and 
GC, resulting in interference by the Nation’s 
Exigency Council (NEC)3 in favor of the par-
liament rather than Islamic jurisprudence of 
the current fuqaha in GC. After nine months 
of legal disputes among MPs and members 
of the GC, NEC and Court of Administra-
tive Justice (CAJ), this happened in late July 
2018. The law was reformed to support the 
presence of religious minorities as represen-
tatives of Muslim majority cities. 
This reform states that Iranian religious 
minorities—Zoroastrians, Jews and Chris-
tians—are eligible to run in elections even 
in regions with a Muslim majority, and rep-
resent them.4
The issue returned first to the nullification of 
a paragraph of the electoral law of June 1996 
that was not clear enough: whether religious 
minorities may be elected as councilors of a 
region with a Muslim majority, and second, 
to the suspension of activities of an elected 
member of the City Council of Yazd.
In 2017, an elected city councilor of Yazd, 
Spanta Niknam, a religious minority of Iran’s 
ancient Zoroastrian religion, was suspended 
via an interim order from the CAJ on the 
ground that non-Muslims cannot represent 
Muslims. He was elected for the first time to 
the city council in 2013 in accordance with 
the election law of the councils approved in 
June 1996. However, in 2017, his presence 
was attacked in a case brought to the CAJ. 
The court order referred suspension to its 
substantive hearing. Later, the GC nullified 
a paragraph of the June 1996 electoral law 
that previously had been approved both by 
the ICA and GC. The GC used the authority 
given by article 4 of the constitution that all 
regulations must be based on Islamic crite-
ria, which applies absolutely to all articles of 
the constitution as well as to all laws, and 
the fuqaha of the GC are judges in this mat-
ter. The GC argued that this paragraph was 
against the opinion of the founder of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, and therefore Islam.
Immediately, the ICA passed a bill clarify-
ing the 1996 law on religious minorities and 
allowing them to stand for council elections 
in their towns even when there is a majority 
of Muslims. The GC found it against Islam 
and by the insistence of the ICA, the matter 
was sent to the NEC for final decision, which 
resulted in a ruling in favor of the democratic 
side of the constitution.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Critiques on Leader Qualifications
On January 8, leaked footage brought new 
pieces of evidence on critiques of the legality 
of the appointment of the supreme leader and 
revealed the selection process for the first 
time. At the time of the selection of the cur-
rent leader, the constitution was under an of-
ficial amendment discussion via an appoint-
ed (not elected) commission. The enforced 
constitution, however, had two limited op-
tions: either an accepted Marja taqlid by the 
overwhelming majority of the people like 
the previous leader and founder of the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, or a council of three/
five Marja taqlid as the office of leadership, 
determined and introduced by the AE. The 
AE determined a temporary leader in a secret 
session without any public announcement, 
and later through the amendment removed 
the term Marja taqlid. In another secret ses-
sion, it omitted the word “temporary” from 
the leader and made it unconditional. 
:KLOHWKHVHWZRVHFUHWVHVVLRQVDQGWHPSRUDO
leadership were secrets for the past 30 years, 
the leader has been introduced to the public 
from the first appointment as an entirely con-
stitutional and qualified entity. At the time, 
there were critiques that his qualifications 
did not match a Marja taqlid. Governmen-
tal debates always denied those allegations 
without mentioning the secret appointments. 
Therefore, it seems the critiques were right 
since there was a temporary leader for a pe-
riod but the constitution was amended to re-
move that term. 
The AE is the only constitutional organ with 
the authority to determine a leader’s incapa-
bility of fulfilling duties or loss of qualifi-
cations.
2. Judicial Order on Blocking the Top Mes-
senger Service, Telegram
In May 2018, the Iranian Judiciary issued an 
order via the Second Branch of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office of Culture and Media 
that all Internet providers take steps to block 
the app Telegram as of April 30. The plat-
form was in use by some 40 million active 
users in the jurisdiction, within a country of 
82 million people. By 2018, this app was in 
use in most tracks of life in Iran, including 
communications, education, business, news, 
politics, healthcare, art and culture and so-
cial life. It was foreign owned, based outside 
the country, and previously targeted for cen-
sorship because of its secure private calls.
Later, following the widespread anti-govern-
ment protests in late 2017 and early 2018, 
Telegram, along with Instagram, the other 
pop social app, was temporarily banned. 
The ban was meant to maintain peace after 
3 Article 112.
4 Article 13.
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claims of encouraging offensive conduct, 
use of Molotov cocktails, armed uprisings 
and social unrest through the app.5
President Hassan Rouhani tried to criticize 
blocking decisions in other blocked social 
media in case the highest level of the judi-
cial system decided to restrict or prevent the 
communication of the people.
Some lawyers called for the ban to be lifted 
not only in a civil law case but also a crimi-
nal one, referring to the denial of individual 
rights of the people and their deprivation of 
the rights conferred by the constitution by 
the issuance of a general order outside the 
jurisdiction of a judge. They grounded the 
debate on a law that says any government of-
ficial who deprives individuals of the right to 
liberty or deprives people of the rights out-
lined in the law, in addition to dismissal from 
service and government employment, will 
be sentenced to prison. They also based their 
claims on other rights under the constitution, 
through which those who earned income on 
Telegram and lost their jobs through the is-
suance of the order could seek compensation 
from the issuing judge.
The constitution prohibits the inspection of 
letters, the recording and disclosure of tele-
phone conversations and the disclosure of 
telegraphic and telex communications. Cen-
sorship, or all forms of covert investigation, 
are forbidden except as provided by law.6
3. ICA Question to the President
:KHQHYHUDWOHDVWRQHIRXUWKRIWKHWRWDO03V
sign a question posed to the president on a 
subject relating to his duties, he is obliged to 
attend the ICA in not more than a month and 
answer it.7 Iran’s jurisdiction had not applied 
a question to a president since the eighth 
ICA, in March 2012. Even after the first such 
question was raised, there was a taboo. The 
MPs canceled the second in 2014 upon the 
leader’s call, that said continuing this legal 
action in time is not expedient. The second 
application to ask a question to the president 
happened in summer 2018, regarding the ad-
ministration’s economic performance.
The parliament summoned the president. 
Lawmakers had questions about the Rou-
hani administration’s handling of the coun-
try’s economic issues, including a high un-
employment rate, slow economic growth 
and a devaluation of Iran’s rial currency as 
well as goods and currency smuggling. The 
MPs were also critical of the ongoing sanc-
tions against banking despite the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as 
part of the international nuclear deal. The 
president called this questioning against the 
constitution and not in due time and circum-
stances, but to prevent any dispute between 
the powers and respect for the ICA, he at-
tended the parliament in due time.
On August 28, after the president’s explana-
tions, the results of a vote conducted at the 
end of the session showed that the lawmakers 
were not convinced by the answers on four 
out of the five questions. They only found 
the president’s answer to the issue of banking 
sanctions satisfying. If the majority of repre-
sentatives present at such a meeting are not 
satisfied with the president’s response to their 
questions, a statute of the ICA provides that 
this is a violation of the law or the failure of 
the law. The matter will then be sent to the ju-
diciary. Accordingly, after hearing the case, it 
reports to the parliamentary committee. How-
ever, in another session, the committee con-
cluded that, since the questions asked were 
not law and the questioners did not mention 
this in their questions, the referral of the mat-
ter to the judiciary was not relevant.
4. Special Courts on Financial Crimes
Through a letter on August 8, the head of the 
judiciary asked the leader for authorization 
to act within the framework of the penal code 
of disrupters of the economic system of the 
country and the Islamic Penal Code to set up 
tribunals in the face of exclusive economic 
conditions. He mentioned the current special 
economic conditions as a kind of economic 
war, and that those disrupting and corrupting 
the economy also provide for the enemy’s 
goals and commit crimes that require urgent 
and rapid action. The letter asked for autho-
rization especially on:
1) Special open tribunals for two years 
and directed to hand down maximum 
sentences;
2) Prohibition of any suspension or mit-
igation of the sentences; 
3) The court branches being composed 
of the Islamic Revolutionary Tribunals; 
4) Members of the court being made up 
of three judges with at least 20 years of 
judicial experience, a judge, and two ju-
dicial advisors; 
5) The trial being run with the atten-
dance of two members; and 
6) All legal timelines specified in the 
procedure law, such as notification, ap-
peals and protest, be set at a maximum 
of 5 days. 
It also demanded that all court rulings ex-
cept the death penalty be final, with death 
sentences subject to appeal at the Supreme 
Court within a maximum of 10 days. 
The leader authorized and mentioned that 
the purpose of the courts should be to punish 
corrupt financial criminals swiftly and fairly. 
Earlier, the leader described “outright and 
unequivocal” treatment of economic corrup-
tion as one of the judiciary’s primary duties, 
stressing that confronting economic corrup-
tion must be decisive and effective. 
The requests and the issuance of permits for 
their content were not only challenging from 
the perspective of the constitution and the 
powers of its correspondences but also from 
the following dimensions:
1. Subjective matters and territorial ju-
risdiction of the courts;
2. Procedural timelines, such as time to 
appeal set at 5 days;
3. In the event of a research flaw, the Race 
Court shall proceed to its completion;
5 Ilya Khrennikov, ‘Telegram Loses Bid to Block Russia From Encryption Keys’ (Bloomberg, 20 March 2018) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
JSLZ[LSLNYHTSVZLZIPK[VZ[VWY\ZZPHMYVTNL[[PUNLUJY`W[PVURL`Z%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
6 Article 25.
7 Article 88.
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4. Suspensions and other discounts in 
sentences prohibited;
5. The term of detention is not objec-
tionable, and only the judge shall deter-
mine that; and
6. All decisions of the courts other than 
the death penalty are final.
These requests are illegal and in violation 
of the legal principles and standards of hu-
man and constitutional rights, including the 
right to a fair trial. The principle of the rule 
of law, the legality of crimes and penalties, 
the separation of powers and a fair trial are 
all neglected.
Statistics show special tribunals set up in 
Tehran have so far handed down various sen-
tences to 35 economic offenders. Three were 
sentenced to death for “spreading corruption 
on earth,” and their convictions were upheld 
by the Supreme Court. Thirty-two other de-
fendants received up to 20 years for econom-
ic corruption.
The defendants were found guilty of illegal 
dealings in coins and currency, while there 
is no prohibition and limitation for this un-
der any laws. Some parts of the trials were 
broadcast on national television along with 
documentaries of the confessions of the ex-
ecuted felons. The legality of the trials and 
their fairness are under question. Amnes-
ty International condemned the process as 
show trials with abhorrent executions and 
called these actions flagrant violations of in-
ternational law and a display of disregard for 
the right to life.
5. Edict on a Law Revision
In the eyes of the current constitution, the 
leader is equal with the rest of the people of 
the country. In September, the ICA ratified 
a new retirement law meant to abolish a de-
cades-long practice of re-employing public 
sector managers who are past retirement 
age. However, there is a vast exclusion. It 
explicitly excluded the leader, the president, 
presidential deputies, the judiciary chief, 
MPs, members of the GC, top military com-
manders and those who could get an exemp-
tion from the country’s leader. Some retired 
through this law, such as Tehran’s last may-
or, Mohammad Ali Afshani; however, others 
got the exemption of the leader. 
The leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, ad-
dressed this matter in a speech. He called on 
the parliament to review the law and possi-
bly revise it with more general exceptions so 
there would be no need to ask for exemp-
tions from his office. A few hours later, the 
ICA speaker, Ali Larijani, directed the ICA 
research body to draft the revision.
The leader’s remarks raised an old debate 
on his powers and whether the article 57 
wording, “absolute wilayat al-’amr and the 
Leadership of the Ummah,” along with oth-
ers, provide him such power. Some interpret-
ed articles 57 and 110 of the constitution as 
meaning that the leader enjoys the power to 
issue so-called “leadership commands,” or 
special edicts that could reverse any law ap-
proved by legislators. Others refer to consti-
tutional limitations that are not mentioned in 
the constitution. In practice, the first opinion 
is in force.
Edicts have long histories not only in the past 
constitutional history of Iran but also in the 
recent one. This was true under the monarchy 
and has continued under the Islamic Republic, 
which has no clear written term on them.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The constitution will be the source of large-
scale legal events, and more importantly, sig-
nificant amendments in the upcoming years. 
In 2019, the appointment of the seventh 
chief of the judiciary will take place, earli-
er than usual. Sadiq Larijani, who has been 
in charge of the judiciary since 2009, is an 
AE member and also one of the six fuqaha 
members of the GC. He was simultaneously 
appointed as the head of the NEC after Mah-
moud Hashemi Shahroudi’s death in Decem-
ber 2018. The next chief of the judiciary is 
said to be someone who tried to be head of 
another power in the 2017 presidential elec-
tion, Sayed Ebrahim Raisol-Sadati, who car-
ries a long history of judicial service. 
These two facts, first placing the current head 
of the judiciary in charge of the NEC, and 
second, appointing the chief of the judiciary 
earlier than usual, fuel speculation about the 
AE electing a new leader in the near future. 
The current leader turns 80 in 2019 and has 
been ruling for the past 30 years. The NEC is 
a significant office that is composed of three 
heads of power, all GC members and official 
individuals of some organs.
After several rounds of ping-pong between 
the ICA and the GC on ratifying Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and Paler-
mo Convention, which ICA passed and GC 
rejected, it is now the NEC’s turn to decide 
which side to take in 2019.8
V. FURTHER READING
Sahar Maranlou, Access to Justice in Iran: 
Women, Perceptions, and Reality, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017, 275
*: %RZHUVRFN The Crucible of Islam,
Harvard University Press, 2017, 220
Medea Benjamin, Inside Iran: The Real His-
tory and Politics of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, OR Books, 2018, 256
8 The CFT bill is one of the four Financial Action Task Force (FATF) bills which seek reform in the money-laundering rule and change in the funding terrorism law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Just as it was for the 2016 and 2017 reports, 
the issue of abortion loomed large over Irish 
constitutional politics in 2018. The big dif-
ference for this year’s report, however, is 
that 2018 marked the culmination of the var-
ious review processes discussed in previous 
years with the holding of the long-anticipat-
ed referendum on the issue.
These processes—from Citizens Assembly 
through parliamentary committee and onto 
referendum—have attracted considerable at-
tention from overseas commentators. Much 
of the commentary, marvelling in its appar-
ent capacity to persuade a deeply Catholic 
Ireland to support change, have looked to the 
Irish experience as a model for constitutional 
deliberation.
The reality of the abortion referendum—like 
the marriage equality amendment before it—
may, however, be more nuanced and less re-
velatory than this commentary assumes.
2018 was also noteworthy in that it saw the 
Supreme Court’s entry into the abortion de-
bate for the first time in recent years. The 
decision of the Court clarified an outstand-
ing—if somewhat arcane—question in the 
Irish case law on abortion. Of more long-
term interest may be what the manner of the 
Court’s entry into the debate indicates about 
its self-perception as a political actor.
:KLOH WKHDERUWLRQ LVVXHDWWUDFWHG WKHPRVW
attention, the year was also noteworthy for 
the Government’s continued interest in con-
stitutional change. A referendum was held 
in late 2018 on blasphemy, while the Gov-
ernment has also announced its intention to 
hold referendums on divorce, extending cer-
tain voting rights to citizens living abroad, 
and on the future of the Constitution’s cur-
rent recognition of woman’s “life within the 
home”. This would mean there will be sev-
en referendums in four years, after only 33 
in the previous 70 years, something which 
suggests that recourse to referendums may 
be becoming an increasingly settled part of 
Ireland’s constitutional politics.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
The major constitutional development was 
the holding of a referendum on the amend-
ment of the provisions of the Constitution of 
Ireland concerning the rights of the unborn. 
Article 40. 3. 3 of the Constitution, which was 
inserted into the constitutional text by a refer-
endum in 1983, previously provided that:
“The State acknowledges the right to 
life of the unborn and, with due regard 
to the equal right to life of the mother, 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as 
far as practicable, by its laws to defend 
and vindicate that right.”
The 8th Amendment (as it was more com-
monly known) was introduced as the result 
of a campaign by groups expressing concern 
that an Irish court could follow the example of 
the English courts in R. v Bourne1 or US Su-
SUHPH&RXUWLQ5RHY:DGH2 and interpret the 
relevant statutory or constitutional provisions 
in a manner which made abortion more wide-
ly available than was the case under the then 
1 ?
2 Geoghegan J., in Roche v Roche [2010] 2 IR 321, para 210.
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legislation. The aim of the Amendment was 
“to prevent the introduction of abortion either 
by legislation by the Oireachtas or by judicial 
decision”.3 This meant, in effect, that it was 
generally regarded as impossible to introduce 
a broad “decriminalisation of abortion with-
out the approval of the people as a whole”.4
The proposal which was put to the people 
in May 2018 was to replace Article 40. 3. 3. 
with the following text:
Provision may be made by law for the 
regulation of termination of pregnancies.
The aim of this was to confirm the entitle-
ment of the Oireachtas (parliament) to in-
troduce legislation providing for abortion, 
thereby addressing a concern that there 
could be legal constraints on the expansion 
of abortion services—or, at the very least, 
lengthy litigation asserting the existence of 
legal constraints—notwithstanding the re-
peal of the 8th Amendment.
This concern is discussed further in the next 
section.
The proposal was put forward by the Gov-
ernment at the end of a process which had 
featured involvement by various bodies. 
First of all, the question was one which had 
become increasingly difficult for the politi-
cal establishment to ignore as the result of a 
visible and effective campaign for the repeal 
of the 8th Amendment by activists.
This led ultimately to the establishment of 
a 100-person Citizens Assembly in 2016 to 
consider the issue. Its recommendations, is-
sued in late 2017, were for the 8th Amend-
ment to be replaced with text confirming the 
entitlement of the Oireachtas to legislate on 
this issue. The referendum proposal largely 
followed this recommendation.
The Assembly also made detailed rec-
ommendations concerning the legislation 
which, in its view, ought to be introduced 
after the referendum.
For those interested in deliberative as-
semblies and the politics of constitutional 
change, it is this aspect of the Assembly’s 
work, rather than its more obviously “con-
stitutional” effects, which might merit most 
scrutiny. If there were any aspect of the 
Assembly which shifted public or political 
opinion (and this remains open to debate), 
it was the Assembly’s recommendations on 
legislative rather than constitutional change.
This is where some consideration of the spe-
cific social and political context becomes 
LPSRUWDQW :KLOH WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO SHUFHS-
tion of Ireland can be of a deeply religious 
society, this is arguably years, if not decades, 
out of date. That is not to say that there are 
not parts of Irish society, especially amongst 
older generations, that remain heavily influ-
enced by religious belief. That is also not 
to overlook the fact that Irish society is, in 
many respects, more visibly—or anecdotal-
ly—Catholic than many other states. Reli-
gion certainly features prominently in many 
of the familiar rituals of family or social life. 
However, the one-time capacity of the Cath-
olic Church to influence political or social 
life has long been in significant decline, es-
pecially since the child abuse scandals of the 
1990s. To give one example, at the time of 
the 1983 referendum, 87% of Catholics were 
estimated to attend Mass weekly. By 2012, 
this was estimated to have fallen to around 
30-35%, with some parishes in Dublin re-
porting only 2% weekly attendance.
In terms of the specific issue of abortion, it 
is a distortion to suggest that either the ref-
erendum campaign or the Citizens Assembly 
brought about a shift in deeply held views. 
This not only underplays the efforts of ac-
tivists for many years prior to these formal 
deliberative processes but also overlooks 
polling data on the abortion issue. Opinion 
polls for several years prior to the Assem-
bly and referendum had consistently shown 
comfortable majorities for both a repeal of 
the 8th Amendment and increased access 
to abortion. This casts serious doubt on the 
cause-and-effect assumptions implicit in 
some of the more optimistic accounts of the 
Assembly’s role.5
In reality, the “dramatic” results of the mar-
riage equality, abortion, and (perhaps) blas-
phemy referenda are more to do with the 
delayed acknowledgement by an innately 
risk-averse political class of changes in ma-
jority social attitudes that happened—or be-
gan to happen—20 or 25 years ago. 
However, it is amongst this group of polit-
ical representatives where the Assembly’s 
deliberations did seem to have some effect. 
Its legislative recommendations were initial-
ly greeted with significant skepticism as too 
liberal to command public support. Nonethe-
less, it ultimately proved highly influential in 
shaping the legislative proposals announced 
by the Government in 2018. The Assembly 
recommendations set the agenda for the con-
sideration of the issue by a parliamentary 
committee. Moreover, while the committee 
did not endorse all of the Assembly recom-
mendations, they seem in general to have 
given them a presumptive weight in their 
deliberations. That this committee’s report 
(which was, again, more liberal than might 
have been assumed a few months previous-
ly) was largely adopted by the Government 
as the basis for its proposed legislative re-
gime in 2018 can arguably be seen as con-
crete evidence of the Assembly model hav-
ing practical political effects.
The second referendum on constitutional 
change in Ireland in 2018 involved the re-
3 Hardiman J., in Roche v Roche [2010] 2 IR 321, para 181.
4 ?
5 :LLMVYL_HTWSL(UUP7V[[VYɈº3LZZVUZMYVT[OL0YPZO*P[PaLUZ»(ZZLTIS`!+LSPILYH[L,]LU>OLUP[»Z+PɉJ\S[»¸0YLSHUK»ZYLJLU[JP[PaLUZ»HZZLTIS`HUKYLZ\S[PUN
YLMLYLUK\TVUHIVY[PVUYPNO[ZOPNOSPNO[Z[OLOPZ[VY`JOHUNPUNPTWHJ[JP[PaLUZ»HZZLTISPLZJHUOH]L¯5V[VUS`KPK[OL(ZZLTIS`ZWHYRHSVUNH^HP[LKW\ISPJ
KPZJ\ZZPVUVUHIVY[PVUYPNO[ZP[OLSWLKZL[[OLZ[HNLMVYSHZ[TVU[O»ZUH[PVUHSYLMLYLUK\TVU4H`¹"7H[YPJR*OHSTLYZº/V^  Z[YHUNLYZPUH+\ISPUOV[LSIYVRL
0YLSHUK»ZHIVY[PVUKLHKSVJR»;OL.\HYKPHU4HYJO¸(YLMLYLUK\T^HZZJHYJLS`PTHNPUHISL^OLU[OLPKLHVMHUHZZLTIS`^HZÄYZ[TVV[LKPU)HJR
[OLUML^WVSP[PJPHUZKHYLKL]LUYHPZL[OLZ\IQLJ[VMHW\ISPJ]V[LSL[HSVUL]VPJLZ\WWVY[MVYHIVY[PVUYPNO[Z¹
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moval of the criminal offence of blasphemy 
from the text. This was, again, a provision 
with conspicuously religious origins but 
with significantly less practical effects. Ar-
ticle 40. 6. of the Constitution had provided 
(in part) that:
1° The State guarantees liberty for the ex-
ercise of the following rights, subject to 
public order and morality:
i The right of the citizens to express 
freely their convictions and opinions.
….
The publication or utterance of blas-
phemous, seditious or indecent matter 
is an offence which shall be punish-
able in accordance with law.
However, while the Constitution thus re-
quired that blasphemy be an offence, it did 
not itself define what this meant or how the 
offence might be committed. That this made 
it difficult to apply in practice in the absence 
of legislative intervention was confirmed in 
Corway v Independent Newspapers.6 There,
a private individual applied to the High 
Court for permission to bring a prosecution 
for blasphemous libel. The application re-
lated to a newspaper cartoon about the 1995 
referendum on divorce. The courts refused 
the application. The Supreme Court point-
ed out that the legislation which referred to 
blasphemy provided “no statutory definition 
of blasphemy … [and] assume[d] that the 
crime exists without defining it.” The Court 
pointed out that there was uncertainty over 
which religion or religions were protected 
from blasphemy. There was also uncertainty 
over how a person might commit blasphemy, 
and of how an offence of blasphemy might 
interact with the Constitution’s protection 
of freedom of expression and freedom of 
conscience. The Court concluded that the of-
fence existed but that there was significant 
uncertainty over what it involved.
This uncertainty was addressed by the Def-
amation Act 2009. The justification for its 
introduction was a perceived rule-of-law 
requirement that political actors ought to 
comply with the obligations imposed by the 
Constitution rather than to introduce de facto
an amendment by constitutional desuetude. 
This meant that the legislation was specifical-
ly stated by its sponsors to be designed to be 
difficult to prosecute. Under the Act, a person 
could be found guilty of blasphemy if they 
published or uttered “grossly abusive or in-
sulting” matter on “matters held sacred by any 
religion”; their action caused outrage among 
a substantial number of members of that reli-
gion; and they intended to cause that outrage.
One curious, if little-remarked, feature of 
the referendum was that it was widely justi-
fied and celebrated as a victory for freedom 
of expression even though it specifically 
re-enacted the obligation in Article 40. 6. 1 
to provide for criminal offences of obscenity 
and sedition. From a freedom of expression 
perspective, these are arguably as objection-
able and constitutionally unorthodox as the 
previous blasphemy requirement. Nor would 
there appear to be any great public or politi-
cal demand for their retention in the consti-
tutional text. It seems most likely that they 
were retained as an afterthought (if even 
that) to the political objective of “dealing 
with” a blasphemy issue that had attracted a 
degree of media and civil society criticism. 
This is broadly consistent with the point 
already made about the extent to which the 
programme of constitutional change in re-
cent years reflects a decline in religious in-
fluence in Irish society. It may also point to 
aspects of contemporary Irish constitutional 
politics that may be of interest or influence 
in the medium-term. In particular, it rais-
es a question as to whether there is a per-
ceived political dividend from constitutional 
modernization—especially one defined in 
secular terms—by supplanting the habitual 
caution of the Irish political class towards 
referendums and socio-religious issues over 
the last two decades. If that is the case, then 
the prevalence of Catholic symbolism in the 
1937 text suggests that there may be many 
more referenda in the years to come.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. M v Minister for Justice and Equality 
[2018] IESC 14: Abortion – right to life – 
popular sovereignty – natural law
These proceedings involved a leapfrog ap-
peal to the Supreme Court from the decision 
of Humphreys J. The High Court ruling had 
addressed a range of constitutional issues, 
several of which have been the subject of 
contention for many years. These included the 
meaning of family under Articles 41 and 42 as 
well as the constitutional rights of the unborn.
The latter issue is one which, while the sub-
ject of considerable public, judicial, and ac-
ademic attention since the 1970s, had never 
been comprehensively resolved. It had been 
suggested by several judges prior to the 
1983 referendum that at least some of the 
rights protected by the Constitution might 
DSSO\ EHIRUH ELUWK )RU H[DPSOH :DOVK -
expressed the view in G. v An Bord Uchtála 
[1980] IR 32 that “a child … has the right to 
life itself and the right to be guarded against 
all threats directed to its existence whether 
before or after birth” (at 69). It was never de-
finitively clarified either before or after the 
1983 referendum whether this represented 
the law on this issue, and therefore whether 
the 8th Amendment created the right to life 
of the unborn or was declaratory of it.
:LWKUHIRUPRI$UWLFOHXQGHUVHUL-
ous consideration, this became a key issue. 
It was prominent in discussions before the 
Citizens Assembly and seemed to have in-
fluenced that body’s recommendation that an 
express enabling amendment be included in 
any constitutional reform. This appeared to 
be intended to deal with the potential for an 
argument to be made that the unborn contin-
ued to enjoy constitutional rights even after 
the repeal of Article 40. 3. 3.
The Court stated in M that the unborn has 
no rights under the Constitution other than 
those contained in Article 40. 3. 3. This was 
6 [1999] 4 IR 484.
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generally expected as a result, especially 
given the very expansive interpretation of 
the unborn as holding full Article 42A rights 
that had been advanced by the High Court 
judge in the decision under appeal.
The Court engaged in a relatively detailed 
review of the various occasions in which 
judges had suggested that the unborn may 
enjoy some degree of wider constitutional 
protection. It concluded that these sugges-
tions were all obiter dicta. It also relied to 
some degree on the reference in the consti-
tutional text to “citizen” or “person” as de-
fining the scope of the constitutional “rights 
holder”,7 and on the fact that the 13th and 
14th Amendments seemed to regard Article 
40. 3. 3 as an exhaustive statement of right. 
This meant that “the only right of the unborn 
child as the Constitution now stands … is 
that enshrined by … Article 40. 3. 3” (para 
10. 62).
However, and in keeping with its somewhat 
obtuse finding in the immigration law por-
tion of its ruling that regard must be had to 
the rights of the unborn-once-born, the Court 
then immediately went on to suggest that the 
unborn retains some degree of constitutional 
“visibility”. This was partly linked to Arti-
cle 40. 3. 3. In addition, though, it noted that 
“the fact … that the Minister must take into 
account of rights which will be acquired on 
birth … recognise[s] and protect[s] the in-
terests of an unborn child”, adding that “the 
State is entitled to take account of the respect 
which is due to human life as a factor which 
may be taken into account as an aspect of the 
common good in legislation”. Although it is 
expressed in enabling terms that the State 
is “entitled to take into account”, the refer-
ence to the “respect which is due to human 
life” has the potential to be seen as a basis 
for constitutional challenges or limitations in 
the future.
:KLOHWKHFDVHDWWUDFWHGVLJQLILFDQWDWWHQWLRQ
at the time, the constitutional effects of the 
decision are arguably quite limited, at least 
as far as the abortion issue is concerned. This 
is most obviously because the decision was 
concerned with text that was removed short-
ly thereafter. However, it is also because 
the decision was ultimately delivered after 
the Government had already announced the 
wording of the proposed amendment. The 
decision clarified a legal issue which had 
generated doubts over whether Article 40. 
3. 3 should be repealed or replaced. It con-
firmed, in effect, that the Article could be 
repealed—but after that decision had already 
been made.
:KDW PD\ EH PRUH LQWHUHVWLQJ DERXW WKLV
however, is the fact that the Supreme Court 
appeared prepared to intervene in this de-
bate at all. From a procedural and political 
perspective, there was no necessity for them 
to do so. The proceedings had long become 
moot by the time that an appeal was sought 
to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the 
Court not only agreed to hear the matter but 
did so on an expedited basis for the express 
purpose of addressing the issue prior to the 
referendum being held. Furthermore—and 
possibly unrelatedly—the decision was the 
first (and so far only) occasion on which the 
delivery of the ruling by the Supreme Court 
was broadcast on television. The Court’s de-
cision is, it should be noted, careful to re-
peatedly disclaim any political dimension to 
its ruling. Nonetheless, the deliberate nature 
of the Court’s intervention is somewhat out 
of keeping with the traditional conservatism 
of the Supreme Court on sensitive issues. It 
is arguably the clearest indication of a shift 
that has debatably been occurring since the 
Court acquired control of its own caseload 
in 2016, moving from a traditionally reactive 
common law court to a more self-conscious-
ly proactive role as a constitutional actor.
2. C v Minister for Social Protection [2018] 
IESC 57: Remedies
This decision is important for its consider-
ation of the circumstances in which a sus-
pended declaration of invalidity may be ap-
propriate. As discussed in the 2017 report, 
the Supreme Court, in keeping with this 
sense of a shifting role, has begun to experi-
ment with suspended declarations of invalid-
ity. However, it had provided little clarity as 
to when or in what circumstances they might 
be available. C marked the first occasion on 
which the Court gave a more detailed insight 
into the rationale for this new departure, and 
the parameters of its exercise. There is some 
evidence in the decision of differing lev-
els of enthusiasm amongst the members of 
the Court. In general, O’Donnell J. seemed 
mindful of the potential issues with this form 
of remedy but attracted to the flexibility 
which it provides. By contrast, McMenamin 
J. seemed more sceptical. Overall, all agreed 
with Clarke J. that this was an exceptional 
remedy; that an immediate declaration was 
the norm; and, in particular, that Ministers 
should not seek to engage with the Court for 
advice on what responses might be appropri-
ate after a declaration was made.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Constitutional change again looks likely 
to be a significant theme of the year ahead 
with referendums proposed on a number of 
issues including voting rights for emigrants, 
divorce, and the current constitutional refer-
ence to the role of women in the home. The 
latter two are in keeping with the nature of 
the amendments in recent years, being pro-
posals to address aspects of the text that bear 
the particular imprint of Catholic teaching.
The 1937 Constitution originally contained 
an absolute prohibition on divorce, but 
this was modified by a referendum (which 
passed with a narrow majority) in 1996 to 
permit divorce subject to certain conditions. 
One of these was that the couple had to have 
lived apart from one another for a period of, 
or periods amounting to, at least four years 
during the previous five years. The proposal 
is that this would be reduced or, perhaps, re-
moved from the Constitution in its entirety.
The other Catholic-influenced provision at 
issue for 2019 is Article 41. 2 of the Consti-
tution. This provides that:
1° In particular, the State recognises 
that by her life within the home, wom-
an gives to the State a support without 
7 This may have implications for other issues, including the question of the extent to which certain rights may or may not be reserved to citizens.
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which the common good cannot be 
achieved.
2° The State shall, therefore, endeav-
our to ensure that mothers shall not be 
obliged by economic necessity to en-
gage in labour to the neglect of their du-
ties in the home.
The provision has had little, if any, impact 
on constitutional litigation in Ireland but has 
long been criticized for its symbolic anach-
ronism. However, the Government’s initial 
proposal to abolish the Article encountered 
some opposition in Parliament from some 
members who argued in favour of re-draft-
ing it to make it gender neutral, or otherwise 
recognize the value of caring to society. This 
led to the postponement of the referendum 
from 2018 to 2019 in order to further con-
sider the issue.
In terms of the courts, the most anticipated 
judgment(s) of 2019 (so far) is the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in the linked cases of Kerins 
v McGuiness8 and O’Brien v Clerk of Dail 
Eireann.9 These were heard in March 2018 
and judgment is expected in the first quar-
ter of 2019. The first concerns a claim by a 
witness that her constitutional rights were 
infringed by the manner in which she was 
treated by a parliamentary committee. The 
second relates to a complaint that the Dáil’s 
(lower house) omission to sanction a TD 
(member of parliament) who had revealed 
information which was the subject of an in-
junction breached the constitutional rights of 
the party who had obtained the injunction. 
The previous case law on the scope, extent 
and justiciability of parliamentary privileges 
under the Constitution is less than clear—
something it is hoped the decisions will ad-
dress.
The other issue of note in the judicial domain 
is whether there is any further progress on 
the Government’s controversial proposals 
for reform of judicial appointments. These 
proposals (which were discussed in previous 
reports) have generated significant, if not 
unprecedented tensions between the political 
and legal branches. They also remain gov-
ernment policy and, perhaps more relevant-
ly, a particular priority of a party on whose 
support the minority government is depen-
dent. There is likely to be further controver-
sy if the Judicial Appointments Bill proceeds 
without amendment in 2019.
V. FURTHER READING
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+DUW¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQDO6\VWHPVRI WKH:RUOG
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8 An appeal from [2017] IEHC 34.
9 An appeal from [2017] IEHC 179.
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I. INTRODUCTION
,VUDHO¶V6XSUHPH&RXUWLVDPDMRULQÀXHQWLDO
SOD\HULQWKH¿HOGRIMXGLFLDOSROLWLFV1 After
PDUNHGD\HDUZLWKVLJQL¿FDQWMXGLFLDO
decisions, inter alia, invalidating a law based 
XSRQSURFHGXUDOÀDZV DQG LVVXLQJ D QRWLFH
of invalidation to a basic law concerning the 
biennial budget,2 2018 was a relatively mod-
erate year with not a single invalidation of a 
primary law or part thereof. 
In this report, we highlight major constitu-
tional developments, mainly the enactment 
of a new chapter in the Israeli constitution—
Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the 
Jewish People—and amendments to Basic 
Law: The Government on waging war. Fur-
thermore, we summarize the central consti-
tutional cases dealing with security, law and 
religion, delegation of authority and judicial 
review of basic laws. 
One additional notable development within 
the judiciary is the appointment, by the Ju-
dicial Appointments Committee, of two new 
justices to the Supreme Court—Prof. Alex 
Stein and Prof. Ofer Grosskopf. Prof. Gross-
kopf was previously a central district court 
judge, and Prof. Stein has been a professor 
of law in the US since 2004 and taught at 
Cardozo, Yeshiva University’s Law School, 
until moving to Brooklyn Law School in 
2016. The two new justices replaced retiring 
Justice Yoram Danziger, who was appoint-
ed as a full professor at Tel-Aviv Universi-
ty, Faculty of Law, and Justice Uri Shoham, 
who was appointed Ombudsman of the Is-
raeli Judiciary on November 2018.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS 
The most important development in Israeli 
constitutional law in 2018 was probably the 
enactment of the Basic Law: Israel as the 
Nation State of the Jewish People.3 On July 
19, 2018, in the very last day of the Knes-
set’s summer session, it passed a new Basic 
Law stating that Israel is the Nation State 
of the Jewish people by a majority of 62-55 
members. As the Israeli constitution-mak-
ing process is an incremental one, conduct-
ed in stages through the enactment of Basic 
Laws,4 this new Basic Law is a new ‘chap-
ter’ in Israel’s constitution, dealing with the 
identity of the State. 
1 On the Supreme Court’s legacy, see Pnina Lahav ‘Israel’s Supreme Court’, in Robert O. Freedman (ed), 
Contemporary Israel - Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Security Challenges (Routledge, 2008).
2 See Justice Uzi Vogelman, Yaniv Roznai, Ron Goldstein, Maya Gazit and Michael Herscovici, ‘Israel’, 
in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (eds), .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VU-
stitutional Law (I·CONnect-Clough Center, 2018) 151-155; Yaniv Roznai, ‘Constitutional Paternalism: 
The Israeli Supreme Court as Guardian of the Knesset’ (2019) 51(4) Verfassung und Recht in Übersee 
(forthcoming).
3 For a translation of the Basic Law, see https://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawNationState.pdf
4 We elaborate on this feature in Israeli constitutional law in our 2016 report. See Justice Uzi Vogelman, 
Nadiv Mordechay, Yaniv Roznai, and Tehilla Schwartz, ‘Developments in Israeli Constitutional Law’, in 
.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon 
Drugda (eds.), I·CONnect-Clough Center, 2017), 105-109.
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The Nation-State Basic Law states that Israel 
is the ‘national home of the Jewish people’, 
stating that ‘The exercise of the right to na-
tional self-determination in the State of Isra-
el is unique to the Jewish People.’ It includes 
eleven clauses, anchoring the State’s sym-
EROVVXFKDVLWVQDPHÀDJQDWLRQDODQWKHP
DQG HPEOHP DQWKHP RI¿FLDO ODQJXDJH DQG
national holidays. It states that ‘Jerusalem, 
complete and united, is the capital of Israel’, 
that ‘Hebrew is the State language’ and that 
Arabic, which had a formal status, now has 
‘a special status in the State… Nothing in 
this article shall affect the status given to the 
Arabic language before this law came into 
force.’ Thus, Hebrew is now Israel’s sole of-
¿FLDOODQJXDJH7KH%DVLF/DZIXUWKHUVWDWHV
that ‘The State shall be open for Jewish 
immigration, and for the Ingathering of the 
Exiles’, and elaborates on the connection of 
the State with the Jewish People. It also pro-
vides that ‘The State views the development 
of Jewish settlement as a national value, and 
shall act to encourage and promote its
establishment and strengthening.’ It further 
LQFOXGHV SURYLVLRQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH RI¿FLDO
calendar, Independence Day and Memorial 
Days, Days of Rest and Statutory Holidays. 
This Basic Law is formally entrenched and 
may be altered or repealed by a majority of 
61 members (out of 120) as opposed to a reg-
ular majority of members present, as is the 
case for ordinary laws.5
The Basic Law was at the center of public 
debates,6 and various petitions against its 
constitutionality were submitted to the High 
Court of Justice (HCJ). The President of the 
Supreme Court, Honorable Justice Esther 
Hayut, has announced that a panel of 11 jus-
tices will hear the petitions, which are cur-
rently pending. 
Another important constitutional change 
dealt with war powers. On May 2, 2018, 
Basic Law: The Government was amended 
to allow the transfer of authority to launch 
military operations and declare war from the 
government to the smaller Security Cabinet. 
The amendment also included a provision 
according to which a decision in the Securi-
ty Cabinet would be adopted with a quorum 
of half of the Cabinet’s members. However, 
in extreme and urgent conditions, the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Defense can decide 
to adopt such a decision with a narrower 
quorum.7
The constitutional provision that allowed 
the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense 
to decide, in extreme conditions, on war or 
on a substantive military operation on their 
own—without the approval of the Cabinet—
was abolished only two months later, in July 
2018. The rationale behind the abolishment 
was that ‘It is appropriate that a decision of 
the Ministerial Committee regarding starting 
DZDURUWDNLQJVLJQL¿FDQWPLOLWDU\DFWLRQWKDW
may at a high level of certainty lead to war 
be adopted by as wide a panel as possible.’8
The question of war powers is extremely im-
portant in Israel, which has been in a state of 
emergency since its establishment in 1948.9
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. HCJ 2964/18 Parents Circle – Families Fo-
rum, Bereaved Families for Peace v. Minister 
of Defense (April 17, 2018): Entry of Palestin-
ians to Israel for a Memory Ceremony
This petition was directed against the deci-
sion of the Minister of Defense not to allow 
3DOHVWLQLDQUHVLGHQWVRIWKH:HVW%DQNWRHQ-
ter Israel in order to participate in a private 
memorial service organized by the petition-
ers, a grassroots organization of families on 
ERWKVLGHVRI WKH,VUDHOL3DOHVWLQLDQFRQÀLFW
who have lost immediate family members in 
hostilities. The ceremony has been held an-
nually for the last 12 years with the purpose 
of joining together bereaved families who 
believe in reconciliation. It is attended by 
several thousand Israelis and takes place on 
the same day as the national Israeli Memo-
rial Day, which commemorates Israel’s fall-
en soldiers and victims of terrorism. For the 
past 12 years, except for one year in which 
the permit was denied for security reasons, 
the Minister of Defense allowed the entry 
of Palestinians into Israel so that they could 
take part in the ceremony.
The Petitioners argued that the Defense Min-
ister’s decision was unreasonable, based on 
extraneous considerations, and would consti-
tute a violation of the freedom of expression 
of both the organizers and the participants. 
They also noted the worthy, altruistic and 
positive values behind the ceremony and that 
without the participation of Israelis and Pal-
estinians side by side, the ceremony would 
be meaningless. On their part, the respon-
dents argued that the Defense Minister has 
a wide discretion, including consideration of 
the anticipated harm to the public’s feelings 
and bereaved Israeli families who were out-
spoken in their opposition to the ceremony. 
In addition, it was argued that non-citizens of 
Israel have no vested right to enter the coun-
try and that the petitioners have a reasonable 
alternative and can conduct the ceremony in 
WKH:HVW%DQN
The Court accepted the petition, ruling that 
the Defense Ministers’ discretion is not un-
limited and must be exercised in a reasonable 
manner and in accordance with the rules of 
administrative law. In its decision, the Court 
5 For the full text of the Basic Law, see: https://m.knesset.gov.il/EN/News/PressReleases/pages/Pr13978_pg.aspx
6 6U[OL)HZPJ3H ^ZLLLN:\aPL5H]V[º(UL^JOHW[LYPU0ZYHLS»Z¸JVUZ[P[\[PVU¹!0ZYHLSHZ[OL5H[PVU:[H[LVM[OL1L^PZO7LVWSL»=LYM)SVNO[[WZ!
verfassungsblog.de/a-new-chapter-in-israels-constitution-israel-as-the-nation-state-of-the-jewish-people/, DOI: https://doi.org/10.17176/20180727-124823-0; 
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, ‘Israel’s Nation-State Law – What Now for Equality, Self-Determination, and Social Solidarity?’ (October 1, 2018), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3270476; and especially this collection of essays: Simon Rabinovitch (ed.), +LÄUPUN0ZYHLS¶;OL1L^PZO:[H[L+LTVJYHJ `HUK[OL3H^(Hebrew Union 
College Press, 2018).
7 Amichai Cohen, ‘Who Can Declare War on Behalf of the Israeli People?’ IDI (May 06, 2018), https://en.idi.org.il/articles/23444
8 ‘Knesset rescinds law allowing PM, DM to declare war’ (July 17, 2018), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/249082
9 See generally, Suzie Navot, ‘Emergency as a State of Mind—the Case of Israel’ in Pierre Auriel, Olivier Beaud, and Carl Wellman (eds.), ;OL9\SLVM*YPZPZ!
;LYYVYPZT,TLYNLUJ`3LNPZSH[PVUHUK[OL9\SLVM3H^ (Springer, 2018), 185-212.
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took into consideration, among other things, 
that entry permits had been issued in the past. 
The Court pointed out that the respondents 
had not explained why the Defense Minister 
had decided to deviate and adopt a different 
policy. The Court also found that while the 
Defense Minister had considered the feel-
ings of certain bereaved Israeli families and 
part of the Israeli public who were against 
the ceremony, he had failed to consider the 
feelings of the bereaved families and the Is-
raeli public that did wish to conduct the cer-
emony and who identify with its goals. As an 
additional consideration, the Court took into 
account the position of the professional ech-
elon in the Ministry of Defense, who were 
of the opinion that the bereaved Palestinian 
families should be issued temporary entry 
permits in order to attend the ceremony.
2. HCJ 5744/16 Adv. Shachar Ben Meir v. 
The Knesset (May 27, 2018): An Unconstitu-
WLRQDO$PHQGPHQWWRD%DVLF/DZ"
These petitions, which were discussed in an 
expanded bench of nine justices, were direct-
ed against amendments to the Basic Law: 
The Knesset that allows the removal from 
the legislature of lawmakers whose actions 
constitute incitement to racism or support for 
an armed struggle against the State of Israel. 
Pursuant to the amendments, the process of 
UHPRYDOIURPRI¿FHLQFOXGHVVHYHUDOVWDJHV
7KHSURSRVDOWRUHPRYHDQ0.IURPRI¿FH
must enjoy the support of 70 MKs, of whom 
at least 10 must belong to a Party which is 
not a member of the coalition government. 
It must then be approved by the Knesset 
Committee and then adopted by the Knesset 
plenum by a majority of 90 of the 120 MKs. 
As an additional precaution, an MK whose 
service has been terminated may appeal to 
the Supreme Court.
According to the petitioners, the amend-
ment, commonly referred to as the ‘Remov-
DO/DZ¶ VLJQL¿FDQWO\ YLRODWHV WKH SULQFLSOH
of separation of powers and basic demo-
cratic principles, including the right to vote 
and to be elected, the right to equality and 
freedom of political expression. According-
ly, its adoption constitutes a misuse of the 
Knesset’s constituent powers. On the other 
hand, the respondents argued that the peti-
tion was not yet ripe, as the powers invested 
in the Knesset by the amendments had yet 
to be exercised. Moreover, these were not 
exceptional circumstances that could justify 
the Court’s intervention in a Basic Law, in-
ter alia, since the amendment was consistent 
with restrictions that apply to banning polit-
ical parties and nominees, and in light of the 
mechanism’s internal checks and balances. 
All justices on the bench agreed that the 
petitions should be dismissed, but for dif-
fering reasons. According to the main opin-
ion, written by the President of the Supreme 
Court, Honorable Justice Esther Hayut, the 
law unavoidably violates fundamental dem-
ocratic principles and constitutional rights, 
a matter which can be determined even be-
fore the law is applied. As an amendment to 
a Basic Law, it is clear that the manner of 
reviewing its constitutionality is not equal to 
WKDW RI D UHJXODU ODZ:KHUHDV LQ VRPH OH-
gal systems the doctrine of ‘Unconstitutional 
Constitutional Amendments’ exists, in the 
context of the ‘Removal Law’, there is no 
need yet to address and decide the question 
of the applicability of this doctrine in Israel, 
considering that the constituent body has not 
yet completed its constitution-making pro-
cess, and that the law does not negate the ba-
sic principles of the Israeli legal system. This 
is also in view of the checks and balances 
contained therein and the legitimate purpose 
of the law—preventing the use of democrat-
ic tools to advance anti-democratic goals.10
3. FHHCJ 3660/17 General Association of 
Merchants and Self-Employers v. Minister 
of the Interior (October 26, 2017): Legali-
ty of a Municipal By-Law Authorizing the 
Opening of Minimarkets on the Sabbath
A seven-justice bench held an additional 
hearing on an amendment to the Municipal 
By-Law of the City of Tel Aviv-Jaffa that au-
thorizes the opening of minimarkets in the 
city on the Sabbath (Friday evenings and 
Saturdays). In 2014, the Minister of the In-
terior exercised his authority and halted the 
publication and execution of the amendment. 
After the minister’s resignation, the decision 
on the matter by his successors was deferred 
again. The municipality appealed the sus-
pension of the by-laws and the Court accept-
ed its petition. This current request for an 
additional hearing was accepted as the Court 
held that the matter has broad implications, 
mainly the nature of the Sabbath in the pub-
lic sphere. In his decision, the minister had 
concluded that the amendments should not 
be adopted considering the scope of damage 
they would purportedly cause to the social 
and religious-national values that underlie 
the Sabbath.
The Court held by a majority opinion that 
the subject of the additional hearing should 
not be interfered with. Despite the grounds 
for dismissing the petition in limine, all the 
justices discussed the questions that arose 
on their merits. According to the Honorable 
President (ret.) Justice Miriam Naor, who 
wrote the main opinion of the Court, the 
minister’s position is unreasonable in the 
absence of proper weighting for the auton-
omous status of the municipality. According 
to the interpretation of the relevant legisla-
tion, the minister’s authority cannot replace 
the municipality’s discretion, which stems 
IURPWKHQHHGWREDODQFHFRQÀLFWLQJLQWHUHVWV
in a diverse society. According to the minori-
ty opinion, the minister’s decision should not 
be interfered with. 
In January 2018, in response to the Court’s 
ruling, amendments were made to the or-
ders authorizing the municipalities to enact 
by-laws. These amendments, commonly re-
ferred to as the ‘Minimarket Law’, include 
a demand for the consent of the Minister of 
10 On the applicability of the ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment’ in Israel, see Aharon Barak, ‘Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments’ (2011) 44(3) 
Israel Law Review 321; Yaniv Roznai, ‘Constitutional Unamendability in Israel: Remarks Following Professors Baxi, Hoque and Singh’ (2018) 0UKPHU1V\YUHSVM
*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS(KTPUPZ[YH[P]L3H^ (2018) 33; Mazen Masri, ‘Unamendability in Israel – A Critical Perspective’, in Richard Albert and Bertil Emrah Oder (eds.), An 
<UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHS*VUZ[P[\[PVU&<UHTLUKHIPSP[`PU*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS+LTVJYHJPLZ (Springer, Forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840941; Suzie Navot and 
Yaniv Roznai, ‘From Supra-Constitutional Principles to the Misuse of Constituent Power in Israel’ (2019), ,\YVWLHU1V\YUHSVM3H^9LMVYT (forthcoming).
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the Interior as a condition for the validity of 
by-laws regarding the opening and closing 
of businesses on days of rest. At the time of 
this writing, petitions submitted by a number 
of municipalities against the new authority 
of the minister are pending.
4. HCJ 4113/13 The Coordinating Bureau 
of the Economic Organizations v. The Min-
ister of the Interior (March 26, 2018): The 
Legality of Municipalities to Delegate the 
Collection of Municipal Taxes to Private 
Companies
The basis of this petition questions whether 
municipalities have the authority to delegate 
the collection of municipal taxes and other 
compulsory payments to private companies 
LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI VSHFL¿F VWDWXWRU\ OHJLVOD-
tion’s explicit authorization. During the dis-
cussion, the justices examined the actions 
taken by the private collection companies 
in order to decide whether this is a techni-
cal action or an action requiring discretion. 
The current petition was submitted in 2013, 
and for several years no decision was giv-
en in light of the State’s announcement that 
the matter at hand was just before legislative 
regulation. However, the legislative process 
did not progress for many years, and thus the 
time came for a decision to be made upon 
the matter.
The HCJ accepted the petition, stating that 
local municipalities should not be allowed to 
delegate their authority to collect taxes and 
other payments to private companies without 
being regulated by an authorized legislation. 
The Court ruled that private collection com-
panies carry out actions that cannot solely be 
regarded as ‘technical matters’. The Court 
concluded that in accordance with the ex-
isting law, performing collection actions 
through private companies is a forbidden 
delegated authority using discretion, and is 
not merely technical assistance. The Court 
stated that according to Section 249(31) of 
the Municipalities Ordinance, the munici-
pality is entitled to carry out its functions 
‘together or in partnership’ with other par-
ties, but this provision does not justify the 
transfer of discretion to those entities. In or-
der not to ‘shock’ the existing systems and 
allow the respondents reasonable additional 
time to advance the legislative process, the 
HCJ gave a period of a year to complete leg-
islation regulating the status of the collection 
companies, if the Knesset so wishes.
5. HCJ 3003/18 Yesh Din et al. v. IDF Chief 
of Staff et al (May 24, 2018): Lawfulness of 
the IDF’s Rules of Engagement During the 
Recent Events on the Gaza border 
Since Palestinian ‘Land Day’ on March 30, 
2018, thousands of Palestinians staged large-
scale, violent demonstrations in the area of 
the security perimeter between Israel and the 
Gaza Strip. The petition challenged the rules 
of engagement governing the use of force 
by the Israeli security forces in the violent 
clashes in the area of the security fence be-
tween Israel and the Gaza Strip. 
The petitions argued that the rules of engage-
ment allowing the Israeli security forces to 
use lethal force against persons deemed ‘pri-
mary inciters’ even when such persons did 
not present an imminent, actual threat to hu-
man life, are prohibited. The respondents ar-
gued that the rules of engagement are consis-
tent with Israeli and international law as well 
as with the case law of the Supreme Court.
A three-justice panel unanimously dismissed 
the petition. According to Justice Melcer, 
deputy president of the Supreme Court, who 
wrote the primary judgment, the HCJ could 
not examine the means employed by the IDF 
in response to the events, both because of the 
great restraint required in judicial review of 
military operations that are not prima facie
unlawful, and particularly in circumstances 
in which the requested review is of the im-
plementation of operational policy occurring 
in real time.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
There are several questions awaiting Israel 
both in constitutional law and constitutional 
politics. As for the latter, this year is an elec-
tion year. Elections for the 21st Knesset will 
be on April 9, 2019. 
As for constitutional law, there are 14 chal-
lenges submitted to the HCJ concerning the 
above-mentioned ‘nation state law’, which 
will be heard this year and which have in-
stigated a public debate on the authority of 
the HCJ to review basic laws, i.e., laws of a 
constitutional status. 
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ITALY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Italian Constitutional Court (hereafter 
ICC or “the Court”) has long characterized 
its position within the constitutional system 
by exercising a significant effort in coordi-
nating its powers both with other constitu-
tional institutions (“horizontal relationality”) 
and with international and supranational law 
(“vertical relationality”). Accordingly, our 
report on constitutional developments in 
2016 primarily focused on aspects of vertical 
relationality, while our 2017 report focused 
on horizontal relationality. These dimensions 
remained crucial in 2018: in particular, the 
Court intensified its capacity of relationality 
with civil society by organizing an unprec-
edented number of visits by constitutional 
judges to public schools and prisons.1 Last
year’s case law also stands out for an ap-
parent judicial engagement on fundamental 
rights. The Court reasserted its crucial role in 
one of the most classical and characterizing 
ILHOGV RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO DGMXGLFDWLRQ:KLOH
this concern emerges more clearly in crucial 
developments concerning limits to the judi-
cial enforcement of rights (and focusing in 
particular on significant decisions reported 
in Part II concerning the mitigation of cor-
rectional harshness, alternatives to mandato-
ry sentences, and end-of-life choices), it runs 
through many other segments of the 2018 
ICC’s case law (Part III). 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The ICC’s activism on rights manifested 
itself on many fronts, and along many di-
mensions. The three rulings selected here 
share two traits: they all concern delicate 
substantive issues; they also present some 
long-standing problems connected to the 
limits of judicial review.2
The ICC’s judicial review “excludes any 
consideration of a political nature as well 
as any control on the discretionary powers 
of the Parliament”: each ruling should rest 
on purely legal grounds; no choices should 
be made if they entail political assessments. 
Moreover, the Court is bound to the specific 
LVVXHVUDLVHGEHIRUHLW:KHQLWDQQXOVDODZ
the ICC has some room for manipulation, 
but only to a limited extent. These circum-
stances—by no means exclusive to the Ital-
ian model—can hinder the judicial enforce-
ment of constitutional rights, as the cases 
here demonstrate.
The cases are in order of increasing diffi-
culty of the relevant problems as well as in-
creasing boldness of the ICC in dealing with 
them.
The first judgment3 concerned life sentences 
for persons convicted of kidnapping victims 
for a ransom and causing their death. Due 
1 :LL[OLVɉJPHS^LIZP[L^^ ^JVY[LJVZ[P[\aPVUHSLP[PU[OLZLJ[PVU¸=PHNNPVPU0[HSPH¶3H*VY[LJVZ[P[\aPV-
UHSLULSSLJHYJLYP¶3H*VY[LJVZ[P[\aPVUHSLULSSLZJ\VSL¹;OLPUP[PH[P]LPZVUNVPUN"HUL^YV\UKVM]PZP[ZPU
schools was announced on 4 February 2019.
2 For a general outline, see Vittoria Barsotti, Paolo G Carozza, Marta Cartabia and Andrea Simoncini, Italian 
*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS1\Z[PJLPU.SVIHS*VU[L_[6<7<:(ɈɈ 
3 Corte costituzionale, Judgment of 11 July 2018, No. 149.
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to the extreme seriousness of the offence 
(normally connected with organized crime), 
this sentence precludes most of the benefits 
(leaves, work-release, day-release) which 
usually reward the convicts’ gradual prog-
ress towards rehabilitation. The benefits be-
come accessible only after 26 years of prison 
time; but at that point, if not earlier (thanks 
to cooperation with justice), inmates may be 
entitled already to conditional liberation (pa-
role), which is far more favorable. And yet, 
as an additional paradox, liberation (as well 
as day-release) might be denied precisely be-
cause of the lack of previous, more limited, 
and successful release experiments.
According to the ICC, this regulatory frame-
work is unconstitutional. The Court put three 
main arguments at the basis of its decision: 
1) The Constitution requires correctional 
flexibility, i.e., rewarding social rehabilita-
tion with a progressive pattern through time; 
2) The offenders’ commitment to rehabili-
tation should not be discouraged by putting 
rewards beyond a very distant horizon; 
3) Such harshness is due only to the offence 
committed, without any regard for the of-
fenders’ personality, behavior, and social 
dangerousness (or lack thereof). The Italian 
Constitution assumes that the offender’s per-
sonality is never irreversibly marred, how-
ever heinous a crime may be. The offender 
has the responsibility to engage on a path 
towards critical revision and rehabilitation; 
society, on its side, must allow and stimulate 
such progress. Therefore, the ICC removed 
the rigid legal barrier.
There is an inconvenient issue here: because 
of the effect of the decision, benefits be-
come accessible for life sentences, but not 
for fixed-term sentences (e.g., 30 years) for 
similar offences (e.g., kidnapping for ransom 
which does not cause the victim’s death). In 
a sense, the former sentences become more 
flexible than the latter. The ICC is aware of 
this but feels unable to extend the scope of its 
ruling, which is bound to the specific ques-
tion raised.
And yet the Court is undeterred: an annul-
ment shall not be denied only because it cre-
ates abstract inconsistencies within the legal 
order. It is for the legislator to address and 
resolve these problems. Of course, one may 
add, nothing prevents a similar constitution-
al question from also being raised before the 
ICC on fixed-term sentences, in separate 
proceedings.
The second judgment4 concerned the punish-
ment for bankruptcy; not the main sanction 
(prison time), but the additional sanction, 
namely the prohibition from owning any 
commercial enterprise (and holding manag-
ing offices within one). This prohibition is 
mandatory and always lasts 10 years.
In principle, all punishments should have a 
duration comprised between a minimum and 
a maximum, to be calibrated by the judge in 
each single case. Only exceptionally may the 
term be directly and precisely fixed by law, 
and only if it reasonably fits the whole scope 
of behaviors which the criminal provision 
aims at punishing. This is not the case with 
bankruptcy; it has several legal variants, 
each of them applicable to a wide range of 
situations. However, a further issue emerges: 
what should be the duration of these addi-
tional sanctions, if the fixed 10-year duration 
LVXQZDUUDQWHG"1HLWKHUODZQRUORJLFJLYHV
“one right answer.” A whole range of options 
is theoretically available.
In these situations in the past, the ICC would 
issue an inadmissibility ruling: there is a uni-
vocal constitutional problem, but no equal-
ly univocal constitutional solution (no “set 
rhymes” for replacing the wrong “verse” in 
the law); only the Parliament may choose 
one. Here, the ICC takes a less deferential 
stance. It notes that the Parliament has not 
heeded the ICC’s own call (in a judgment 
of 20125) for a general reform of additional 
sanctions. It is unbecoming to wait any lon-
ger. Now, according to the ICC, it is neces-
sary, but also sufficient, to seek within the 
existing legal system a plausible alternative 
to the 10-year fixed term6. In this case, the 
alternative is the “up to 10 years” duration 
established for the same punishment in dif-
ferent but comparable economic crimes. This 
gives the judge enough discretion to make 
the punishment fit the crime and to preserve 
the distinctive dissuasive effect of this type 
of additional sanction. The Court eventually 
notes that the Parliament may still amend the 
law if it seems appropriate.
Arguably, the most surprising novelty of the 
year came in the third case, concerning the 
criminal indictment of assistance to suicide.7
For the ICC, the prohibition of such assis-
tance is constitutionally sound, in general. 
But a distinction must be made when specif-
ic conditions are met: the relevant illness is 
irreversible and causes intolerable physical 
or psychological suffering or the patient sur-
vives only due to life support but is still capa-
ble of free and fully conscious decisions. In 
these tragic instances, patients already have 
a statutory right to refuse life support (and 
obtain continuous deep sedation); therefore, 
for the ICC, it is unreasonable to deny them 
the right to request assistance in anticipating 
their own death when they find this option 
more dignified and more merciful for their 
loved ones.
Here a serious problem arises. The option 
for assisted suicide should be exercised only 
within a specific and carefully crafted legal 
framework. The issues in need of regulation 
include the relevant preliminary assessments; 
the medical enactment of the assistance, pos-
sibly only in public hospitals; and the consci-
entious objection of doctors and paramedics. 
Also, every patient must have effective access 
to palliative care before alternatives are even 
considered. All these issues have substantial 
political implications and, therefore, should 
be settled by the Parliament.
4 Corte costituzionale, Judgment of 5 December 2018, No. 222.
5 Corte costituzionale, Judgment of 31 May 2012, n. 134, Giur. cost., 2012, III, 1850 (It.).
6 The ICC also builds on its Judgment of 10 November 2016, No. 236, Foro it. 2017, I, 97 (It.), in our 2017 report (p. 158, fn. 10).
7 Corte costituzionale, Order of 16 November 2018, No. 207.
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 169
In the past, when this kind of problem arose, 
normally the question would be dismissed 
as inadmissible, in deference to the legisla-
tive discretion of the Parliament; if the latter 
would not intervene, and the same question 
happened to be raised again at a later point, 
the ICC might abandon its self-restraint and 
lay hands on the relevant legislation (see also 
above). This time, the ICC took a different 
stance: it still refused to immediately take 
action and strike down or manipulate the law 
as things stood (allo stato); but it did not con-
clude the judgment (with an inadmissibility 
ruling) and instead postponed it to a later 
date (24.09.2019) to see if the law would be 
amended through a political process. This 
was an attempt at imitating techniques em-
ployed by other constitutional tribunals: the 
decision explicitly quotes the Supreme Court 
of Canada in Carter v Canada;8 and a study 
by the ICC’s Research Office (Comparative 
Law Unit) refers to similar practices by the 
Austrian and German constitutional tribu-
nals.9 There is a fundamental difference: the 
ICC neither struck down a legal provision 
while suspending the ruling’s effects nor 
set a binding term for the legislator; it sim-
ply delayed its judgment, keeping it entirely 
open in its outcome, albeit on grounds that 
might support a final annulment.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgment No. 5 of 2018: Mandatory vac-
cination imposed by law
In this case, the Court considered two appli-
cations from the Veneto region contesting a 
decree-law laying down urgent provisions 
concerning mandatory vaccinations imposed 
by national law. The provisions listed 10 
mandatory vaccines for all minor children 
under the age of 16, four of which were 
already mandatory, and six of which were 
elevated from recommended to mandatory 
status. Under the decree-law, the mandato-
ry vaccines were a requirement for access to 
early childhood educational services, mak-
ing enrollment contingent upon the presenta-
tion of a certificate of vaccination. Noncom-
pliance could also result in administrative 
fines. The Court ruled that urgent provisions 
were appropriate given the preventive nature 
of vaccinations and the declining level of 
coverage in Italy. Second, the Court clarified 
that the choice of tightening up legislation to 
compel vaccinations was not unreasonable, 
as, in medical practice, recommendation 
and obligation are conjoined concepts, and 
a shift from the latter to the former is jus-
tified by the growing concerns on vaccina-
tion coverage. Third, it stated that requiring 
a certificate to enroll in school and imposing 
fines was reasonable, not least because the 
legislator had provided for initial steps that 
included one-on-one meetings with parents 
and guardians to inform them about vaccine 
efficacy. Finally, it noted that epidemiologi-
cal conditions must be constantly monitored 
and that in the future, depending on the rel-
evant findings, it could be possible to exper-
iment with downgrading certain vaccines 
from mandatory to suggested status.
2. Judgment Nos. 81 and 183 of 2018: Sub-
national minorities and symbols
These decisions deal with two separate re-
gional legislative initiatives originating from 
the Veneto region (which has recently been 
particularly active in constitutional litiga-
tion).
In the first case, the Court considered a di-
rect application from the President of the 
Council of Ministers challenging a Veneto 
regional law classifying the “Veneto people” 
as a national minority under the international 
Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. The Court struck down 
the whole regional law as unconstitutional. 
The Court’s main argument was based on the 
fact that protection of minorities, as an ex-
pression of the principle of pluralism, is to 
be included among the supreme principles of 
WKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOV\VWHP:LWKLQWKLVIUDPH-
work, both regional and State legislation are 
called to ensure the objective of the concrete 
effectiveness of such protection. Howev-
er, the Court held that the identification of 
national minorities is an exclusive compe-
tence of the State legislator. Regions may 
not classify their own population as such and 
automatically as “national minorities.” This 
would undermine the unity and indivisibility 
of the Republic, as safeguarded in Article 5 
of the Constitution. 
In the second case, the Court decided on a 
constitutional issue concerning another re-
gional legislation adopted in Veneto. This 
regional law required State bodies and enti-
ties to display certain regional flags outside 
of buildings and on certain vessels within 
the regional territory. The Court struck down 
these provisions as unconstitutional, and 
held that “the contested legislation encroach-
es upon the exclusive legislative competence 
of the State over the legal and administrative 
organisation of the State and of national pub-
lic bodies.” Interestingly, the Court drew a 
parallel between State-region relations and 
the EU-Member State relations. As Member 
States display the EU flag on governmental 
buildings but may not impose the display of 
Member States’ flags on EU governmental 
buildings, regions are required to display na-
tional symbols, but may not require national 
authorities to display regional symbols. 
3. Judgment No. 115 of 2018: Taricco saga 
(final episode)
:LWK WKLV MXGJPHQW WKH ,&&ZURWH WKH ODVW
chapter of an important saga that called the 
ICC and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union into a historical judicial dialogue.
The stake at issue derives from the so-called 
“Taricco case” of the CJEU (Case C-105/14, 
Taricco and others), originating a saga con-
sisting of multiple decisions.10:LWKWKLVODVW
episode, the ICC ruled on the applicabili-
ty of the so-called “Taricco rule” within the 
Italian legal system. This rule—interpreta-
tively drawn by the CJEU from Article 325 
TFEU—implied for national courts the obli-
8 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5.
9 Maria Theresa Rörig (ed.), ‘Le pronunce di incostituzionalità e di incompatibilità costituzionale nella giurisprudenza costituzionale tedesca e austriaca’, October 
2018, Comp. 242, in https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/242_incompatibilita_Germania_Austria.pdf
10 For an overview of the preceding episodes of this saga, see our 2016 and 2017 reports. 
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gation to set aside national legislation on the 
limitation of offences, which, in the situations 
and under the circumstances described by the 
CJEU, compromises the efficacy of the pen-
alty. This consequence was particularly prob-
lematic in the Italian legal system, as statute 
of limitation is considered an institution of 
substantive criminal law, and falls therefore 
within the scope of the principle of legality in 
criminal matters. Thus, some Italian judges, 
when called to apply the “Taricco rule” after 
the CJEU decision, claimed that by disapply-
ing the national legislation concerning the 
limitation they would have violated Italian 
constitutional identity, and in particular the 
principle of legality in criminal matters. The 
ICC, called to decide on these constitutional 
questions, made a reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling to the Court of Justice, substan-
tially sharing the referring judges concerns, 
but giving a chance to the CJEU to settle the 
issue by means of (re-)interpretation of the 
“Taricco rule.” The CJEU accommodated the 
ICC’s concerns and revised its previous de-
cision: national courts were given the chance 
to scrutinise the level of determination in the 
individual case in order to avoid any possible 
clash with the higher level of protection that 
is ensured to the principle of legality in crim-
inal matters in the Italian legal order, and in 
particular by safeguarding the prohibition of 
UHWURDFWLYHDSSOLFDWLRQRIFULPLQDO ODZ:LWK
its Judgment no. 115 of 2018, the ICC closed 
the saga by acknowledging the CJEU’s re-in-
terpretation. Moreover, the ICC held that in 
no case could the “Taricco rule” apply in the 
Italian legal order, even if the application of 
the rule turned out to be not retroactive, as the 
“Taricco rule” violated the constitutional prin-
ciple of legal certainty in criminal matters. In 
fact, the Court held that the rule was overly 
vague and indeterminate. However, because 
the violation of the principle of legal certain-
ty in criminal matters served as an absolute 
bar on the introduction of the “Taricco rule” 
into the Italian legal system, the Court held 
that the Italian legal provisions that would 
otherwise work to incorporate the rule into 
the legal system did not do so; therefore, the 
questions raised by the referring courts were 
unfounded.
4. Judgment No. 120 of 2018: Legal status 
of the ECtHR and European Social Charter
In this case, the Court heard referral orders 
challenging the constitutionality of legis-
lation that prohibited the establishment of 
trade unions by members of the armed forc-
es with reference to ECtHR case law and 
the European Social Charter. As a matter of 
sources of law, the ICC held that decisions 
of the European Committee of Social Rights 
do not entail the same status as ECtHR case 
law in the Italian legal system. On the con-
trary, as the Charter is to be labeled under the 
general umbrella of international law under 
Article 117(1) of the Italian Constitution, the 
European Committee decisions are merely 
“authoritative.” However, the Court found 
that the contested legislation—in the part in 
which it prohibits, independently and in gen-
eral, the trade union freedom of the Italian 
military—was incompatible with the ECHR 
and the European Social Charter, but that 
these instruments allowed for the imposition 
of restrictions in relation to certain special 
categories, such as the armed forces. The 
Court also held that Italian constitutional 
law required the regulation of these restric-
tions—and the restrictions’ limitations—by 
law. Therefore, the Court instructed the leg-
islature to adopt suitable legislation, balanc-
ing all constitutional interests involved. In 
the meantime, considering the utmost impor-
tance of the constitutional rights in discus-
sion, the Court held that their effectiveness 
could not be conditioned to legislative action 
(or inaction), and therefore found that certain 
provisions regulating military bodies, al-
ready in force, could be applied pending the 
enactment of a new legislative framework.
5. Judgment Nos. 106, 107 and 166: Social 
rights of legal immigrants
In three judgments, the ICC reiterated its 
long-established finding that Article 3 (prin-
ciple of equality) of the Italian Constitution 
is a bulwark against policies that rely on con-
tinued presence in a territory as a requisite for 
accessing social benefits, in a thinly veiled 
attempt at excluding recent immigrants from 
welfare. As a matter of principle, situations 
of need or hardship, directly related to the 
human person as such, are the foremost pre-
requisite for enjoying social benefits: when 
legal immigrants incur such a situation, they 
should not be discriminated against. In the-
ory, some benefits could require a stronger 
and more stable integration in the local terri-
tory and community. This might happen for 
social housing, as frequent changes in tenan-
cy would aggravate and hamper administra-
tive action. But such limiting choices must 
not be arbitrary or unreasonable. The ICC 
also relied on anti-discriminatory EU law as 
a significant complement in the judicial en-
forcement of equality. Two of the three rul-
ings concerned access to, respectively, social 
housing and kindergartens; non-EU citizens 
were entitled only if they had been legal res-
idents in the region for a long time (respec-
tively, 10 and 15 years).11 The third judgment 
struck down analogous national provisions 
concerning support for housing expenses.12
Indeed, in this field, the ICC’s scrutiny was 
far from deferential towards both regional 
and national laws.
6. Judgment Nos. 174 and 186 of 2018: Pris-
oners’ rights
Judgment No. 149 (see above) was not the 
only one in the year dealing with prisoners’ 
rights, even when they are convicted of seri-
ous offenses. In another instance, a mother of 
three (two 5-year-old twins and one 3-year-
old child) was serving a sentence for drug 
trafficking. Several law provisions allow 
mothers of young children to avoid detention 
in prisons, but only one provision, concerning 
prison leaves, was applicable in the specific 
situation. Yet the sentence for the relevant 
offence was among those precluding leaves, 
both for working and taking care of young 
children, until one-third of the prison time 
had been served. For the ICC, this violated 
Article 31 of the Italian Constitution: the chil-
dren’s interests have a special constitutional 
status and deserve a distinct protection; there-
fore, care-leaves cannot be equalized with 
work-leaves, where only the offender’s right 
to resocialization is at stake. It is true that 
11 Corte costituzionale, Judgment of 24 May 2018, No. 106, and of 25 May 2018, No. 107.
12 Corte costituzionale, Judgment of 20 July 2018, No. 166.
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convicted parents may still obtain leaves if 
they cooperate with justice (or if cooperation 
is proved to be impossible, irrelevant, etc.) 
and that this condition is not, in principle, an 
unreasonable measure for fighting organized 
crime. But no rule should rigidly sacrifice 
children’s best interests in the name of social 
defense. Therefore, again, the ICC removed 
the rigid legal barrier and allowed each case 
to be individually assessed.
Another judgment concerned high-security 
detention, where special limitations to pris-
oners’ rights were adopted to prevent con-
tacts with criminal organizations, and also 
interactions with inmates belonging to the 
same or different (allied or hostile) organiza-
tions. In 2009, a new limitation, previously 
considered only in administrative guidelines, 
was imposed by statutory law: the prohibi-
tion to cook raw food. This limitation was 
entirely unreasonable for the ICC; it served 
no purpose for either internal security or 
the fight against crime. Therefore, it had a 
merely afflictive character, whereas those 
detained in high-security conditions “must 
retain access to small gestures of ordinary 
life, particularly precious as they are the last 
residues where their individual freedom can 
expand.” The measure was struck down as 
both unreasonable and incompatible with the 
humanity prescribed by Article 27 of the Ital-
ian Constitution for all punishments.
7. Judgment No. 194 of 2018: Labor law re-
form, unjustified dismissal
In this case, the Court considered a refer-
ral order challenging a legislative decree 
on permanent employment contracts with 
increasing protection over time (known as 
“jobs-act”), which made provision for com-
pensation within fixed bands in the event of 
unfair dismissal based solely on the length 
of service of the dismissed employee. Ac-
cording to the contested provisions, the com-
pensation consisted of two months’ wages 
for each year of seniority of the employee 
(between the minimum of six and the maxi-
mum of 36 months’ salary). The Court struck 
down the contested legislation as partly un-
constitutional, as it was incompatible both 
with national constitutional law and with the 
European Social Charter. Specifically, the 
ICC struck down those norms that automati-
cally tied the amount of compensation to the 
length of service of the dismissed employ-
ee. The Court ruled that, in treating different 
situations identically, the criterion in ques-
tion violated the principle of equality: “the 
detriment caused in various cases by unfair 
dismissal depends upon a variety of factors. 
:KLOVWOHQJWKRIVHUYLFHLVFHUWDLQO\UHOHYDQW
it is thus only one of many.” The Court also 
held that the lack of flexibility rendered the 
mechanism for establishing compensation 
unreasonable. In addition, the mechanism 
failed to achieve a balanced settlement be-
tween the respective interests of the employ-
er and the employee.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
In September 2019, the next stage of the pro-
ceedings on the right to assisted suicide will 
take place. As noted above, a new, experi-
mental decisional technique has been creat-
ed. The actual mix of activism and restraint 
will become clear only at the end of this con-
troversial case.
An important judgment will concern the 
2018 budget law. Its entire text has been re-
written by the Government with a last-min-
ute amendment (after extensive negotiations 
with the European Commission) and has 
been approved by the Senate with a particu-
larly hasty procedure. Some opposition sen-
ators have challenged the deliberation before 
the ICC (in a conflict of attribution), arguing 
that in such a short time it was impossible 
to read and understand the text before voting 
on it. The preliminary stage of this litigation 
should be completed in January 2019.
Many other issues are on the rolls for 2019, 
e.g., the rights of offenders, including those 
who are mentally ill or have a life sen-
tence for very serious crimes (barring ac-
cess to most benefits: see above); those of 
sex-workers, in the light of the criminal pro-
hibitions concerning prostitution; stepchild 
adoption in same-sex couples; and on a more 
technical note, the capacity of the antitrust 
administrative authority to challenge laws in 
incidental proceedings as if it were a judi-
cial authority. Furthermore, some questions 
on the relationship with the Court of Justice 
of the European Union remain open after the 
evolutions in 2017.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the project of authoritarian constitu-
tionalism pushed by the Abe administration 
was frustrated by unexpected domestic and 
international events. Even so, Abe was eager 
to challenge the status quo of both “large-c” 
Constitution and “small-c” constitution. In 
this situation, the judicial branch in the 2018 
term did not play a leading role. Rather, the 
2018 term showed how important public 
opinion and the extra-judicial system were 
as guardians of the Constitution. In the end, 
Abe’s attempt towards constitutional amend-
ment came to a standstill because of a failure 
to get broad public support. Furthermore, 
the governmental action to introduce a web-
site-blocking system also suffered a setback 
in the pre-legislative process. On the other 
hand, the controversy between Okinawa and 
the central government over relocation of the 
US military base is entering into a new stage 
of Ackermanian constitutional politics.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Movement towards constitutional 
amendment 
The Constitution of Japan has never expe-
rienced any amendment since its creation 
on May 3, 1947. Prime Minister and Presi-
dent of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
Shinzo Abe has nonetheless shown a strong 
desire to amend it. For amendment, the Con-
stitution requires the support of two-thirds 
(a supermajority) of both houses of the Diet 
and a simple majority of voters of the Jap-
anese people. However, this hasn’t become 
much of a great obstacle for Abe. On July 
10, 2016, in the regular election of members 
of the House of Councillors (the upper house 
of the Diet), the LDP and other pro-amend-
ment parties gained a supermajority. Subse-
quently, in the general election of members 
of the House of Representatives (the lower 
house of the Diet) on October 22, 2017, the 
governing coalition of the LDP and Komeito 
retained a supermajority. 
Soon after the general election in 2017, the 
LDP released a paper setting out four items 
for amendment: (1) clarification of constitu-
tionality of the Self-Defense Force (SDF), 
(2) introduction of emergency powers, (3) 
fixing prefectures as fundamental districts 
for House of Councillor elections and (4) 
enhancement of education. Concerning the 
first point, the government has repeatedly 
made statements that the SDF is not uncon-
stitutional even under the current Article 9 of 
the Constitution. Nevertheless, Abe claims 
that the amendment of Article 9 is required 
in order to eradicate views regarding the 
SDF as unconstitutional. The paper present-
ed two options to clarify the constitutionality 
of the SDF. The first option was to keep all 
of the present Article 9 and just add word-
ing stipulating the status of the SDF. The 
second option was to delete Article 9 (2) as 
well as add the stipulation wording. Of these 
two options, Abe has placed the first as the 
most workable alternative. Based on this pa-
per, the LDP aimed to present a draft of the 
amendment to the Diet in 2018. 
However, the movement toward the amend-
ment began to lose momentum at the begin-
ning of 2018. In February 2017, a scandal 
broke out when media reported that Abe and 
his wife might have been involved in the 
* We thank Professor Yasuo Hasebe (Waseda University) for valuable advice and Professor Keith Carpenter 
(Kobe University) for language editing.
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improper disposal of state-owned land to a 
school operated by an acquaintance of theirs. 
Abe strongly denied their involvement in ses-
sions at the Diet. However, in March 2018, 
a further scandal broke when media reported 
that the Finance Ministry had tampered with 
official documents submitted to the Diet to 
make their content consistent with Abe’s re-
sponses in the Diet. After this new scandal 
broke out, discussion at the Diet on amend-
ment stopped, and the approval rating of the 
Abe administration dropped to nearly 30 
percent. In addition to this, the détente cre-
ated by the North Korea–United States Sin-
gapore Summit on June 12 extinguished the 
intense feeling of anxiety people had for na-
tional security. Finally, the LDP was forced 
to abandon their initial plan to present a draft 
amendment to the Diet in 2018.
2. Website-blocking controversy
There was a heated argument over the pros 
and cons of legislation on website blocking 
in 2018. Piracy websites offering manga 
and anime for free inflicted serious damage 
on the content industries. Although copy-
right holders could seek legal remedies 
such as injunctions and compensation from 
infringers, the industries argued that these 
remedies were not enough because opera-
tors of the piracy websites were anonymous 
and the online locations of these websites 
were outside Japan. They requested the gov-
ernment to introduce legal measures that 
oblige Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to 
block access to the piracy websites by an 
executive or judicial order.  
In EU law, arguments against website block-
ing are based on human rights; in particular, 
freedom of expression and free access to in-
formation. On the other hand, in Japan, the 
arguments on blocking are based on not only 
these rights but also the secrecy of commu-
nications. However, the underlying logic is 
somewhat complex. 
Article 21(2) of the Constitution provides 
“the secrecy of any means of communication 
[shall not] be violated.” Traditional interpre-
tation of this article has been that the “acqui-
sition” of information without consent of the 
communicators corresponds to a “violation” 
prohibited by Article 21(2) and that even if 
the information is acquired legitimately, “us-
ing” it or “leaking” it to others against the 
will of communicators is also regarded as a 
“violation.” It is not clear whether this con-
stitutional protection of the secrecy of com-
munication has horizontal effect. However, 
because Article 4 (1) of the Telecommunica-
tions Business Act (TBA) also provides “The 
secrecy of communications being handled 
by a telecommunications carrier shall not 
be violated,” ISPs as telecommunications 
carriers are prohibited by law from violating 
the secrecy of communications. A violator of 
this prohibition incurs criminal sanction. 
Under the above legal rule, Japanese law re-
gards website blocking as an infringement of 
the secrecy of communications for the fol-
lowing reason. Generally, ISPs cannot carry 
out their Internet connection service without 
“acquiring” and “using” information such 
as the hostname, IP address and URL of the 
website to which their customer wants access. 
This “acquiring” and “using” in itself does 
not correspond to a “violation” of the secrecy 
of communications insofar as it is conducted 
only to the extent necessary for legitimate 
business activity. In the case of blocking, 
however, the ISPs use the information from 
the communications not for a website con-
nection which the customer requests but for 
blocking access to the website against their 
will. Even if the process of blocking proceeds 
automatically based on an algorithm, such 
usage is regarded as “using without permis-
sion,” which the TBA prohibits. 
The development of blocking disputes in 
2018 can be divided into two stages. The 
first stage was a move leading up to an ex-
ecutive opinion issued on April 13. As de-
scribed above, voluntary blocking by ISPs 
is prohibited by the TBA. However, block-
ing child pornography websites has been 
considered a justifiable “emergency action” 
(Kinkyu-hinan) permitted under the Crim-
inal Code to protect the personal rights of 
children. Although conventional wisdom has 
considered that blocking justified as “emer-
gency action” can only be applied against 
child pornography, on April 13, the Intellec-
tual Property Strategy Headquarters, head-
ed by Prime Minister Abe, issued an opin-
ion without sufficient discussion that ISPs 
should block access to three specified piracy 
websites as “emergency action.” Although 
the legal characteristic of this opinion is ob-
scure, NTT (the largest telecommunications 
operator in Japan) immediately introduced a 
policy to block access to the websites men-
tioned by the April 13 opinion.  
This sequence of events was fraught with 
serious problems from the perspectives of 
the separation of powers and the rule of law 
because while the Diet has protected the se-
crecy of communications of individuals by 
legislating the TBA, the April 13 opinion 
undermined this right significantly without 
due legal process. Critics argued that if this 
approach applied to other targets like defama-
tion, false rumor and terrorism, freedom of 
communication on the Internet will disappear. 
However, the direction drastically changed 
in the second phase, which is a move to-
wards legislation on blocking. Soon after re-
leasing the April 13 opinion, the government 
HVWDEOLVKHG D WDVN IRUFH $QWL3LUDF\:HE-
sites Task Force) to determine the appropri-
ate direction of legislation on blocking. The 
members of the task force consisted of stake-
holders, lawyers and legal academics but no 
politicians. It is noteworthy that the members 
included not only those who support block-
ing but also many others who oppose it. It 
can be inferred that the government needed 
to include members who oppose blocking 
because the legislation on it requires pro-
fessional knowledge, which such opponents 
have, and the government was unable to ig-
nore public opinion against blocking.
Under the Constitution of Japan, the consti-
tutionality of blocking by executive order 
is suspect on the grounds of being “cen-
sorship,” which is prohibited. On the other 
hand, a blocking injunction by judicial order 
is considered to be constitutional provided 
there are no alternative means. However, 
many members of the task force pointed out 
that there are effective measures other than 
blocking, e.g., advertising regulation, to 
cope with piracy websites. As a result, the 
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task force could not produce a report within 
the scheduled deadline. The legislation on 
blocking stumbled at the entry stage, and its 
completion is nowhere in sight.
It is not unusual that such a professional 
committee plays an important role at the be-
ginning of the legislative process in Japan. 
Rather, as this case indicates, it can be said 
that such a pre-legislative process constitutes 
a significant constitutional guarantee in the 
Japanese governmental system.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
2018 was a year that saw few constitutional 
cases before the Supreme Court that could be 
considered landmarks. Although the Grand 
Bench of the Supreme Court decided two 
cases, they did not make any monumental 
change to the landscape of constitutional 
review. Japanese judiciary has both active 
and passive faces, like Janus. It might be 
said that the passive face dominated in 2018. 
However, this result is largely due to the na-
ture of the cases with which the Supreme 
Court dealt. It seems premature to think that 
it reflects a long-term trend.
1. Judge Okaguchi Case: Judge’s freedom of 
expression to tweet
The first Grand Bench decision in 2018 was 
the Judge Okaguchi Case.1 In this case, the 
Grand Bench made a judgment on a dispute 
between the freedom of expression to tweet 
and the official duty of a judge. 
The Constitution and other laws give judges 
specially enhanced protection for their status 
to guarantee their independence. Pursuant to 
Articles 64 and 78 of the Constitution, judg-
es are not to be removed except by proceed-
ings of an impeachment court set up by the 
Diet. However, “If a judge has violated his/
her official duties, neglected his/her jobs or 
degraded himself/herself, that judge shall 
be subjected to disciplinary action by judi-
cial decisions” (Article 49 of the Court Act). 
:KLOHWKHGLVFLSOLQDU\DFWLRQLVRQO\D³UHS-
rimand” (Kaikoku) or a “non-penal fine” of 
not more than 10,000 yen, for a judge such 
disciplinary action is widely considered to 
be as serious as a criminal penalty. The prob-
lem is that the meaning of “to degrade him-
self/herself” is not clear. In particular, until 
the Judge Okaguchi Case, there had been no 
precedent on what kind of expressions this 
disciplinary rule covers.
Kiichi Okaguchi is a Tokyo High Court 
Judge. He has a Twitter account that acquired 
more than 40,000 followers. He occasionally 
posted tweets containing sexual expressions 
and words, and these tweets had given rise 
to public censure. The Chief Judge of the 
Tokyo High Court gave him strong warnings 
on two occasions. The first was an oral warn-
ing against three tweets including a photo-
graph of Judge Okaguchi wearing only white 
briefs. The second was a warning in writing 
against a tweet which described a victim of 
sexual crime as “a 17 years old woman who 
was murdered mercilessly by a man having 
aberrant sexual propensity” and provided the 
URL of the court website where the judg-
ment of this criminal case was posted. 
These warnings were still not disciplinary 
action under the Court Act. However, after 
he posted a tweet on May 17, 2018, proceed-
ings for disciplinary action against Judge 
Okaguchi were initiated. This tweet was 
about a civil law case as follows. The plain-
tiff left her dog behind in a park because her 
boyfriend did not like dogs. The defendant 
had found the dog and nurtured it careful-
ly for three months. The plaintiff ended the 
relationship with the boyfriend and then re-
quested the defendant to return the dog. The 
defendant denied this request, and therefore 
the plaintiff filed a suit requesting the return 
of the dog based on her property right. The 
Tokyo District Court allowed the plaintiff’s 
claim. On May 17, Judge Okaguchi, posting 
a link to a news website which reported this 
civil case, tweeted as follows. “One picked 
up a dog which had been left at the park and 
took care of it as a pet. Then three months 
later, the original owner appeared and said, 
³µ3OHDVHJLYHLWEDFNWRPH¶´³:KDW"<RX"
<RXDEDQGRQHGLWGLGQ¶W\RX"(YHQWKRXJK
you have left it for three months,….” “The 
result of this trial is….” 
The plaintiff, who had read this tweet, com-
plained to the Tokyo High Court. According-
ly, the Tokyo High Court filed a petition for 
disciplinary action against Judge Okaguchi 
in the Supreme Court on the ground that 
by his tweet on May 17 he had “degraded 
himself” under the Court Act. The judgment 
of a disciplinary action case against a High 
Court judge is made by the Grand Bench of 
the Supreme Court. However, the hearing is 
held in camera, and a judge who is subjected 
to disciplinary action by the Supreme Court 
is not given further opportunity to appeal in 
the form of a contentious case, for which a 
public hearing is guaranteed. 
Judge Okaguchi and his counsel contended 
that he had only introduced the civil case to 
the public; hence, if such a tweet is subject 
to disciplinary action, judges will hesitate to 
publish even commentaries on legal cases. 
Moreover, they argued prohibition of such 
a tweet infringes the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. 
Regarding free speech cases, in the Horikoshi
Case in 2012,2 the Supreme Court showed a 
sign of shifting from an old, deferential con-
stitutional review paradigm established by 
the Sarufutsu Case in 1974 to a new, strict-
er one.3 Thus, the Judge Okaguchi Case at-
tracted academic attention concerning how 
this paradigm shift might be reflected in the 
judgment.
In this case, the reasoning of the Grand 
Bench of the Supreme Court was very sim-
ple. Initially, it showed its interpretation of 
Article 49: “‘to degrade himself/herself’ 
prescribed in the Article can be construed to 
mean every behavior, regardless of whether 
an official act or purely private act, which 
1 The Grand Bench decision of October 17, 2018, 72 4PUZO\ (forthcoming).
2 Second Petty Bench Judgment of December 7, 2010, 66 2LPZO\ 1337. 
3 Grand Bench Judgment of November 6, 1974, 28 2LPZO\ 393; see also Yasuo Hasebe, ‘The Supreme Court of Japan, One Step Forward (But Only Discreetly)’ 
(2018), 16 ICON 672.
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undermines public confidence in judges or 
invokes doubts of a fair trial.” Subsequently, 
the Grand Bench denounced Judge Okagu-
chi on the basis that he conveyed to the pub-
lic without adequate explanation a unilateral 
evaluation that the filing of suit by the plain-
tiff was unjust; that such behavior gave rise 
to public suspicion that judges make judg-
ments based only on superficial information; 
and that such behavior also wounded the 
sensibility of a private citizen guaranteed the 
right of access to the courts. In conclusion, 
the court declared that Judge Okaguchi’s 
behavior should be regarded as having “de-
graded himself” as prescribed in Article 49 
and issued him a reprimand as disciplinary 
action. Although the Grand Bench touched 
upon the problem of free expression, the 
reference was surprisingly short. After it 
held “each judge enjoys the constitutional 
guarantee of free expression and is entitled 
to free expression as an ordinary citizen,” it 
left only one sentence: “Judge Okaguchi’s 
behavior overstepped the permitted limit of 
judges’ freedom of expression.” 
Because this decision was entirely based on 
the specific facts of the case, the range where 
it functions as a precedent will be very small. 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court failed 
to show clearly the scope of application of 
Article 49. Therefore, from now on, there is 
a possibility that such ambiguity will make 
judges hesitate to express their views, and 
will invite political intervention when they 
do. However, it may be evaluated positively 
that the Grand Bench did not rely on the old 
Sarufutsu paradigm in spite of being able to 
do so. 
2. 2017 General Election of the House of 
Representatives Case: equality in terms of 
the value of a vote
The second Grand Bench case in 2018 was 
a suit by voters to seek invalidation of the 
general election of members of the House of 
Representatives on October 22, 2017, based 
on the grounds that the demarcation of con-
stituencies for this election created inequali-
ty in the value of votes between districts and 
was therefore unconstitutional.4
In Japan, constant population movement has 
caused disparity in the value of votes be-
tween rural and urban districts. Such mal-ap-
portionment is a chronic disease of the Jap-
anese election system. However, the LDP 
had been reluctant to resolve the mal-appor-
tionment, which would entail a reduction 
in the number of seats in rural areas where 
the LDP is stronger. Therefore, whenever a 
general election is carried out, voters have 
challenged the election and election system, 
as in this case. 
Since a 1976 Grand Bench judgment, the Su-
preme Court has understood that the Consti-
tution requires equality in the value of votes 
notwithstanding a lack of provision that ex-
plicitly requires it.5 However, at the same 
time, the Supreme Court has not regarded 
equality in the value of votes as the abso-
lute criterion for determining the design of 
DQHOHFWLRQ V\VWHP:KHQHVWDEOLVKLQJ VSH-
cific constituencies, the Diet is allowed to 
take into account various factors, including 
the size, population density, composition of 
residents, transportation conditions and geo-
graphical situations of the respective areas in 
addition to equality in terms of the value of 
votes as long as it is “reasonable.” 
Moreover, even when the Diet considered 
factors to be “unreasonable,” the Supreme 
Court has not immediately held that an 
election system is unconstitutional or that 
the election following the election system 
should be invalidated. Thus, according to the 
Supreme Court, even if unreasonable dispar-
ity in terms of the value of votes is in a state 
contrary to the constitutional requirement 
(this is generally called “a state of unconsti-
tutionality”), such a state is not in violation 
of the Constitution (this is literally called 
“unconstitutionality”) as long as the Diet 
does not fail to take corrective action within 
“a reasonable period of time.” Furthermore, 
even in the case that an election system was 
“unconstitutional,” the Supreme Court has 
only declared that the election based on such 
a system was illegal, without invalidating the 
election.
Since 1994, what had been employed as a 
criterion for the demarcation of single-seat 
constituencies for members of the House of 
Representatives was the so-called “rule of 
reserving one seat per prefecture,” which ap-
portioned at least one constituency to each 
prefecture regardless of its population. It was 
clear that this rule had increased the dispar-
ity between constituencies in terms of the 
value of votes. A 2011 Grand Bench judg-
ment found this rule to be unconstitutional.7
Following this judgment, in 2012, the Diet 
enacted the 2012 Amendment Act, which 
abolished the “rule of reserving one seat per 
prefecture.” However, the determination of 
new alternative criteria for demarcation was 
postponed. For a while, without clear crite-
ria, the Diet had made ad hoc revisions of 
the demarcation towards satisfying the con-
stitutional requirement in relation to the dis-
SDULW\LQWKHYDOXHRIYRWHV:KLOHDYRLGLQJD
declaration of unconstitutionality, both 2013 
and 2015 Grand Bench judgments continued 
to conclude that demarcation was in “a state 
of unconstitutionality.”8
:LWKWKLVEDFNJURXQG LQ-DQXDU\ WKH
Research Commission on the Election Sys-
tem, established by the House of Representa-
tives, submitted a report suggesting the “Ad-
ams’ Method” as the best criterion to achieve 
both the principles of proportion to popu-
lation and consideration to rural areas.9 Al-
though the opposition parties argued that this 
4 Grand Bench Decision of December 19, 2018, 4PUZO\ (forthcoming).
5 Grand Bench Judgment of April 14, 1976, 30 4PUZO\ 223. 
6 Grand Bench Judgment of November 6, 1974, 28 2LPZO\ 393; see also Yasuo Hasebe, ‘The Supreme Court of Japan, One Step Forward (But Only Discreetly)’ 
(2018), 16 ICON 672.
7 Grand Bench Judgment of March 23, 2011, 65 4PUZO\ 755.
8 Grand Bench Judgment of November 20, 2013, 674PUZO\ 1503; Grand Bench Judgment of November 25, 2015, 69 4PUZO\ 2035.
9 Adams’ Method is a method of apportionment that US President John Adams once proposed. 
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Adams’ Method should be adopted immedi-
ately, reflecting the strong preferences of the 
LDP, the Diet enacted the 2016 Amendment 
Act prescribing the introduction of the Ad-
ams’ Method after the 2020 national census. 
The demarcation of the 2017 general elec-
tion challenged in this case was not based 
on this new Adams’ Method. However, there 
was no constituency in which the maximum 
disparity exceeded 1:2 and the maximum 
disparity between constituencies had been 
reduced to 1:1.979 as a result of the gradual 
reforms. In this case, following the tradition-
al framework, the Grand Bench held that the 
demarcation was not in “a state of unconsti-
tutionality” for the first time since the 2011 
Grand Bench judgment. The main factors 
that this 2018 Grand Bench judgment took 
into consideration were that the introduction 
of the Adams’ Method is scheduled to be im-
plemented after 2020 and the disparity had 
been reduced to 1:1.979. There are criticisms 
of this judgment in that it is logically impos-
sible to include a future plan as a factor of 
judgment on whether a current demarcation 
is in “a state of unconstitutionality” or not 
and that disparity still exists even if it is 
below 1:2. Anyway, the 2018 Grand Bench 
judgment showed the incremental approach 
of the Supreme Court. The Court does not try 
to impose the constitutional ideal as long as 
the Diet continues to make gradual reforms.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2019
In 2019, the abdication of Emperor Akihi-
to and the enthronement of Crown Prince 
Naruhito are scheduled events that are con-
stitutionally and socially important. Under 
prevailing legislation, the emperor was not 
allowed to abdicate, but in 2016, Akihito, at 
the age of 82, appealed to the public, citing 
the difficulties of performing his duties due 
to being elderly. Accordingly, in 2017, a re-
vision of the law that would allow Akihito to 
abdicate was been made. Under the terms of 
the Constitution, the Emperor has no politi-
cal authority, but the social influence of the 
imperial succession is great. For example, 
the Japanese era name (Gengo) will change 
from Heisei to a new one. In addition, a re-
ligious ritual called Daijo-sai, based on the 
Shinto religion, will be performed by the 
new Emperor. Public money is to be used 
for the Daijo-sai, and it is likely to stir some 
controversy because it violates the principle 
of separation of state and religion prescribed 
in the Constitution.
In the judicial field, there is a pending case 
that challenges the current civil law re-
striction on marriage to heterosexuals. In a 
judgment on January 23, 2019, the Second 
Bench upheld the constitutionality of the law 
requiring the removal of gonads to change 
gender based on a sexual identity disorder. 
The grounds of the decision were the unde-
sirability of sudden changes to gender dis-
tinction. This case reinforces the expectation 
that the courts will avoid a judgment that al-
ters the conservative concepts of family and 
gender in a pending case on the status of a 
same-sex marriage.
Furthermore, development of friction sur-
rounding American military bases in Oki-
nawa will be unmissable as Constitutional
Politics. The central government is planning 
construction of a new military base for the 
United States in Henoko Bay in Okinawa. 
Although the prefecture has challenged this 
plan in lawsuits, it has lost every case. How-
ever, Denny Tamaki, who has opposed the 
central government’s plan, won the 2018 
Okinawa gubernatorial election and has 
scheduled a referendum in 2019 by the peo-
ple of Okinawa concerning the central gov-
ernment’s plan. 
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Japanese Pacifism (Routledge, 2019)
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I. INTRODUCTION
2017 was an election year. Kenya begins to 
fight one election the moment the previous 
one is ended, so 2022 dominated headlines 
in 2018—but not this paper. 
A dominant theme in politics is a continued 
struggle to maximise the opportunities for 
power that the constitution presents: gover-
nors pitted against county assemblies, Na-
tional Assembly against the other house of 
Parliament, the Senate, and a general unwill-
ingness on the part of the President to accept 
the constraints of office, and on the part of 
the national government to give full rein to 
the counties. Some of these issues are re-
flected in the cases considered here. 
2018’s major constitution-related devel-
opments (elaborated below) included the 
“swearing-in” of an opposition leader as 
“People’s President” and a curious rapproche-
ment a few months later between him and the 
President. The constitutional ramifications of 
this are most likely to be felt in 2019. 
Another issue, still rumbling on, is the fail-
ure to achieve the constitutionally promised 
“no more than two-thirds of either gender” 
among members of public bodies, especially 
those elected. 
And the President’s apparent desire to be 
seen as combatting corruption has had var-
ious constitutional spin-offs. 
Meanwhile, though sometimes in response 
to these broader political currents, the pro-
cess of giving meaning and life to the Con-
stitution continues, especially the system 
of devolution reintroduced in 2013. Some 
county governors seem to be making genu-
ine efforts to make use of the possibilities for 
development it offers. But massive corrup-
tion at that level has continued.
This paper does not go into the many elec-
tion petitions from the 2017 elections. But 
issues of human rights and executive over-
reach are prominent in the cases. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Raila Odinga, the candidate who had been 
announced as the main loser in the 2017 
presidential election and, when that election 
was declared constitutionally defective and 
rerun in October 2017, boycotted the rerun, 
was “sworn in” as the “People’s President” 
(January 30, 2018).1 (Three major television 
stations were taken off air by the government 
in an attempt to prevent the event from get-
ting media coverage.2 At the end of 2018, the 
constitutionality of this action was before 
the courts.) The swearing-in was part of an 
opposition campaign to undermine the gov-
ernment. Negative impacts on the economy 
and elsewhere of this campaign may explain 
the later development: “After months of in-
sults during a divisive and deadly election, 
these two heirs of Kenya’s most powerful 
political dynasties stood side by side, shook 
1 See retrospective, Standard newspaper, January 30, 2019, at https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/ureport/ 
article/2001311339/on-this-day-last-year-raila-odinga-was-sworn-in-as-people-s-president 
2 ))*º2LU`H;=Z[H[PVUZ[VYLTHPUVɈHPYHM[LY6KPUNH¸PUH\N\YH[PVU»¹H[O[[WZ!^^ ^IIJJVTUL^Z
world-africa-42888904
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hands and pledged reconciliation”3 (the 
“handshake”). Opinions on this event were 
still divided, and its implications unclear. 
For various individuals, including Kenyatta 
(in his last possible term as President) and 
Odinga (who has long aimed at the presi-
dency), the possible implications are central. 
The reconciliation generated an inadequate 
debate on constitutional change, especially 
from a presidential to a parliamentary sys-
tem for the purpose of “inclusion” on the 
basis that such a system (with a number of 
senior posts available) would prevent the 
tension and even violence of most Kenyan 
elections. Also aired was altering the system 
of devolution to introduce a middle govern-
ment tier, between the national government 
and that of the 47 counties. 
The other development (or non-develop-
ment) was the constitutional amendment that 
did not happen. The Constitution requires 
that no more than two-thirds of the members 
of any elected or appointed body be of the 
same gender. In 2012, the Supreme Court 
directed that this be legislatively achieved 
by 2015. By the end of 2018 it had not been 
done. Unable to agree on any method with-
in the framework of the Constitution, MPs 
have focussed on changing it. Their pre-
ferred method is one that adds enough wom-
en to both houses of Parliament to achieve 
the two-thirds rule. This method is used for 
the county-level legislatures. MPs have re-
peatedly failed even to muster a quorum to 
pass the amending legislation. In 2018 this 
happened again, complicated by the reluc-
tance of MPs to go along with the change 
despite pressure from the President, because 
the President indicated he would not sign a 
bill, even if passed, that would unconstitu-
tionally allow MPs to fix their own allow-
ances. There is a likelihood that 2019 will 
see a resurrection of litigation designed to 
have Parliament dissolved for failure to do 
something demanded by the Constitution.
There are frequent complaints of tendencies 
to try to exceed constitutional powers or un-
dermine constitutional safeguards. One or 
two of the cases in Section III touch on these. 
One example of presidential behaviour that 
in our view undermines the independence of 
constitutional offices but which has not been 
challenged in court, and would probably not 
be held technically improper, relates to the 
appointment of constitutional office holders 
to non-protected posts. In August, the Pres-
ident appointed a Cabinet Secretary (Minis-
ter) as the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP). The DPP had only about one year 
of his independent, but time-limited office 
left. At the same time, the President of the 
Court of Appeal was appointed as Attorney 
General. Both the DPP and superior court 
judges are posts in which the incumbents 
are supposed to be unaffected by concerns 
about how the political leaders perceive their 
work. Yet, especially for the DPP, who does 
not have life tenure, the way is now open for 
these office holders to be appointed to polit-
ical or quasi-political office—but only if the 
President is pleased with them. 
These appointments are linked to a new 
presidential commitment to deal with the 
grave problem of corruption (in addition to 
his “Big Four” of water, housing, food se-
curity and industrialisation). Among the con-
stitutional spin-offs of this is some tension 
between the DPP, the police and the courts. 
Constitutional provisions on the right to bail 
(Article 49(1)(h)) unless there are compel-
ling reasons, and their application by the 
courts, and prosecutorial competence are in-
volved in the “blame game”, to use the Chief 
Justice’s phrase. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The Supreme Court (the final court of appeal) 
ended 2017 on a high note with its decision 
declaring the mandatory death penalty un-
constitutional. 2018 was largely concerned 
with election petitions, and cases on when 
the Court’s jurisdiction can be invoked. Thus 
no Supreme Court cases are discussed here.
1. Miguna Miguna v Fred Okengo Ma-
tiang’i, Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of In-
terior and Coordination of National Gov-
ernment; Kenya National Commission on 
Human Rights (Interested Party) [2018] 
eKLR: Citizenship; abuse of office4
The petitioner is a lawyer who “officiated” 
at Odinga’s “swearing in” (above). He also 
claimed to lead the “National Resistance 
Movement”, an amorphous and largely hy-
pothetical opposition movement that had 
been declared a prohibited organisation. 
The government tried to deport him on the 
basis that he was no longer Kenyan, having 
automatically lost his citizenship when he 
became Canadian under the previous consti-
tution, which did not permit dual nationality. 
He resisted deportation and was detained for 
some days at the airport in deplorable condi-
tions. Before that, the government arrested 
him after attacking his house with force, and 
then took him from court to court, trying to 
avoid High Court orders. He was eventually 
deported.
The court held first that he remained a Ken-
yan citizen, under the former constitution, 
section 97:
(3) A citizen of Kenya shall, … cease to 
be such a citizen if -
(a) having attained the age of twen-
ty-one years, he acquires the citi-
zenship of some country other than 
Kenya by voluntary act (other than 
marriage) ….
The court held that this applied only to citi-
zens other than by birth. Citizenship by birth 
was inalienable. Alternatively, the court held 
that Miguna’s acquisition of a Canadian 
passport was not voluntary because he was 
compelled to do it by the refusal of the Ken-
yan government to issue him one. 
Miguna was held entitled to compensa-
tion for his abusive treatment. The judge 
3 Nic Cheeseman, ‘With a handshake, Kenya leaves behind divisive poll’, 5H[PVU, April 10, 2018, at https://www.nation.co.ke/news/politics/Uhuru-Kenyat-
ta-and-Raila-Odinga-handshake/1064-4379964-os1fhtz/index.html 
4 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/163893/ (Justice Chacha Mwita)
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servants commit a wanton violation of the 
Constitution and the law, any awards arising 
from such violations should not be vested 
>VF LPSRVHG"@ RQ WKHSXEOLF´+H DZDUGHG
considerable damages against the Cabinet 
Secretary (Minister), Director of Immigra-
tion, the head of the police and three other 
senior police officers personally.
:HKDYHJUDYHGRXEWVDERXWWKHFRUUHFWQHVV
of the first decision on citizenship. The other 
decision on liability is interesting, but may 
leave untouched those who were most deter-
mined to clamp down on the opposition and 
Miguna specifically. 
2. Mohamed Ali Baadi and others v Attorney 
General & 11 others [2018] eKLR: Rights to 
environment, culture5
A huge government infrastructure project 
is having major impact on a world heritage 
site, local fishermen and local communities, 
including indigenous people. Despite its be-
ing a constitutional petition (usually decided 
on the basis of law), the court did receive a 
great deal of evidence, including expert evi-
dence, and even conducted a site visit.
The court decided [para. 221] that public 
participation in environmental issues was 
not only something required by the Constitu-
tion, but was a rule of customary internation-
al law, making it part of Kenyan law under 
Article 2(6). It also pointed out [para. 225] 
that sustainable development is a value of 
the Constitution, and spelled out its gener-
ally accepted elements. The court concluded 
that the public had not been adequately in-
volved. Interestingly, they indicated that to 
limit public involvement would require jus-
tification in terms of Article 24 (on limiting 
human rights) [para. 238], though participa-
tion is not explicitly included as a recognised 
human right. The right to information (Arti-
cle 35) had also been violated to some extent 
in the Strategic Environmental Assessment 
process, and the right to a clean environment 
was in imminent danger of being violated 
(based on the judges’ own site visit). 
In the court’s view, traditional fishermen had 
a right to continue to fish that had the status 
of a fundamental right—building on Articles 
26 (right to life), 28 (dignity), 40 (property), 
43 (economic, social and cultural rights) and 
70 (environmental rights). It could be limit-
ed only if permitted via Article 24, and even 
then compensation must be paid. As indige-
nous people, their rights must be given sensi-
tive and priority consideration. Yet, they had 
been discriminated against in compensation 
arrangements.
The scheme’s implementers had not used 
the “due diligence required to consult the 
indigenous residents of Lamu Island on the 
impacts of the Project on their culture. This 
lack of consultation led to an inadequate cul-
tural impact assessment, and equally insuffi-
cient cultural impact mitigation measures”, 
thus the right to enjoy their culture (Article 
44) had been violated.
The court ordered that an elaborate plan 
be drawn up to rectify these various flaws 
DQG WR HQVXUH WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI D:RUOG
Heritage Management Plan, and required 
a report back within six months. The court 
also ordered that compensation of roughly 
US$17,600,000 be paid to the fishermen, 
and awarded costs to the petitioners for ex-
pert witness expenses, which is unusual in 
public interest litigation cases.
3. JOO (also known as JM) v Attorney 
General [2018] eKLR): Rights to health and 
dignity6
The petitioner complained of poor treatment 
at a local public hospital when giving birth. 
The court identified three forms of violation 
of her rights. One was the inexcusably abu-
sive treatment. The second was by the un-
availability of the most basic equipment. The 
third was by a failure of care. The first was 
dealt with mainly as a violation of the peti-
tioner’s dignity (Article 28). The others were 
treated as violations of Article 43, which 
recognizes the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, including reproductive 
health. The court also invoked, albeit brief-
ly, international instruments, including the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the African Charter 
on Human and People’s Rights, which, by 
virtue of Article 2(6) of the Constitution, are 
part of Kenyan law. 
Interestingly, the judge who wrote the opin-
ion held that governments, at both the na-
tional and county (devolved) level, were in 
violation of the right to health by a failure 
to establish policy guidelines to ensure ef-
fective implementation of national (actual-
ly presidential) directives on free maternal 
care, or to monitor performance. 
This is one of the few cases to even address 
issues about the allocation of resources, and 
the promotion and fulfilment of an economic 
or social right, as opposed to the failure to 
respect those rights. However, the analysis 
lacks depth, including in the judge’s use of 
the concept “maximum available resources”, 
which is not clear in the Constitution.
4. Okiya Omtatah Okoiti v Communication 
Authority of Kenya [2018] eKLR and Kenya 
Human Rights Commission v Communications 
Authority of Kenya [2018] eKLR: Privacy7
These cases, decided the same day, con-
cerned the first respondent’s plan to install a 
device management system on mobile phone 
networks, ostensibly to detect stolen, coun-
terfeit and unapproved types of phones. 
The main legal issues were whether the pe-
tition was premature, because the system 
was not yet in operation, and whether any 
infringement of users’ privacy was justified 
by Article 24 of the Constitution (essentially 
a proportionality issue). 
The judge decided that Article 22(1), allow-
ing actions for the protection of human rights 
even if a violation is “threatened”, made 
concerns about the “ripeness” of the action 
irrelevant, and in fact was intended to do so. 
5 O[[W!RLU`HSH ^VYNJHZLSH^JHZLZ]PL^/PNO*V\Y["Ä]LQ\KNLILUJO
6 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/150953/ (High Court; Justice Abida Ali-Aroni
7 Respectively, http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/151117/ and http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/151191/ High Court; Justice John Mativo)
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The evidence was that the system would al-
low the identification not only of the phone 
and whether it was counterfeit, etc., but also 
of the subscriber’s identity, phone number 
and the number called, date and time and du-
ration of the call.
The judge held that this went further than 
necessary for identifying counterfeit phones. 
He observed that laws and institutions on im-
portation, on counterfeit goods, on standards, 
on taxing and police and customs “have not 
been shown to be insufficient”. Another ob-
jection to the decision was the absence of 
public participation and involvement of sub-
scribers. There was thus also a violation of 
Article 10 on national values and principles, 
one of which is public participation. 
5. Law Society of Kenya v National Assembly of 
the Republic of Kenya [2018] eKLR: Judicial 
Service Commission8
The Constitution (Article 171) provides that 
six members of the Judicial Service Com-
mission (JSC), which selects most superior 
court judges, be elected by various bodies of 
judges or lawyers while the Public Service 
Commission nominates one. Two non-law-
yers are appointed by the President (with 
National Assembly approval) to represent 
the public. Most commission appointments 
must be approved by the National Assembly 
(Article 250). The decision focussed on the 
appointment of the Court of Appeal’s elect-
HG PHPEHU -XVWLFH :DUVDPH 7KH 3UHVL-
dent had forwarded his name to the National 
Assembly. The court held that Article 171 
applied, not 250, and no approval by the 
National Assembly was required. The court 
stressed the need to take a holistic view of 
the Constitution. 
This case has significance because of some 
perceived hostility between the judiciary and 
other arms of government, and attempts by 
the latter to control the former. In January 
WKHVDPHMXGJHKHOGWKDW:DUVDPHZKR
had still not been sworn in) neither needed to 
be formally appointed nor sworn in.
6. Simeon Kioko Kitheka v County Govern-
ment of Machakos [2018] eKLR9 
This is one of a growing number of cases 
giving some specificity to the constitutional 
requirement that the public be able to par-
ticipate in the work of legislative bodies. It 
related to a charge for sand harvesting, in the 
form of a fee-per-lorry trip. The County As-
sembly bill had proposed KShs (Kenya shil-
lings) 1,300 per trip while the bill as passed 
imposed KShs5000 per trip. The judge said 
that “by introducing new and substantial 
amendments to the Act which were not in 
the Bill, the Assembly not only set out to 
circumvent the constitutional requirements 
of public participation but, with due respect, 
mischievously short-circuited and circum-
vented the letter and the spirit of the Consti-
tution” [para. 120]. 
This was the only formal decision, and the 
judge ordered that any money paid over and 
above KShs1300 per trip be refunded. His 
further observations included, “To inform 
the public to air their views on a Bill whose 
contents are not disclosed without informing 
them how and where to access the Bill, and 
proceeding to limit the period for transmis-
sion of the views to two days in respect of a 
Bill so crucial to the public ordinarily can-
not, in my view, amount to reasonable op-
portunity for the public to participate in the 
process of enactment of the Bill in question”. 
7. Transparency International (TI Kenya) 
v Attorney General [2018] eKLR: Audi-
WRU*HQHUDO3UHVLGHQWDVDODZPDNHU"10
The Constitution has fairly standard provi-
sions on the Auditor-General (Au-G). There 
is particular emphasis on the independence 
of the office: Article 249 stresses that it is an 
independent office not subject to any direc-
tion. The Kenyan branch of an international 
NGO challenged legislation that diminished 
the separateness of the office from control by 
the Public Service Commission, and in vari-
ous other ways seemed to limit its powers or 
independence.
The court held the statute unconstitutional 
in that it made the office a “statutory head” 
(while being a constitutional office); sub-
jected any issue of appointment of staff to 
the Public Service Commission; allowed 
appointment of an Acting Au-G; allowed 
for secondment of Au-G staff to other public 
bodies, which would be audited by the Au-
G; set up an audit advisory board to advise 
the Au-G, including heads of public bodies 
that are audited by the Au-G; and provided 
that the Au-G should not question the merits 
of a policy objective of a government or any 
public entity. Another provision would have 
restricted the power to audit the security 
forces. It required the Au-G to meet national 
security organs to agree on areas that might 
touch on national security and on how to en-
sure confidentiality of the information. All or 
part of nine sections of the Public Audit Act 
were held unconstitutional. 
A very different point failed. The Consti-
tution (Article 115) allows the President to 
refer a bill back to Parliament for reconsid-
eration, noting any presidential reservations. 
Parliament may then (using normal legisla-
tive procedure) amend the bill adopting the 
President’s views, or pass it again without 
adopting them, and if it does so by a two-
thirds majority, the President must assent. 
Parliament has always passed a new version 
with the President’s reservations accommo-
dated. The practice has been for the Presi-
dent to return bills with language that he 
wished to see enacted. The judge held that 
this was not unconstitutional. He did add that 
“… should the President make substantial 
recommendations that significantly alter the 
character of the Bill as earlier passed, [he] 
has to consider whether public participation 
will be necessary before passing those rec-
ommendations”.
The Kenyan provision on assent is treated as 
meaning that Parliament has only two choic-
es: to accept the President’s view or insist on 
its own by a two-thirds vote. In other words, 
the reference back does not mean that the bill 
otherwise lapses. The authors, on reflection, 
are not sure this is right. In the US, the use 
8 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/157657/ (Justice Chacha Mwita)
9 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/157582/ (High Court: Justice Odunga)
10 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/147941/ (High Court: Justice Chacha Mwita)
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of the presidential veto kills a bill. A recog-
nition of this possibility might prompt earli-
er addressing of disagreements and improve 
the legislative process. 
8. Kenya Human Rights Commission v At-
torney General [2018] eKLR: High Court: 
legislation restricting courts’ contempt pow-
er; public participation11
The petitioner NGO (KHRC – not the offi-
cial commission on human rights) argued 
that the 2016 Contempt of Court Act includ-
ed provisions limiting the power of the courts 
to punish for contempt. The court held that 
such a power was derived from the Consti-
tution and indeed it went as far as casting its 
power as inherent, not even constitutionally 
derived.12  It invoked Articles 2(1) (suprem-
acy of Constitution), 159 (judicial authority 
is derived from the people) and 160 (judicial 
independence). The courts could, therefore, 
hold unconstitutional provisions that limit 
their contempt power.13 This court held that 
provisions that made it procedurally harder 
to prosecute public officers for contempt and 
imposed a more lenient maximum sentence 
were both discriminatory and shackled the 
courts’ contempt power. This included “no 
state officer [senior elected and appoint-
ed officers] shall be convicted of contempt 
of court for execution of his duties in good 
faith”. The same was true of a section that 
barred contempt proceedings against a 
Speaker of a House of Parliament for any 
decision or directions in the performance of 
his official role. 
However, the court then held that the en-
tire Act was unconstitutional on the basis 
of lack of public participation (specifically 
required for the work of Parliament by Arti-
cle 118(1)). In fact, it seems that the respon-
dent mounted no defence to this—the judge 
found there was “no attempt on the part of 
the respondent to show that there was any 
semblance of public participation in the leg-
islative process”. 
This is the first time that national legislation 
has been held unconstitutional for want of 
participation. It is unfortunate that the State 
Law Office did not see fit to take the issue 
seriously. There was a bit of an “own goal” 
for the KHRC: the judge also held that a 
strict liability offence for publications about 
proceedings actively before a court, which 
created a “substantial risk” of seriously prej-
udicing the course of justice, was justifiable. 
The general public might be influenced, and 
that could prejudice the right to a fair trial 
(though Kenya does not have juries or lay 
justices trying cases). The Act also enshrined 
the “scandalising the court” form of con-
tempt, done away with in many countries.
9. Wanuri Kahiu v CEO Kenya Film Classi-
fication Board (High Court; Justice Okwa-
ny): Censorship
This has so far involved only an interim 
order. The Film Classification Board had 
banned a film because of its lesbian content. 
The application was for a temporary lifting 
of the ban pending the final resolution of the 
case so it could be shown briefly in order to 
be an eligible candidate for the Oscars.
The application was successful. The judge 
said, “One of the reasons for artistic creativ-
ity is to stir the society’s conscience even on 
very vexing topics such as homosexuality”. 
The film was shown at various venues for 
seven days (but not picked as an Oscar nom-
inee).
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Two themes are likely to be prominent in 
2019. One is the continuing tension between 
the executive/legislature and the judiciary. 
Already, two of the judges whose decisions 
“against” government featured here have 
been moved from the Constitutional and 
Human Rights Division. The Chief Justice 
is being accused of having given in to presi-
dential pressure.
The other theme will be constitutional 
amendment, with an increasing number of 
issues being raised for debate, but with no 
clear process. One party is about to submit 
proposals with one million signatures sup-
porting amendments to trigger a popular ini-
tiative (Article 257). 
V. FURTHER READING
-LOO &RWWUHOO *KDL ³:DQMLNX¶V &RQVWLWXWLRQ
:RPHQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG WKHLU LPSDFW LQ
Kenya’s constitution building processes”, in 
Tania Abbiate, Markus Böckenförde and Ve-
ronica Federico, eds., Public Participation 
in African Constitutionalism (Routledge, 
2018) pp. 220-242
Jill Cottrell Ghai and Yash Ghai, “The Con-
tribution of the South African Constitution 
to Kenya’s Constitution”, in Rosalind Dix-
on and Theunis Roux, eds., Constitutional
Triumphs, Constitutional Disappointments: 
A Critical Assessment of the 1996 South Af-
rican Constitution’s Local and Internation-
al Influence (Cambridge University Press, 
2018) pp. 254-293
Rose Macharia and Yash Ghai, “The role 
of participation in the two Kenyan consti-
tution-building processes of 2000-2005 and 
/HVVRQV OHDUQW"´ LQ7DQLD$EELDWHHW
al, Public Participation in African Constitu-
tionalism (Routledge, 2017), pp. 86-99
11 http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/162352/ (Justice Chacha Mwita) 
12 Citing ,X\P[`)HUR3PTP[LK]>LZ[3UR4IV3PTP[LK[2013] eKLR. 
13 Citing the Indian Supreme Court cases of )HY(ZZVJPH[PVU]Z<UPVUVM0UKPH [1998] 4 SCC 409 and:\KOHRHY7YHZHK].V]LYUTLU[VM(UKOYH7YHKLZO [2001] 
SCC 516. 
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LATVIA
I. INTRODUCTION
On 18 November 2018, the State of Latvia 
celebrated its centenary. This celebration 
served as a long-term investment into 
strengthening the loyalty towards the 
modern Latvian state and for the further 
integration of the single political nation, 
based upon shared constitutional values 
and common social memory. At the same 
time, this anniversary helped to present 
Latvia to the world as a modern European 
state of the 21st century. The international 
conference organised by the Constitutional 
Court (hereinafter also CC, the Court) on 
“The Role of the Constitutional Courts in 
WKH*OREDOLVHG:RUOG RI WKH VW &HQWXU\´
attested to the CC that Latvia is part of 
a global debate on the increasing impact 
of rulings of constitutional courts beyond 
national borders. Also this year, main 
developments in the area of constitutional 
law were triggered by the legislator (the 
Saeima) and the CC. 
In Part II of this report, we reflect upon general 
constitutional developments, examining 
amendments to regulatory enactments, the 
relevant trends in political processes and the 
development of the judicial system as well as 
the work of the CC in 2018 and the impact 
of its case law on further development and 
change within the legal system. All these 
activities can be considered important 
steps towards strengthening the rule of law; 
however, in general, we can speak about the 
continuity and stability of the democratic 
processes. The report provides an overview 
(Part III) of the main cases decided by the 
CC of the Republic of Latvia in the past year 
that may be of interest to an international 
audience.
Finally, an overview looks ahead to 
some developments and most important 
constitutional issues expected to unfold in 
2019 related to the elections and pending 
constitutional court cases (Part IV).
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The year 2018 witnessed a few notable 
constitutional developments and court 
decisions. A general election to the Saeima
(Parliament) took place. Regretfully, this 
election was characterised by the lowest 
activity of voters in the recent history of 
the state. As a result, seven parties and 
associations thereof were elected to the 
Saeima. Less than 30% of all voters expressed 
their support for the parties represented 
in the government. The former major 
government parties of the Saeima—“Unity”
and “Union of Greens and Farmers”—
became the minority. Three new, centre-right 
political forces entered the Saeima. Against 
the background of elections in a number of 
EU Member States, the results of the Saeima
elections look nevertheless positive. The new 
players represent conservative and liberal 
values, and none of them has questioned 
Latvia’s Euroatlantic identity. The process 
of forming the government was the longest 
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in Latvia’s history. The government was 
approved only 109 days after the election of 
the 13th Saeima, with 61 MPs among 100 
voting in favour of it.
On 4 October 2018, the Saeima adopted 
amendments to the Constitution (the 
Satversme). These amendments entered into 
force on 1 January 2019. The procedure of 
electing the President was altered, providing 
that the Saeima elects the President (similar 
to other highest officials of the state) by 
an open vote instead of the secret ballot as 
formerly. The vote for the President of the 
State was the only secret ballot left in the 
Saeima. Discussions on the procedure of 
electing the President continue. A draft law 
regarding the President elected by the people 
has been submitted to the Saeima.
As for the system in force, a draft law has 
been adopted by the Saeima in the first 
reading, extending the period between 
proposing candidates for the President’s 
office and the voting at the Saeima on 
these candidates.1 A longer period between 
the proposing of candidates and the vote 
would ensure the possibility of holding open 
discussions, where members of the Saeima
would have the opportunity to also hear 
public opinion. Likewise, debates between 
the proposed candidates in the public space 
could be held.
The work to strengthen the effectiveness 
of the judiciary and judicial independence 
continues, although slowly. By introducing 
amendments to the law “On Judicial Power”, 
the legislator has diminished the influence of 
executive power on the organisation of courts’ 
work and expanded the competence of the 
Council for the Judiciary in appointing the 
chairpersons of the courts and in determining 
a judge’s career. The Council for the 
Judiciary not only will appoint to the office 
the chairpersons of the district (municipal) 
and regional courts but will also establish the 
procedure for proposing candidates for the 
chairperson’s office and for appointing them 
to office. The competence of the Minister for 
Justice to transfer a judge to an open vacancy 
also has been deleted from the law. The work 
of the Judicial Qualification Board has been 
made more effective, and the process for 
assessing judges’ professional activities has 
been improved. The territorial reform of 
courts has been completed.
This year, five out of seven elected members 
of the Council for the Judiciary were re-
elected (together with ex officio members,
the Council for the Judiciary comprises 15 
members).
In 2018, the Saeima, responding to the 
CC’s judgment by which the norms that 
regulated judges’ remuneration were 
recognised as incompatible with the 
Satversme, introduced changes to the system 
of judges’ remuneration. It remains to be 
seen how successful and compatible with 
the Satversme this regulation will be. As 
the case law of the CC thus far shows, the 
enforcement of previous judgments by the 
CC in cases regarding judges’ salaries has 
not been successful. 
The CC’s judgments illustrate topical social 
processes in Latvia and also the extent to 
which the legislator, the executive and the 
local governments, by regulating these 
processes, comply with the constitutional 
framework. Compared to 2017, the number 
of judgments delivered by the CC increased 
by 13% in 2018, whereas the number of 
examined legal norms (acts) remained 
unchanged.
Due to restrictions on length, only some 
issues will be examined in this report 
(separate cases will be reviewed in the 
following part of the report). The case law 
of the CC of 2018 can be found in the Report 
RQ WKH:RUN RI WKH&& RI WKH5HSXEOLF RI
Latvia in 2018.2
As in previous years, the CC confronted 
questions on the quality of the legislative 
process. In a case on an enforced lease,3 the 
legislator’s obligation to duly assess and 
substantiate the established restriction on a 
person’s fundamental rights as well as the 
obligation to abide by the previous findings 
made by the CC was examined. In several 
cases, the CC focused on the legislator’s 
discretion. 
In 2018, the CC delivered four judgments 
in the field of taxes and budget.4 In two 
cases, it examined the compliance of taxes 
not only with the Satversme but also the 
relevant European Union law. The issue of 
the constitutionality of legal acts issued by 
local governments had an important role in 
the Court’s work in 2018. Legal acts issued 
by local governments were examined in four 
judgments.5 In the case regarding restrictions 
on standing for Saeima elections (examined 
in the following part), the CC expressed 
important findings regarding the principle 
of militant democracy and the intertemporal 
application of the law.6
The CC is an active participant in a European 
judicial dialogue. In more than one-third of 
the judgments delivered in 2018, the CC 
made references to case law of the ECtHR, 
and in several of them noted that the standard 
of human rights protection in an area at 
issue was higher in Latvia compared to that 
established by the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and 
1 ;OLPU[LUKLKHTLUKTLU[ZWYV]PKL[OH[JHUKPKHJPLZMVY[OL7YLZPKLU[»ZVɉJLT\Z[ILZ\ITP[[LK[V[OL7YLZPKP\TVM[OL:HLPTHUVZVVULY[OHUKH`ZHUKUV
SH[LY[OHUKH`ZILMVYL[OL[LYTVMVɉJLVM[OLPUJ\TILU[7YLZPKLU[L_WPYLZ*\YYLU[S `[OLSH^WYV]PKLZ[OH[[OLJHUKPKHJPLZT\Z[ILZ\ITP[[LKUVZVVULY[OHU
HUKUVSH[LY[OHUKH`ZILMVYL[OL[LYTVMVɉJLVM[OLPUJ\TILU[7YLZPKLU[L_WPYLZ
2 Annual Report 2018 http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/en/ 
3 CCRL 12.04.2018, 2017-17-01 - Note: Unless indicated otherwise, all Judgments and Decisions referred to in the footnotes are by the Constitutional Court of the 
9LW\ISPJVM3H[]PH**93;OLM\SS[L_[ZPU,UNSPZOHYLH]HPSHISLOLYL#O[[W!^^ ^ZH[][PLZHNV]S]LUJHZLZ%
4 CCRL 11.04.2018, 20017-12-01; 29.06.2018, 2017-28-0306; 18.10.2018, 2017-35-03; 18.10.2018, 2018-04-01
5 CCRL 29.06.2018, 2017-28-0306; 29.06.2018, 2017-32-05; 18.10.2018, 2017-35-03; 15.11.2018, 2018-07-05
6 CCRL 29.06.2018, 2017-25-01
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Fundamental Freedoms. The ECtHR, in turn, 
addressed the CC in two of its judgments in 
2018. Firstly, in its decisions of 22 May 2018 
in the case 6RURþLQVNLVY/DWYLD7 the ECtHR 
noted that, in certain cases, the CC had to 
be regarded as an effective legal remedy that 
had to be used prior to turning to the ECtHR. 
Secondly, in the decision of 4 September 
2018 in the case .YDVƼHYVNLVDQGRWKHUV Y
Latvia,8 the ECtHR referred to the case law 
of the CC in the “rent ceiling” cases.9
In 2018, the CC concluded the first case in its 
history in which the procedure of preliminary 
ruling in the Court of Justice of the European 
Union had to be used. The CC received the 
preliminary ruling on 7 August 2018 from 
the Court of Justice of the European Union 
in case C120/17, by which it answered the 
questions referred to it by the CC in case 
No. 2016-04-03 regarding inheritance of 
farmers’ early retirement benefit paid by the 
EU by heirs.
In 2018, the CC examined the compliance of 
legal norms with various fundamental rights: 
the right to stand for election,10 the right to 
a fair trial,11 the right to private life,12 the 
right to property,13 the right to the freedom 
of religious conviction and association,14 the 
right to the protection for a family15 and the 
right to equality.16
To ensure that everyone can effectively 
defend his or her rights before the CC, 
amendments to “State Legal Aid Law” were 
adopted in 2018 and have been in force since 
1 January 2019, providing the possibility 
to receive legal aid, paid for by the state, to 
submit a constitutional complaint to the CC.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Case No. 2017-17-01: Compulsory land 
lease case17
The regulation restricting landowners’ right 
to receive a freely agreed-upon lease on 
their land where, during Soviet occupation, 
apartment buildings were built was examined 
in this case.
The case was initiated by a number of 
constitutional complaints. It was noted in 
the complaints that the applicants owned 
land plots on which apartment buildings 
owned by other persons were located. The 
relationship of compulsory lease existed 
between the applicants and the owners of the 
respective buildings or apartments therein. 
It was alleged that the contested norms 
considerably lowered the amount of lease 
and, thus, disproportionately restricted the 
applicants’ right to property. 
Firstly, the CC recognised that the right to 
property also comprised a person’s right to 
lease his immovable property as he deemed 
it necessary. However, this right could 
be restricted, in particular, in the field of 
housing, which is an important element of 
social and economic policy in contemporary 
society. Setting the maximum amount of 
lease payment in the legal relationship 
of a compulsory lease is one among such 
restrictions.
Secondly, the CC noted that in adopting the 
legal regulation in the area of compulsory 
leasing, the legislator had to balance the 
opposite interests of persons and ensure 
justice, abiding by the findings made in 
judgments by the CC. The legislator must 
monitor, to the extent possible, whether a 
proportionate balance exists in this legal 
relationship throughout its existence, and 
should avoid adopting a regulation that is 
aimed at protecting the interests of one party. 
In particular, in such cases where the CC has 
examined the constitutionality of the norms 
that regulate this legal relationship already, 
the legislator must ensure such process of 
legislation that builds towards the conviction 
that the chosen solution is fair. Thus, in 
planning to include in legislation a new 
restriction on the amount of the compulsory 
lease payment, the legislator had to ensure 
proper analysis and substantiation of the 
constitutionality of such possible regulation, 
inter alia, also in the context of the 
established case law of the CC in the matters 
of the compulsory lease.
Thirdly, the CC found that the Saeima had 
not examined the impact of the restriction 
on fundamental rights of the landowners 
properly and had not substantiated the 
compliance of the intended solution with 
the CC’s case law on this legal relationship. 
Hence, the contested norms had not been 
adopted in proper legislative procedure and 
thus were incompatible with Article 105 
(right to property) of the Satversme.
Fourthly, the CC recognised that a legal 
norm that has not been adopted in the proper 
legislative procedure is ultra vires. However, 
in exceptional cases, where recognising the 
contested norm as void ab initio would create 
a situation that was even more incompatible 
with the Satversme, another date for the 
norm to become void could be set. If in the 
particular case the CC were to rule that the 
contested norms should be recognised as 
7 :VYVȏPUZRPZ]3H[]PH(WWUV ,*/94H`
8 2]HZȪL]ZRPZHUKV[OLYZ]3H[]PH(WWUV,*/9:LW[LTILY
9 Ibid., Para 54.
10 CCRL 29.06.2018, 2017-25-01
11 CCRL 15.03.2018, 2017-16-01, 14.06.2018, 2017-23-01, 23.05.2018, 2017-20-0103
12 CCRL 11.10.2018, 2017-30-01
13 CCRL 11.04.2018, 2017-12-01, 12.04.2018, 2017-17-01, 06.06.2018, 2017-21-01, 18.10.2018, 2018-04-01, 23.05.2018, 2017-20-0103
14 CCRL 26.04.2018, 2017-18-01
15 CCRL 15.02.2018, 2017-09-01
16 CCRL 15.05.2018, 2017-15-01, 29.06.2018, 2017-25-01, 18.10.2018, 2017-35-03, 29.06.2018, 2017-28-0306.
17 **93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being void as of the moment of their adoption 
or any other past date, then the amount of 
compulsory lease fee would not be defined 
in regulatory enactments altogether. A ruling 
like this could create a significant threat to 
the rights and lawful interests of the parties 
to the legal relationship of the compulsory 
lease rather than ensure legal stability, 
clarity and peace in society. Therefore, the 
contested norms were recognised as void as 
of 1 May 2019.
2. Case No. 2017-25-01: Restriction to be 
elected in the Parliament18
The prohibition of persons who, after 
13 January 1991, had been active in 
the Communist Party of Latvia or 
other organisations directed against the 
independence and democratic state order 
of Latvia to run in Saeima elections was 
examined in this case. 
A constitutional complaint initiated the 
case. It was noted in the application that the 
applicant had been active in the Communist 
Party of Latvia after 13 January 1991. Thus, 
the contested norm deprives her of the right to 
run for the Saeima. The applicant argued that 
the restriction on election rights determined 
a long time ago is no longer legitimate 
and is incompatible with the principles of 
proportionality and equality.
Firstly, the CC established that the restriction 
aims to protect the democratic state order, 
national security and the territorial unity 
of Latvia. This norm should be interpreted 
to mean that it prohibited to stand as a 
candidate for the Saeima a person who, by 
being active in the prohibited organisations 
after 13 January 1991, by her actions posed 
a threat and continued to pose a threat to the 
independence of the Latvian State and the 
principles of a democratic state governed by 
the rule of law.
Secondly, the CC found that the compliance 
of the contested norm with the legal norms 
of higher legal force had been examined 
already in 2000 and 2006. However, the 
claims included in the application cannot be 
deemed as already adjudicated because the 
interpretation of the contested norm evolves 
over time with the evolution of social 
relations it is aimed to regulate. Moreover, 
such arguments that had not been examined 
in the previous judgments were included in 
the application. 
Thirdly, the CC recognised that the exercise 
of a person’s rights and freedoms was most 
efficient in a democracy. However, such 
exercise may not be directed against the 
independence of the state and the principles 
of a democratic state governed by the rule 
of law. Hence, it may be necessary for the 
state to take special defencive measures to 
guarantee the stability and effectiveness of 
its democratic system. Moreover, loyalty 
to statehood and democracy has not yet 
become sufficiently consolidated in Latvian 
society—democracy is far from being 
considered self-evident.
Fourthly, the CC noted that the internal 
and external threats to the state should be 
taken into consideration in examining the 
proportionality of the restriction on election 
rights. The fact that persons who previously 
were active in the organisations referred 
to in the contested norm, and continue to 
express opinions and take actions that can 
be seen as contrary to the national security 
and interests, ought to be considered as a 
threat to democracy. The most significant 
external threat, in turn, is caused by Russia’s 
aggressive foreign policy. These threats are a 
significant factor that justifies the retention 
of the restriction on fundamental rights 
included in the contested norm.
Fifthly, the CC found that the benefit to 
society provided by the restriction included 
in the contested norm outweighed the 
adverse consequences that a person incurred 
as a result of this restriction. However, if the 
political situation in the state changes and 
foreign policy threats decrease, the legislator 
has an obligation to review the restriction 
included in the contested norm and to decide 
on amendments to the Saeima Election Law. 
In view of these findings, the CC recognised 
that the contested norm, if appropriately 
interpreted, complied with Article 1 and 
Article 9 of the Satversme.
Moreover, the aforementioned norm was 
recognised as being compatible also with 
Article 91 (right to equality) of the Satversme 
since the Court concluded that persons 
referred to in the application were not in 
similar and comparable circumstances.
3. Case No. 2017-18-01: Restriction to estab-
lish a religious community (e.g., a church)19
The prohibition for newly founded 
congregations20 to establish a religious 
association (a church) prior to the expiry 
of the re-registration period of ten years, as 
well as the restriction to establish more than 
one religious association (a church) in one 
denomination, were examined in this case. 
It was initiated by an application by the 
Supreme Court. 
Firstly, the CC recognised that the right to 
religious freedom is closely linked to the 
right to freedom of association and thus must 
be interpreted with a view to their systemic 
relationship. Secondly, the CC noted that the 
re-registration requirement had been set to 
newly established congregations to prevent 
abuse of the status of a religious association.
Hence, this requirement was directed 
towards protecting other persons’ rights 
and public order. However, these legitimate 
aims of the restriction on fundamental 
rights could be reached, at least by the same 
quality, by measures that are less restrictive 
upon a person’s rights. I.e., law enforcement 
institutions are supervising the compliance 
of the activities conducted by religious 
organisations. This measure is an alternative 
to the obligation of annual re-registration; 
moreover, it is individualised and applicable 
18 **93 #O[[W!^^ ^ZH[][PLZHNV]S]LUJHZLZ&WHNL$%
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exactly to those religious organisations that 
endanger the rights of other persons and 
public order. Hence, the contested norms, 
which envisage re-registration of the newly 
established congregations, were incompatible 
with the principle of proportionality, and 
thus also with the Satversme.
Thirdly, the CC found that the restriction that 
prohibited congregations from registering 
more than one religious association within 
the framework of one denomination had 
been established to decrease the schism 
within religious organisations. However, 
in a democratic society, it is not necessary 
for the state to take measures to ensure 
that religious communities are subject to 
united leadership. In the case of a schism 
within a religious community, the state has 
an obligation to remain neutral and refrain 
from any measures that would give priority 
to one or another religious leader, and its aim 
should be forcing the religious community, 
contrary to its wishes, to be subject to one 
leadership. Therefore, the state does not have 
the right to refuse registration of a religious 
association to a religious community that 
identifies itself with a denomination, in the 
framework of which a religious association 
as the legal person of private law already 
has been registered in the state. Moreover, 
the legislator has ensured that a religious 
organisation, upon registration, may not 
deceive society as to its affiliation with 
another religious organisation, inter alia, 
by providing that the name of the religious 
organisation must differ from the names of 
other religious organisations. Hence, the 
contested norm that envisages the restriction 
allowing the establishment of only one 
religious association within the framework 
of one denomination lacks a legitimate aim 
and is incompatible with the Satversme.
4. Case No 2017-28-0306: Real estate tax 
rate applied to foreigners21
A procedure by which reduced tax rates 
were applied to the payers of real estate tax 
in Riga if the place of residence was of a 
foreigner22 had been declared in the city, and 
was examined in this case.
The case was initiated with regards to an 
application submitted by the Ombudsman. 
It is noted in the application that the 
Binding Regulation of the Riga City 
Council envisages different rates of the 
real estate tax, inter alia, the basic rate and 
the reduced rate. Pursuant to the contested 
norm, if a foreigner’s place of residence has 
been declared on the property, the reduced 
tax rates are allegedly applied only if the 
foreigner’s place of residence in Latvia had 
been declared on 1 January seven years prior 
the respective taxation year. However, if 
the place of residence of a citizen or a non-
citizen of Latvia is declared in the respective 
taxation object, an additional requirement 
like this is not set. Thus, the reduced tax 
rate is applied to the payer of the real estate 
tax in whose property the place of residence 
of a citizen or a non-citizen of Latvia or a 
foreigner who meets the requirement set 
in the contested norm has been declared. 
:KHUHDV WKH EDVLF UHDO HVWDWH WD[ UDWH LV
applied to the payer of the real estate tax in 
whose property the place of residence of a 
foreigner who does not meet the requirement 
set in the contested norm has been declared. 
Allegedly, this legal regulation violates the 
principle of the prohibition of discrimination.
Firstly, the CC noted that in accordance 
with the EU Treaty, EU citizenship was 
one of the criteria included in Article 91 
of the Satversme as prohibited grounds 
for discrimination. However, establishing 
differences on the basis of citizenship status 
as such could be justified in certain cases.
Secondly, the CC recognised that the 
requirement included in the contested norm 
differentiates in a comparable situation 
between EU citizens23 and the citizens and 
non-citizens of Latvia. This requirement is 
incompatible with the essence of the right 
to free movement in the EU and violates the 
principle of the prohibition of discrimination.
Thirdly, the CC found that the differential 
treatment established by the contested 
norm had no legitimate aim. The Riga City 
Council had not substantiated the existence 
of such an aim, nor the objective differences 
between the taxpayers that would require 
different tax rates. Likewise, the Court was 
not provided with a reasonable explanation 
on how the requirement of a prolonged 
and permanent link of the aforementioned 
foreigners to Latvia ensured or facilitated 
the performance of those functions and 
tasks of the municipality, the fulfilment of 
which being the reason the real estate tax 
was collected. In view of these findings, 
the CC recognised the contested norm as 
being incompatible with Article 91 of the 
Satversme.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Two important elections will take place 
in 2019. First, in May, Latvia is going to 
elect its representatives to the European 
Parliament, and later in the summer, the 
Saeima will have to appoint the President of 
the Republic. 
In 2019, the CC will have to decide on 
the constitutionality of education reform 
affecting the use of minority languages in 
public and private schools. Another case 
21 **93 #O[[W!^^ ^ZH[][PLZHNV]S]LUJHZLZ&WHNL$%
22 A foreigner is a citizen of another Member State of the European Union, a state of the European Economic Area or the Confederation of Switzerland, or a person 
who has received a permanent residence permit in Latvia. 
23 Citizen of another Member State of the European Union, a state of the European Economic Area or the Confederation of Switzerland, or a person who has 
received a permanent residence permit in Latvia.
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to be noted is the dispute whether making 
public the salaries of all employees in public 
law institutions is compatible with the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation and the 
constitutional right to privacy. One more 
case involving EU law concerns the question 
whether universities may employ academic 
personnel on the basis of fixed-term 
contracts, which need to be renewed every 
six years. The last case which merits attention 
is a case involving the constitutional right to 
know one’s rights in criminal proceedings 
for illegal possession of a dual-use device. 
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LIECHTENSTEIN
I. INTRODUCTION 
Liechtenstein took advantage of the 40th 
anniversary of its Council of Europe 
membership in autumn 2018 to hold a well-
attended event on the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECHR). Throughout their 
speeches, judges and academics emphasized 
the importance of the ECHR and its 
jurisprudence.1 Liechtenstein’s respect for 
human rights is also reflected by the fact that 
several delegations of the Council of Europe 
visited the country during the last few years.2
The country takes their recommendations 
seriously and implements them, whether 
through legislative amendments3 or 
alterations of the administrative process.
In 2018, no amendments of the Constitution 
were voted for by Parliament. Yet, one 
amendment was discussed and will be voted 
on in early 2019.4
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Throughout 2018, the Parliament was 
preoccupied with a number of questions 
concerning its own organization.
The Splitting of a Political Party
In summer 2018, one Member of Parliament 
(MP) of the party “The Independents” (Die
Unabhängigen) lost their membership in it 
after having discussed the best method of 
party organization. As a consequence, two 
other MPs joined him and left the party 
on their own. After the summer break, the 
parliamentary group of the The Independents 
consisted of only two MPs. The by-law of 
the Parliament (Geschäftsordnung für den 
Landtag) demands three MPs to form a 
parliamentary group. As the Constitution and 
the laws do not contain any special regulation 
for this new situation, the President of 
Parliament proposed an accord—in touch 
with all the political parties. The accord was 
voted for unanimously by Parliament on 
5 September 2018. Among other things, it 
stated that the The Independents would lose 
their status as a parliamentary group. On the 
other side, the three dissidents (who have 
meanwhile founded a new political party 
named “Democrats in Favor of Liechtenstein” 
(Demokraten pro Liechtenstein) would 
form another parliamentary group. One 
of them would take a seat on the board 
of Parliament while the member of The 
Independents would have to leave the 
board. The Independents would continue to 
1 The third issue of the Liechtensteinische Juristen Zeitung has been devoted to the ECHR membership 
anniversary: LJZ 3 [2018] 103-156.
2 See for 2018: European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI): Fifth report on Liech-
tenstein (adopted on 22 March 2018, published on 15 May 2018), ECRI(2018)18. Group of States 
against Corruption (GRECO): Third evaluation round, Compliance Report, published on 30 May 2018, 
.YLJV9*(J[PVUHNHPUZ[;YHɉJRPUNPU/\THU)LPUNZ.9,;(!*VTIPULKZ[UK,]HS\H[PVU
Round, Government’s Reply to GRETA’s Questionnaire, submitted 28 August 2018, GRETA(2018)24.
3 See chapter II (Implementation of the GRECO-Recommendations).
4 See chapter II (Abolition of the principle of rotation).
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receive public funding, as the financing of 
Liechtenstein’s political parties is based on 
the results of the elections and not on their 
constitution as a parliamentary group. The 
Parliament then nominated six members to 
build a special commission. The commission 
was tasked to propose amendments to the 
Constitution and to parliamentary laws to 
regulate the consequences of party splitting 
and MPs dissenting prior to the next 
parliamentary elections.
To be precise: It is the first time in history 
that members of five political parties are 
represented in Parliament. The Independents 
had run for election in 2013 for the first 
time and immediately won four seats out of 
25, and five seats in 2017. Until 1993, only 
two political parties had sent members to the 
Parliament. Up to 2018, no political party that 
had made it into Parliament was dropped.
The Composition of the Joint Body for the 
Selection of Judges
After the elections in March 2017, the 
Parliament nominated four members of 
the Joint Body for the Selection of Judges 
(Richterauswahlgremium), regulated by 
Art 96 of the Constitution. Each of the four 
political parties represented in the Parliament 
made a proposal for one MP. Johannes Kaiser 
was elected for the “Progressive Party of 
Citizens” (Fortschrittliche Bürgerpartei).
After a disagreement with the Prime 
Minister (who happened to be a member 
of the same party) and with the board of 
the party, Johannes Kaiser quit the party in 
March 2018.
But he did not accept leaving the Joint Body. 
Therefore, the question arose as to whether 
the Joint Body was properly composed. 
The wording of Art 96 of the Constitution 
provides that: “The Reigning Prince and 
Parliament shall avail themselves of a 
joint body for the selection of Judges. The 
Reigning Prince shall chair this body and 
have the casting vote. He may appoint as 
many members to this body as the number 
of representatives delegated by Parliament. 
Parliament shall delegate one of its Members 
for each electoral group represented in 
Parliament (…).”
The Constitution itself does not use the 
words “political party”. Instead, the term 
“electoral group” is used (similar to Art 96 of 
the Constitution), which refers to the statute 
regulating the elections (Volksrechtegesetz).
In this statute, 30 persons signing an 
electoral list are labelled as “electoral 
group”. For the running members of a 
political party, the representatives of the 
respective political parties are supposed to 
sign the electoral list. Given that the concept 
of the Volksrechtegesetz theoretically 
allows a group of 30 friends to sign a list 
without possessing a party-like structured 
organization (membership fees, board), the 
term “electoral group” does not function as a 
synonym for “political party”. Furthermore, 
Liechtenstein law does not provide a legal 
basis on which MPs sitting in commissions 
can be recalled. 
The President of the Parliament then asked 
a Liechtenstein lawyer to provide an expert 
opinion. The answer remains unpublished, 
but clear: Nobody may force an MP to leave 
the Joint Body or any commission before the 
end of their term. Immediately thereafter, the 
Hereditary Prince informed the Parliament 
about his fear that the composition of the 
Joint Body for the Selection of Judges might 
be unconstitutional if the Progressive Party 
of Citizens continues to be unrepresented 
in the Joint Body, but rather an independent 
MP makes part of it. For this reason, the 
Parliament voted on 2 May 2018, for an 
MP of the Progressive Party of Citizens to 
re-join the Joint Body. At the same time, 
the Parliament decided to require a second 
expert opinion to answer the questions of 
the Hereditary Prince. The second expert 
did not follow the first one’s opinion. On 
4 June 2018, Johannes Kaiser declared his 
resignation as a member of the Joint Body.
Even if the situation seems to be resolved, the 
question of how to deal with crossbenchers 
as members of commissions remains to 
be discussed and hopefully answered by 
the Special Commission formed after the 
splitting of the The Independents. 
Implementation of the GRECO-Recommen-
dations Concerning Party Funding
An amendment to the statute regulating 
public funding of political parties5 will be 
voted upon by Parliament in spring 2019. 
The amendment is not linked to the splitting 
of The Independents, but rather motivated 
by the recommendations made by GRECO 
in 20166  and 20187  during their third 
evaluation round “transparency of party 
funding”.
The sum spent on political parties will not 
be changed. Political parties will have to 
publish their accounts (to show all their 
sources of income). Receiving anonymous 
donations will no longer be legal, but the 
parties will not be required to publish the 
names and addresses of their donors.8
Abolition of the Principle of Rotation from 
Case to Case for the Alternate Judges of the 
Constitutional Court and the Administrative 
Court
Art 102 para 4 of the Constitution and the 
Constitutional Court Statute (Gesetz über 
den Staatsgerichtshof, StGHG) will be 
amended in 2019.9  In September 2018, the 
Parliament passed the amendments without 
any further discussion during the first 
5 LGBl 1984 Nr 31 LR 162, https://www.gesetze.li/konso/1984.31.
6 Group of States against Corruption (GRECO): Third evaluation round, Evaluation Report, published on 2 June 2016), GrecoEval3Rep(2016)2Theme II.
7 Group of States against Corruption (GRECO): Third evaluation round, Compliance Report, published on 30 May 2018), GrecoRC3(2018)3.
8.V]LYUTLU[VM3PLJO[LUZ[LPUº)LYPJO[\UK(U[YHN»)\(5Y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9 .V]LYUTLU[VM3PLJO[LUZ[LPUº)LYPJO[\UK(U[YHN»)\(5Y1\UL#O[[W!I\HNTNIPa)\(&I\HUY$I\HQHOY$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`
 HUK)\(5Y 6J[VILY#O[[W!I\HNTNIPa)\(&I\HUY$I\HQHOY$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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reading. As a consequence, one may expect 
new rules on the call for alternate judges of 
the Constitutional and Administrative Courts 
to be passed in early 2019.
The new wording of Art 102 obliges the two 
Courts to adopt their own rules of procedure. 
In them, they will have to describe the 
selection mechanisms of alternate judges. 
Until now, Art 102 para 4 stated that the 
substitution shall be undertaken “by the 
principle of rotation from case to case”. 
The previous rule resulted in a situation 
in which alternate judges were called 
up alphabetically without respect to 
their special skills or their disposability, 
thereby provoking delays. The amendment 
will make proceedings in front of the 
Constitutional Court and Administrative 
Court resemble those in front of ordinary 
courts. Therewith, the amendment is part 
of a series of adaptations inspired by the 
government’s search for more efficiency and 
standardisation.
Dispute on Parliament’s Right to Informa-
tion vis-à-vis the Government 
In December 2017, a number of MPs 
raised an initiative to extend their right 
to information vis-à-vis the government. 
The proposal to amend the Administrative 
Control Statue (Geschäftsverkehrs und 
Verwaltungskontrollgesetz) was modelled 
after Art 7 of the Swiss Parliament Statute.10
The decisive proposal was contained by Art 
20 Sec 1, suggesting that all MPs should 
obtain the right to request the government 
and the state administration to provide 
them with any information and documents 
necessary to perform their parliamentary 
mandates. The government considered 
the proposal as unconstitutional given 
that Art 63 of the Constitution would only 
subject the government to parliamentary 
control but not the entire administration. 
References to Art 7 of the Swiss Parliament 
Statute left the government unimpressed, 
given that information rights provided by 
Liechtenstein’s Constitution could not be 
compared with its Swiss counterpart.11
On 1 March 2018, 13 out of 25 MPs decided 
to consider the initiative as constitutional. 
However, 15 out of 25 MPs decided—during 
the same session—to refer the initiative to 
a special parliamentary commission. The 
latter has not yet reported on the issue and 
as a result, one might expect a prolonged and 
lingering conflict between the Parliament 
and the government. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. StGH 2017/82 and StGH 2017/83
In their 2017 report, the authors Bußjäger/
Gamper referred to several judgments of 
the Liechtenstein Constitutional Court12
concerning the access to law. They mentioned 
that the Constitutional Court on 4 December 
2017 examined the constitutionality of Art 
83 para 1a Asylum Act13 on this provision. 
The Constitutional Court then asked the 
government explicitly how a complainant 
who was not assisted by a lawyer could be 
expected to lodge a complaint in line with the 
necessary legal requirements if the remedy 
could only be expected to be effective if 
it had been given sufficient legal aid (as 
according to Art 43 Constitution). 
On 27 March 2018, the Constitutional Court 
issued its decision. The facts of the case are 
summarized below.
The applicants, asylum seekers from the 
Republic of Macedonia and the Republic 
of Serbia, had made an application for 
asylum in the Principality of Liechtenstein. 
The member of government in charge then 
declared these applications inadmissible in 
his decisions of 24 April 2017 and 24 May 
2017. Against these decisions, the applicants 
made a writ to the Head of the Administrative 
Court, including an application for legal aid. 
In his orders from 27 June 2017 and 28 June 
2017, the Head of the Administrative Court 
qualified these writs as formal complaints, 
confirmed the member of government’s 
decision and dismissed the applications for 
legal aid.
In a constitutional complaint, the applicants 
alleged that the qualification of the writs as 
formal complaints constituted a violation of 
their right to legal aid and the prohibition 
of arbitrary. Only by mentioning the 
intention on making a complaint in the writ, 
the writing cannot be qualified as such. 
The applicants argued that under these 
circumstances they would be deprived of 
the possibility of submitting a complaint 
meeting all legal requirements. Under the 
law of the Principality of Liechtenstein, 
there would be no possibility to get access 
to aid for the comprehensive conduction 
of a complaint against the decision of the 
member of government, especially not for 
the formulation of the complaint itself. 
Under the amended Art 83 para 1a Asylum 
Act, the application for legal aid could 
be made the earliest together with the 
introductory writ (i.e., the application for 
asylum) or the complaint (against a negative 
decision), and the application for legal aid 
would be treated during deciding on the 
principle cause. 
The Constitutional Court acknowledged 
the intention of the lawmaker to accelerate 
asylum proceedings and pointed out 
that restrictions to the right to legal aid 
are permissible as long and as far as the 
constitutional right to an effective complaint 
will be maintained. Yet, the Constitutional 
Court maintained that this is the case only 
if the applicant is rightfully represented by a 
10 7HYSPHTLU[VM3PLJO[LUZ[LPUº.LZL[aLZPUP[PH[P]L0UMVYTH[PVUZYLJO[»+LJLTILY#O[[WZ!^^ ^SHUK[HNSPÄSLZTLKPLUHYJOP].LZL[aLZPUP[PH[P]LF0UMVYTH[PVU-
ZYLJO[WKM%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
11 .V]LYUTLU[VM3PLJO[LUZ[LPUº)LYPJO[\UK(U[YHN»)\(5Y1HU\HY`#O[[W!I\HNTNIPa)\(&I\HUY$I\HQHOY$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
12 Peter Bussjäger, Anna Gamper, .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^#O[[WZ!WHWLYZZZYUJVTZVSWHWLYZJMT&HIZ[YHJ[FPK$%HJJLZZLK
February 2019.  
13 LGBl. 2016 Nr. 411, https://www.gesetze.li/chrono/2016.411.
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lawyer while filing the introductory writ or 
the complaint including the application for 
legal aid.
However, the primary objections of the 
Constitutional Court concerned more 
common cases in which a lawyer does not 
rightfully represent the applicants. Before 
Art 83 para 1a Asylum Act had entered into 
force, the treatment of the application for 
legal aid before the introductory writ could 
be guaranteed the right to complaint, since 
a positive decision on the question of legal 
aid beforehand ensured the payment for 
legal representation. Under the current legal 
situation, the applicant faces the risk of not 
finding a lawyer filling out his complaint 
because payment cannot be guaranteed. 
According to the Constitutional Court’s 
constant jurisdiction, the right to legal aid 
(which derives from the constitutional right 
to complain and the principle of equality) is 
not only of procedural but also of substantive 
character. This substantive character cannot 
EH XQGHUPLQHG :KLOH UHVWULFWLRQV WR WKH
right of complaint can be permissible if they 
are of public interest and in accordance with 
the principle of proportionality, Art 83 para 
1a Asylum Act restricts the right excessively. 
The prevention of the possibility to first 
decide on the question of legal aid and 
only afterwards on the principal question 
undermines the right to legal aid in asylum 
cases. As a result, this legal allegation would 
make a positive decision on the granting 
of legal aid ineffectual, since the principal 
claim has already been decided. 
Therefore, the Constitutional Court 
revoked Art 83 para 1a Asylum Act as 
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, it noted, that 
the aim behind this legal allegation would 
be justifiable if the lawmaker would abolish 
the obligation to a concurrent decision on the 
application for legal aid and the complaint 
(Art 83 para 1a phrase 1). Thereupon, after 
a final positive decision on the granting of 
legal aid, an appointed legal representative 
can complement the complaint within a 
newly set time limit. 
:LWK WKHDPHQGPHQWRI WKH$V\OXP$FWRI
5 October 2018,14 the lawmaker introduced 
the unprecedented right of asylum seekers to 
not only require translations of the decisions 
of their cases but also information and 
consultations on the applicable law and the 
changes of success of judicial remedies. 
2. StGH 2018/074
In this case, the Constitutional Court had 
to deal with the question of the indirect 
application of fundamental rights in disputes 
under private law. The applicant, a deputy 
senior medicinal officer of the department of 
internal medicine, claimed that the appellee 
had dismissed him unlawfully after he had 
made a criminal charge against a senior 
medical officer based on the suspicion that 
the latter had conducted active euthanasia on 
VHYHUDOSDWLHQWV:KHUHDVWKH&RXUWRI)LUVW
Instance had dismissed the applicant’s action, 
the Court of Second Instance followed the 
applicant’s complaint. The Court stated that 
given that the freedom of expression protects 
the reporting of grievances, there was no 
such misfeasance found that could justify 
a dismissal without prior notice. However, 
the Supreme Court varied this decision and 
found the dismissal legal.
In a constitutional complaint, the applicant 
alleged that the Supreme Court’s decision 
constituted a violation of his constitutional 
right of freedom of expression, the principle 
of equality and prohibition of arbitrary 
decision-making. By reporting sincere 
grievances to the state attorney, he saw 
himself in the role of a whistle-blower. 
Therefore, the qualification of his conduct 
as a constitutive ground for dismissal would 
infringe the above-mentioned constitutional 
rights. The freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by Art 40 of the Constitution and 
Art 10 of the ECHR, implies the freedom of 
communication as well as (political) opinion 
making.
First of all, the Constitutional Court 
analysed if the freedom of expression 
could have been affected in the case. Even 
though the dismissal of the applicant was 
part of a civil law dispute and there was no 
general grounding for third-party effects of 
fundamental rights in the ECHR, the right of 
freedom of expression reaches beyond the 
classic understanding as a protective right 
against the state. Thus, by implying effects 
on third parties in civil law, a dismissal on the 
grounds of the exercise of one’s constitutional 
right is unlawful. In consequence, the state 
also needs to guarantee the freedom of 
expression in employment relationships, 
which in this case means interpreting labour 
laws in favour of the freedom of expression, 
especially Sec 1173a Art 53 and Art 4 of the 
Civil Rights Code.
The Constitutional Court further 
acknowledged the applicant’s perspective 
to see himself as a whistle-blower and thus 
akin to the constitutional protection of the 
freedom of expression. The Constitutional 
Court has pointed out that a whistle-blower 
is understood as an employee who reveals 
serious misconduct in his work environment 
out of mostly altruistic reasons. 
Even though freedom of expression is 
affected in this case, and even though Sec 
1173a Art 53 and Art 4 of the Civil Rights 
Code thus need to be interpreted according to 
the Constitution, further considerations need 
to be taken into account, namely the public 
interest, duties and responsibilities of the 
whistle-blower as well as possible damages. 
The Constitutional Court did not doubt the 
public interest of the information released. 
However, it remains questionable whether 
the conduct of the applicant fulfilled the 
high demands that come along with the 
severity and sensitivity of the accusations 
and consequences for those involved. By not 
taking all reasonable measures for validating 
the reliability of the accusations (in this case 
additionally looking at the paper patient file 
when knowing about the incompleteness of 
the electronic version), the Constitutional 
Court had followed the Supreme Court’s 
opinion that in such context, the applicant 
acted recklessly. 
14 LGBl 2018 Nr 270, https://www.gesetze.li/chrono/2018.270. 
192 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
As a consequence, the Constitutional 
Court declared that there had not been any 
violation of the freedom of expression. 
Additionally, the Constitutional Court found 
that no violation of the principle of equality 
had taken place. The Supreme Court had 
declared that the noticing period can depend 
exemplarily on the sensibility of the manner 
and can therefore vary among different cases. 
Correspondingly, this special case must not 
be compared with other dismissals with a 
shorter noticing period, hence not harming 
the principle of treating equal things equally 
and unequal things unequally.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
On Sunday, 24 March 2019, elections will be 
held in all of the 11 municipalities. The citizens 
have to elect mayors and six to 12 members of 
the municipal councils. The big question is if 
more women will be voted for than in 2015, 
when 85 men were elected as members of 
municipal councils, but only 19 women. If not, 
women’s organizations can be expected to re-
voice claims for a women’s quota.15
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M A L AY S I A
I. INTRODUCTION
For the first time since independence in 1957, 
Malaysia experienced a change of govern-
ment at the federal level following the 14th 
General Election (GE14) on 9 May 2018. 
The Pakatan Harapan (‘Pact of Hope’, or 
PH) alliance of parties successfully unseated 
the Barisan Nasional (‘National Front’, or 
BN) coalition in a peaceful transition that re-
affirmed Malaysia’s commitment to consti-
tutionalism and democracy. This presented a 
unique opportunity for Malaysia to forge a 
new direction following a particularly scan-
dal-ridden period epitomized by allegations 
of massive corruption surrounding state in-
vestment fund 1Malaysia Development Ber-
had (1MDB) and its dealings worldwide.1
The change of political leadership heralded 
the opportunity to reform the country’s laws 
and institutions, which was indeed a central 
feature of the incoming coalition’s promise to 
an electorate fatigued by decades of corrup-
tion and mismanagement at state institutions.2
An interesting—if somewhat ironic—fea-
ture of the aftermath of GE14 was the return 
of 93-year-old Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad 
as Prime Minister. This is the second time Dr 
Mahathir has held this position, following 
his first premiership from 1981 to 2003 at 
the head of BN—a period that was also beset 
with significant issues including the under-
mining of the judiciary, authoritarian-style 
politics, and the entrenchment of crony 
capitalism. This time, however, Dr Maha-
thir leads a very different political coalition, 
with his Cabinet comprising some leaders 
who were previously his bitter adversaries, 
as well as more conservative elements who 
defected from BN on the eve of GE14. Giv-
en this eccentric mix of new and old, the ex-
tent to which Malaysia can and will reform 
itself following the watershed of May 2018 
remains an open question.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The change of government is particular-
ly significant because, although there have 
previously been changes of prime minister 
within the ruling party, essentially the same 
coalition had governed for 61 years since 
independence, first as the Alliance and later 
as the BN. During this time, numerous re-
pressive laws—particularly on sedition and 
internal security—were enacted, granting 
the executive branch very wide powers to in-
terfere with fundamental liberties guaranteed 
by the Federal Constitution. The office of the 
Prime Minister also became a powerful in-
stitution, encompassing control over no less 
than 42 federal departments and agencies. 
The lack of effective checks and balances 
1 See, e.g., Hannah Ellis-Petersen, ‘1MDB Scandal Explained: A Tale of Malaysia’s Missing Billions’ (;OL
Guardian, 25 October 2018) <www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/25/1mdb-scandal-explained-a-tale-of-
THSH`ZPHZTPZZPUNIPSSPVUZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
2 Pakatan Harapan, ‘)\R\/HYHWHUº)VVRVM/VWL»9LI\PSKPUN6\Y5H[PVU-\SÄSSPUN6\Y/VWLZ»#O[[WZ!
RLTWLUZHTHaVUH^ZJVTTHUPMLZ[V4HUPMLZ[VF[L_[4HUPMLZ[VF7/F,5WKM%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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was further aggravated by the recent prac-
tice of the Prime Minister also concurrently 
holding the position of Finance Minister. 
This situation facilitated opaque dealings and 
alleged abuses of power by the ruling par-
ty, most notably the recent 1MDB scandal, 
which attracted worldwide regulatory inves-
tigations.3 The previous government’s control 
over the levers of power—including Parlia-
PHQWJLYHQWKH:HVWPLQVWHUPRGHOµIXVLRQRI
powers’ practised in Malaysia—was also used 
to stymie local attempts at securing account-
ability, and to gerrymander electoral boundar-
ies in an (ultimately unsuccessful) attempt to 
shore up the ruling coalition’s position prior 
to GE14 (see last year’s Review). 
Against this backdrop, the PH coalition 
campaigned on a promise to repeal repres-
sive laws, reform the government by decen-
tralizing power from the Prime Minister’s 
Department (PMD), strengthen parliamen-
tary checks-and-balances, and enhance the 
credibility of the judiciary.  Indeed, soon 
after the election, the new PH government 
appeared to have consolidated its agenda by 
securing the resignation of the country’s top 
two judges, the Chief Justice and the Presi-
dent of the Court of Appeal, who had been 
appointed by the previous administration in 
2017 under highly dubious circumstances.4
These justices were swiftly replaced by the 
next most senior judges in the judicial hier-
archy. The new government also appointed 
a new Attorney-General, replacing the in-
cumbent who had infamously absolved the 
previous government of any wrongdoing in 
the 1MDB saga despite mounting evidence 
to the contrary.5 The appointment of the new 
Attorney-General, however, was delayed for 
weeks amidst rumours that the new appoin-
tee—a double minority (i.e., a non-Malay 
and non-Muslim)—was not acceptable to the 
then King, whose position still commands 
significant deference in Malaysia’s political 
culture.6
Highlighting its commitment to reform, the 
new government established an Institutional 
Reforms Committee (IRC), which was com-
prised of eminent personalities and tasked 
with providing recommendations for the re-
IRUPRINH\QDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQV:LWKLQ
days of the change of government, the IRC 
reported back with a set of recommendations 
based on the pledges made in the PH’s elec-
toral manifesto for the Cabinet’s consider-
ation and approval; this report, however, has 
yet to be made public.7 Also, in a landmark 
move, the new government announced its in-
tention to abolish the death penalty and im-
posed a moratorium on pending executions 
until changes to the legal framework were 
implemented.8 Furthermore, in July, the new 
government announced plans to devolve 
power from the PMD by placing several crit-
ical bodies, such as the Election Commis-
sion, the Public Services Commission, and 
the Judicial Appointments Commission¬ 
under the oversight of Parliament, and trans-
ferring certain agencies to other ministries.9
The government has, however, faced seri-
ous difficulties in implementing its reform 
agenda. Its attempt to repeal the Anti-Fake 
News Act 2017 in September failed: the bill 
to abolish the Act was passed in the popular-
ly elected lower house of Parliament but it 
was rejected in the Senate—the upper house 
of Malaysia’s bicameral legislature—where 
appointees of the previous government still 
held a majority. This rejection—unprece-
dented in the history of Malaysia—means 
that pursuant to the Federal Constitution, 
the repealing bill is now on hold for at least 
a year before the Senate’s rejection can be 
bypassed, if the lower house re-enacts the 
measure.10 PH will eventually gain a ma-
jority in the Senate under the appointments 
system, and the Senate is not constitutional-
ly empowered to block money bills.11 None-
theless, this episode amply illustrates the 
obstacles that remain—at least for the short 
term—in the path of reform measures that do 
not enjoy bipartisan support. Another issue is 
the new administration’s lack of a two-thirds 
majority in either house to amend Malaysia’s 
Federal Constitution, which will be required 
if some of the coalition’s promises, such 
as the separation of the Attorney-General’s 
functions from that of the Public Prosecutor 
and the reform of the judicial appointments 
process, are to be realized.
A deeper undercurrent of resistance to the 
new administration’s reform agenda was il-
lustrated by the failed proposal for Malaysia 
to ratify the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination (ICERD) in 2018. Following an in-
spiring speech at the United Nations in which 
Dr Mahathir pledged to ‘ratify all remaining 
core UN instruments relating to the protec-
3 Malaysia’s 1MDB Scandal’ (:V\[O*OPUH4VYUPUN7VZ[-LIY\HY` #^^ ^ZJTWJVT[VWPJZTHSH`ZPHTKIZJHUKHS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
4 See the case discussion in Part III(4) below; see also George Varughese, ‘Legal Action Filed to Seek Declarations that the Appointments of the Chief Justice and 
the President of the Court of Appeal are Unconstitutional and Void’ (Malaysian Bar, 17 October 2017) <www.malaysianbar.org.my/press_statements/press_re-
SLHZLF*FSLNHSFHJ[PVUFÄSLKF[VFZLLRFKLJSHYH[PVUZF[OH[F[OLFHWWVPU[TLU[ZFVMF[OLFJOPLMFQ\Z[PJLFHUKFWYLZPKLU[FVMF[OLFJV\Y[FVMFHWWLHSFHYLF\UJVUZ[P[\[PVU-
HSFHUKF]VPKO[TS&KH[L$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
5 ‘A-G: 1MDB Did Nothing Wrong’ (;OL:[HY6J[VILY#^^ ^[OLZ[HYJVTT`UL^ZUH[PVUHNTKIKPKUV[OPUN^YVUNUVVɈLUJL[VHJ[VU
ZH`ZHWHUKP%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
6 Notwithstanding these rumours, in this matter the King (VY@HUNKP7LY[\HU(NVUN) as a constitutional monarch was in fact required to act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister; Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Arts 40(1A), 145(1).
7 º0UZ[P[\[PVUHS9LMVYTZ*VTTP[[LLZ\ITP[ZÄUHSYLWVY[[V*,774»Z+LW[»Malay Mail, 7 August 2018) <www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2018/08/07/institu-
[PVUHSYLMVYTZJVTTP[[LLZ\ITP[ZÄUHSYLWVY[[VJLWWTKLW[  %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
8 ‘Malaysia to abolish death penalty’ ((S1HaLLYH, 11 October 2018).
9 Royce Tan, ‘Massive overhaul in PM’s Dept with MACC, EC among agencies placed under Parliament’ (;OL:[HY, 1 July 2018) <www.thestar.com.my/news/na-
[PVUTHZZP]LV]LYOH\SPUWYPTLTPUPZ[LYZKLWHY[TLU[^P[OTHJJLJHTVUNHNLUJPLZWSHJLK\UKLYWHYSPHTLU[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
10 Federal Constitution of Malaysia, Art 68(2).
11 Ibid, Art 68(1).
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tion of human rights’,12 attention turned to 
the issue of ratifying ICERD, which could 
have raised questions regarding Malaysia’s 
long-standing affirmative action policy in 
support of the Malay and other indigenous 
communities, who form a significant ma-
jority in the country. Amidst coordinated 
protests from the (now opposition) United 
Malay National Organization (UMNO) and 
the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), a mam-
moth gathering galvanizing the Malay ma-
jority was scheduled for 9 December in Kua-
la Lumpur. The increasing tension, which 
had begun to take on ominous ethnic under-
tones, was only defused by the new govern-
ment’s announcement that it would not ratify 
ICERD after all, and the rally (which turned 
into a ‘celebratory’ event) passed without in-
cident. This episode, which leaves Malaysia 
as one of only 14 countries in the world that 
have not signed or ratified the Convention, 
illustrates the precarious nature of the new 
administration’s reform agenda, particularly 
when ethnic and/or religious considerations 
enter the fray.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Ja-
batan Agama Islam Negeri Perak & Ors: 
Basic Structure Doctrine and the Judicial 
Power of the Courts
In Indira Gandhi, the Federal Court exam-
ined the legality of the conversion of three 
minor children by their father without the 
knowledge or consent of their non-Mus-
lim mother. The father had converted to 
Islam and become estranged from his Hin-
du spouse, the applicant in this case. Apart 
from the issue of the claimant’s constitu-
tional right to determine the religion of her 
offspring, this case also raised the important 
question of whether the civil (or ordinary) 
courts have jurisdiction to determine legal 
questions concerning the religious status of 
Muslim converts. 
Under Article 12(4) of the Federal Constitu-
tion, the religion of a person under the age 
of eighteen years ‘shall be determined by his 
parent or guardian’. The High Court had in-
terpreted this provision to mean ‘parents’ in 
the plural, not least to avoid the absurd sit-
uation whereby one parent could convert a 
child to a particular religion on one day, only 
for the other to convert the child to another 
religion on a later day. Conversely, the Court 
of Appeal adopted a literal interpretation of 
Article 12(4) and allowed the father’s con-
version of the children to the Islamic faith. If 
that conversion was valid, however, it would 
be difficult for the applicant to convert the 
children back to the Hindu faith, since con-
versions out of Islam require the prior ap-
proval of the Syariah (Islamic law) courts 
in Malaysia. The validity of the purported 
conversion of the children thus assumed par-
amount importance—and the question was 
whether the civil courts or the Syariah courts 
had jurisdiction to determine this. This ques-
tion also engaged Article 121(1A) of the 
Federal Constitution, an amendment inserted 
in 1988 which provides that the civil courts 
‘shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any 
matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah 
courts.’ This provision had been cited by nu-
merous cases since 1988 to justify repeated 
instances of the civil courts deferring to the 
Syariah courts on questions involving the 
status of Muslim converts.
The Federal Court held that the civil courts 
had jurisdiction to rule on the legality of the 
purported conversions in this case. In the 
first place, the Court stridently asserted that 
the amendment of the Federal Constitution 
in 1988 that removed ‘the judicial power of 
the Federation’ from Article 121(1), the pro-
vision establishing the judiciary in Malaysia, 
does not have the effect of ousting the power 
of judicial review, which is ‘essential to the 
constitutional role of the courts, and inher-
ent in the basic structure of the Constitution.’ 
This invocation of the ‘basic structure doc-
trine’, which follows the Federal Court’s 
acceptance of the doctrine in Semenyih Jaya 
Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu 
Langat & Others13 in 2017, means that de-
spite the constitutional amendment to the 
power-vesting clause of the Federal Consti-
tution, the judicial power of the Malaysian 
courts did not—and could not—become sub-
ordinated to legislative diktat. In contrast, 
the Syariah courts are creatures of state leg-
islatures as permitted by the Federal Consti-
tution, and they do not have inherent judicial 
powers. Their jurisdiction must be expressly 
conferred by state legislation, and cannot be 
expanded by implication. 
Thus, the Federal Court held that Article 
121(1A) does not oust the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts in interpreting the Consti-
tution and reviewing the lawfulness of state 
action (here, the conversion of the minor 
children by the State of Perak Registrar of 
Converts) and that there was no express stat-
utory provision conferring jurisdiction on 
the Syariah courts to determine the validity 
of conversions to Islam. The Court found 
that the action of the Registrar of Converts 
in converting the minor children without the 
knowledge or consent of their mother was 
unlawful and in contravention of the moth-
er’s constitutional right to determine the reli-
gion of her children. Accordingly, the Court 
quashed the certificates of conversion, which 
was the basis upon which the Syariah courts 
had proceeded to issue ancillary orders, such 
as those granting custody of the children to 
their father. 
The Indira Gandhi judgment has been hailed 
as a ‘restoration of the proper hierarchy be-
tween the civil and Syariah courts’.14 This is 
an important development in the ‘jurisdic-
tional imbroglio’ between the civil and Sya-
riah courts that has dogged Malaysia since 
the constitutional amendments of 1988, and 
it provides some vindication for non-Muslim 
12 ‘Dr M addresses UN General Assembly’ (;OL:[HY :LW[LTILY#^^ ^[OLZ[HYJVTT`UL^ZUH[PVU  KYTHKKYLZZLZ\UNLULYHSHZZLTIS`%
accessed 16 February 2019.
13 [2017] 5 CLJ 526 (Federal Court).
14 Jaclyn Neo, ‘Return of Judicial Power: Religious Freedom and the Tussle over Jurisdictional Boundaries in Malaysia’ (I·CONnect, 15 March 2018) <www.icon-
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spouses who have often found themselves 
without legal recourse as a result of civ-
il courts routinely declining jurisdiction to 
hear their applications for relief.15
Importantly, the Indira Gandhi decision also 
reaffirmed the application of the ‘basic struc-
ture doctrine’ in Malaysia, whereby Parlia-
ment cannot amend certain basic, fundamen-
tal characteristics of the Constitution even if 
the stipulated constitutional amendment pro-
cedure is complied with. This brings Malay-
sia in line with Commonwealth jurisdictions 
such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, 
where the doctrine has been judicially recog-
nized and applied. 
2. Chong Chieng Jen v Government of the 
State of Sarawak & Anor: State Govern-
ments Can Sue Individuals for Defamation
In Chong Chieng Jen’s case, the Federal 
Court affirmed that the principle propound-
ed by the UK House of Lords in Derbyshire 
County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd16
does not apply to state governments and 
similar public authorities in Malaysia. The 
so-called Derbyshire principle provides, as a 
matter of common law, that although public 
authorities can sue and be sued, this does not 
extend to the ability to sue for defamation. 
Conversely, the Federal Court held that pub-
lic authorities such as the State Government 
of Sarawak (the plaintiff in this case) are reg-
ulated by the Government Proceedings Act 
1956 (GPA), section 3, which provides for 
the power of these authorities to sue without 
qualification. Therefore, public authorities 
can institute suits for defamation, as the Sar-
awak Government did in this case against a 
leader of the state-level opposition, who had 
insinuated corruption and mismanagement 
of state funds on the part of the Sarawak 
Government. In so holding, the Federal 
Court also made reference to the limited na-
ture of the freedom of speech secured under 
Article 10(1) of the Federal Constitution, 
which can be limited by laws passed by Par-
liament under Article 10(2). Indeed, Article 
10(2) refers specifically to the ability of Par-
liament to legislate restrictions on the free-
dom of speech in order to provide against 
defamation. Thus, the Federal Court ruled 
that the Derbyshire principle must give way 
to the provisions of the domestic statute—in 
this case the GPA—which allows public au-
thorities to institute defamation suits.17
3. Hassan bin Marsom & Others v Mohd 
Hady bin Ya’akop: Irregularly Obtained Re-
mand Order Is a Violation of Constitutional 
Rights and Occasions Damages for False 
Imprisonment
In Hassan bin Marsom the Federal Court dis-
missed an attempt by a group of policemen, 
who had assaulted a detainee in custody, to 
challenge an award of exemplary damages 
against them on the basis that a magistrate 
had lawfully ordered the detention. It was 
asserted on their behalf that the act of the 
magistrate in issuing the remand order was 
a judicial act that could not of itself give rise 
to a claim for damages under the Courts of 
Judicature Act 1964. Alternatively, it was as-
serted that even if the remand order had been 
improperly obtained (which indeed it had), 
the remand order remained valid once issued 
and it had never been set aside. 
The Federal Court held that because the ev-
idence showed that the remand order had 
been issued without complying with the re-
quirements of the Criminal Procedure Code 
(specifically section 117) and the Chief 
Justice’s Practice Direction No. 3 of 2003, 
the detention was unlawful ab initio and in 
violation of the constitutional right to lib-
erty secured by Article 5(1) of the Federal 
Constitution. The Federal Court observed 
that the courts’ constitutional role is to be 
the ultimate bulwark against excesses in ad-
ministrative action, and that assault in police 
custody is a clear violation of the most fun-
damental liberty guaranteed under the Feder-
al Constitution.18 Hence, the award of exem-
plary damages was not only maintained but 
also enhanced. Hassan bin Marsom’s case 
thus marked an important vindication of the 
right not to be deprived of liberty without 
due process of law by the apex court.
4. Malaysian Bar & Others v Government of 
Malaysia: Controversial Extension of Chief 
Justice’s Tenure
On 24 September, the Federal Court decided 
the suit brought by the Malaysian Bar and 
the Advocates Associations of Sabah and 
Sarawak seeking to invalidate the appoint-
ments of Justice Raus Sharif and Tan Sri 
Zulkefli Ahmad Makinudin as Chief Justice 
and President of the Court of Appeal, the two 
highest-ranking positions in the Malaysian 
judicial hierarchy, respectively. The duo had 
been controversially appointed to these posi-
tions by the previous administration in 2017, 
despite both having passed the retirement 
age stipulated in the Federal Constitution. 
This was achieved via the unprecedented 
and constitutionally doubtful route of first 
appointing both as ‘Additional Judges’ of the 
apex court. Apart from the Bar Associations, 
Dr Mahathir (then a ‘former Prime Minis-
ter’) and a component party of the PH coali-
tion had also challenged the legality of these 
appointments (both ultimately unsuccessful; 
see last year’s Review).
Following the change of government in May, 
however, both appointees resigned in July—
though not before both had been controver-
sially ‘summoned’ to meet the chairman of 
the advisory Council of Eminent Persons 
(CEP), set up by the new administration.19  A 
new Chief Justice and President of the Court 
of Appeal were swiftly sworn into office 
through the regular appointment process.
Given these developments, the Federal 
Court declined to provide the much-awaited 
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answer to the question of whether Raus and 
Zulkefli’s appointments had been validly 
made. Holding that the matter had become 
‘academic’ now that the judges in question 
had resigned, the Federal Court sidestepped 
the questions of constitutionality posed by 
the applicants, reiterating that ‘it is not the 
function of the courts to decide hypothetical 
questions which do not impact on the par-
ties before them.’20 This was an unfortunate 
decision that spurned an unprecedented op-
portunity to rule on the legality of using the 
‘Additional Judge’ mechanism to appoint 
top judicial office-holders and thereby estab-
lish guidance on the issue in case a future 
government is tempted to repeat this maneu-
ver.21 The decision also failed to address the 
uncertainty surrounding the legality of the 
duo’s actions and decisions during their dis-
puted tenure in these positions. 
5. A Child and Others v Jabatan Pendaft-
aran Negara & Others: Religion and Ad-
ministrative Power
In November, the Federal Court deferred its 
decision on the appeal arising out of the ju-
dicial review action to compel the National 
Registration Department (NRD) to change 
the surname of ‘bin Abdullah’, appended 
as a matter of procedure to a child born to a 
Muslim family who was illegitimate under 
Islamic law (see last year’s Review). Last 
year, the Court of Appeal had held against 
the NRD, affirming that the agency is not 
entitled to rely on a fatwa (religious decree) 
to defeat the provisions of ordinary law (in 
this case the Births and Deaths Registration 
Act 1957), which permit other ways of deter-
mining the child’s surname.22 This is an im-
portant ruling which affects the relationship 
between the ordinary ‘civil’ law and ‘Islamic 
law’, which co-exist somewhat uneasily in 
the Malaysian legal system.
On appeal by the NRD and a coalition of 
Muslim organizations, the Federal Court ul-
timately reserved the judgment it had been 
scheduled to deliver, agreeing with the gov-
ernment’s counsel that the matter required 
a careful solution from the legislative and 
executive branches.23 This was a curious po-
sition given that no legislative or executive 
proposal to resolve the impasse is currently 
in the public domain, and the matter raises 
the issue of the primacy of one source of law 
over the other, which is an issue of substan-
tial public interest. 
6. Sisters in Islam v Selangor Fatwa Com-
mittee & Others: Courts’ Jurisdiction to Re-
view Religious Fatwa
This judicial review application by the 
non-governmental organization ‘Sisters in 
Islam’ (SIS) against a fatwa by the Fatwa
Committee of the State of Selangor, which 
had proclaimed SIS a deviant organization 
due to its close association with the ideolo-
gies of ‘liberalism’ and ‘pluralism’, raised the 
important—albeit extremely sensitive—issue 
of whether the civil courts enforcing ordinary 
:HVWPLQVWHUPRGHOSULQFLSOHVRIFRQVWLWXWLRQ-
alism could judicially review proclamations 
of an Islamic religious body purporting to rule 
on questions of Islamic law.
Previously, the Court of Appeal had over-
ruled a High Court decision that it had no 
jurisdiction to perform such judicial review 
(see last year’s Review). On appeal by the 
Fatwa Committee, the parties reached a 
consent judgment before the Federal Court 
whereby the case would be remitted to the 
High Court for all issues, including the ques-
tion of jurisdiction, to be ventilated and ad-
judicated upon.24 This case will once again 
invite Malaysia’s judicial authorities to deal 
with the difficult question of the overlapping 
authorities of secular and religious bodies in 
the country.25
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Apart from the question of whether, and to 
what extent, the new government will deliv-
er the promised reforms, a major uncertainty 
on the horizon is how the numerous corrup-
tion cases against former prime minister Na-
jib Razak and his associates will be handled. 
In view of the election result, public opinion 
clearly demands that those responsible for 
the 1MDB scandal be brought to justice as 
soon as possible; however, the reality is that 
these complex cases will take at least another 
year to conclude.
The ability of the new PH government to 
maintain public support for its reform agen-
da will also be tested as anti-incumbent fa-
tigue and global economic factors beyond 
its control begin to chip away at its popu-
larity. This will be an important determinant 
of whether Malaysia continues on its current 
trajectory of reform or reverts to a version of 
the ancien regime.
The promised handover of power from 
current Prime Minister Dr Mahathir to the 
‘prime minister-in-waiting’, Anwar Ibrahim, 
LVDOVRDQHYHQWWRZDWFKIRU:KLOHWKLVZDV
a central plank of the incoming adminis-
tration’s promise to the electorate, there is 
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LZHWWVPU[TLU[ZKPZTPZZLK%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
21 =(UIHSHNHUº,_Q\KNL!-LKLYHS*V\Y[T\Z[Y\SLVUHWWVPU[TLU[ZVM9H\ZA\SRPÅP»Free Malaysia Today, 29 June 2018) <www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/
UH[PVU L_Q\KNLMLKLYHSJV\Y[T\Z[Y\SLVUHWWVPU[TLU[ZVMYH\Za\SRLÅP%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
22 [2017] 4 MLJ 440.
23 4HPaH[\S5HaSPUHº-LKLYHS*V\Y[WVZ[WVULZKLJPZPVUPU¸IPU(IK\SSHO¹JHZLMVSSV^PUN.V][YLX\LZ[MVYHKQV\YUTLU[»;OL:[HY, 22 November 2018) <www.the-
Z[HYJVTT`UL^ZUH[PVUMLKLYHSJV\Y[WVZ[WVULZKLJPZPVUPUIPUHIK\SSHOJHZL%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
242OHPYHO52HYPTº:PZ[LYZPU0ZSHT[VOH]LKH`PUJV\Y[[VSLNHSS`JOHSSLUNL[OL¸KL]PHU[NYV\W¹SHILS»5L^:[YHP[Z;PTLZ, 25 September 2018) <www.nst.com.
T`UL^ZJYPTLJV\Y[Z ZPZ[LYZPZSHTOH]LKH`JV\Y[SLNHSS`JOHSSLUNLKL]PHU[NYV\WSHILS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
25 4HPaH[\S5HaSPUHº4(0:KLJSHYH[PVU[OH[:PZ[LYZPU0ZSHTPZ¸KL]PHU[¹·/PNO*V\Y[[VKLJPKL»;OL:[HY, 2 October 2018) <www.thestar.com.my/news/na-
[PVUOPNOJV\Y[[VKLJPKLVUTHPZKLJSHYH[PVU[OH[ZPZ[LYZPUPZSHTPZKL]PHU[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
198 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
undoubtedly no love lost between the two 
leaders, not least because of the dismissal 
and jailing of the latter by Dr Mahathir in 
the 90s.
In the courts, the ability—and willingness—
of the Federal Court to maintain the ‘ba-
sic structure doctrine’ articulated in Indira
Gandhi and earlier cases will determine the 
trajectory of constitutional adjudication in 
Malaysia. The eventual resolution of the bin 
Abdullah and Sisters in Islam cases will also 
reflect on the courts’ willingness to exercise 
judicial oversight in matters involving an el-
ement of religious law.
On a wider canvas, cases involving an Islam-
ic law element, particularly those engaging 
the freedom of religion, are likely to take on 
even greater significance in the coming years 
with the resurgence in political fortunes of 
the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), which 
won control of two state administrations in 
GE14. The enthusiasm of the new PAS-led 
governments for an uncompromising appli-
cation of Syariah was underlined by the pub-
lic caning of two women in the northeastern 
state of Terengganu in September for the of-
fence of ‘attempting to have lesbian sex’.26
This trend may also portend future conflict 
between the PAS-led state governments and 
the PH-led federal administration, given that 
the administration of Syariah law falls pri-
marily within state jurisdiction.
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MEXICO
I. INTRODUCTION
2018 witnessed important developments and 
advances in constitutional law. Among the 
most significant ones, we must include the 
entry into force of the Constitution of Mex-
ico City and the declaration of unconstitu-
tionality of the Internal Security Law. 
Important changes in constitutional law 
have also been registered in terms of human 
rights, one of the main issues on the political 
and legal agenda. In this sense, 2018 was the 
year in which the Mexican Supreme Court of 
Justice (hereinafter the Court or the Supreme 
Court) recognized the right of homosexual 
couples to become parents through assisted 
reproduction, facilitated gender reassign-
ment proceedings in public administration 
and annulled the internal legislation that fa-
vored the militarization of public security. 
Laws and judgments on women’s rights also 
deserve special mention. 
2018 saw outstanding judgments that pro-
tected those who work double days, both at 
a job and at home. The Supreme Court also 
reinforced laws on femicide and ratified the 
implementation of gender perspective in the 
investigation of crimes. Additionally, several 
proposals that limited the rights of women 
to freely decide over their bodies were de-
feated, and others that fought for equal pay 
between men and women were approved by 
broad majorities.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018 there were two major developments 
in Constitutional Law. The first one was the 
entry into force of the Constitution of Mex-
ico City on 17 September 2018. The second 
one started on December 2017 with the pub-
lication of the Internal Security Law and 
culminated with its declaration of unconsti-
tutionality by the Supreme Court of Justice 
on November 2018. 
The call for a Constitution of Mexico City 
was long-standing, and its publication on 5 
February 2017 has been regarded as a demo-
cratic and federalist exercise. However, there 
are two main reasons why this is debatable. 
First, it is worth noticing that the Constituent 
Assembly was made up of 100 representa-
tives, 60% of whom were elected and 40% 
appointed by political elites. Of the 40 ap-
pointed representatives, 6 were appointed 
by the former President (from the Partido
Revolucionario Institucional - PRI), 6 were 
appointed by the former Head of Govern-
ment of Mexico City (from the Partido de la 
Revolución Democrática - PRD), and 28 by 
the Mexican Congress. 
The two parties that benefitted the most by 
this arrangement were the PRI and the PRD. 
Apart from their 5 representatives elected by 
popular vote, the PRI—Mexico City’s fourth 
political force prior to the formation of the 
Constituent Assembly—got 10 additional 
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representatives appointed by the Congress 
and 6 more by the former President. For its 
part, the PRD got 4 representatives appoint-
ed by the Congress and 6 representatives 
appointed by Mexico City’s former Head 
of Government apart from its 19 represen-
tatives that were elected by popular vote. In 
this sense, since the very beginning, the Con-
stituent Assembly was not a place for popu-
lar deliberation in a full sense, but rather an 
agreement among political elites.
The second reason for debate concerns the 
content of Article 122 of the Mexican Feder-
al Constitution, which was last reformed in 
January 2016. Said disposition regulates in 
great detail the Constitution of Mexico City. 
Our Federal Constitution is one of detail, 
and Article 122 is no exception. The body of 
federal constitutional reform strongly limit-
ed the content of the Constitution of Mexico 
City by deliberately providing its scope in 
said article.
Indeed, Article 122 of the Mexican Constitu-
tion establishes rules related to the Legisla-
tive, Executive and Judiciary Powers, which 
involve the election of their holders as well 
as their duties, attributions and more. It also 
describes the process for approval of amend-
ments to the Constitution of Mexico City. 
Besides, it provides guidelines for real estate 
taxes, exemptions and subsidies, among other 
financial matters. Likewise, Article 122 en-
shrines the characteristics and attributions of 
municipalities, Mexico City’s public admin-
istration, the city’s public finance and auton-
omous constitutional organs such as the Tri-
bunal of Administrative Justice, etc. Finally, 
said disposition dictates how labor relations 
between Mexico City and its workers must 
be regulated and the functions of the federal 
branches of government in Mexico City. 
In this way, Article 122 limited substantively 
the Constituent Assembly’s field of action. 
Maybe there won’t be another Constituent 
Power in the short run, but we should learn 
from the experience of the Constitution 
of Mexico City that to get the citizenry in-
YROYHGLQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOPDWWHUV:HVKRXOG
take care also of the way in which represen-
tatives are elected and stress the necessity 
to obtain the direct approval of citizens by 
referendum. Moreover, we should rethink 
which matters would be better served to have 
a Constitution of detail and which where a 
Constitution of principles would be more ad-
equate.
The second major development in Consti-
tutional Law that we want to mention is the 
publication of the Internal Security Law in 
December 2017, which was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court in November 
2018. This law militarized public security in 
Mexico and authorized the Executive branch 
to use the military as a regular force for public 
security instead of the police, in contravention 
to what Articles 21 and 129 of the Mexican 
Constitution currently prescribe. 
Nowadays, perhaps the most important de-
bate going on in Mexico concerns the use 
of armed forces as a public security body. 
Fortunately, a lot of citizens, NGOs, the gov-
ernment and the Federal Congress are taking 
the implications of using armed forces as a 
VHFXULW\ ERG\ VHULRXVO\:H¶OO KDYH WRZDLW
and see what happens.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Amparo Directo en Revisión 4883/2017: 
Double shift of working hours
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court 
decided a case in which a woman sued her 
ex-husband for compensation for half of the 
assets that were acquired during their mar-
riage. In the procedure, it was determined 
that such compensation was not due, since 
the plaintiff failed to prove that throughout 
her marriage she had dedicated herself ex-
clusively to housework and the care of their 
children, while it was shown that, in addi-
tion to domestic work, she was employed at 
a workplace.
A federal circuit court which reviewed the 
previous judgement stated—based on Article 
267, section VI, of the Civil Code of Mexico 
City, valid until June 2011—that the woman 
should have proven that she dedicated her-
self exclusively to the care of their children 
and home during their whole marriage. 
The Supreme Court determined that the in-
terpretation by the circuit court was uncon-
stitutional, since the purpose of the compen-
sation was to mitigate the inequity suffered 
by a spouse as a result of her dedication to 
housework and to the care of the children. 
Therefore, double shifts of work (that is, un-
dertaking family responsibilities in addition 
to paid employment) cannot be an obstacle 
to access to such compensatory mechanisms. 
2. Amparo Directo en Revisión 6181/2016 
and Amparo Directo en Revisión 5490/2016: 
Domestic violence
In its decision of 7 March 2018, in the Ampa-
ro Directo en Revisión 6181/2016, the First 
Chamber of the Court ruled that judges must 
take into account the context of violence 
suffered and judge them under a gender per-
spective paradigm in cases where women 
who had suffered domestic violence faced 
criminal charges for assaulting their perpe-
trators. In this case, the appellant pointed 
out on several occasions that she suffered 
domestic violence. However, the authorities 
never considered such allegations. 
The application of gender perspective on this 
kind of case implies an imposition on judges 
to identify whether a case involving a pos-
sible context of power based on gender is 
able to generate a situation of prejudice and 
disadvantage for the appellant. Judges must 
order the obtainment of whatever evidence 
is necessary for discarding any gender ste-
reotype or prejudice as well as for visual-
izing any situations of disadvantage caused 
by sex or gender conditions. Evidence may 
include expert opinions of the psychological 
and physical condition of the affected person 
as well as expert evaluations of her psycho-
social environment, experiences and circum-
stances.
The gender perspective approach was also 
adopted in the Amparo Directo en Revisión 
5490/2016, which recognized the capacity of 
a woman and her son to sue for reparation of 
damages from their aggressor as victims of 
domestic violence. According to the Court, 
pecuniary and moral damages suffered by 
victims of domestic violence must be re-
paired economically by the perpetrator in a 
fair and proportional manner. In this sense, 
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the judgement established that domestic vi-
olence constitutes an unlawful act that gen-
erates civil liability, given its harmful effects 
on the physical, emotional or psychic sphere 
of a family member. It is a transgression of 
the right to live in a family environment free 
of violence, which derives from the rights to 
life, health, the dignity of people, equality 
and to the establishment of conditions for 
personal development. 
3. Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad 10/2014 
and 11/2014: National Code of Criminal 
Procedures
The Supreme Court resolved the Acciones de 
Inconstitucionalidad 10/2014 and 11/2014 
with a decision issued on 22 March 2018, on 
the constitutionality of the provided faculties 
of the police and public prosecutor in the in-
vestigation of crimes. In 2014, the Nation-
al Human Rights Commission (hereinafter 
CNDH from its name in Spanish, Comisión
Nacional de Derechos Humanos) and the 
then Federal Institute of Access to Public 
Information and Data Protection presented 
an action of unconstitutionality, demanding 
the invalidation of 13 articles of the Nation-
al Code of Criminal Procedures (hereinafter 
CNPP, from its name in Spanish, Código Na-
cional de Procedimientos Penales), enacted 
that same year in the framework of the re-
form to the criminal justice system. 
The action of unconstitutionality was based 
on the alleged ambiguity and vagueness of 
the contested articles, which would allow for 
authorities to apply them according to their 
own discretion and subjective judgement. 
Among the various provisions challenged, 
the core of the issue in the Court’s discussion 
was the constitutionality of the competence 
of the police to carry out inspections on peo-
ple and vehicles in the context of a criminal 
investigation without requiring any form of 
judicial control.1
Likewise, the Court declared the constitu-
tionality of several provisions: Article 148 of 
the CNPP, which establishes a limit of up to 
24 hours of detention for persons detained in 
flagrante delicto without a formal complaint 
being filed by the entitled party; Article 155, 
section XIII, of the CNPP on home securi-
ty as a precautionary measure, establishing 
that while this precautionary measure is not 
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it 
is consistent with the principles that pervade 
the criminal process. The first paragraph of 
Article 153 of the CNPP, on the duration of 
precautionary measures, refers to “the ab-
sence of a term or temporary catalog for the 
imposition of a precautionary measure does 
not imply establishing or granting arbitrary 
or excessively discretionary powers to the 
control judge”; and the last paragraph of Ar-
ticle 434 of the CNPP on international legal 
assistance at the request of the defendant, 
in particular the part establishing that legal 
assistance can only be invoked in order to 
obtain evidence through an order of an in-
vestigating or judicial authority, and not for 
evidence offered by the defense.
4. Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad 
122/2015, 124/2015 and 125/2015: Right of 
reply
On 1 February 2018, after six sessions of 
discussion, the Pleno of the Supreme Court 
resolved the Acciones de Inconstitucionali-
dad 122/2015, 124/2015 and 125/2015 filed 
on the Law of the Right of Reply, published 
in the Official Gazette of the Federation in 
November 2015, declaring unconstitutional 
its Article 10. This provision established a 
period of no more than five business days 
following the day of publication or com-
munication of information for an interested 
party to rectify or respond to it. Additionally, 
the Court recognized the constitutionality of 
the rules requiring that those interested in re-
questing a reply must prove the existence of 
the respective disseminated information. 
According to the Court, the deadline set by 
the Congress for requesting a reply could 
make this right nugatory, mainly because 
some of the media cannot be consulted daily, 
which would force the interested person to 
be aware of all media disseminating infor-
mation. Although a majority of seven judges 
considered that the possibility of appealing 
the ruling of a judge in relation to a reply 
could prevent the correct exercise of this 
right (since the reply is more effective when 
published closer to the time of the original 
publication), Acciónes de Inconstituciona-
lidad was dismissed on this point for not 
reaching the minimum of eight votes neces-
sary for a qualified vote. 
5. Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 15/2017: 
The Constitution of Mexico City 
The Supreme Court upheld large parts of the 
Constitution of Mexico City’s provisions, 
the first in its political history. The relevance 
of this case constrains not only the capital’s 
legal system but this abstract judicial action 
represents a leading precedent in defining 
the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states’ powers on fundamental 
rights law.
The first important point addressed in this 
case was Mexico City’s recognition as a po-
litical entity enabled to extend human rights 
beyond the Federal Constitution and interna-
tional treaties. In fact, some of the rights rec-
ognized therein were completely new and, 
consequently, different from those enshrined 
at the federal constitutional level. 
Such was the case of the right to medical and 
therapeutic use of marijuana in the capital’s 
territory. The Court found this provision 
compatible with the federal legislative com-
petence in public health matters and with the 
federation reserved powers on drug regula-
tion. The legitimate mention to that right in 
the local Constitution does not imply a reg-
ulation but merely a recognition of use with-
out interfering with federal laws.
Another outstanding discussion was the right 
to die with dignity. The disposition under 
analysis literally provides that: “The right 
to a life with dignity implicitly contains the 
right to a death with dignity”. This right was 
considered part of the freedom of self-indi-
vidual autonomy. This provision does not 
necessarily mean euthanasia or assisted sui-
cide. Instead, it is understood to provide the 
possibility of taking care of patients with 
terminal diseases, or the development or im-
1 This competence is provided in Articles 132, section VII, 147, 251, sections III and V, 266 and 268 from the CNPP.
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provement of the quality standards of medi-
cal care and psychological support in the last 
stages of a terminal life.
Another right declared constitutional by the 
ruling was the inalienable right of access to 
water and sanitation for personal and domes-
tic use. According to the Court, this provision 
didn’t violate an exclusive federal competence.
The Court also upheld sexual and reproduc-
tive rights in the City’s Constitution. The 
legislative competence to recognize those 
kinds of rights has a concurring basis in the 
Mexican political system: at a federal level, 
the legal system must provide rules for sci-
entific and technical criteria, but that doesn’t 
imply a prohibition on the states to recognize 
these rights and to provide public services 
regarding family planification.
6. Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 6/2018: 
Internal Security Law 
For many reasons, this case could be one 
of the most important judgments since the 
2011 constitutional reform. Such reform 
created a powerful constitutional basis for 
human rights law.2 The Court ruled that the 
entire so-called “Internal Security Law” was 
unconstitutional. In doing so, the judiciary 
struck down a statute that was promoted by 
Enrique Peña Nieto’s government and ap-
proved by both federal chambers to face a 
profound Mexican social crisis: organized 
crime in matters of drug trafficking and other 
serious crimes.
Basically, the statute regulated the inter-
vention of armed forces to combat “internal 
security” threats. The law allowed the Pres-
ident to declare the existence of such threats 
in state territories or determined regions of 
the country. This declaration would have 
generated federal forces action, including 
military operations.
The Court ruled that the use of military force 
to intervene in public security was not al-
lowed not only by the constitutional order 
but by international human rights law. Also, 
some judges considered that the Federal 
Congress was not constitutionally able to 
legislate in matters regarding so-called “in-
ternal security”.
7. AAmparo en Revisión 533/2018: Same 
sex-couples’ right to assisted reproduction 
Through a subrogated maternity technique, a 
same sex-marriage achieved the procreation 
of a child. They intended to officially register 
him as their biological son. A governmental 
office in Yucatán state denied the registration 
on the basis of local civil legislation. The law 
did not provide such possibility, given that it 
could only be applied to an existing relation-
ship by consanguinity.
In the case, a federal judge ruled that it was 
impossible to recognize the filial link be-
tween the child and the couple. According to 
the judge, there was no proof of minimal le-
gal requirements of a subrogated maternity. 
The civil registration of the child must pre-
viously be supported by a judicial authoriza-
tion and an adoption procedure.
The Court’s First Chamber ruled that the child 
must be registered as the couple’s son on the 
basis of his right to a family name and to a civil 
personality. Also, both parents have the right 
to a private life, to no discrimination based on 
sexual preference and to access to assisted re-
production techniques. Finally, the biological 
mother also has a right to privacy and a free 
development of her own personality.
The Court decided that, under assisted repro-
duction technique circumstances, the child’s 
filiation does not need a proved biological 
link. His official recognition by civil author-
ities through paternity or maternity presump-
tions was legally possible. The biological 
mother’s explicit consent was also important 
in this case, and her recognition of the bio-
logical father and his partner as legal parents. 
Therefore, there were no doubts about their 
responsibility coming from that condition.
8. Amparo en Revisión 1049/2017: Right to 
life and health of a child vs. parents’ reli-
gious beliefs
A six-year-old girl with leukemia was hos-
pitalized in emergency conditions. The doc-
tors indicated urgent blood transfusions. Her 
parents denied the treatment because of their 
religious beliefs. A family prosecution office 
started a guardianship procedure in order to 
provisionally authorize the transfusions.
The parents reclaimed their right to free-
ly decide about their daughter’s health. A 
federal judge recognized, on one hand, that 
right. On the other hand, he decided that the 
family prosecutor must respect the parents’ 
conviction about alternative medical treat-
ments. Additionally, the judge ordered blood 
transfusions only in urgent cases.
The Court revoked that decision on the basis 
that the Constitution protects children’s rights 
to life and health. Both rights are considered 
as a “preponderant constitutional interest”. 
Thus, this interest means a restriction to the 
parents’ autonomy to decide about their chil-
dren’s rights. The state can intervene in the 
parents’ autonomy in certain cases.
There are two cases in which an alternative 
medical treatment can risk the health or the 
life of a child: when there is an emergency 
or urgent situation and when the alternative 
treatment is not equally effective to recover 
the child’s health.
In this sense, firstly, the Court ordered the 
duty of giving a child protection procedure. 
Secondly, the Court ruled that the public 
authority could authorize successive blood 
transfusions in case there is a medical in-
dication for them. It also indicated that in 
such supervision, public authorities must 
provide a fair and respectful treatment to 
the girl’s parents.
2 The constitutional reform published on June 10, 2011, recognized that international treaties on human rights law have the same hierarchy as the Constitution itself 
within the Mexican legal system. See: Herrera García, Alfonso, La interpretación de los derechos humanos y sus garantías por la Suprema Corte de Justicia. Una 
aproximación jurisprudencial, México, CNDH, 2015, pp. 27-39.
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9. Amparo Directo en Revisión 9/2018: 
Non-discrimination of domestic women 
workers 
The Social Insurance Law provided that 
employers had no obligation to include do-
mestic workers in the social security sys-
tem. The Supreme Court’s Second Chamber 
declared that this legal exclusion violated 
the right to non-discrimination in terms of 
social insurance.
The Court concluded that there was no rea-
sonable justification to exclude domestic 
workers from a mandatory social security 
regime. This circumstance mostly affects 
women workers in a disproportional way, 
since statistically nine out of ten domestic 
workers are female. The Court explained 
that domestic work has been traditional-
ly exposed to inadequate labor conditions, 
long working days and low salaries. Nowa-
days, this historical discrimination prevails, 
which is quite far from the concept of work-
ing with dignity.
The Court ordered the Mexican Social Secu-
rity Institute to implement a complete social 
insurance system program, providing both 
guarantees to domestic workers and correl-
ative employers’ obligations.
10. Amparo en Revisión 163/2018: Prohibi-
tion of cockfights
On 31 October 2018, the First Chamber of 
the Supreme Court issued the Amparo en Re-
visión 163/2018, in which it determined that 
Articles 2, second paragraph, 3 and 28 and 
fractions V, VIII and X of the Animal Pro-
tection Law of the State of Veracruz were 
constitutional because they provided an ap-
propriate and necessary measure to guaran-
tee animal welfare, which is the prohibition 
of cockfights. In said resolution, the First 
Chamber established that no practice that en-
tails unnecessary suffering and ill-treatment 
of animals can be considered as a cultural 
expression protected by the Constitution. 
Hereof, the Chamber underlined that the 
achievement of the purpose of said Articles 
compensates the infringement of property 
rights over fighting birds and the freedom of 
labor of the people involved in those activi-
ties. Also, the sentence settled that the right 
of equality before the Law does not protect 
the claim to include cockfights in a list of 
permitted activities that also imply animal 
mistreatment, such as bullfights, because 
plaintiffs cannot benefit from the fact that 
the legislator was incongruous to include 
one activity and not the other.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2019 is an important year for the Mexican 
judiciary. From 1 December 2018, there 
has been a new federal government headed 
by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who ran 
for the third time and won with over 53% of 
the vote. During the campaign and after the 
elections, he presented himself as an agent 
of economic, political and social change. 
During his six-year presidential period, 
President López Obrador has the responsi-
bility of appointing three new justices to the 
Supreme Court. Last December, the Sen-
ate confirmed Justice Juan Luis González 
Alcántara Carrancá, replacing Justice José 
Ramón Cossío Díaz, and in January 2019, 
Justice Arturo Zaldívar Lelo de Larrea was 
elected by his colleagues as the new Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Judiciary Council. It is expected that during 
February 2019 the Senate will confirm one 
female justice. The next vacancy will take 
place in 2021.
This year, the Supreme Court will solve an 
important lawsuit against a controversial stat-
ute: the Public Servants’ Salaries Law. This 
statute, promoted by the new major political 
party, reduces public salaries, including those 
applied to the judiciary. One of the main ar-
guments against this statute is the violation of 
judicial independence.
Another central public issue that will take 
place throughout 2019 is the expected consti-
tutional reform that will create the so-called 
“National Guard”. Given the apparent mili-
tary elements that underlie this public security 
body, the debate will again put on the judicial 
table a fascinating topic: the possible uncon-
stitutionality of a constitutional reform.
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Moldova
Dr. Anna Fruhstorfer, Humboldt University Berlin and University of Göttingen
M O L D O VA
I. INTRODUCTION
Analysis of the developments in the Consti-
tutional Law of Moldova in 2018 illustrates 
the trans-formation the political system has 
gone through over recent years, both sub-
stantively as well as procedurally.1 It also rep-
resents the complex and economically diffi-
cult social reality of the country with a torn 
QDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\EHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW7KH
complicated separation of power, involving 
the rising power of the Constitutional Court 
to mediate between the President and the 
Parliament to enforce their duties, is analyt-
ically fascinating but highly problematic for 
the country’s future. The level of democracy 
of the Republic of Moldova has been on a 
negative trajectory for some years now. The 
year 2018 was no different and concerned all 
aspects of the political system. Any consti-
tutional development that could have had a 
positive effect on the level of democracy was 
strangled by an inter-institutional deadlock 
between the President, Prime Minister and 
parliamentary majority. 
This deadlock, starting in 2017, became one 
of the dominant stories in Moldovan poli-
tics and remains a big constitutional crisis. 
It started with the refusal of President Igor 
Dodon from the Socialist Party of the Re-
public of Moldova (PSRM)2 to confirm the 
new Minister of Defense. This was followed 
by the President’s refusal to sign laws de-
spite his constitutional obligation to do so. 
To break this deadlock, the Constitutional 
Court started to temporarily suspend the Pre-
si-dent from his duties for several minutes 
until the Interim President signed the laws or 
appointed the ministers. This has happened 
five times so far, most recently in November 
2018. The indi-vidual laws that were blocked 
by President Dodon will be discussed below. 
I give preference to these decisions over oth-
er activities of the Court. 
The conflict between the core institutions 
of the political system overshadowed other 
important political and constitutional devel-
opments. One such development involved 
EU financial assis-tance. Despite the claim 
that the temporary suspension of the Presi-
dent was done to foster the relationship with 
the European Union, this relationship sig-
nificantly deteriorated to a point where EU 
financial assistance was blocked or signifi-
cantly reduced.3
Each of the sections below details how the 
substantive issues continue to grow: identity 
conflict, procedural issues and role enforce-
ment. The new judicial activism is colliding 
with presidential interests, and the decisions 
by the Constitutional Court in the inter-insti-
tutional conflict will sub-stantively alter the 
political process in the coming years.
1 The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova (CCM) provides important information on the Court 
in Eng-lish, including a comprehensive documentation of current and past cases and a description of the 
WYVJLLKPUNZ;OPZJHUILMV\UKVU[OL*V\Y[»Z^LIZP[L#O[[W!^^ ^JVUZ[JV\Y[TK%(JVTWSL[LKVJ\-
mentation of all decisions and the applications for judicial review is available here, <http://www.constcourt.
TKJJKVJZWOW&S$YV% 
2 7HY[PK\S:VJPHSPȴ[PSVYKPU9LW\ISPJH4VSKV]H
3 Rikard Jozwiak, ‘EU Cuts Moldova Funding Amid Rule-of-Law Concerns’ (Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, 15 November 2018) <https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-cuts-moldova-funding-amid-rule-of-law-con-
JLYUZ O[TSHJJLZZLZ-LIY\HY` %HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 205
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional development in the Republic 
of Moldova often centers around two topics: 
the role of the President of the republic and 
the tension arising from a torn national iden-
WLW\EHWZHHQ(DVWDQG:HVW:LWKLQWKHVHWZR
areas, different constitutional developments 
FDQEHREVHUYHGLQWKHODVW\HDUV:KDWLV
so special about 2018 is that in this year, the 
two areas start to overlap strongly. 
The role of President in the constitutional 
system of Moldova is one of intense strug-
gles. The 1994 constitution failed to estab-
lish a clear separation of power, with the role 
of President a re-curring theme of constitu-
tional amendments and Constitutional Court 
decisions. As a result, the political discus-
sion takes on the style of a ping-pong game,4
going back and forth between a par-liamen-
tary and semi-presidential system. In 2016, 
the game moved back to a semi-presidential 
system.5 This change was not based on a 
constitutional amendment but a decision of 
the Consti-tutional Court to declare the 2000 
amendments unconstitutional.6 At a time 
when the country was reeling from massive 
protests after a corruption scandal and bank 
heist in the course of which the country lost 
approximately 1 billion USD,7 the Constitu-
tional Court showed an un-precedented level 
of judicial activism. This activism became 
apparent when the Court decided to declare 
a 16-year-old amendment unconstitutional, 
and as we have seen throughout 2018, no 
iso-lated case. It was the start of parts of the 
Moldovan ruling elite relying on the Consti-
tutional Court to help solve inter-institution-
al conflicts, and preserve its hegemonic sta-
tus.8 However, this was a new direction for 
the Court. The country had experienced an 
intense inter-institutional im-pass before, in 
a 900-day deadlock from 2009-2012 during 
which the Parliament could not elect a Presi-
dent,9 but the Court was not involved. At that 
time, it refrained from substantial activism, 
instead asking the Venice Commission for 
an opinion on the relevant provisions of the 
constitu-tion.10 But that changed. 
In more recent years, the activism of the Court 
has often targeted the presidency, yet the sus-
pen-sion of the President in October 2017 and 
again in January and November of 2018 add-
ed a whole new chapter to the already compli-
cated relations between the President, govern-
ment and parlia-mentary majority. 
In October 2017, the Moldovan Constitu-
tional Court suspended the President tempo-
rarily. The reason was Dodon’s refusal to ap-
point Eugen Sturza as Minister of Defense, an 
appointment process that had already started 
in December 2016. Early in 2017, the Con-
stitutional Court had issued an interpretation 
of Article 98 of the constitution, whereby the 
President can only reject the nomination of 
a cabinet member once.11 Thus, the repeated 
refusal to appoint Sturza led the government 
to appeal to the Constitutional Court again. 
The Court first decided that the refusal to 
confirm a cabinet nomination is considered a 
violation of the constitution and can lead to a 
temporary suspension. This suspension was 
issued by the Court and was in force until 
the acting President (the head of Parliament) 
appointed the new minister. Yet the consti-
tutional procedure stipulated by Article 89 
would have been entirely different, requiring 
a 2/3 majority in Parlia-ment. A temporary 
suspension was thus an invention of the Con-
stitutional Court that set a dan-gerous prece-
dent. But we should not forget that the Presi-
dent was in clear violation of his duties when 
he refused to promulgate laws. The constitu-
tion only stipulates a suspensive veto right 
ac-cording to Article 93. 
This newly found instrument of temporarily 
getting rid of the President as a veto player 
has pro-found institutional and legal ram-
ifications, and questions the power of the 
directly elected Presi-dent (Dodon’s direct 
election is an argument he frequently uses to 
justify his refusal to sign laws he deems un-
constitutional). The October 2017 decision 
also proved not to be a unique occurren-ce—
the government, as well as members of Par-
liament, started to use this method to handle 
the disadvantages of so-called cohabitation 
and to pursue their interests. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Temporarily suspending the President: Im-
mediately following the first presidential 
election un-der the reinstated constitutional 
order that took place in November 2016, it 
was unclear how con-frontational the rela-
tionship between the President, parliamen-
tary majority and Prime Minister might be. 
Since then, we have seen an “inter-institu-
4 With thanks to Nicole Gallina, who described a similar process in Ukraine as a ping-pong game (see Fruhstor-fer/Hein 2016). Anna Fruhstorfer, ‘Moldova’, in Anna 
Fruhstorfer and Michael Hein (eds), *VUZ[P[\[PVUHS7VSP[PJZPU*LU[YHSHUK,HZ[LYU,\YVWL-YVT7VZ[:VJPHSPZ[;YHUZP[PVU[V[OL9LMVYTVM7VSP[PJHS:`Z[LTZ (Springer 
VS, 2016). 
5(UUH-Y\OZ[VYMLYº*VUZPZ[LUJ`PU*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS+LZPNUHUK0[Z,ɈLJ[VU+LTVJYHJ`»B MVY[OJVTPUND+LTVJYH[PaH[PVUMVY[OJVTPUN
6 /V[ȋYoYLno.7 (CCM Judgement) of 4 March 2016.
7+HUPLS)YL[[,SSPL2UV[[HUK4POHP7VWZVPº;OL¸IPSSPVUKVSSHYWYV[LZ[Z¹PU4VSKV]HHYL[OYLH[LUPUN[OLZ\Y]P]HSVM[OLJV\U[Y`»ZWVSP[PJHSLSP[L»;OL3VUKVU:JOVVSVM
Economics and Political Science, 21 September 2015) <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/09/21/the-billion-dollar-protests-in-moldova-are-threatening-the-
Z\Y]P]HSVM[OLJV\U[Y`ZWVSP[PJHSLSP[L%HJJLZZLK5V]LTILY
8 Ran Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Mega-Politics and the Rise of Political Courts’ [2008] ARPS 1.
9 Anna Fruhstorfer, ‘Moldova’, in Anna Fruhstorfer and Michael Hein (eds), *VUZ[P[\[PVUHS7VSP[PJZPU*LU[YHSHUK,HZ[LYU,\YVWL-YVT7VZ[:VJPHSPZ[;YHUZP[PVU[V
[OL9LMVYTVM7VSP[PJHS:`Z[LTZ(Springer VS, 2016), 372.
10*V\UJPSVM,\YVWL=LUPJL*VTTPZZPVUº-\UJ[PVUPUNVMKLTVJYH[PJPUZ[P[\[PVUZPU4VSKV]H»0UMVYTH[PVUUV[LI`[OLJVYHWWVY[L\YZVU[OLPYMHJ[ÄUKPUN]PZP[[V
*OPZPUH\#O[[W!HZZLTIS `JVLPU[*VTTP[[LL+VJZFHTVUKVJYL]WKM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY`  
11 *VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[VM4VSKV]Hº;OL7YLZPKLU[VM4VSKV]HTH`VUS`VUJLKLJSPUL74»ZWYVWVZHSVM*HIPUL[YLZO\ɊL»*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[1HU\HY`
#O[[W!JVUZ[JV\Y[TKSPI]PL ^WOW&S$LUPKJ$PK$ [$4LKPH5V\[H[P;OL7YLZPKLU[VM4VSKV]HTH`VUS`VUJLKLJSPUL74ZWYVWVZHSVM*HIPUL[YLZO\ɊL%
accessed 14 January 2018. 
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tional deadlock”12 that has culminated in 
five temporary suspensions of the President 
in the course of a little more than a year be-
cause of the laws described in the follow-
ing section. These temporary suspensions 
were used in 2018 when the President did 
not confirm new members of the cabinet 
and also refused to sign various laws. These 
laws are not necessarily the most important 
law cases in the jurisdiction, but as they are 
the key pawn in an intense power struggle 
between the President, Parliament and the 
Court, it seems only useful to discuss their 
content briefly. 
1. The amendment to the audio-visual code 
in January 2018
On January 4, 2018, the Court decided to 
temporarily release the President of his duties 
when Dodon refused to sign an amendment 
to the broadcasting code of the Republic of 
Moldova.13 It was confirmed in Parliament 
on December 22, 2017, after the President 
vetoed it, citing concerns over the constitu-
tionality of the law, in particular with regard 
to the freedom of the press.14 The law as such 
was not unique in the region, as several coun-
tries moved to limit the influence of Russian 
news broadcasts (arguably limiting disin-
formation and pro-Russian propaganda).15
But the content of the law was obviously a 
contentious policy as it targeted the tension 
between the self-proclaimed European-ori-
ented government and the Russian-friendly 
President. Upon Presi-dent Dodon’s refusal 
to sign the law, Deputy Serghei Sârbu filed a 
complaint with the Constitu-tional Court and 
asked it to determine the justifiable circum-
stances to temporarily release the President 
and allow the Interim President to do the 
signing. The President’s refusal was not in 
coherence with the provision of Articles 73 
and 93, which stipulate his suspensory legis-
lative veto. In its opinion, the Court argued: 
“that given the imperative nature of Article 
93 of the Constitution, in the case the Par-
lia-ment repeatedly votes a particular law, 
the President is under the obligation to pro-
mulgate it, de-spite any doubts in respect of 
the constitutionality of the adopted law (JCC 
No. 9 of 14 February 2014). The possibility 
to submit a complaint to the Constitutional 
Court to carry out the constitu-tionality re-
view of the law prior to its publication has 
no direct impact on the promulgation pro-ce-
dures. Thus, in the event of promulgation of 
the contested law until the delivery by the 
Consti-tutional Court of a ruling in regard 
thereof, the procedure of a priori control of 
the constitutional-ity of the law continues in 
the framework of a posteriori control.”16
This was an important argument the Court 
made, signifying that the President cannot 
actually veto legislation either on procedural 
or substantive grounds but can only force an-
other debate. In addition, the application for 
judicial review of legislation to the Court by 
the President—according to this opinion—
had no impact on the promulgation proce-
GXUH :LWK WKLV WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW
temporarily relieved the President of his du-
ties and the Speaker of Parliament, Andrian 
Candu, signed the bill into law.17
Every hope of political observers of this be-
ing a unique or at least sparse occurrence 
was shat-tered right away. The day after, the 
government appealed to the Court to again 
temporarily sus-pend the President from 
office, because he refused to appoint seven 
new ministers. The Constitu-tional Court 
sided with the government and the Interim 
President appointed the new ministers.18
2. The Carabinieri Troops in November 
2018
Related to the competences of the presiden-
cy in the area of national security, President 
Dodon asked the Court to review the consti-
tutionality of two laws voted in Parliament 
regarding reform within the institution of 
the “Carabinieri Troops”; namely, their inte-
gration into the professional police system, 
resulting in a dual police system in Moldo-
va.19 The so-called “Carabinieri Troops” are 
a group with military character. The Presi-
dent initially vetoed the law. He suggest-
ed changes to it, in particular making the 
President (not the Prime Minister), on the 
recommendation of the Minister of the Inte-
rior, responsible for the appointment of the 
Commander for the General Inspectorate of 
the Carabinieri Troops.20 In his application 
to the Constitutional Court, President Dodon 
referred to Articles 87 and 108 of the Consti-
tution as well Law no. 345/2003 on nation-
al defense (in particular Article 9, Articles 
124POHP7VWȵVPº4VSKV]HU7YLZPKLU[0NVY+VKVU:\ZWLUKLKI`[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[»4VSKH]PHU7VSP[PJZ6J[VILY#O[[WZ!TVSKV]HUWVSP[PJZ
JVTTVSKV]HUWYLZPKLU[PNVYKVKVUZ\ZWLUKLKI`[OLJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSJV\Y[%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY`
13 Avizul (CCM Opinion) no. 2 and Sesizarea (Referral by Deputy) 1f concerning Law 257 [2018].
14 .HIYPLS3Lȴº94VSKV]H!+VKVUH[YPTPZSH*\Y[LH*VUZ[P[\[PVUHSHSLNLHHU[PWYVWHNHUKHWLJHYLHYÄ[YLI\P[ZHVWYVT\SNL»/V[5L^ZYV (4 January 2018) 
#O[[WZ!^^ ^OV[UL^ZYVZ[PYPLZLU[PHSTVSKV]HKVKVU[YPTPZJ\Y[LHJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSHSLNLHHU[PWYVWHNHUKHJHYL[YLI\P[WYVT\SNLO[T%HJJLZZLK
February 19. 
15 Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are among those countries that pursued a similar restriction of state-backed broadcasting from Russia. Liliana 
Barbarosie and Robert Coalson, ‘Banning Russian TV, Moldova Is Latest Hot Spot Fighting Kremlin Disinformation’, 9-,935L^Z (1 February 2018) <https://www.
YMLYSVYNHTVSKV]HIHUZYL\ZZPHU[]RYLTSPUKPZPUMVYTH[PVU O[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
16 Avizul (CCM Opinion) no. 2 and Sesizarea (Referral by Deputy) 1f; concerning Law 257 [2018].
17 *VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[VM4VSKV]Hº;OL*V\Y[/HZ(ZJLY[HPULK[OL*PYJ\TZ[HUJLZ1\Z[PM`PUN[OL0U[LYPT6ɉJLVM7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJVM4VSKV]HPU7YVT\S-
NH[PUNH3H^»*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[1HU\HY`#O[[W!JVUZ[JV\Y[TKSPI]PL ^WOW&S$LUPK$PKJ$[$4LKPH5L^Z;OL*V\Y[/HZ(ZJLY[HPULK[OL*PY-
J\TZ[HUJLZ1\Z[PM`PUN[OL0U[LYPT6ɉJLVM7YLZPKLU[VM[OL9LW\ISPJVM4VSKV]HPU7YVT\SNH[PUNH3H^%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
18 In September 2018, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova decided again on the temporary suspension of President Igor Dodon for the 
fourth time after he refused to sign the decrees appointing two ministers. The application for judicial review was made by two deputies to Parliament, Ser-
ghei Sârbu and Eugeniu Nichiforciuc (Sesizarea no.131f) [2018].
19 Sesizarea (application for judicial review) no. 177a [2018].
20 In particular, he asked the Court to decide on Article 10, paras 2 and 3 of Law no. 219 as well as Article II, para 2, sec 3 of Law no. 220.
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24-25 and Article 29), which stipulate the 
presidential role in matters of national de-
fense. As expected, the Constitutional Court 
declared the applica-tion for judicial review 
inadmissible. In its reasoning, the Constitu-
tional Court emphasized that Article 87 of 
the constitution does not give the President 
unlimited power to declare war or gen-eral 
mobilization but that he/she can only do so 
upon prior confirmation of Parliament. Thus, 
the appointment power with regard to the 
Carabinieri Troops was not automatically a 
presidential competence.21
3. Amendment of the labor code in Novem-
ber 2018
At the same time, the President asked the 
Court to declare an amendment to the Labor 
Code un-constitutional. Law no. 203 to amend 
Article 111 of the Labor Code establishes a 
“Europe Day” on May 9 alongside (not in-
stead of) Great Victory Day.22 But the Pres-
ident claimed that Great Victory Day should 
already represent the Moldavian State and cit-
izens—which are not part of the EU—and that 
the introduction of paragraph g1 to the Labor 
Code was unconstitutional. In his application 
for judicial review, the President listed several 
reasons for this, primarily appealing to cultural 
differences and wanting to avoid tarnishing or 
somehow reducing the existing re-membrance 
day. In a legal sense, the addition to the Labor 
Code was not necessarily important; it also 
did not change the fact that May 9 is an of-
ficial holiday. But it was another pawn in the 
in-stitutional crisis between the self-declared 
EU-friendly government and parliamentary 
majority and the Russian-oriented President. 
Again, the Constitutional Court declared the 
application for judicial review filed by the 
President inadmissible.23
4. Land transfer to build the U.S. Embassy 
in November 2018
Parliament repeatedly sent a law regarding 
the transferal of real estate property (the 
former Re-publican Stadium) to the U.S. to 
build their new embassy. President Dodon 
asked the Constitu-tional Court to declare 
this law unconstitutional. Aside from the 
misappropriation of Republican Stadium, 
the President also referred to problems with 
several private property constructions within 
the designated area. In its decision no. 148, 
the Court declared the application for judi-
cial review inadmissible.24
5. New audio-visual code in November 2018
After amending the audio-visual code in Jan-
uary 2018, Parliament also prepared a new 
law on the audio-visual code that was sup-
ported by the Council of Europe and draft-
ed with the assis-tance of the Joint EU-CoE 
Project “Promoting Media Freedom and Plu-
ralism in the Republic of Moldova”.25 But the 
President deemed the law unconstitutional. 
It states similar provisions as the amendment 
to the code in January 2018. After he vetoed 
the law and it was confirmed in Parlia-ment, 
he referred it to the Constitutional Court for 
an abstract constitutional review.26 In its de-
ci-sion, the Court declared the application 
for judicial review inadmissible. As part of a 
five-law package, this new audio-visual code 
was signed by the Interim President after the 
decision of the Court. 
6. Judicial review on national security
Next to the decisions and application for 
judicial review described earlier, the Court 
also decided on different issues that were im-
portant for the constitutional development in 
the country, yet did not receive widespread 
attention—not even in the local media, and 
certainly not beyond Moldova. One exam-
ple is the application for judicial review no. 
108. In it, President Dodon asked to assess 
the constitutionality of several articles re-
garding which institutions share/have the re-
sponsibility of national security, and deemed 
unconstitutional the parliamentary decision 
from June 19, 2018, on the National Securi-
ty Strategy and Action Plans for 2018-2022. 
In its judge-ment no. 33 on December 21, 
2018, the Court explicitly defined the rele-
vant competences.27 It ruled that Parliament 
has an exclusive legislative competency over 
matters of national defense, national securi-
ty policies, strategies and plans, while the 
President does not have any responsi-bilities 
on these matters and can only take actions 
and measures according to the laws. The 
deci-sion furthermore declared the strategy 
adopted by Parliament on June 19, 2018, 
constitutional.28
7. Minorities and Russian as an interethnic 
communication language
Disputes over the identity of the polity are 
one of the most important issues in the Mol-
dovan po-litical discourse. The ideologized 
approach towards topics such as the official 
language drives the political debate. The het-
erogeneity and its resulting disunity of the 
different population groups already became 
apparent before Moldovan independence. 
But the variety of language laws and the 
politically supported strengthening of iden-
tification with the Romanian language and 
Romania resulted in a substantive ethnic 
polarization. This was only exacerbated by a 
so-called frozen conflict, namely in Transn-
istria.29 These “competing local identities”30 
21 Decizia (Decision) no. 146 [2018].
22 3HIVY*VKL4HYJO#O[[W!SL_Q\Z[PJLTKTK%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
23 Sesizarea (application for judicial review) no. 178a, Decizia (Decision) no. 147 [2018].
24 Sesizarea (application for judicial review) no. 179a, Decizia (Decision) no. 148 [2018].
25 Council of Europe, ‘New audiovisual legislation elaborated with support of the Council of Europe, adopted by Moldovan Parliament’ (Council of Europe Portal 18 
October 2018) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/-/new-audiovisual-legislation-elaborated-with-support-of-the-council-of-europe-adopted-by-mol-
KV]HUWHYSPHTLU[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
26 Sesizarea (application for judicial review by President Dodon) no. 180 a [2018].
27 /V[ȋYoYLH(Judgement CCM) no. 33 [2018].
28 Madalin Necsutu, ‘Moldova President Threatens to Block New Security Strategy’ (Balkan Insight 3 July 2018) <https://balkaninsight.com/2018/07/03/dodon-
threatLUZ[VISVJRHUL^UH[PVUHSKLMLUZLZ[YH[LN`%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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are repre-sented by an ongoing constitution-
al struggle on the official language. Article 
13, para 1 of the 1994 constitution stipulates 
the official language to be Moldovan with 
a Latin alphabet (distin-guishing it from 
Romanian). Article 13, para 2 specifies the 
recognition and guarantee of the pro-tection, 
preservation and freedom of use of Russian 
and other languages. This issue has remained 
important up until today, for example with 
the 2013 decision of the Constitutional Court 
giving the text of the independence declara-
tion in which Romanian is described as the 
national language primacy over the Consti-
tution.31 Despite several attempts to change 
the Constitution, Article 13 was not suc-
cessfully amended until 2018. Reviving this 
discussion, six parliamentary deputies asked 
the Constitutional Court to assess the consti-
tutionality of several individual laws. Their 
reasoning stated that all the phrases mention-
ing Russian as an interethnic communication 
lan-guage, and as a language for the official 
documents, were unconstitutional and that 
the individual provisions in the five differ-
ent laws ranging from 1989 to 2001 had to 
be changed.32 In their ap-plication for judi-
cial review, they also argued that all nation-
al minorities should have the right to speak 
their own languages (Bulgarian, Ukrainian, 
Gagauz, etc.) and not Russian. Although this 
is provided for with the Moldovan Language 
Law, Russian still maintains its status as the 
official language of communication within 
public services and official documents.33 In 
its judgement, the Court declared the law re-
garding the use of languages obsolete, and 
two other articles unconsti-tutional.34
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
In 2019, the elections to the national Parlia-
ment will become an important litmus test 
for Moldo-van democracy. The widespread 
frustration among Moldovan citizens with 
its political leader-ship extends to all sides of 
the political spectrum. The decision between 
DQRULHQWDWLRQWRZDUGV WKH:HVWRU WKH(DVW
will again be a big part of the election cam-
paigns, but will be of little conse-quence. 
:LWK WKH 5XVVLDQ SUHVHQFH LQ 7UDQVQLVWULD
and the increasing frustration of the Europe-
an Union and other international actors with 
the stalled reforms, this friend-or-foe mind-
set seems like a distraction from the substan-
tial challenges Moldova faces.
Probably the most important challenge 
ahead of the country is the need for judicial 
reform. This long-overdue reform stagnated 
in 2017. In 2018, the European Union For-
eign Affairs Council prepared a draft rec-
ommendation urging the Moldovan Govern-
ment to increase its fight against corruption 
and, in particular, to restore public trust in 
the judicial system by increasing judicial 
autonomy.35 The process of seating a judge 
(appointment) and the President’s involve-
ment and ability to unseat or remove a judge 
(tenure) are vulnerable and have in the past 
been misused. This lack of any substantive 
reform when it comes to the judiciary and 
the fight against corrup-tion even led the Eu-
ropean Union to reduce its financial support 
for judicial reforms.36 This combination of a 
crippled rule of law, a stalled process for re-
form of the judiciary and increasing inter-in-
stitutional conflict is curbing democracy. It 
looms large over the upcoming parliamenta-
ry elections and the ensuing formation of a 
new government.37
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Following the election in November 2017 
of a new Labour-New Zealand First Gov-
ernment supported by the Green Party, 2018 
was something of a consolidating year in 
New Zealand’s parliamentary democracy. 
This new Government spent much of the 
year coming to terms with the fact that it 
had (somewhat unexpectedly) won office 
while the now-opposition National Party 
also grappled with its new status. As such, 
constitutional developments largely came 
via the judiciary, with some important (albeit 
restrained in their reach) decisions handed 
down by the nation’s Supreme Court. These 
decisions touched on what are the two main 
issues in New Zealand’s contemporary con-
stitutional discussions: the relationship of 
the judicial and legislative branches and the 
ULJKWVRIWKHLQGLJHQRXV0ƗRULSHRSOHXQGHU
WKH7UHDW\RI:DLWDQJL
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Any constitutional arrangement involving 
some form of separation of powers inevita-
bly will generate inter-institutional tensions. 
In New Zealand, such tensions commonly 
emerge through an ongoing negotiation of 
the relationship between a Parliament that re-
mains theoretically sovereign in its command 
over the nation’s laws, and courts that uphold 
rule of law values. Unlike systems deriving 
from a higher law constitutional document, 
this relationship does not involve questions 
of whether and when the judiciary will in-
validate legislative enactments for straying 
beyond the bounds of competence accorded 
to the Parliament, or for trenching on funda-
mental individual rights guarantees. Ortho-
dox constitutional understandings simply do 
not permit New Zealand’s courts such a role. 
Instead, tensions emerge over the form that 
“comity” between the branches should take; 
in particular, the degree to which judicial de-
cision-making should avoid matters that are 
more properly “parliamentary” in nature.
In 2018, variants of this question were ad-
dressed in three rulings from the Supreme 
Court regarding the courts’ jurisdiction to 
grant relief. As these cases’ details are dis-
cussed in the following section, only a brief 
summary of each is necessary here. 1JƗWL
:KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL 7UXVW Y $WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO1
held that courts may issue declarations re-
garding the Crown’s actions during Treaty of 
:DLWDQJLVHWWOHPHQWQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK0DRUL
tribes, despite such settlements invariably 
being recorded in parliamentary enactments 
upon being finalised. This decision reversed 
previous rulings that any judicial interven-
tion in such settlement discussions is con-
stitutionally inappropriate due to their close 
connection with the legislative process. 
Attorney-General v Taylor2 affirmed that a 
judicial “declaration of inconsistency” is an 
available remedy under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) with 
respect to legislation that unjustifiably lim-
its guaranteed rights. Although such a dec-
laration cannot affect the ongoing validity 
or application of the legislation in question, 
it represents an express curial judgment on 
the substance of Parliament’s enacted pol-
icy. And Ngaranoa v Attorney-General3
NEW ZEALAND
1 [2018] NZSC 84.
2 [2018] NZSC 104.
3 [2018] NZSC 123.
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cautiously indicated, albeit without finally 
deciding, that legislation passed other than 
in accordance with relevant procedural re-
quirements contained in a statute (a “man-
ner and form” provision) would be invalid. 
This hint that the judiciary will enforce such 
provisions involves the courts determining 
the necessary prerequisites for Parliament to 
properly enact “law”.
Two points may be made about this trium-
virate of cases. First, the Court’s approach 
in each was only cautiously expansionist. 
:KLOHWKHPDMRULW\LQ1JƗWL:KƗWXDƿUƗNHL
Trust found declarations could be made on 
some matters before it, it refused to do so 
on others it regarded as being too closely 
related to legislative proceedings. Thus, the 
Court recalibrated the line between those 
7UHDW\ RI:DLWDQJL VHWWOHPHQW PDWWHUV WKDW
are solely for parliamentary consideration 
and those that remain amenable to judicial 
scrutiny rather than obliterating it complete-
ly. Equal-y, the majority in Taylor found the 
jurisdic-tion to grant declarations of incon-
sistency on a narrowly defined extension of 
the courts’ general power to provide a reme-
dy in the case of rights infringements.. And 
Ngaranoa only noted that “the pendulum has 
swung” towards the position that a parlia-
mentary failure to comply with manner and 
form requirements will result in invalid leg-
islation without finally deciding the matter.4
:HPD\XQGHUVWDQGWKLVFDXWLRQDVUHIOHFWLQJ
the somewhat unstable constitutional ground 
being trod. Each decision may be justified 
through a systemic need to ensure adequate 
rule of law mechanisms exist to police public 
power and respond to its improper use. How-
ever, as Matthew Palmer suggests,5 the concept 
of the rule of law has a somewhat fragile foot-
ing in New Zealand’s predominantly political 
constitutional culture. Consequently, when the 
courts expand their jurisdictional remit they 
face real legitimacy problems. In the absence 
of strong societal consensus that legal forms 
of accountability ought to trump political pro-
cesses, what authorises such assertions of the 
MXGLFLDOUROHLQWRDUHDVSUHYLRXVO\FORVHGWRLW"
Nevertheless, the second notable point about 
these three decisions is the political branch-
es’ sanguine response to them. Previous 
extensions of judicial oversight sometimes 
have provoked sharp rebuke by members 
of the executive and legislature. So when in 
2003 the Chief Justice cautiously suggest-
ed that parliamentary sovereignty may be 
subject to some limits of competency,6 the
then-Attorney-General responded with an 
orthodox Diceyan defence and warning that 
unelected judges should avoid politicising 
their role.7 And in 2014, Parliament legislat-
ed to expressly reverse the holdings of two 
judicial decisions that narrowed the ambit of 
parliamentary privilege.8 In contrast, the po-
litical branches expressed no disquiet at all 
in relation to 2018’s Court rulings. Indeed, 
the Government announced even before the 
Supreme Court handed down its Taylor deci-
sion that it intends legislating to “provide a 
statutory power for the senior courts to make 
declarations of inconsistency under the Bill 
of Rights Act, and to require Parliament to 
respond”.9 This apparently relaxed attitude 
towards an expanded judicial role perhaps 
reflects the new Justice Minister’s claim that 
“The Attorney-General … and I resolved 
some time ago that we are determined that 
ours will be a government that respects the 
rule of law, and will not over-reach” while re-
cording his own view that “I now give much 
less weight to the absolute sovereignty of Par-
liament, and … believe there needs to be a 
VWURQJHUFKHFNDQGEDODQFHRQLW´:KHWKHULW
marks a longer-term shift in inter-institutional 
relationships remains to be seen.10
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Attorney-General v Taylor: Declarations 
of Inconsistency
In 2015, Mr Taylor successfully obtained a 
declaration from the High Court11 that New 
Zealand’s legislative ban on all prisoners 
voting is inconsistent with the NZBORA, s 
12 right to vote. The Court of Appeal upheld 
granting this declaration.12:KLOH WKH OHJLV-
lation’s ongoing validity or application was 
unaffected by the declaration, the Crown 
nevertheless chose to appeal its issuance to 
the Supreme Court.
That appeal was not based on any disagree-
ment with the lower courts’ substantive con-
clusion on the rights question. The Crown 
conceded from the outset that a blanket ban 
on prisoner voting imposes an unjustifiable 
limit on the s 12 right. Rather, the Crown 
argued that as the NZBORA contains no 
express power to grant a “declaration of in-
consistency”, it simply is not an available 
judicial remedy.13 Consequently, the appeal 
required the Court to consider both whether 
a declaration of inconsistency represents a 
real remedy for a rights breach and if grant-
ing such a remedy is consistent with the ju-
dicial function. 
Two members of the Court, Susan Glaze-
brook and Ellen France JJ, traversed earlier 
4 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2018] NZSC 123 [70].
5 Matthew Palmer, ‘New Zealand’s Constitutional Culture’ (2007) 22 NZULR 565, 588-589.
6 Dame Sian Elias, ‘Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Another Spin on the Merry-Go-Round’ (2003) 14 PLR 148.
7 Hon Michael Cullen, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Courts’ [2004] NZLJ 243.
87HYSPHTLU[HY`7YP]PSLNL(J[ZZJK
9 Hon Andrew Little and Hon David Parker, ‘Government to provide greater protection of rights under the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990’, 26 February 2018 <https://
^^ ^ILLOP]LNV][UaYLSLHZLNV]LYUTLU[WYV]PKLNYLH[LYWYV[LJ[PVUYPNO[Z\UKLYUaIPSSYPNO[ZHJ[  % 
10/VU(UKYL^3P[[SLº:WLLJO[V[OL3H^-V\UKH[PVU(^HYKZ+PUULY»+LJLTILY#O[[WZ!^^ ^ILLOP]LNV][UaZWLLJOZWLLJOSH^MV\UKH[PVUH^HYKZKPUULY%
11 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [2015] 3 NZLR 791 (HC).
12 Attorney-General v Taylor [2017] NZCA 215, [2017] 3 NZLR 24. See Andrew Geddis, ‘“Declarations of Inconsistency under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990’ 
(UK Constitutional Law Blog, 19 Jun 2017) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/06/19/andrew-geddis-declarations-of-inconsistency-under-the-new-zealand-bill-of-
YPNO[ZHJ[  %HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
13 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [25].
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Court decisions that emphasised the impor-
tance of having some form of effective ju-
dicial response available when confronted 
with NZBORA inconsistent exercises of 
public power.14 For their honours, nothing 
in the NZBORA then gainsays this general 
“no right without a remedy” approach when 
it comes to issuing a formal declaration of 
inconsistency.15 Doing so also is compatible 
with the judicial function, as it “is a formal 
declaration of the law and, in particular, of 
the effect of the 2010 Amendment on the re-
spondents’ rights and status. It provides for-
mal confirmation that they are persons who 
are disqualified to vote by a provision incon-
sistent with their rights”.16
Consequently, their honours presented the 
declaratory power as little more than the nat-
ural extension of the ratio of existing case 
law. Glazebrook and France JJ also express-
ly distanced themselves from the Court of 
Appeal’s quite expansive discussion of the 
basis for such declarations, which had:17
canvassed the relationship between the 
political and judicial branches of gov-
ernment and the role of the higher courts 
under the New Zealand constitution. As 
is apparent, we have not found it neces-
VDU\WRXQGHUWDNHDVLPLODUH[HUFLVH:H
are accordingly not to be taken as en-
dorsing the Court of Appeal’s approach 
towards these matters.
Elias CJ wrote separately, largely concurring 
with Glazebrook and France JJ’s reasoning. 
,QFRQWUDVW:LOOLDP<RXQJDQG2¶5HJDQ--
dissented on the basis that “it is … problem-
atic whether a declaration of inconsistency is 
really a remedy and, if it is, whether it is an 
effective remedy”.18  Its grant does not vin-
dicate a rights breach as “a declaration binds 
no-one in relation to future actions and has 
no impact on the victim’s position”.19  And 
for their honours, the courts should not in-
vent a jurisdiction for themselves to give 
such an ineffective non-remedy. 
2. Ngaranoa v Attorney-General: Manner 
and Form Provision
In a separate challenge, Mr Taylor and sever-
al other prisoners also claimed that the 2010 
legislation was invalidly enacted because of 
a failure to comply with the Electoral Act 
1993 (NZ), s 268. This manner and form 
provision identifies various statutory provi-
sions governing aspects of New Zealand’s 
electoral process (the “reserved provisions”) 
and states that they may only be altered by 
either a vote of 75 percent of all MPs, or a 
majority vote at a referendum. The immedi-
ate question for the courts was whether the 
2010 legislation had amended one of these 
reserved provisions. If so, the prisoner chal-
lengers alleged the amendment was invalid 
as the necessary parliamentary majority had 
not been obtained.
Central to the case was the interpretation of 
s 268(1)(e), which reserves: “section 74, and 
the definition of the term adult in section 
3(1), and section 60(f) so far as those pro-
visions prescribe 18 years as the minimum 
age for persons qualified to be registered as 
electors or to vote”. The High Court20 and 
Court of Appeal21 found that this provision 
only encompasses the age at which people 
may enroll to vote and none of s 74’s oth-
er qualifications to vote. On further appeal, 
four members of the Supreme Court agreed 
with this conclusion, with Elias CJ issuing a 
strong dissent.
The majority did so having regard to the natu-
ral interpretation of the statutory provision,22
its legislative history23 and the purpose for 
its enactment.24 In a nutshell, the majority 
believed the entrenchment provision could 
be read only one way, with Parliament quite 
clearly intending that it attach to but one nar-
row aspect of voter qualifications. Given that 
context, there was no room for the NZBO-
RA s 6 interpretative mandate25 to operate 
in order to expand the protection afforded 
to the right to vote. Nor did the fundamen-
tal importance of that right otherwise justify 
an expansionary reading of s 268’s ambit in 
order to safeguard rights from majoritari-
an interference. Therefore, as the 2010 law 
change did not amend a reserved provision, 
no question as to its validity arose.
Furthermore, the majority refused to even 
fully commit to the consequences that would 
follow from a failure to comply with s 268. 
It noted only that:26
The enforceability of entrenchment pro-
visions like s 268 has been the subject 
of debate over a number of years both 
in New Zealand and in comparable ju-
risdictions. Those authorities indicate 
14 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [29]-[39].
15 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [40]-[51].
16 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [53].
17 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [66].
18 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [134].
19 Taylor v Attorney General [2018] NZSC 104 [139].
20 Taylor v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 355, [2016] 3 NZLR 111 (HC).
21 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2017] NZCA 351, [2017] 3 NZLR 643 (CA). See Andrew Geddis, ‘Judicial enforcement of New Zealand’s reserved provisions’ 
(2017) 28 PLR 289. 
22 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 123 [36]-[48].
23 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 123 [49]-[58].
24 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 123 [59]-[64].
25 This reads: “Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be 
WYLMLYYLK[VHU`V[OLYTLHUPUN¹ 
26 5NHYVUVH]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 123 [70].
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the pendulum has swung in favour of 
enforceability but we would prefer that 
the issue to be resolved after argument 
on the point.
The problem is that, in keeping with the 
“pendulum [swing] in favour of enforceabil-
ity”, the Crown expressly had conceded that 
a failure to comply with s 268 renders legis-
lation invalid. As such, it is difficult to see 
where “argument on the point” is going to 
come from in this or any future case.
 1JƗWL :KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL 7UXVW Y $WWRUQH\
General: 5HYLHZLQJ7UHDW\RI:DLWDQJL6HW-
tlements
1JƗWL:KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL LV D KDSǌ VXEWULEH
LQ 7ƗPDNL 0DNDXUDX RU $XFNODQG 1HZ
Zealand’s largest city. In 2006, as part of its 
negotiations to settle its claims for historical 
EUHDFKHV RI WKH 7UHDW\ RI :DLWDQJL 1JƗWL
:KƗWXDƿUƗNHLHQWHUHGLQWRDQDJUHHPHQWLQ
principle with the Crown. The terms of that 
agreement raised the ire of other iwi (tribes) 
DQGKDSǌZKRKDGRYHUODSSLQJFODLPVRYHU
the area in question, and so the Crown en-
tered into another series of agreements which 
provided a process for addressing their con-
FHUQV HYHQWXDOO\ LPSOHPHQWHG E\ WKH 1JƗ
0DQD:KHQXDR7ƗPDNL0DNDXUDX&ROOHF-
WLYH 5HGUHVV $FW  0HDQZKLOH 1JƗWL
:KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL KDG VHWWOHG LWV FODLPV ZLWK
the Crown and that agreement was imple-
PHQWHGE\WKH1JƗWL:KƗWXDƿUƗNHL&ODLPV
Settlement Act 2012. Against that legislative 
background, in 2015 and 2016 the Crown 
made decisions to transfer property to two 
KDSǌFRYHUHGE\WKH&ROOHFWLYH5HGUHVV$FW
with a view to settling Treaty claims with 
WKRVHKDSǌ7KHWUDQVIHURIWKHSURSHUW\UH-
quired authorising legislation. 
1JƗWL :KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL DSSOLHG IRU MXGLFLDO
review of the decisions to transfer proper-
ty, seeking declarations from the Court that 
they were contrary to its legal rights arising 
from the 2006 agreement, the 2012 settle-
ment legislation, customary law and the 
Treaty itself, and thus beyond scope of the 
Crown’s power. The High Court struck out 
1JƗWL:KƗWXDƿUƗNHL¶VFODLPDQGWKH&RXUW
of Appeal dismissed an appeal against that 
ruling. Both lower courts agreed that the 
Crown’s decisions were non-justiciable; 
since the proposal was to enact them into 
IRUFH 1JƗWL:KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL¶V FODLP HVVHQ-
tially challenged proposed legislation and 
thus the principle of non-interference with 
Parliamentary proceedings was engaged. 
The question for the Supreme Court was 
ZKHWKHU 1JƗWL :KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL¶V FODLP GLG
challenge proposed legislation or instead 
seek clarification and recognition of its 
rights.27 Since settlements between iwi and 
KDSǌ LQYDULDEO\ OHDG WR OHJLVODWLRQVXFK LV-
sues have come before the courts before. 
The difficulty is determining the point where 
a (permissible) challenge to the Crown’s de-
cision to enter into a settlement becomes a 
(impermissible) challenge to Parliament’s 
right to enact the terms of that settlement 
as legislation. After traversing past cases on 
this issue, the Supreme Court demurred from 
“resolving the exact metes and bounds” of 
the principle of non-interference in parlia-
mentary proceedings.28 Crucially, however, 
they did limit the principle’s effect in the 
present proceedings: just because a decision 
of the executive can be predicted to result 
in future legislation did not oust the Court’s 
jurisdiction.29 The potential for future settle-
PHQWVZLWKRWKHULZLDQGKDSǌPHDQWLWZDV
LPSRUWDQW WRFODULI\1JƗWL:KƗWXDƿUƗNHL¶V
rights and the constraints on the Crown’s 
power when making future decisions.30 The 
PDMRULW\ UHLQVWDWHG WKH KDSǌ¶V VWDWHPHQW RI
claim to the extent that it focused on its rights 
qua these future issues (and not specifically 
with 2015-2016 decisions), and remitted it to 
the High Court for a substantive hearing.31
In a long, largely concurring decision, Elias 
CJ was far more bullish, holding that “recent 
restatements of the principle [of non-inter-
ference with Parliamentary proceedings] 
are unacceptably broad”.32 Indeed, the Chief 
Justice went as far as rejecting the proposi-
tion that “matters contemporaneously before 
Parliament are non-justiciable”,33 and held 
as long as the Court does not preclude Par-
liament’s consideration of a matter, it may 
consider that same matter and the impact on 
the present rights of claimants. Such consid-
eration is not an interference with parliamen-
tary proceedings, nor is it an enlargement of 
the Court’s constitutional function.34 In the 
FDVH DW KDQG 1JƗWL :KƗWXD ƿUƗNHL KDG D
continuing interest in how the Crown should 
conduct itself; it was not attempting to in-
junct Parliament, and thus the lower courts 
had mischaracterised its claim: she would 
have allowed the appeal in its entirety.35
So while not entirely clarifying the limits 
of its power to consider matters engaged 
by proposed legislation, the Supreme Court 
confirmed the principle that even where leg-
islation proposes to alter the rights of a par-
ty, the judiciary is not necessarily prevented 
IURPFRQVLGHULQJWKRVHULJKWV:KLOHWKHGH-
cision ought to have impact beyond Treaty 
jurisprudence, it has particular pertinence 
IRU WKLV DUHD:LWKRXW WKH FRPSOHWH DELOLW\
to shield its decisions from review by stat-
ing they are subject to future parliamentary 
approval, the Crown’s approach to “over-
lapping claims”—already the subject of an 
27 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [34].
28 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2018] NZSC 84 [46].
29 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2018] NZSC 84 [46].
30 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2018] NZSC 84 [53].
31 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [50]-[66].
32 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [113].
33 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [113].
34 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [116].
35 5NȊ[P>OȊ[\HǰYȊRLP;Y\Z[]([[VYUL`.LULYHS[2018] NZSC 84 [127].
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XUJHQW KHDULQJ EHIRUH WKH:DLWDQJL 7ULEX-
nal36 —likely will come under even greater 
scrutiny.
1JƗL7DLNL7ƗPDNL7ULEDO7UXVWY0LQLVWHU
of Conservation: Interpreting the Principles 
RIWKH7UHDW\RI:DLWDQJL
This decision of the Supreme Court also in-
YROYHG 7ƗPDNL 0DNDXUDX MXGLFLDO UHYLHZ
DQG WKH7UHDW\ RI:DLWDQJL EXW LQVWHDG IR-
cused on the application of the Treaty’s prin-
ciples. The focus of the case was a decision 
by the Department of Conservation to grant 
concessions to two commercial operators 
to run tours to and on two motu (islands) in 
Auckland’s Hauraki Gulf, which are part of 
the Crown-owned conservation estate. The 
Department made those concessions using 
its powers under Conservation Act 1987, s 
4, of which states: “This Act shall so be in-
terpreted and administered as to give effect 
WRWKHSULQFLSOHVRIWKH7UHDW\RI:DLWDQJL´
7KH1JƗL7DL7UXVW UHSUHVHQWV WKH1JƗL7DL
iwi, which has maintained (in agreement 
with the Court) that it has mana whenua (ter-
ritorial customary rights) over the motu.37
Alongside the two commercial operators, the 
Department of Conservation also granted the 
iwi a concession to conduct walking tours on 
WKH PRWX:KHQ FRQVLGHULQJ WKRVH YDULRXV
applications, it refused to consider whether 
it should decline the commercial operators’ 
concessions in order to preserve and improve 
WKHHFRQRPLFEHQHILWDULVLQJIURP1JƗL7DL¶V
concession because there was no basis for 
JLYLQJ1JƗL7DLSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQW38 The 
question before the Court was what s 4 of 
the Conservation Act required of the Depart-
ment when considering concession applica-
WLRQVUHODWLQJWRDQDUHDZKLFKDQLZLRUKDSǌ
has mana whenua. 
The High Court held that the Department had 
committed an error of law, but the Court of 
Appeal reversed that finding. The Supreme 
Court agreed with the High Court: the De-
partment’s refusal to consider the econom-
ic benefit to an iwi with mana whenua ran 
contrary to previous case law and the prin-
ciple of active protection under the Treaty 
RI:DLWDQJL:KLOHVRI WKH&RQVHUYDWLRQ
Act did not operate in a vacuum and there 
were many factors to take into account when 
making such concession decisions, the De-
partment failed to give it proper consider-
ation and was thus in breach of its statutory 
obligations.39 The Court went on to reject the 
argument that this breach was not material 
to the outcome: while the Court held that s 4 
GLGQRWSURYLGHDYHWRWR1JƗL7DLLQFRP-
mitting the breach, the Department did not 
put itself in the position to properly consider 
the iwi’s submission, and thus it ought to re-
consider its decision.40 In a dissenting judg-
PHQW:LOOLDP<RXQJ-KHOGWKDWDQ\HUURURI
law did not influence the final decision; he 
would have dismissed the appeal.41
In reaching this result, the majority con-
firmed the earlier precedent of Ngai Tahu 
Maori Trust Board v Director-General of 
Conservation,42 and have clarified the im-
pact of statutory provisions such as s 4 of 
the Conservation Act. The wording of such 
clauses—and particular the use of words 
“give effect”—means that they are “pow-
erful” and demand more than procedural 
steps: it may require a change in substantive 
outcomes.43 One such substantive outcome, 
and one way for the Crown to give practical 
effect to the Treaty principles, is to enable 
LZLRUKDSǌWRUHFRQQHFWZLWKWKHLUDQFHVWUDO
whenua (land).44 That may mean declining 
other applications for concessions to access 
the same land.  The decision is thus a firm 
restatement of the potential power of Treaty 
principles, and may force decision-makers 
bound by similar statutory obligations to al-
ter their processes in order to properly give 
effect to those principles. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Perhaps the most interesting development 
in 2019 will be the announcement of the de-
tails of the Government’s proposal to amend 
the NZBORA to “provide a statutory power 
for the senior courts to make declarations 
of inconsistency under the Act, and to re-
TXLUH 3DUOLDPHQW WR UHVSRQG´:KLOH LQIRU-
mal consultation has taken place throughout 
2018, there is no firm indication as to what 
the Government has in mind. In particular, 
it is not clear how Parliament might be “re-
quired” to respond to a judicial ruling that 
does not affect the validity of the relevant 
piece of legislation. Nevertheless, the pro-
posal could have a significant impact on the 
role that the NZBORA plays in New Zea-
land’s constitutional arrangements as well as 
alter the role that the judiciary and elected 
representatives play in defining and protect-
ing individual rights.
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SHWWPUNJSHPTZWYVILKH[\YNLU[^HP[HUNPPUX\PY`%HJJLZZLK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I. INTRODUCTION
The ascension of the major opposition par-
ty, the All Progressives Congress (APC), 
into government in 2015 was considered an 
improvement in the key indicators of liberal 
democracy. Early manifestations of dictator-
ship were excused because the government 
was new. But recent developments point to a 
populist authoritarianism to the detriment of 
democracy and the citizens.1 The violations 
of the minimum requirements for the con-
duct of transparent governorship elections 
in the states of Ekiti and Osun do not only 
UHÀHFWDJURZLQJµJDSEHWZHHQHOHFWRUDODQG
liberal democracy’2 but also a possible re-
lapse into dictatorship.
:KLOH WKH QXPEHU RI UHJLVWHUHG SROLWLFDO
parties grew to ninety-one, transparent elec-
toral process, separation of powers, rule of 
law, judicial independence, and other mech-
anisms necessary to secure the continuing 
popular control and public accountability 
of government suffered reverses. The insti-
tutional protection of democracy, such as 
the legislature, the courts, and civil society 
groups, was intimidated, and procedural 
safeguards such as restraint in the exercise 
of public power, political tolerance, and due 
process of law weakened.
Given the initial hype about the ascension of 
the APC in consolidating democratic prac-
tices, the reverse experienced in 2018, in-
dicative of a desperation to hold onto power, 
reminisces “democratisation backwards”.3 
An election, or the mere existence of elect-
ed government, critical as it is, is merely 
the starting point in the quest for democ-
racy.4:KHUH WKH LPSRUWDQW YDULDEOHV OLNH D
free press, free and fair elections, respect for 
freedom of thought, freedom of association 
and opposition rights, and equality before 
the law are not improved upon, democra-
cy loses essence and soon authoritarianism 
takes hold of the polity. A fact that the recent 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO GHYHORSPHQWV FRQ¿UP LV WKDW
opposition success at the polls does not by 
itself lead to the entrenchment of democracy. 
Rather, opposition parties when in govern-
ment are susceptible to the allures of abuse 
of power and political dominance. Since 
democracy in its simplest form is a system 
of institutions, rules, and procedures for the 
exercise of power based on the consent of 
the people, a consolidated democracy is one 
in which these arrangements develop into 
autonomous institutions governed by jus-
ticiable rules.5 It is increasingly becoming 
indisputable that democracies become con-
VROLGDWHGRQO\ZKHQDOOVLJQL¿FDQWHOLWHVZKR
are major players and an overwhelming pro-
portion of citizens abide by stipulated rules.6
1 Michael Wahman, ‘Opposition Coalitions and Democratisation by Elections’ (2013) 48 .V]LYUTLU[
Opposition 3. 
2 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999) 10.
3 Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin, ‘Democratisation Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democra-
cies’ (2001) 31 )YP[PZO1V\YUHSVM7VSP[PJHS:JPLUJL 331-354, 332. 
4 Terry Karl, ‘Imposing Consent: Electoralism versus Democratisation in El Salvador’, in Paul W. Drake and 
Eduardo Silva (eds.), ,SLJ[PVUZHUK+LTVJYH[PZH[PVUPU3H[PU(TLYPJH  *LU[YLMVY0ILYPHU3H[PU
(TLYPJHU:[\KPLZ<UP]LYZP[`VM*HSPMVYUPH7YLZZ   
5 See Terry Karl, ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America’ (1990) 23 Comparative Politics 1.
6 See Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stephan, ‘Towards Consolidated Democracies’ (1996) 7 1V\YUHSVM+LTVJYHJ`
14-33, 15.
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Autonomy of the National Assembly
Separation of powers is an essential ele-
ment in constitutional thought and a useful 
guide for institutional design.7 From Locke 
to Montesquieu, separation of powers is nec-
essary for the promotion of political liberty 
and the prevention of autocracy. Locke’s 
three characteristic innovations in institu-
tion-planning are “civil” government, a su-
preme “legislative” power coupled with a 
responsible executive, and a vigilant “major-
ity”; that is, a virile civil populace that elects 
a government and can also rebel against 
any non-popular government.8 This division 
of power is constitutionalized in sections 4 
(legislative), 5 (executive), and 6 (judicial) 
of the Constitution of 1999 in the style of the 
U.S. Constitution. The Nigerian courts have 
emphasized the importance of separation 
of powers as a constitutional doctrine un-
der the various constitutional arrangements 
in Nigeria.9 The combination of separation 
of powers with the concept of checks and 
balances provides an effective, stable polit-
ical system that controls abuse of power.10 
The institutional arrangement of separation 
of powers suggests that no one branch of 
government should dominate the other, nor 
should one branch be undermined by others. 
Executive dominance over the legislature 
makes the latter weak and less effective. A 
less effective legislature is an empirically 
proven explanation for the failure to consol-
idate democracy.11 A legislature is effective 
if it is independent of executive interference 
and intimidation in the choice of leadership, 
the planning of its agenda, and the discharge 
of its functions.12
There were a series of events which sug-
gested interference and intimidation of the 
National Assembly in the year under review. 
The National Assembly comprises the Senate 
(109 members, selected three per state) and 
the House of Representatives (comprising 
360 members elected by electoral districts 
delineated by population). On April 18, the 
plenary session of the Senate was disrupted 
by invaders who seized and took away the 
mace but it was subsequently recovered by 
the police. However, no arrest has been made 
even though the entire event was captured on 
camera and Senator Ovie Omo-Agege, who 
was on suspension, was widely suspected to 
have organized the invasion.
,QZKDWVHHPHGWREHDFRQ¿UPDWLRQRIWKH
plot of the executive to surreptitiously effect 
a leadership change in the Senate, on July 
24, policemen barricaded the exit road of the 
residence of the Senate President and that of 
his deputy. However, the Senate President 
beat the ambush and was able to reach the 
National Assembly for a plenary session.
Perhaps due to the failure of earlier attempts 
to convene a session in the absence of the 
Senate President or his deputy, on August 
7, operatives of the Department of State 
Service (the secret police) barricaded the 
entrance of the National Assembly, initial-
ly allowing only legislators from the ruling 
party into the legislative building. Two days 
before this blockade, the Senate President 
had announced his defection from the ruling 
party to the main opposition People’s Demo-
cratic Party (PDP).
2. Floor Crossing
In spite of the constitutional ban and judicial 
GLVSURYDORIÀRRUFURVVLQJWKHSKHQRPHQRQ
is growing in political practice in Nigeria. In 
a previous review, the futility of both a con-
stitutional proscription and judicial sanction 
against the practice was explained.13 This is 
SULQFLSDOO\EHFDXVHÀRRUFURVVLQJUHPDLQVD
mechanism for consolidating, and recently, 
ascending to power in Nigeria. The ruling 
APC ascended to power partly because of 
the defection of lawmakers and governors 
from the then-ruling PDP into its fold. In 
like manner, on July 24, 2018, fourteen sen-
ators and thirty-seven members of the House 
of Representatives crossed from the ruling 
APC to the main opposition PDP. In what 
may have been an extension of the defection 
of leaders of the legislature experienced in 
2013, in addition to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, the Senate President also 
FKDQJHG SDUW\ DI¿OLDWLRQ WR WKH RSSRVLWLRQ
3'3/LNH LQZKHQ¿YHJRYHUQRUVRI
the then-ruling PDP moved to the opposition 
APC, in 2018, three governors abandoned 
the current ruling party to join the opposi-
tion PDP. Against the current trend of party 
change, the leader of the opposition PDP par-
ty in the Senate, Godswill Akpabio, crossed 
to the ruling APC. Consistent with the earli-
er trend, the ruling party has responded by 
offering patronage to attract legislators from 
WKHRSSRVLWLRQLQWRLWVIROG:LWKWKHJHQHUDO
HOHFWLRQVRI¿FLDOO\ VFKHGXOHG WREHKHOGRQ
February 16 and March 2, 2019, it is expect-
ed that these defections will have an impact 
on the outcome of the polls.
3. Decline in Credibility of Elections
As was hinted in the 2017 review, elections 
for governor were held in two southwestern 
states, Ekiti and Osun. Contrary to expecta-
tions, the elections were a regression from 
the pattern that was established in 2015. 
The Ekiti election, held on July 14, 2018, 
was a straight contest between the APC and 
7 See Christoph Möllers, ;OL;OYLL)YHUJOLZ!(*VTWHYH[P]L4VKLSVM:LWHYH[PVUVM7V^LYZ(Oxford University Press, 2013).
8 Robert Faulkner, ‘The First Liberal Democrat: Locke’s Popular Government’ (2001) 63 Review of Politics 5.
9 3HRHUTP6YZ]([[VYUL`.LULYHS>LZ[LYU9LNPVU [1971] 1 UILR 20 at 218; <UVUNV](R\[1983] 2 SCNLR 332; .V]LYUVYVM2HK\UH:[H[L]/V\ZLVM(ZZLTIS`, 
2HK\UH:[H[L(UVY (1981) 2 NCLR 444. 
10 John P. Humphrey, ‘The Theory of the Separation of Functions’ (1946) 6 <UP]LYZP[`VM;VYVU[V3H^1V\YUHS331.
11 Ming Sing, ‘Explaining Democratic Survival Globally (1946-2002)’ (2010) 72;OL1V\YUHSVM7VSP[PJZ 438.
12 Gabriel O. Arishe, +L]LSVWPUN,ɈLJ[P]L3LNPZSH[\YL (Paclerd Press, 2017).
13 :VSVTVU<RO\LNIL.HIYPLS6(YPZOLº5PNLYPH!;OL:[H[LVM3PILYHS+LTVJYHJ`».SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^208, 2010; Gabriel O. Arishe,  
‘Proscription of Floor Crossing in Nigeria: The Limits of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’ (2017) (MYPJHU1V\YUHSVM*VTWHYH[P]L*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ 126.
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the PDP, the former being the ruling party at 
the centre. The APC won the election. Lo-
cal and international observer groups dep-
recated the election as being below global 
standards, and one that should not be used 
as a template for the general elections due 
in 2019.14 Observers reported incidences of 
ballot box-snatching, sporadic shootings, 
and the dispersal of some party agents as 
well as intimidation, oppression, and undue 
LQÀXHQFH 7KH PDVV GHSOR\PHQW RI RYHU
30,000 security personnel to the state was 
ostensibly to ensure peaceful polling but 
was also used for voter intimidation and the 
arrest of opposition party agents.15
The Osun governorship election was held on 
September 22, 2018, and was also a straight 
¿JKWEHWZHHQ WKH UXOLQJ$3&DQG WKHPDLQ
opposition PDP. The election recorded better 
transparency than that of Ekiti but was de-
clared inconclusive because the margin that 
put the PDP ahead of the APC (353 votes) 
was less than the number of registered vot-
ers (3,498) in the seven polling units where 
elections were cancelled for malpractices 
RU WHFKQLFDO GLI¿FXOWLHV16 A supplementary 
election for the affected areas was held on 
September 27. This election was marred by 
reported “widespread misconduct by secu-
rity agencies, including intimidation of ac-
credited journalists, observers, and even vot-
ers of the opposition party”.17 It was against 
this background that the candidate of the 
APC was declared winner of the election.
The results of the elections in both states 
were challenged at the post-election tribunal, 
with that of Ekiti decided in favour of the de-
clared winner, the APC candidate.18 An ap-
peal is expected. Although past electoral ex-
periences in Nigeria teach us that perversion 
WKURXJKIDOVL¿FDWLRQRIUHVXOWVULJJLQJDQG
violence is widespread, judicial reversal of 
results of fraudulent polls is relatively com-
mon.19 However, after 2015, there has been a 
noticeable decline in the number of election 
SHWLWLRQV E\ GLVVDWLV¿HG FDQGLGDWHV RU WKHLU
parties as well as the number of successful 
Court challenges of election results.
The Electoral Act (amendment) Bill, which 
proposed far-reaching reforms, including an 
electronic format for documentation, placing 
legislative elections before the presidential 
poll, stricter regulation of the nomination 
process for candidates, and so on,20 was re-
fused assent thrice in a space of less than ten 
months by President Buhari, citing drafting 
errors.21 On the fourth occasion, however, he 
refused ostensibly because assenting to a bill 
to change electoral law so close to the elec-
tion (December 2018) could cause “some 
uncertainty about the applicable legislation 
to govern the process”.22 The last refusal 
VHHPVWRFRQ¿UPWKDWWKH3UHVLGHQWZDVQRW
committed to any electoral reforms. Unfortu-
nately, the legislature did not have the num-
bers to override the President’s veto. The 
2015 law will be used for the 2019 elections.
4. Freedom of the Press
The Nigerian Constitution of 1999 guaran-
tees freedom of the press and the dissemi-
nation of information.23 The Court has inter-
preted this right as extending to barring the 
harassment of journalists because of their 
news reporting.24 There are public-owned 
media organisations and privately controlled 
ones in Nigeria. The privately controlled me-
dia expectedly are quite intrusive in covering 
government activities and have been helpful 
in unravelling alleged breaches of rights. 
These have exposed them to harassment 
E\ JRYHUQPHQW DJHQFLHV /DWHO\ WKH ¿JKW
against terrorist groups has caused friction 
between journalists and security agencies as 
to permissible limits of information dissem-
ination when weighed against national secu-
rity considerations.
:KDW DSSHDUV WR EH UHSUHVVLRQRI WKH SUHVV
began on January 1, 2018, when three jour-
nalists were arrested and detained for at least 
two days by operatives of the Special An-
14 Emmanuel Ani, ‘Ekiti Election: Observers discredit Poll, say large deployment of Security Operatives marred Exercise’ Daily Post (17 July 2018) 
#O[[W!KHPS`WVZ[UNLRP[PLSLJ[PVUVIZLY]LYZKPZJYLKP[WVSSZH`SHYNLKLWSV`TLU[ZLJ\YP[`VWLYH[P]LZTHYYLKL_LYJPZL%HJJLZZLK  
15 Kamarudeen Ogundele, ‘Ekiti: Election Fell Short of Global Standards, Say US Observer Group, Others’ 7\UJO (18 July 2018)  
#O[[WZ!W\UJOUNJVTLSLJ[PVUMLSSZOVY[VMNSVIHSZ[HUKHYKZZH`\ZVIZLY]LYNYV\WV[OLYZ%HJJLZZLK  
16 Jide Ojo, ‘An Observer’s Intimate View of Osun Governorship Election’ 7\UJO (26 September 2018) <https://punchng.com/an-observers-inti-
TH[L]PL^VMVZ\UNV]LYUVYZOPWLSLJ[PVU%HJJLZZLK  
17 Samuel Ogundipe, ‘Osun Decides 2018: Re-run Election Not Free, Fair or Credible – CDD’ Premium Times (27 September 2018) <https://www.premiumtimesng.
JVTUL^ZOLHKSPULZVZ\UKLJPKLZYLY\ULSLJ[PVUUV[MYLLMHPYVYJYLKPISLJKKO[TS%HJJLZZLK :LL1LYY`,TTHUZVUº6Z\U.\ILY!
Observer Group Releases Report...’ 3LHKLYZOPW6J[VILY#O[[WZ!SLHKLYZOPWUNVZ\UN\ILYVIZLY]LYNYV\WYLSLHZLZYLWVY[YLY\UWVSS%
accessed 08/02/2019. 
18 0RLJO\R^\5UVJOPYP9V[PTP6QVTV`LSHº,RP[P.V]LYUVYZOPW,SLJ[PVU;YPI\UHS\WOVSKZ-H`LTP»Z=PJ[VY`»Vanguard (29 January 2019) <https://www.vanguardngr.
JVT LRP[PNV]LYUVYZOPWLSLJ[PVU[YPI\UHS\WOVSKZMH`LTPZ]PJ[VY`%HJJLZZLK 
19 :LL1;VJO\R^\6TLUTH6RLJO\R^\60ILHU\0RL,6U`PZOPº+PZW\[LK,SLJ[PVUZHUK[OL9VSLVM[OL*V\Y[PU,TLYNPUN+LTVJYHJPLZPU(MYPJH!;OL5PNLYP-
an Example’ (2017) 2 1V\YUHSVM7VSP[PJZ+LTVJYH[PaH[PVU 28-55; ;OL.LULYHS,SLJ[PVUPU5PNLYPH*VTWLUKP\TVM7L[P[PVUZAvailable online: http://www.
placng.org/situation_room/sr/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Compendium-of-Election-Cases-in-Nigeria.pdf.
20 See ‘Factsheet on the Electoral Act Amendment Bill, 2018 as Passed by the National Assembly’ February 2018 < http://placng.org/wp/wp-content/up-
SVHKZMHJ[ZOLL[VU[OLLSLJ[VYHSHJ[HTLUKTLU[IPSSHZWHZZLKI`[OLUH[PVUHSHZZLTIS `WKM%HJJLZZLK 
21 Henry Umoru, ‘Signing Amended Electoral Act for 2019 Elections will create uncertainty, crisis – Buhari’ Vanguard (7 December 2018) < https://www.vanguardn-
NYJVTZPNUPUNHTLUKLKLSLJ[VYHSHJ[MVY LSLJ[PVUZ^PSSJYLH[L\UJLY[HPU[`JYPZPZI\OHYP%HJJLZZLK 
22:L\U6WLQVIPº,SLJ[VYHS(J[!)\OHYPÄUHSS`IYLHRZZPSLUJLYL]LHSZ^O`OLYLM\ZLK[VZPNU)PSS» Daily Post (8 December 2018) < http://dailypost.ng/2018/12/08/
LSLJ[VYHSHJ[I\OHYPÄUHSS`IYLHRZZPSLUJLYL]LHSZYLM\ZLKZPNUIPSS%HJJLZZLK 
23 S. 39.
24 0UUVJLU[(KPR^\]-LKLYHS/V\ZLVM9LWYLZLU[H[P]LZ (1983) 3 NCLR 394; Tony Momoh v Senate (1984) 4 NCLR 269.
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ti-Robbery Squad unit of the Nigerian Police 
for allegedly criticising the Inspector Gener-
al of Police.25 In February 2018, Tony Ezi-
makor, a senior editor with the Daily Inde-
pendent newspaper, was detained for about 
a week without charge by the DSS for what 
the security agency considered an offensive 
report on the missing Chibok girls.
,QWKH:RUOG3UHVV)UHHGRP,QGH[1L-
geria was placed 119th (on the global rank-
ing of 180 countries), sandwiched between 
Afghanistan and Maldives.26 Nigeria’s latest 
ranking is a marginal improvement from the 
122nd position it had in 2017. The accom-
panying report to the ranking published by 
Reporters without Borders (RSF) regretted 
that in Nigeria, journalists are often harassed 
by authorities when covering subjects with 
QDWLRQDO VHFXULW\ UDPL¿FDWLRQV 7KH UHSRUW
also raised concerns that “the all-powerful 
regional governors are often the media’s 
most determined persecutors and act with 
complete impunity”.27 This concern may not 
be unrelated to the March 13, 2018 arrest of 
Musa Kirshi, a correspondent with the Daily
Trust, in the National Assembly premises for 
allegedly facilitating an advertorial against 
the interest of the governor of Jigawa State, 
Abubakar Badaru. On March 12, 2018, at 
OHDVW¿YHSULYDWHO\RZQHGQHZVSDSHUVZLWK
nation-wide coverage were prevented from 
covering President Buhari’s visit to Benue 
State in the aftermath of suspected herdsmen 
killing unarmed villagers.28
In another show of might, on August 19, 
2018, the Oyo State Government demolished 
the building in Ibadan housing Fresh FM, a 
private radio station, on the pretext that the 
building contravened physical planning law, 
though an independent report stated that the 
government’s actions were based on political 
differences with the station proprietor.29 The 
management of the media house claimed 
that it obtained all necessary government ap-
provals before it built the radio house.30 In 
contempt for the rule of law, the government 
EURXJKWGRZQ WKHEXLOGLQJ LQGH¿DQFHRID
court order restraining it from doing so.
There has not been much improvement in the 
way private media organisations have been 
treated by the government. The importance 
of the press to the consolidation of democra-
cy means that repressive acts against private 
media as recorded last year diminishes the 
prospect of strengthening democracy.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Dasuki v FRN: Unlawful Detention
Mr. Sambo Dasuki, the former National Se-
curity Adviser, challenged his continued de-
tention in spite of an order of an Abuja High 
Court on December 18, 2015, which granted 
him bail after his arraignment by the Eco-
nomic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC). He was released on December 29, 
2015 in obedience to the order of the High 
Court but immediately re-arrested by oper-
atives of the DSS and kept in custody. The 
High Court and the Court of Appeal ruled 
separately that the government was not in 
breach by its action because there was no 
court order against the re-arrest of Mr. Da-
suki. On March 2, 2018, the Supreme Court 
aligned itself with the two courts below it, 
DI¿UPLQJ WKDW 0U 'DVXNL FRXOG EH UHDU-
rested by the same or different agency of 
government on suspicion of committing any 
crime, and ordered an accelerated trial.31 Un-
fortunately, since then, the trial of Mr. Da-
VXNLKDVQRWSURJUHVVHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\ZKLFK
is in breach of the right to personal liberty 
and fair trial protected by the Constitution of 
1999.32 The comment of President Muham-
madu Buhari that national security and the 
nation’s interest are superior to the rule of 
law is a pointer to perhaps a deliberate policy 
of clamping down on freedom.33
Saraki v FRN: Accountability of Public 
Officials
The Constitution of 1999 prescribes a code 
RI FRQGXFW IRU SXEOLF RI¿FLDOV UHTXLULQJ
them to declare their assets on assumption 
DVZHOO DV RQ H[LW IURP SXEOLF RI¿FH34 An 
RI¿FLDO LQ EUHDFK RI WKH FRGH LV WULHG E\
the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT). The 
Senate President, Dr. Bukola Saraki, was 
charged in 2015 to the CCT for non-decla-
ration and anticipatory declaration of assets 
from 2003 to 2011, when he was governor 
of Kwara State. The CCT ruled on June 14, 
2017 that the prosecution failed to prove its 
case and acquitted Dr. Saraki. In the federal 
government’s appeal against his acquittal, 
the Court of Appeal, on December 12, 2017, 
reversed the ruling of the CCT but reduced 
the charges from eighteen to three.35 On ap-
peal, the Supreme Court, on July 6, 2018, 
25 Wole Elegbede, ‘Threat to Press Freedom and Democracy’ Thisday (9 January 2019) < https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2019/01/09/threat-to-press-free-
KVTHUKKLTVJYHJ`%HJJLZZLK 
26 9LWVY[LYZ^P[OV\[)VYKLYZº>VYSK7YLZZ-YLLKVT0UKL_»#O[[WZ!YZMVYNLUYHURPUN%HJJLZZLK 
27 (IK\SSH[LLM:HSH\º>VYSK7YLZZ-YLLKVT+H`!5PNLYPH\WWLKPU7YLZZ-YLLKVT0UKL_I\[ZVTLZ\IQLJ[ZZ[PSSVɈSPTP[Z»Daily Trust (3 May 2018) < https://www.
KHPS`[Y\Z[JVTUN^VYSKWYLZZMYLLKVTKH`UPNLYPH\WWLKPUWYLZZMYLLKVTPUKL_I\[ZVTLZ\IQLJ[ZZ[PSSVɈSPTP[ZO[TS%HJJLZZLK 
28 Editorial, ‘Police, SSS Unwarranted Media Crackdown’7\UJO4HYJO#O[[WZ!W\UJOUNJVTWVSPJLZZZ\U^HYYHU[LKTLKPHJYHJRKV^U%HJJLZZLK
11/02/2019.
29 Chijioke Jannah, ‘Real Reason Yinka Ayefele’s Radio Station was marked for demolition – Ajiboye’ +HPS`7VZ[18 August 2018) < http://dailypost.ng/2018/08/18/
YLHSYLHZVU`PURHH`LMLSLZYHKPVZ[H[PVUTHYRLKKLTVSP[PVUHQPIV`L%HJJLZZLK
30 Olufemi Atoyebi and Peter Dada, ‘Outrage as Oyo demolishes Ayefele’s N800m Radio Station, Studio’ 7\UJO(20 August 2018) < https://punchng.com/out-
YHNLHZV`VKLTVSPZOLZH`LMLSLZUTYHKPVZ[H[PVUZ[\KPV%HJJLZZLK 
31 +HZ\RP]-952018) LPELR-43897 (SC).
32 Sections 35 and 36(1), respectively.
33 Ikechukwu Nnochiri, ‘Rule of Law must be subjected to National Interest, Buhari insists’ Vanguard (27 August 2018) <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/08/
Y\SLVMSH^T\Z[ILZ\IQLJ[[VUH[PVUHSPU[LYLZ[I\OHYPPUZPZ[Z%HJJLZZLK 
34 Para. 11(1), 5th Schedule to the Constitution of 1999.
35 :HYHRP]-95(2017) LPELR-43392.
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ruled that the decision of the Court of Appeal 
to agree with the CCT in one breath yet or-
der Dr Saraki to return to the CCT in anoth-
er amounted to a “judicial summersault”.36
The trial of Saraki at the CCT may have had 
a political undertone than simply a quest to 
punish corrupt enrichment.
Hon. Justice Sylvester Ngwuta v FRN: 
Judicial Independence
Justice Sylvester Ngwuta of the Supreme 
Court was arraigned separately before the 
Federal High Court (Abuja) for money laun-
dering and at the CCT for false and non-dec-
laration of assets. On May 15, 2018, the CCT 
threw out the charges against Justice Ngwu-
ta in deference to a recent Court of Appeal’s 
precedent that the criminal prosecution of a 
serving judge for any offence bordering on 
professional misconduct can take place only 
after the National Judicial Council (NJC) 
has investigated and applied or recommend-
ed appropriate disciplinary actions.37 Barely 
two months before this time, on March 23 
2018, the Federal High Court struck out the 
charges against Justice Ngwuta relying on 
the same judicial authority.38
The Nigerian Constitution is consistent with 
international principles on judicial indepen-
dence, such as the United Nations’ Basic
Principles on Judicial Independence39 and
the International Bar Association’s (IBA) 
Minimum Standards of Judicial Indepen-
dence,40 that require judicial self-governance 
in matters of appointment and discipline of 
MXGLFLDORI¿FHUV41 Notwithstanding the con-
stitutional guarantee of tenure, however, the 
two decisions above are hard to rationalize 
legally because the offences alleged were not 
actions carried in the course of performing 
a judicial function. Rather, they were vio-
ODWLRQV RI H[WDQW ¿QDQFLDO UHJXODWLRQV DQG
HWKLFDO VWDQGDUGV UHTXLUHG IRU SXEOLF RI¿-
cers generally under the code of conduct 
contained in the Constitution. The decision 
of the CCT is especially hard to support be-
cause it is the body that has exclusive juris-
diction over a breach of the code of conduct 
IRU SXEOLF RI¿FHUV FRQWDLQHG LQ WKH&RQVWL-
tution. Relying on a judicial pronouncement 
to create a prerequisite for carrying out a 
constitutional duty is merely evasive. As-
suming the reasoning in Nganjiwa’s case is 
tenable, of what use is it if the Attorney-Gen-
eral prefers the charge after the retirement of 
the judge, as was the case against the Senate 
3UHVLGHQWGLVFXVVHGDERYH"7KH&&7¶VH[FL-
VLRQRIMXGLFLDORI¿FHUVIURPLWVMXULVGLFWLRQ
using the pretext of Nganjiwa’s case is an 
unwarranted abdication of its constitutional 
responsibility.42
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The conduct of the February 16/March 2, 
2019 general elections, especially the presi-
dential election, will have a huge impact on 
political developments in Nigeria in 2019. 
The European Union and United States as 
well as several others have sent election mon-
itors. Political campaigns have been acrimo-
nious, in some instances raising serious con-
cerns about possible pre- and post-election 
violence. The test elections in Ekiti and Osun 
have also cast a dark cloud on the sincerity of 
the government, the capacity of the elector-
al commission, and the neutrality of security 
agencies regarding the 2019 elections.
The outcome of the ongoing investigation 
and trial of the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Jus-
WLFH:DOWHU2QQRJKHQIRUVXVSLFLRXVDVVHWV
ZLOO GH¿QLWHO\ UHGH¿QH MXGLFLDO LQGHSHQ-
dence and the relevance of the NJC. It is also 
possible that should the opposition emerge 
victorious in the presidential election, upon 
DVVXPLQJRI¿FH WKH WULDOZLOOEH WHUPLQDWHG
and all prior actions taken by President Bu-
hari voided.
One vacancy was created in the Supreme 
Court in 2018 when Justice Clara Ogunbiyi 
retired mandatorily at seventy. The vacancy 
ZDV ¿OOHGZLWK WKH DSSRLQWPHQW RI DQRWKHU
woman, Justice Uwani Musa Abba-Aji. She 
formally took her seat in January 2019. Until 
her appointment, she was one of the senior 
justices on the Court of Appeal, Nigeria’s in-
termediate appellate court. This appointment 
IROORZVWKHHVWDEOLVKHGSDWWHUQRI¿OOLQJ6X-
preme Court vacancies with Justices of the 
Court of Appeal, and restores the number 
of women on the Supreme Court to four, a 
quarter of the bench. One vacancy by retire-
ment is expected in 2019 (Justice Akaahs). 
Barring the resignation of the Chief Justice, 
no other vacancy is anticipated.
36 Evelyn Okakwu, ‘Updated: Supreme Court Dismisses Saraki’s False Asset Charge’ Premium Times (6 July 2018) <https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/
OLHKSPULZ\WKH[LKZ\WYLTLJV\Y[KPZTPZZLZZHYHRPZMHSZLHZZL[JOHYNLO[TS%HJJLZZLK
37 /VU1\Z[PJL/`LSHKaPYH5NHUQP^H]-LKLYHS9LW\ISPJVM5PNLYPH (2017) LPELR-43391.
38 Ade Adesomoju, ‘False Assets Declaration: Court Strikes out Charges against Justice Ngwuta’ Punch (16 May 2018) <https://punchng.com/false-assets-
KLJSHYH[PVUJV\Y[Z[YPRLZV\[JOHYNLZHNHPUZ[Q\Z[PJLUN^\[H%HJJLZZLK")YPKNL[*OPLK\6UVJOPLº**;+PZJOHYNLZ5N^\[HV]LY-HSZL(ZZL[Z
+LJSHYH[PVU».\HYKPHU4H`#O[[WZ!N\HYKPHUUNUL^ZJJ[KPZJOHYNLZUN^\[HV]LYMHSZLHZZL[ZKLJSHYH[PVU%HJJLZZLK
39 Endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInter-
LZ[7HNLZ0UKLWLUKLUJL1\KPJPHY `HZW_%HJJLZZLK
40 International Bar Association, 4PUPT\T:[HUKHYKZVM1\KPJPHS0UKLWLUKLUJL (Int’l Bar Assn., 1982), 46.
41:Z  WHYHVMYK:JOLK\SLVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM   
42 See the critique of 5NHUQP^H»ZJHZLPU<RO\LNIL(YPZOLº5PNLYPH»BUD
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 219
Norway
Anine Kierulf, Research Director – Norwegian National Human Rights Institution
Marius Mikkel Kjølstad, LLM candidate – Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main
NORWAY
I. INTRODUCTION 
:HGHVFULEHGDVD\HDURIFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
status quo in Norway.1 2018 has been more 
eventful, at least on the political scene. Here, 
developments have unfolded like a drama in 
three acts (fortunately not of Shakespearean 
dimensions; rather, with the subdued intrigues 
characteristic of many of Ibsen’s plays).
In act one, the protagonist—Prime Minister 
Erna Solberg (Conservatives)—came one 
step closer to her goal of uniting all the cen-
ter-right parties in a majority coalition, as the 
Liberal Party joined the Government in Jan-
uary. In the second act, however, Minister of 
Justice Sylvi Listhaug,(Progress Party), the 
main antagonist, entered the scene. In March, 
Listhaug, a controversial right-wing popu-
list, published a much-criticized Facebook 
post chiding the Labour Party for siding with 
terrorists because they wanted courts, not ad-
ministrative bodies, to make decisions about 
deprivation of citizenship in cases of national 
security. Facing the outcry of the opposition 
and position parties alike, she showed no re-
morse. This example of Listhaug’s unwaver-
ing rhetoric was the final straw. The opposi-
tion submitted a parliamentary proposal for a 
vote of no confidence, a possible threat to the 
entire Government. The crisis was averted as 
Listhaug stepped down, grudgingly. This turn 
was but a prelude to the surprising final act, 
in which the spotlight turned to the Christian 
Democratic Party, holding the key to a major-
ity Government. It had been set to exit from 
the political no man’s land following terri-
ble results in the 2017 general elections. In 
September, the party leader proposed a new 
center-left coalition, thus further threatening 
the Government’s position. After a weeklong 
thriller of a national congress, the party de-
cided instead to look right, towards a possible 
entry into the sitting coalition Government. 
The party became part of the Government in 
January 2019. 
Paradoxically, then, Solberg ended up with 
a majority coalition and a strengthened po-
sition after a dramatic year. An impressive 
achievement and certainly a personal victory 
for her. It remains to be seen how historians 
will judge her and the process; a rather sad-
dening episode was when Solberg, during the 
debates within the Christian Democratic Par-
ty, threw out the possibility of adjustments 
in the Abortion Act as bait for the conserva-
tive camp.2 The episode illustrates Solberg’s 
postmodern conservatism, where the only 
“principle” that seems to apply firmly is that 
of pragmatism.
:LWKWKLVRYHUYLHZRIWKHSROLWLFDOGHYHORS-
ments as a backdrop, we go on to consider 
significant legal constitutional developments 
in 2018.
1 Anine Kierulf and Marius Mikkel Kjølstad, ‘Norway. The State of Liberal Democracy’ in Richard Albert, Da-
vid Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (eds), ;OL0Ç*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^
of Constitutional Law, 2018 pp. 209–214.
2 See Alex Matthews-King, ‘Abortion demonstrations draw thousands across Norway after prime 
minister proposes tightening laws’ (;OL0UKLWLUKLU[, 17 November 2018) <https://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/abortion-norway-protest-oslo-storting-womens-erna-solberg-christian-dem-
VJYH[ZTHYJOH O[TS%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
In November 2018, the Government pro-
posed a new Intelligence Service Act. The 
most significant part of the proposal is the 
establishment of a bulk interception scheme. 
If this scheme is enacted, considerable 
amounts of border-crossing communications 
data may lawfully be collected by the intelli-
gence services. Case law from the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) indicates 
that bulk interception schemes aimed at 
protecting national security fall within the 
margin of appreciation of the Member States 
under the privacy protection ensured by Ar-
ticle 8, given that the regime offers sufficient 
procedural safeguards. Two cases decided 
in 2018 are now pending before the Grand 
Chamber.3 In any case, even if legally per-
mitted, the desirability of such an arrange-
ment is a different question. The proposed 
regime will seriously compromise privacy 
rights, and the proposal is already under crit-
icism from parts of civil society in the public 
consultation process.
Of legislation that was enacted, a ban on 
wearing garments that conceal the face—for 
all practical purposes niqab and burqa—in
educational institutions is worth mentioning. 
The new legislation became particularly in-
teresting when the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee later concluded that a 
general niqab and burqa ban in France vio-
lates the right to freedom of religion.4
International bodies and their jurisprudence 
are of considerable importance for human 
rights in Norway. As we explain in the next 
section, international influence on the na-
tional legal system is substantial. Here, some 
important developments pertaining to the 
ECtHR at the regional level are worth men-
tioning below. 
Institutionally, the Copenhagen Declaration 
was a reminder of how diverging views of 
multilateral institutions pave way for pro-
cesses wanting in careful regional ground-
work. For analyzes of the Declaration, and 
the process leading up to it, we refer to writ-
ings elsewhere.5 The Norwegian process was 
most notable for its complete silence—the 
Government offered its comments to the 
Draft Declaration without consulting or even 
informing Parliament or the public—until 
some commentators and MPs raised their 
voices. Only towards the very end of the 
process before the Declaration did the Gov-
ernment clarify that it would not support the 
paragraph that had come to be a central point 
in the critique against the Draft Declaration, 
namely the one telling the ECtHR to stop 
meddling in asylum cases.
Norwegian Supreme Court Justice Arnfinn 
Bårdsen was appointed as the new Norwe-
gian judge to the ECtHR, beginning 1 Jan-
uary 2019. Bårdsen’s profound knowledge 
of human rights law is witnessed both by his 
judicial decisions and extensive legal writ-
ing on the subject. He has been one of the 
justices most ready to use international legal 
sources in his reasoning, thus facilitating the 
judicial dialogue with the ECtHR. 
On the substantial level, the ECtHR deliv-
ered three judgments against Norway. In the 
two first cases, one concerning collection of 
a lawyer’s confidential communication in a 
criminal investigation and one the removal 
of parental responsibility and adoption with-
out the parent’s consent, the Court found no 
violations.6 In a third case, also in the field 
of family life and the Norwegian child wel-
fare system, the Court held that the refusal 
to allow a mother contact with her daughter, 
who had been taken into public care, violat-
ed her right to family life.7 In this field, the 
Court also held Grand Chamber hearings in 
November in the case of Strand Lobben v. 
Norway.8 The decision in this case is still 
pending, as are the hearings of five other cas-
es in the same field. Child welfare cases raise 
extremely complex and sensitive issues, and 
the dissent in the Chamber judgment in 
Strand Lobben indicates that there are fun-
damentally diverging views within the Court 
as to the proper level of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation. The total outcome of 
these cases will influence ongoing reforms 
of the Norwegian child welfare system. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. The Contraception case: Freedom of 
Conscience
The Contraception case received substantial 
public attention in 2018.9 It concerned a gen-
eral practitioner who in 2015 was dismissed 
by the municipality employing her because 
for reasons of conscience, she refused to in-
sert copper IUDs (a contraception device). 
:KHQVKHZDVKLUHGLQWKHSDUWLHVKDG
made an agreement that she could refuse to 
insert IUDs. Following heated debates in 
2015 over the issue of general practitioners’ 
right to reservation, in which a strong pub-
lic demand to protect women’s sexual and 
reproductive health and rights was predom-
3 *LU[Y\TMY9p[[]PZH]:^LKLUApp no 35252/08 (19 June 2018) and Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom App no. 58170/13, 62322/13, and 
24960/15 (13 September 2018). 
4 :VUPH@HRLY]-YHUJL Communication no 2747/2016 (decided 17 July 2018, published 7 December 2018). The ECtHR has, conversely, accepted such bans, see 
:(:]-YHUJL App no 43835/11 (1 July 2014) and +HRPY])LSNP\T App no 4619/12 (11 July 2017).
5 :LLLN1HUULRL.LYHYKZHUK:HYHO3HTIYLJO[º;OLÄUHS*VWLUOHNLU+LJSHYH[PVU!M\UKHTLU[HSS`PTWYV]LK^P[OHML^YLTHPUPUNJH]LH[Z»:[YHZIV\YN6I-
servers Blog(WYPS#O[[WZ!Z[YHZIV\YNVIZLY]LYZJVT[OLÄUHSJVWLUOHNLUKLJSHYH[PVUM\UKHTLU[HSS`PTWYV]LK^P[OHML^YLTHPUPUNJH]L-
H[Z%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
6 >VSSHUK]5VY^H`App no 39731/12 (17 May 2018) and Mohamed Hasan v. Norway App no 27496/15 (26 April 2018).
71HUZLU]5VY^H` App no 2822/16 (6 September 2018).
8 App no 37283/13, decided by the Fifth Section on 30 November 2017. 
9 HR-2018-1958-A. Summaries of all of the Supreme Court’s rulings from 2018 are available in English at <https://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-dom-
Z[VSUVYNLZOV`LZ[LYL[[:\TTHY`VM9LJLU[:\WYLTL*V\Y[+LJPZPVUZZ\TTHYPLZVMY\SPUNZ%;OL*V\Y[»Z(UU\HS9LWVY[PZH]HPSHISLPU,UNSPZOH[
#O[[WZ!PUKKHKVILJVT]PL^I  JHMIM%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
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inant, a provision banning such reservation 
clauses was introduced.
For the Supreme Court, the case could be 
solved by the law of contracts: the general 
practitioner had a contractual right to make 
reservations, and the 2015 amendments did 
not retroactively void such a clause. As the 
public (and legislative) interest was in the 
more principled question of whether the pro-
hibition against reservation clauses conforms 
with the right to freedom of conscience, 
as enshrined in Article 9 of the ECHR, the 
Court commented generally also on this is-
sue in a rather extensive obiter dictum.
The Court, relying to a certain extent on the 
Eweida case from the ECtHR,10 went far in 
accepting such prohibitions on a general level. 
It found the purpose of it, ensuring women’s 
sexual and reproductive health and rights, to 
be a legitimate concern. Courts should thus 
be cautious about substituting their view on 
the balancing of legitimate interests for that of 
political authorities. However, the Court indi-
cated that if, in specific cases, a woman can 
be guaranteed adequate health assistance by 
alternative means, the local authorities must 
undertake a more nuanced assessment, where 
the underlying values behind Article 9 must 
be balanced in the concrete.
The judgment and its rather vague wording 
indicate that the Court was caught between 
the ambition of being a court of precedent 
that ensures clarification of the law and the 
fact that there is no tradition for abstract ju-
dicial review of legislation in Norway. From 
a human rights law perspective, however, the 
Court’s message of defiance to the political 
balancing of interest, while also reminding 
that specific circumstances might tip the 
scales in concrete cases, seems sound.
2. The Nesseby and the Femund sitje cases: 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The rights of the indigenous Sami people are 
protected by Article 108 of the Norwegian 
Constitution and several international human 
rights documents, most importantly Article 
27 of the CCPR and no. 169 of the ILO Con-
vention, concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples in Independent Countries. As in the 
previous year, the Supreme Court decided 
two cases concerning Sami rights in 2018.11
The Nesseby case, heard in plenary, con-
cerned land rights.12 Based on immemorial 
usage, a regional society had rights of use to 
a large part of a municipality in Finnmark, 
the northernmost county in Norway. The so-
ciety claimed these rights also included the 
entitlement to manage the renewable natu-
ral resources in the area, i.e., fish and game, 
timber, etc. The Court disagreed. Based on 
relevant legislation, it found the compe-
tence of resource management belonged to 
the landowner, the Finnmark Estate Agency 
(FeFo). This led to the question of whether 
such a solution violated the requirements in 
ILO convention no. 169 Articles 6, 7, 14, and 
15, pertaining to indigenous peoples’ control 
over the rights of use and participation in the 
decision-making processes. The Court dis-
missed this claim, holding first that the Sami 
people were considerably represented in the 
board of the FeFo and, second, that the Sami 
Parliament had been involved in the drafting 
of the relevant legislation and that it had not 
objected to the framework. 
The Femund sitje case considered wheth-
er the legal provisions on strict liability for 
damages caused by reindeer were discrim-
inatory.13 The alleged discriminatory ele-
ment was that the stipulated form of joint 
and several liability is more extensive than 
when damages are caused by other kinds 
of grazing animals. The Court underlined 
the importance of Sami culture in assessing 
the question of alleged discriminatory effect 
but argued it would be very difficult for the 
plaintiff to identify what animal(s) in a large 
reindeer herd had caused damages, and that 
this circumstance justified the difference in 
regulation in this specific case. The Court 
did, however, signal to the legislator that in 
other cases, this form of liability might be 
too extensive. It pointed out that ten years 
ago, a commission had recommended leg-
islative reforms, and that the UN Human 
Rights Committee has criticized Norway for 
inadequate implementation of these recom-
mendations.
The Court has decided a total of five “Sami 
cases” over the last three years, all of them 
rejecting claims based on the rights of indig-
enous peoples. One possible consequence 
of this—well-founded or not—is that Sami 
rights are perceived to be inadequately pro-
tected. Another factor contributing to this, is 
that the Parliament voted down proposals to 
revise the wording of Constitution Article 
108 to clarify (on a constitutional level) the 
recognition of the Sami people as an indige-
nous people.14
3. HR-2018-1909-A: Interpretation of 
Constitutional Rights
In 2014, the Norwegian Constitution was 
amended with a full-fledged chapter on hu-
man rights.15 The new provisions were mod-
eled on international conventions, and courts 
and scholars have since struggled to develop 
a workable approach to the dual and some-
times triple rights protection that exists under 
resembling, but different provisions. A central 
10  ,^LPKHHUK6[OLYZ][OL<UP[LK2PUNKVTApp no 48420/10 (ECHR, 15 January 2013).
11 For summaries of the 2017 judgments, see Kierulf and Kjølstad (2018) p. 211. 
12 HR-2018-456-P, available in English at <https://www.domstol.no/en/Enkelt-domstol/-norges-hoyesterett/rulings/rulings-2018/the-scope-of-collecetive-rights-of-
\ZL[VSHUKPUULZZLI`ÄUUTHYR%
13 HR-2018-872-A.
14;OPZZ[H[\ZPZNLULYHSS`YLJVNUPaLKI\[UV[YLÅLJ[LKPU[OL^VYKPUNVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVU;OLYLHYLZL]LYHSYLHZVUZ^O`UVULVM[OL[OYLLWYVWVZHSZ^LU[[OYV\NO
ZVTLTVYL[LJOUPJHS[OHUWVSP[PJHS(Y[PJSLJ\YYLU[S`YLHKZ¸[OL:HTPWVW\SH[PVU¹HUK[OLWYVWVZHS^HZ[VJOHUNL[OPZ[V¸[OL:HTPWLVWSL¹VY¸[OL:HTPPUKPN-
LUV\ZWLVWSL¹^OPJO^V\SKOH]LPTWVY[HU[Z`TIVSPJ]HS\L6U1HU\HY`  [OL*VUZLY]H[P]LZHUK[OL7YVNYLZZ7HY[`ISVJRLK[OLYLX\PYLKTHQVYP[ `SPRL
they did in 2014. 
15 See Anine Kierulf, ‘Developments in Norwegian Constitutional Law: The Year 2016 in Review’ in Richard Albert, David Landau, Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drug-
da (eds), ;OL0Ç*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H ^ 2017 pp. 150–154. 
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normative issue is whether courts should tie 
their reasoning to the Constitution or to in-
ternational instruments, or both, and if so, in 
what order. A doctrinal issue, among several, 
is whether an interpretation by the Supreme 
Court based almost exclusively on case law 
from typically the ECtHR, but where the 
constitutional provision is mentioned en pas-
sant, should be considered as a binding inter-
pretation of the Constitution with the effect 
of requiring a constitutional amendment for 
legislative alterations. This would also have 
potential implications where the ECtHR later 
departs from its jurisprudence.
One decision illustrative of some of these 
questions of constitutional interpretation is 
HR-2018-1909-A. Due to different rules of 
evidence in criminal and civil cases, a de-
fendant had been acquitted by the Court of 
Appeal for an indictment for sexual offences, 
but at the same time been ordered to pay civil 
redress. The Supreme Court held that the low-
er court had violated the right to be presumed 
innocent because of statements made under 
the assessment of civil liability that could cast 
doubt on the criminal acquittal.
The Court exclusively considered the case as 
a violation of the presumption of innocence 
under the Constitution, Article 96. It has con-
sidered similar previous cases under ECHR, 
Article 6, alternatively both the ECHR and 
the Constitution.16 It gave no further reasons 
for its approach. Speculation ensued whether 
this indicates a new direction from the Court 
or a phalanx of the Court, a question that re-
mains to be answered. Another interesting 
aspect of the decision is what was for sure 
a new “invention” by the Court: in previous 
cases, it has usually confined itself to state 
a violation as part of the decision premises, 
something that has been affirmed as a suffi-
cient remedy under Article 13 of the ECHR.17
In this decision, however, the Court chose to 
formulate a separate holding in the conclu-
sion where it formally acknowledged that 
there had been a violation, but that this was 
now remedied by the Court’s conclusion. 
At first glance, this might seem like a small 
detail. But the devil often lies in the (proce-
dural) details. The Court’s invention plays 
into a broader debate about whether separate 
claims to have human rights violations de-
clared are directly actionable. The Civil Pro-
cedure Act travaux préparatoires and sev-
eral authors have been reluctant about such 
an opening, whereas the Supreme Court at 
least in some cases has seemed more open.18
An interesting question is whether this judg-
ment indicates more of a general legal evo-
lution, and whether we might eventually end 
up with the possibility of bringing separate 
claims for violations of the Constitution be-
fore the courts. 
4. HR-2018-2096-A: UN Committees’ 
Jurisprudence as Source of Law
Another methodological issue that has puz-
zled Norwegian courts and scholars over the 
last decade is the more precise legal signif-
icance impact of materials from UN com-
mittees in national legal reasoning. Through 
several decisions, the Supreme Court has 
clarified that even though the committees’ 
jurisprudence is not strictly binding under 
international law, their interpretations of the 
conventions shall have considerable weight 
as a legal source under national law. One 
must, however, distinguish between the 
committees’ (legal) interpretations and their 
more concrete recommendations.
HR-2018-2096-A illustrates how this may 
turn out in practice. At the age of 20, a man 
was convicted for sexual offences. The dis-
puted question was whether the courts, in 
their sentencing assessment, were prevented 
from considering previous sexual offences 
committed when he was a minor under his 
right to privacy in Article 40 (2) (b) (vii) of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
The Court referred to the CRC Committee’s 
General Comment (GC) no. 10 (2007). In 
paragraph 64 of the GC, the Committee inter-
prets the scope of the provision—it concerns 
“all stages of the proceedings”—in a way 
that seems to imply that the privacy rights 
do not extend beyond the case against the 
minor. Accordingly, so the Court reasoned, 
the provision does not apply at all in later 
cases when the minor has become an adult. 
On the other hand, the Committee stated ex-
plicitly in paragraphs 66 and 67 that records 
of child offenders should not be used in adult 
proceedings and that the records should be 
automatically deleted when the minor turned 
18 years old. But as these were mere recom-
mendations, the Court disregarded them and 
fell back on the interpretations in paragraph 
64. Thus, the Court concluded that Article 
40 did not prevent it from considering earlier 
convictions in its sentencing.
5. HR-2018-2133-A: Right to Private Life for 
Refugees
HR-2018-2133-A considered whether a de-
cision to withdraw the temporary residence 
permit of an Afghan woman and her daughter 
violated their right to respect for their private 
life. They had been granted refugee status 
and a three-year temporary residence per-
mit upon arrival in Norway in October 2011. 
The basis for the refugee status was that the 
mother was a single woman without a male 
QHWZRUNLQ$IJKDQLVWDQ:KHQKHUKXVEDQG
later arrived in Norway, the grounds for the 
decision ceased to exist, and the residence 
permit was withdrawn in March 2014. The 
withdrawal was upheld in January 2016, and 
the Court had to decide whether the mother 
and her daughter at this point of time had es-
tablished a protected private life in Norway.
The ECtHR’s case law under ECHR Article 
8 stipulates that primarily “settled migrants” 
have a protected right to respect for their pri-
vate life. The Supreme Court held that as a 
main rule, temporary residence permits do 
not establish a protected right, even when 
they are prolonged consecutively. There is, 
however, an exception where the stay be-
comes long-lasting, but the Court did not 
indicate any time frame for what constitutes 
“long-lasting”. Normally, only where a per-
16 In Rt. 2014 p. 1292, the Court even held that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the CCPR.
17 (]5VY^H` No. 65170/14 (ECtHR, decision, 29 May 2018).
18 Cfr. Rt. 2015 p. 93 and HR-2016-2178-U.
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manent residence permit is granted will the 
person be regarded as a “settled migrant”.
Under Norwegian migration law, one may 
apply for a permanent residence permit only 
after three years of legal stay. In addition, 
the migrant must have had his or her own 
income and not have received social securi-
ty benefits over the last 12 months prior to 
the application, a requirement introduced 
in 2017. In practice, a great number of ref-
ugees will not be able to obtain a permanent 
residence permit until they have stayed in 
Norway for a considerable amount of years. 
Thus, it might well be that in the coming 
years, the Court will have to decide on the 
threshold for the protection of private life for 
refugees with temporary permits that have 
been prolonged several times.
6. HR-2018-104-A and HR-2018-699-A: 
Protection of Lawyer-Client Correspondence
Under Norwegian criminal procedure, law-
yer-client correspondence is privileged and 
may, with only narrow exceptions, not be 
seized by the police. Such material is pro-
tected by the right to respect for correspon-
dence in the Constitution Article 102 and the 
(&+5$UWLFOH :KHQ WKH SROLFH FRQGXFW
a search and discover material that might 
contain lawyer-client correspondence, the 
material shall be sealed and handed over to 
a district court. The court will sort out con-
fidential material and return the remaining 
documents to the police. This procedure, 
which is court-developed in the absence of 
any detailed legislation, was accepted by the 
ECtHR in a decision from May last year.19
In two court orders from January and April, 
the Supreme Court elaborated on details of 
the procedure in these cases.20 The interest-
ing part of these decisions is not the rather 
technical issues discussed but the way the 
Court reasoned: methodologically, the or-
ders are model decisions. The Court, when 
deciding matters that are not settled by the 
legislator, bases its reasoning on the underly-
ing principles behind the protection of priv-
ileged correspondence. It emphasizes how 
everyone seeking legal advice should be able 
to expect confidentiality, and, more broadly, 
that a strong relation of trust is necessary in 
order that lawyers may fulfill their role in 
a rule of law-based society, including their 
task to ensure private parties’ right to a fair 
trial. Based on these principles, the Court in 
both cases reached conclusions that ensure a 
strong protection of lawyer-client correspon-
dence.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
In 2019, a central theme will remain how 
properly to finance the judiciary. Following 
strict “de-bureaucratization reforms”, the 
courts’ finances are stripped to the bones, 
and the backlog is increasing. In December 
2018, Parliament requested the Government 
to ensure that the courts have sufficient fi-
nances to ensure the citizens’ right to a trial 
within a reasonable time. An official com-
mission working on the organization of the 
judiciary is at work and will deliver its white 
paper in 2020. Further, a Special Measures 
Commission is supposed to deliver to the 
Government a report in March on the is-
sue of whether to extend the Government’s 
emergency legislative powers in “extraordi-
nary situations” in times of peace. And third, 
appellate court hearings in a prominent and 
very important climate litigation case will be 
held in November.21
On the international scene, the ECtHR’s 
Grand Chamber decision in the Strand Lob-
ben case will be followed closely. 
V. FURTHER READING
$UQILQQ %nUGVHQ µ'HFLGLQJ :KDW WR 'H-
cide: The Filtering Mechanism in the Nor-
wegian Supreme Court’, lecture held before 
the Icelandic Bar Association, Reykjavik, 
16 February 2018. Available at <https://
www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/
artikler-og-foredrag/deciding-what-to-de-
cide-bardsen-23.02.2018.pdf>
Anine Kierulf, Judicial Review in Nor-
way. A Bicentennial Debate (Cambridge
University Press, 2018). DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1017/9781108617727. 
Eivind Smith, ‘Judicial Review of Legis-
lation’ in Helle Krunke and Björg Thora-
rensen (eds), The Nordic Constitutions. A 
Comparative and Contextual Study (Hart 
Publishing Ltd., 2018). DOI: https://doi.
org/10.5040/9781509910960.ch-005. 
19 See footnote 6 above.
20 HR-2018-104-A and HR-2018-699-A. The former is available in English at <https://www.domstol.no/globalassets/upload/hret/decisions-in-english-translation/
OYHWKM% 
21 For details, see Kierulf and Kjølstad (2018) pp. 212-213.
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INTRODUCTION
This review briefly introduces the Palestin-
ian constitutional system. It then assesses 
key and significant constitutional devel-
opments that have taken place in Palestine 
since the endorsement of the institution of 
constitutional review and seeks to refract the 
status of liberalism and democracy through 
historical and political experiences.
The idea of drafting a constitution for the 
‘Palestinian state’ was initially floated af-
ter the Palestinian National Council (PNC) 
passed the Declaration of Independence in 
Algiers in 1988. However, initial drafts were 
only circulated after the Oslo Agreements 
between the government of Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
The delay reflected both the intrinsic limita-
tions of these agreements and the continued 
influence of external impediments, most 
notably the weak status of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and its limited jurisdiction 
during an interim period that was originally 
planned to last from 1994 until 1999.
In 1997, the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(PLC), the PA’s parliamentary body, decided 
one year after its members were elected to 
adopt the Basic Law (BL). This decision was 
only endorsed by Yasser Arafat, the former 
PA president, in 2002, three years after the 
conclusion of the five-year Interim Period. 
The BL was amended in 2003, and its main 
change included the establishment of an Of-
fice of Prime Minister, and this in turn altered 
the role of the President, who, under the pre-
vious version of the BL, had presided over a 
Council of Ministers. A further amendment 
was added in 2005 to enable elections to take 
place every four years. The 2003 BL, includ-
ing the 2005 amendment, is now established 
as the PA’s valid constitution.1
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The year 2012 was a turning point for Pal-
estine when it was recognized as a state by 
the United Nations General Assembly. In 
addition to other privileges, this meant that 
the Palestinian state could establish a con-
stitution and was, within the context of in-
ternational agreements, considered to be a 
participating member state. 
After membership was established, a com-
mittee worked together to create a draft con-
stitution with 273 articles, and this was com-
pleted by the end of 2015. The committee 
was established with the intention of build-
ing on all preceding work, and with com-
pleting a modern Palestinian constitutional 
project. It included members of the national 
and central council, in addition to parliamen-
tarians and jurists, who were tasked with 
addressing problematic or unresolved issues 
that had arisen during the BL’s lifespan. But 
at the time of this writing, no constitution has 
been put in place that establishes sovereignty 
and the pillars of statehood. 
1 All of this chapter’s references to the BL relate to the 2003 version, unless otherwise stated. 
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In 2014, Palestine acceded to a number of 
international conventions and human rights 
treaties without making any reservations.2
It had been difficult for the state to uphold 
its domestic and international obligations, 
and this issue was in turn raised in court on 
multiple occasions because the BL does not 
clarify the status of international law within 
the Palestinian domestic legal system. The 
only reference in the BL is Art. 10(2), which 
calls on the PA to accede, without delay, to 
international declarations and covenants that 
protect human rights. 
1. The Constitutional Court 
The BL called for the establishment of a Su-
preme Constitutional Court (SCC), but left 
the issue to be determined by a law (Art. 
103). Law no. 3 (2006) subsequently estab-
lished an SCC and was later amended by 
Decree Law no. 19 (2017). Both the BL and 
Law no. 3 establish the basis for a central-
ized ‘judicial’ body that is independent of 
the judicial branch. The Constitutional Court 
would mainly be tasked with constitutional 
review and interpretation. 
Constitutional Review
There are various ways in which the Court 
can be engaged; firstly, by original and di-
rect action by the aggrieved; secondly, in-
direct review of constitutionality after the 
request is, against the backdrop of concrete 
litigation, transferred by a court; thirdly, by 
the litigants themselves if certain conditions 
are met; and finally, by the Court itself if it is 
persuaded that an unconstitutional provision 
is linked to the dispute.
The President—authorized by law to pro-
pose the SCC’s first panel—nominated the 
Court’s nine judges in April 2016. Before 
this, Constitutional Court tasks were en-
trusted to the Supreme Court (Art. 101 of 
the BL). The appointment of SCC judges is 
a recurrent issue, and this reflects the fact 
that the power to appoint judges is absolute-
ly limited to the President. This institutes an 
arrangement in which the authority of the 
executive is pre-eminent over the judiciary, 
with the consequence that it can influence 
its decisions while manipulating its (de jure) 
independence.
From November 2005 until the time of this 
writing, 58 constitutional decisions have been 
made, of which almost half (27) have been 
made by the Supreme Court taking on the 
function of a constitutional court in the afore-
mentioned manner. Here it should also be 
noted that the Court preemptively dismissed 
many cases upon the basis of a technicality 
or formality, and therefore did not proceed to 
enquire into its substantive content. 
2. Violations of the Basic Law
There have been several violations of the 
BL, which are often attributed to alternative 
interpretations or the lack of a provision in 
the first instance, occurring, for example, 
in relation to disagreement over the cir-
cumstances concerning when an election or 
referendum can be called or circumstances 
when the President or government can legiti-
PDWHO\LQYRNHHPHUJHQF\SRZHUV:KHQWKH
President’s emergency powers are discussed, 
further disagreements arise in relation to the 
relative privilege that should be accorded to 
the letter and spirit of the BL. The level of 
factional consensus required to amend ex-
isting constitutional arrangements has also 
created disputes.3
One of the main concerns is that Art. 43 of 
the BL has been overused as a law-making 
WRRO LQ WKH:HVW%DQNVLQFHDSHULRG
when effective parliamentary oversight or 
scrutiny has, as a consequence of the PLC’s 
operations being suspended, been entirely 
absent. Art. 43 establishes:
The President of the National Authority 
shall have the right, in cases of necessi-
ty that cannot be delayed, and when the 
Legislative Council is not in session, to 
issue decrees that have the power of law. 
These decrees shall be presented to the 
Legislative Council in the first session 
convened after their issuance; other-
wise they will cease to have the power 
of law. If these decrees are presented to 
the Legislative Council, as mentioned 
above, but are not approved by the lat-
ter, then they shall cease to have the 
power of law.4
The legitimacy of presidential decrees 
passed by the President after the expira-
tion of his term in 2010 continues to create 
heated disagreement, as presidential and 
legislative elections have not been held in 
the State of Palestine since 2006. Very few 
of the decree-laws that have passed can be 
legitimately argued to meet the requirement 
of necessity that demands they be approved 
‘without delay’. Elections have not been 
held since 2007 because of ongoing political 
+DPDV)DWDKDQGJHRSROLWLFDO:HVW%DQN
and Gaza Strip) divisions. Government au-
thority, functions, and the legislature have 
become divided as a consequence. Since the 
Legislative Council has been unable to con-
vene since 2007, Art. 43 was activated.
Although it is possible to invoke legal rea-
soning in support of such authorization, it is 
clear that the state must work to overcome 
these exceptional circumstances and main-
tain a separation of power. Evidence pro-
2 The agreements signed in December 2014 are as follows: The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), The Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal; Protocol 
(KKP[PVUHS[V[OL.LUL]H*VU]LU[PVUZVM(\N\Z[  HUK9LSH[PUN[V[OL7YV[LJ[PVUVM=PJ[PTZVM5VU0U[LYUH[PVUHS(YTLK*VUÅPJ[Z7YV[VJVS00"7YV[VJVS(K-
ditional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949; Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses; Protocol on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents; The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons; Convention in Cluster Munitions; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; and The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons. 
3 Khalil, Asem. ‘Beyond the written constitution: Constitutional crisis of, and the institutional deadlock in, the Palestinian political system as entrenched in 
the basic law’. 0U[LYUH[PVUHS1V\YUHSVM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ 11.1 (2013): 36. 
4 ;OL\UVɉJPHS[YHUZSH[PVUPZH]HPSHISLH[!O[[W!T\X[HÄIPYaLP[LK\LU3LNPZSH[PVU.L[3LN-;HZW_&3LN7H[O$40+$
226 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
duced to date suggests that the state of neces-
sity has been an essential tool in the hands of 
the executive and, for this reason, there is no 
reason to believe it will be dissolved in the 
near future.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Judgment 5/2017, March 12, 2018, Consti-
tutional Court’s Interpretation of Art. 10 of 
the BL
The minister of justice requested an an-
swer for four major questions that the 
BL fails to answer: 
:KRKDVWKHSRZHUWRVLJQDQGUDWLI\
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DJUHHPHQWV" :KDW LV WKH
process of joining and how will it come 
LQWRHIIHFW"
:KDWKDSSHQVZKHQDQLQWHUQDWLRQDO
WUHDW\FRQWUDGLFWVDGRPHVWLFODZ"
3. How does the State maintain and pro-
PRWHKXPDQULJKWV"
:KDWDUHWKHPHFKDQLVPVXVHGWRLQ-
tegrate the international agreement and 
WKHOHJDOVWDWXVLWRFFXSLHV"
In order to reach a clearer understanding, de-
cision (04/2017) must be briefly introduced. 
In November 2017, the SCC issued a short 
and vague decision that established interna-
tional treaties were pre-eminent over nation-
al laws. The issue of the hierarchy of inter-
national treaties came before the SCC after a 
court of first instance referred a case in which 
815:$8QLWHG1DWLRQV5HOLHIDQG:RUNV
Agency for Palestine) was a party. The agen-
cy pleaded immunity before the lower court 
by citing a headquarters agreement with the 
PA. The court was forced to ask if its recog-
nition of this immunity breached Art. 30 of 
the Palestinian BL, which prohibits admin-
istrative decisions from being immunized 
from judicial review. 
The decision in this case did not explicitly 
confirm if international law takes precedence 
over the Palestinian BL, and instead only 
established that international law should be 
accorded primacy over domestic law. This 
applies even if the proposed item is not pub-
lished in the official Gazette, and the only 
exception is if it contradicts Palestinian re-
OLJLRXVSROLWLFDODQGFXOWXUDOPRUDOV:KLOH
none of the treaties ratified by Palestine have 
yet been published, the state must nonethe-
less honor related obligations to the interna-
tional community. In addition to concluding 
that international treaties supersede domestic 
laws, the decision also affirmed they are ‘in-
fra-constitutional’ and, in so doing, added a 
new constitutional provision. In addition to 
highlighting the hierarchical status of inter-
national treaties within the Palestinian legal 
system, this decision also provided insight 
into the incorporation of international trea-
ties into the Palestinian legal system along 
with Palestine’s human rights obligations 
and responsibilities. 
The decision surpassed the limitations of the 
BL by clarifying how to sign or ratify con-
ventions and treaties. Practice provides fur-
ther clarification by establishing that com-
missions that have been delegated the right 
to negotiate by the executive (in effect, the 
President) also have the authority to sign 
accession decisions. In so doing they do not 
prejudice the rights of the President, Prime 
Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
this regard. Ratification is normally the re-
sponsibility of the head of state who, in veri-
fying the treaty, ensures that it, and its imple-
mentation, is consistent with the interests of 
the state of Palestine.
In establishing the obligations of the state in 
relation to human rights, the decision estab-
lished that treaties must be incorporated do-
mestically in a way that takes religious and 
cultural identity into account. In the event of 
a conflict, it would not be enforced, even if 
a reservation were added to the treaty at the 
time of ratification. 
In addressing the integration mechanism, the 
Court maintained that treaties are enforced 
by incorporation within domestic laws, 
which clearly contradicted its previous asser-
tion that international treaties enjoy primacy 
in relation to domestic laws. Once Art. 27 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties is considered, this becomes problematic, 
as it establishes that states, in seeking to jus-
tify non-compliance with their international 
obligations, are prohibited from citing their 
national laws. Here it should also be noted 
that the decision further clarified that the 
declaration of independence (issued by the 
Palestinian National Council of the PLO in 
Algiers in 1988) enjoys primacy over the 
written BL adopted by the Palestinian Leg-
islative Council. 
2. Judgment 2/2018, July 12, 2018: The Con-
stitutional Court’s Interpretation of the Term 
‘Military issue’ and the Nature of the Police 
Force and the Prosecution of Its Members
It should first be noted that the Court, in 
exercising its jurisdiction to respond to re-
quests of interpretation, exceeds its scope 
by allowing itself to constitutionally review 
legislation before declaring it to be uncon-
stitutional. The interpretation request was 
submitted to the Constitutional Court by 
the Minister of Justice. In its 12 September 
2018 decision, the Palestinian SCC issued an 
interpretation decision relating to the provi-
sions set out in Art. 84 and 102 of the BL and 
Art. 53 of Law No. 23. It thereby indicated 
its interpretation of the legal character of the 
terms ‘military issue’ and ‘police’, along 
with the importance that it ascribed to de-
termining the competent court when trying 
police officers. 
In the decision under review, the Court con-
tradicted its previous interpretative decision 
(most notably 01/2017), which held that 
the police were a regular force of a special 
nature who exercised civil jurisdiction. In-
stead, the Court now argued that the police 
are a predominantly military apparatus with 
the capacity to specialize in civil cases. In 
referring to penal provisions, it further ex-
panded its interpretation of ‘military issue’ 
and sought to make the military judiciary the 
rule rather than the exception. 
The Court relied on the 1979 penal code of 
the PLO, and the Revolutionary Penal Code 
in particular, to determine the criteria (per-
sonal, venue, and objective) that needed to 
be present for the military court to exercise 
jurisdiction. These laws are, however, con-
troversial and have been accused of being 
unconstitutional. Critics note, for example, 
that they are not published in the Official 
Gazette, as required by Art. 116 of the BL. 
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They also observe that these laws do not 
distinguish between civilians and the mili-
tary as they were enacted in exceptional cir-
cumstances, when the PLO was establishing 
authority and exercising sovereignty over its 
territory by activating the jurisdiction of the 
Revolutionary Judiciary. 
In the case at hand, the Court decided that 
the criteria must be met, without clarifying 
if one or all needed to be met. The decision 
was issued by a weak majority (four out of 
seven judges) and it led to Law No. 23 being 
revoked on the ground that it was unconsti-
tutional to consider the police as a military 
rather than a civilian apparatus. It was held 
that the Court, in issuing this interpretation, 
had erred by considering the police as a mil-
itary organ and by giving military courts the 
competence to prosecute its members. In do-
ing so, it had overlooked the fact that these 
courts must be subject to their natural judge, 
who is always the regular, and not the mili-
tary, judge.
This ruling sparked a subsequent lengthy 
debate, which was enriched by contributions 
from various civil society actors and special-
ists in the fields of public law and human 
rights. It ultimately forced the president of 
the Court to issue a statement that clarified 
the decision and negated the Court’s stated 
intention to place civilians under the juris-
diction of military courts.
3. Judgment 10/2018, December 12, 2018: In-
terpreted Art. 47, 47 )bis( and 55 of the BL to 
clarify if the Legislative Council is inopera-
tive, with the intention of establishing if Leg-
islative Council members should still receive 
salaries and benefits 
The Minister of Justice requested this inter-
pretation from the SCC after a request from 
the President of the Judicial Council, the 
President of the Supreme Court. The request 
highlighted that the Legislative Council had 
failed because it had not convened from the 
end of its first session on July 5, 2007 up un-
til the end of its legal and constitutional term 
on January 25, 2010. The continuation of this 
situation in the absence of general elections 
violates the provisions of the BL and the law 
of general elections (and related laws), and 
also prejudices public and national interests. 
It also violates the basic right, held by all 
Palestinians of voting age, to periodically 
elect representatives. 
In 2005, an amendment (Clause Three) was 
added to Art. 47 that established ‘[t]he term 
of the Legislative Council shall be four 
years from the date of it being elected and 
the elections shall be conducted once each 
four years in a regular manner’. Art. 47 (bis)
also establishes that ‘[t]he term of the current 
Legislative Council shall terminate when the 
members of the new elected Council take the 
constitutional oath’.
This decision clarifies that the Legislative 
Council is the elected legislative authority 
and establishes that the Legislative Council 
is not just individuals or individuals who 
won the special elections; rather, it is one of 
three authorities entrusted with constitution-
al tasks and is, by virtue of this fact, one of 
the most important authorities in the country. 
The Legislative Council, elected on 
25/1/2006, held only one session, on 
5/7/2007. The Court, in registering this fact, 
proceeded to argue that the Council had ‘re-
fused’ to carry out the role entrusted to it as a 
legislative authority and had refused to abide 
by the laws and regulations governing its 
work, including the second regular session 
convened by His Excellency the President 
in accordance with the law and their oath. 
As a result, it lost its status as a legislative 
authority and thus the status of Legislative 
Council. It finally observed that, although 
sessions have not been held, representatives 
still receive their salaries and benefits in ac-
cordance with Art. 55 (‘A Member of the 
Legislative Council shall receive a monthly 
salary determined by law’), which places 
a further burden on the state of Palestine’s 
budget.
In its interpretation, the Court decided on 
five main points, which are as follows:
- The legitimacy of the existence of the Leg-
islative Council lies in the exercise of legis-
lative powers and control; since this has not 
been held since 2007, it lost its legislative 
authority and, as a consequence, its Legisla-
tive Council status. 
- Art. 47 (bis) shall not apply if the regular 
elections of the Legislative Council are not 
held every four years. This means that Art. 
47 only applies in the presence of two Coun-
cils, a Council that has finished its mandate 
and a newly elected Council.
- Taking the text of Art. 55 into account, the 
SCC considers that there are no valid rea-
sons for continued benefits to be provided 
to members, including financial entitlements 
and bonuses due from the date when the de-
cision was issued.
- The Legislative Council is entirely absent 
and has not convened a session since 5-7-
2007; its last term expired on 25/1/2010 and 
it remains inoperative; as such, the national 
interest requires the dissolution of the Legis-
lative Council.
- The Council called on the President of the 
State to announce legislative elections with-
in six months of the decision being published 
in the Official Gazette.
:KLOH WKHGHFLVLRQKDVD VROLG IDFWXDO IRXQ-
dation, it cannot be claimed that the BL did 
not touch on the issue of the dissolution of 
the Legislative Council. This is established 
by Art. 113 of the BL, which clarifies that ‘[t]
he Palestinian Legislative Council may not be 
dissolved or its work hindered during a state 
of emergency, nor shall the provisions of this 
title be suspended’. Taking into account the 
fact that the constitutional legislature prohib-
ited the dissolution of the Legislative Council 
during a state of emergency, it is questionable 
if the decision of the SCC that dissolved the 
Legislative Council is itself constitutional. 
But Art. 47 (bis) provides clear evidence that 
the term of the Legislative Council may be ex-
tended under exceptional circumstances. This 
issue was raised in 2016 when the Supreme 
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Court, acting in its constitutional capacity, 
addressed itself to the termination of Moham-
mad Dahlan’s official and private immunity, 
which derived from his status as a Legislative 
Council member.5  The Court decided on this 
specific matter and did not extend its decision 
of the dissolution of the whole Council. The 
Court ruled that the President has the full au-
thority to cancel the immunity of any Parlia-
ment member when the Legislative Council 
is not convened. It also decided that the Pres-
ident’s decree was consistent with his legal 
authority. 
The Court’s decision is however contrary to 
the Amended Basic Law and Electoral Law, 
which establishes that presidential and legis-
lative elections should be held concurrently. 
In fact, there is no need to dissolve the Leg-
islative Council because the elections have 
been due since 2010; hence the real constitu-
tional violation is the fact that the president 
is not calling for presidential or legislative 
elections!
The dissolution of the Legislative Council 
has been implemented as a consequence of 
political will, but it is not expected that the 
elections will be implemented – if elections 
do take place, there are no signs that this will 
be done in accordance with to the Basic Law 
and the Electoral Law (i.e. that presidential 
and legislative elections will be concurrent). 
The decisions of the Constitutional Court, 
if anything, envisage the restoration of the 
PLO’s powers in all its councils. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The BL must not be burdened with the stig-
ma of failure for these violations, as it was 
enacted as an interim constitutional alter-
native that was created within a particular 
framework and specific political, cultural 
and national circumstances. The constitu-
tional court, however, is not entrusted with 
fulfilling the public’s wishes, but is instead 
tasked with ensuring compliance with the 
constitution.
The Modern Palestinian constitution is ex-
pected to be revived and put back on the 
table, and the same applies to the various is-
sues and gaps that this review has addressed. 
It is anticipated that the constitution will put 
in place a pluralistic parliamentary democ-
racy that fully conforms with International 
Law and Human rights.
V. FURTHER READING
Asem Khalil, ‘Impulses from the Arab 
Spring on the Palestinian State-Building 
Process’ in Rainer Grote and Tilmann Röder 
(eds): Constitutionalism, Human Rights and 
Islam after the Arab Spring (OUP, 2016) 
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tion: Constitutional Crisis of, and the Insti-
tutional Deadlock in, the Palestinian Politi-
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(2013) 11 International Journal of Constitu-
tional Law 34-73
5 Supreme Court, Rammallah, 06/2012, 26/04/2016.
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PERU
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2018 was marked by two serious 
corruption cases in Peru. The first one was 
the Odebrecht case, even though this was a 
topical case already in 2017. It forced Presi-
dent Kuzcynski, the winner of the 2016 pres-
idential election, to step down from office. 
The second corruption case regarded the 
judiciary. Journalists unmasked a broad net-
work of corruption on the national level, 
which involved the top echelon of the judi-
ciary (public prosecutors, judges, business-
men, parliamentary members). 
Since March 23, 2018, former first Vice-Pres-
ident Martín Vizcarra has served as Presi-
dent, and has chosen to play an active role. 
He positioned himself as willing to push the 
necessary reforms forward against the cor-
ruption in the judiciary and political system, 
although he found himself in a weak posi-
tion. Congress was (and still is) dominated 
by the Popular Force (Fuerza Popular), the 
party of Keiko Fujimori, who is the daughter 
of the condemned former President Alberto 
Fujimori, with the support of Partido Aprista 
Peruano (APRA). Thus, Vizcarra could not 
(and cannot) rely on a majority in Congress. 
This led to a situation where the executive 
and the legislative were confrontational right 
from the beginning, and the majority in Con-
JUHVVZRUNHGDJDLQVWWKHH[HFXWLYH:KHUHDV
according to opinion polls2 Vizcarra main-
tains strong popular support, Congress uses 
its law-making powers and the means of par-
liamentary procedure in abusive ways, lead-
ing to its decreasing public support (which 
was reflected in a referendum). Therefore, it 
does not come as a surprise that 2018 was 
a rather turbulent year for Peruvian politics. 
This is also reflected in the developments in 
constitutional law and in the case law of the 
Constitutional Court.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
The Brazilian company Odebrecht admit-
ted corrupting the government of Pedro 
Kuczynski. This was only the tip of the ice-
berg. Former Presidents Alejandro Toledo, 
Alan García and Ollanta Humala, as well as 
Keiko Fujimori, had also received money 
from Odebrecht. These events highlight the 
1 ;OLYLZLHYJOMVY[OPZYLWVY[^HZWHY[S`ÄUHUJLKI`*LU[YHS,\YVWLHU<UP]LYZP[`-V\UKH[PVU)\KHWLZ[
*,<)7-;OL[OLZLZL_WSHPULKOLYLPUYLWYLZLU[[OLPKLHZVM[OLH\[OVYHUKKVUV[ULJLZZHYPS`YLÅLJ[[OL
opinion of CEUBPF. 
2 ‘Aprobación del presidente Martín Vizcarra sube a 66 % tras referendum’, Diario Correo (16 December 
#O[[WZ!KPHYPVJVYYLVWLWVSP[PJHHWYVIHJPVUTHY[PU]PaJHYYHZ\ILYLMLYLUK\T %HJ-
cessed 24 January 2019.  
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vulnerability of the Peruvian political and 
democratic system. The reasons lie with the 
strong role of the President and the influence 
of factual economic powers. The neo-liberal 
economic Constitution of 1993 (PC) rein-
forces the problem.
Apart from the international Odebrecht 
case, a national corruption scandal became 
public. The leakage of wiretaps showed the 
weakness of the judicial branch and the pub-
lic prosecuting service. The scandal put in 
doubt the effectivity of investigations of cor-
ruption cases in the past and increased public 
pressure on the streets. 
2018 was furthermore marked by the polit-
ical conflict between Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch. It all started when the leader 
of the Popular Force Party, Keiko Fujimori, 
did not accept her 2016 electoral defeat 
against Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (50.12% to 
:LWK  RI WKH YRWHV IRU &RQ-
gress, the Public Forces Party obtained an 
absolute parliamentary majority of 56%. The 
confrontation between the executive and the 
legislative led to the excessive use of legis-
lative instruments. Congress aimed not only 
to control but also hassle the executive. This 
culminated in a call for the President to re-
sign before his first year was over.
The Peruvian President enjoys immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction. Impeachment is 
only possible when the President commits 
infractions set forth in Article 117 PC, and 
even then only  by extraordinary means. 
These are determined by Article 113 PC 
(permanent moral incapacity). 
The Parliament installed an investigative 
commission against President Kuczinsky for 
the purpose of investigating the Odebrecht 
case. The President did not disclose his deal-
ings with Odebrecht before the commission. 
As a consequence, the Parliament discussed 
a request for presidential vacancy (based on 
Article 113 PC). 
The vote carried out by the Plenum of Con-
gress on December 21, 2017 was not suc-
cessful. This was thanks to the government’s 
political negotiations with Congressman 
Kenyi Fujimori, who is the son of Alberto 
Fujimori (a former authoritarian president) 
and the brother of Keiko Fujimori (the head 
of the Popular Force Party). The negotiations 
resulted in a presidential pardon for Alberto 
Fujimori on December 24, 2017, and show 
that the Fujimori family is still very much 
involved in Peruvian politics. Soon after, the 
Odebrecht case emerged in the news again. 
The Popular Force leadership put pressure 
on Kuczynski. The President resigned on 
March 21, 2018. 
First Vice-President Martín Vizcarra as-
sumed the presidency on March 23, 2018. 
Another serious corruption crisis, which in-
volved the heads of the judicial branch and 
members of the Popular Forces, led to pro-
tests in the streets. President Vizcarra then 
proposed a referendum in order to reform 
the Constitution.
The Constitution offers two possibilities for 
complete or partial reform (Articles 32 PC 
and 206 PC). The first one consists of the 
approval of the reform by the Parliament 
and the population. This requires an absolute 
majority of votes of the members of Parlia-
ment. The vote has to be confirmed by a ref-
erendum. The second possibility requires the 
approval of the constitutional reform without 
a referendum, but two positive votes of Par-
liament instead. The votes have to take place 
in two successive ordinary legislatures. Each 
vote requires a majority of more than two-
thirds of Congress. Citizens can also ask for 
a referendum when they have initiated a bill 
and Congress modifies or rejects it. The basis 
for such a request is the Law on Participation 
and Citizens Control.3 If citizens call for con-
stitutional reform, the support of 0.3 percent 
of the electoral population suffices. In that 
case, citizens do not call for a referendum. 
They initiate the process of constitutional re-
form in Congress. As laid down above, this 
usually leads to a referendum.
Since President Vizcarra could not rely on a 
majority in Congress, he had to convince the 
Congress, with the support of public opinion, 
to approve the constitutional amendments. 
:LWKRXW WKH FRQVHQW RI SXEOLF RSLQLRQ WKH
referendum would have been doomed to 
failure. The only option left would have been 
the collection of signatures of citizens. To 
avoid this, President Vizcarra chose anoth-
er option. He asked Congress for its support 
through a motion of confidence (cuestión de 
confianza). According to Article 133 PC, the 
President of the Council of Ministers (Exec-
utive Power) can present a vote of no confi-
dence to Congress. Congress can then accept 
or deny the vote of no confidence. The Presi-
dent can dissolve Congress and convoke new 
elections when the Congress expresses its 
mistrust twice. Congress had already denied 
confidence in the cabinet of former President 
Kuzcinsky once. Thus, a second approval of 
the vote of no confidence would have led to 
its dissolution. The dissolution of Congress 
would have led to new elections. Opinion 
polls predicted disastrous results for Popu-
lar Force if there were new elections. It does 
not, therefore, come as a surprise, given the 
circumstances, that the Parliament approved 
all constitutional amendments, even though 
by amending the original amendments. This 
allowed for the referendum to take place on 
December 9.
Yet, the approval had its price when Con-
gress modified the proposed reforms. 
Among other amendments of the constitu-
tional amendment proposal, the Parliament 
was turned again into a bicameral one, and 
this allowed congressmen in office to stand 
for elections to the new Senate. Moreover, 
the Congress eliminated the planned gender 
distribution of the members of the chambers. 
And, it increased the number of representa-
tives in both chambers. Modifications were 
so remarkable, that President Vizcarra felt 
compelled to ask the nation to vote against 
his own proposal on the return to a bicameral 
Parliament. He continued to support the oth-
er constitutional amendments in spite of the 
modifications.
On December 9, 2018, the referendum took 
place. Four questions were raised: 1. Do you 
approve the constitutional reform on the con-
formation and functions of the National Board 
RI-XVWLFH"IRUPHUO\WKH1DWLRQDO&RXQFLORI
3 Ley de los Derechos de Participación y Control Ciudadanos, Ley Nº 26300, Articles 38, 41.
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the Magistracy); 2. Do you approve the con-
stitutional reform regulating the financing of 
SROLWLFDORUJDQL]DWLRQV"'R\RXDSSURYH
the constitutional reform that prohibits the 
immediate re-election of parliamentarians of 
WKH5HSXEOLF"'R\RXDSSURYHWKHFRQVWL-
tutional reform establishing bicameralism in 
WKH&RQJUHVVRIWKH5HSXEOLF"%\DPDVVLYH
majority of more than three quarters (85%), 
Peruvians voted in favor of the first three 
reforms while rejecting the proposal on the 
establishment of a bicameral Parliament.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso y Nadine 
Heredia Alarcón: Arrest of former President 
Humala and First Lady Heredia
In 2017, former President Ollanta Humala 
and his wife Nadine Heredia were arrested, 
accused of money laundering related to the 
Odebrecht scandal. By a majority, the Con-
stitutional Court declared the habeas corpus 
lawsuit of the Humalas founded and or-
dered their release (Exp. No. 04780-2017-
PHC/TC and Exp. No. 00502-2018-PHC/
TC, accumulated). 
The Court held that when pretrial detention is 
discussed, no evidence can be analyzed with 
the aim of punishment. In fact, this would be 
incompatible with the constitutional princi-
ple of the presumption of innocence. Yet the 
Court stated that it was a very different mat-
ter to consider that the discharge evidence 
was not worthy of assessment at this stage. 
:KHQ DVVHVVLQJ WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ RI SUHWULDO
detention, all the elements, those of charge 
and those of discharge, had to be valued. The 
aim of the evaluation was not to decide about 
guilt or innocence, but to determine if there 
was a plausible link between the investigated 
persons and the criminal act. 
The Constitutional Court found a violation 
of various fundamental rights. This encom-
passed the fundamental right to proof (as an 
implicit manifestation of due process (Ar-
ticle 139, paragraph 3 PC), the right to de-
fense, and the fundamental right to personal 
liberty (Article 2, paragraph 24 PC). 
The Court also pointed out that the refusal to 
assess the evidence provided by the defense 
OHGWRD ODFNRIUHDVRQLQJ:KHUHDV WKHGH-
cision whether a conviction was justified is 
a matter of ordinary jurisdiction, the control 
whether fundamental rights were violated 
falls into constitutional jurisdiction. 
The Constitutional Court laid down rules for 
criminal judges when evaluating new ele-
ments in the context of a request of pretrial 
detention. According to the Constitutional 
Court, the judges had to assess all presented 
elements. These included not only the argu-
ments presented by the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office but also by the defense of the suspect-
ed person. At this stage, the competent crim-
inal judge had to assess only whether there 
were elements that linked the accused with 
the crime. According to the Constitution-
al Court, its rules for criminal judges when 
evaluating new elements regarding a pretrial 
detention helped to safeguard the presump-
tion of innocence. 
The Court noted that the presumption of 
innocence also required another general 
rule. This rule was that any person subject 
to criminal proceedings had to be tried in 
freedom. Pretrial detention as the depriva-
tion of freedom could be the only exception. 
This had been expressed already in Article 9, 
paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights: “The pretrial de-
tention of persons who are to be tried should 
not be the general rule....The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has also stated that 
the principle of the presumption of inno-
cence gives rise to the State obligation not 
to restrict the liberty of the detainee beyond 
what is strictly necessary and proportionate 
to ensure that it will not impede the efficient 
conduct of investigations and that it will not 
evade justice.” The Constitutional Court did 
not only quote the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, it also referred to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in that respect.
2. Modification of Article 37 on the rules of 
procedure of Congress on the regulation of 
parliamentary groups
On August 29, 2017, the Constitutional 
Court issued a ruling (Exp. 0006-2017-PI/
TC) on the so-called Anti-Transfer Law, 
which the Court found to be partly uncon-
stitutional. This decision dates back to 2017 
and was then followed by another decision 
in 2018 (Exp. 0001-2018-PI/TC) on a tight-
ly connected case; therefore, these cases are 
presented together. 
The 2017 decision entails an interesting anal-
ysis of the nature of representative democra-
cy. It concerns the scope of the representa-
tive mandate of parliamentarians. The case 
dealt with some modifications of the rules of 
procedure of Congress (Legislative resolu-
tion N° 007-2016-2017-CR). The Fujimori 
parliamentary majority that approved them 
would have directly drawn benefits from 
their application. The main modifications 
consisted of the prohibition of members of 
Congress who resigned from their parlia-
mentary group to form a new group. These 
modifications restricted the fundamental 
rights of politically dissident congressmen. 
In the opinion of the Court, this measure was 
arbitrary and violated several fundamental 
rights, entailing the freedom of conscience, 
the freedom of association, and the right to 
participation. Thus, the Court found that the 
changes to the rules of procedure which pro-
hibited the formation of new parliamentary 
groups through dissident congressmen were 
unconstitutional.
Given the public debate, the Fujimori bench 
quickly presented and processed a new 
bill. This new bill modified the regulation, 
even before the Court issued its ruling (P.L. 
1874/2017-CR). An interregnum was the 
consequence. The ruling was published in 
the official newspaper, El Peruano on Sep-
tember 13. Four days later, Congress did the 
same with Legislative Resolution No. 003-
2017-2018-CR. In the meanwhile, dissidents 
of the leftist parliamentary group Frente 
Amplio created a new group, named Nuevo 
Perú.
An action of unconstitutionality was filed 
against the new legislative resolution. The 
problem was that the previous ruling of the 
Constitutional Court (Exp. No. 0001-2018-
PI/TC) was not fully respected. This time the 
Court did not declare the resolution uncon-
stitutional. It issued an interpretive ruling 
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regarding Article 1 of Legislative Resolution 
003-2017-2018-CR, which changed Article 
37 of the Rules of Procedure of Congress. 
Article 37 must be interpreted as follows. 
The resignation of members of Congress 
from political groups in the event of dissent 
for reasons of conscience is not prohibited. 
The Court stated (para 50), that the prohibi-
tion on forming a new parliamentary group 
or joining an existing one is not applicable in 
all cases. If a congressman resigns because 
of infringement of due process of rights con-
tained in the rules of procedure of the respec-
tive group, the rule cannot apply. It weighs 
even stronger when it is the parliamentary 
group that is undergoing an ideological shift. 
:KHQ WKH FRQJUHVVPDQ UHVLJQV EHFDXVH RI
that shift, the rule cannot apply either. Many 
internal rules of parliamentary groups do not 
foresee norms for those cases. This does not 
mean that congressmen can be deprived of 
their fundamental rights. Consequently, the 
Court upheld Articles 1 and 2 of legislative 
resolution 003-2017-2018-CR if interpreted 
consistently with the Constitutional Court 
decision.
3.   Vote of no confidence and total cabinet 
crisis: Changes to the rules of procedure of 
Congress
This decision of the Constitutional Court 
(Exp. 0006-2018-P1/TC) originated from 
another change of the rules of procedure 
of Congress. The Popular Forces Party and 
Partido Aprista Peruano (APRA) wanted to 
change the rules on votes of no confidence. 
If the Constitutional Court had upheld the 
new regulations, the Parliament would have 
obtained a stronger position vis-à-vis the ex-
ecutive in case a no confidence vote was re-
jected. This would have mainly favored the 
Popular Forces Party and the APRA.
In March 2018, more than 25% of Congress 
filed an action of unconstitutionality against 
Legislative Resolution 007-2017-2018-CR 
(i.e., the norm approved by Parliament mod-
ifying Article 86, literal e) of its procedural 
rules) because it violated several articles of 
the Constitution (Articles 43, 103, 105, 132, 
133, and 134 PC). The claimants argued that 
the modification affected the principle of di-
vision of power, the principle of balance of 
powers, and the political regime established 
in the Constitution because it incorporated 
three rules altering them. Those new rules 
foresaw that: a) If the Parliament rejected a 
confidence motion (requested by the Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers), the new 
ministerial cabinet should be composed of 
completely new ministers; b) If this rule 
was not followed by the executive (i.e., the 
new cabinet was composed of old and new 
ministers), the rejection of the motion should 
not be counted when the above-mentioned 
condition of two denials of passed motions 
of no confidence were to be verified for the 
dissolution of the Parliament; and c) The 
President of the Council of Ministers should 
not be able to include the approval of laws or 
the approval of proceedings of parliamentary 
control in a vote of no confidence.
According to the defense of the Parliament, 
Legislative Resolution 007-2017-2018-CR 
established a valid and reasonable limitation 
to the vote of no confidence. The defense ar-
gued that a restriction applying to the Coun-
cil of Ministers, or a ministry, regarding its 
possibility to request a vote of no confi-
dence, connected with the approval of a leg-
islative act, was reasonable since the approv-
al of laws was an exclusive competence of 
the Parliament. At the same time, the defense 
of the Parliament added that it was unreason-
able that a minister subject to an interpella-
tion could introduce the interpellation as a 
matter of a vote of no confidence.
The Constitutional Court pointed out that 
the Constitution confers the competence of 
the normación autónoma (autonomous reg-
ulation) to Congress. This allowed Congress 
to establish independently its own rules of 
procedure; in that sense, the Congress is able 
to regulate its activities and its relationship 
with other institutions. However, the Court 
concluded that the modification of Article 
86, literal e) of the Rules of Procedure (mod-
ifying the relationship between the executive 
and the Parliament) entered into matters that 
were not parliamentary in nature and, there-
fore, exceeded the scope of the normación
autónoma, affecting the faculty of the Cabi-
net of Ministers to put forward a vote of no 
confidence.
Additionally, the Court noted that the prin-
ciple of division of power limits any consti-
tutional reform, as it forms part of the “hard 
core” of the Constitution. The Court also 
argued that the confidence motion was de-
signed as a counterbalance to the mechanism 
of the censure of ministers (attribution given 
to the Parliament). Consequently, the Court 
found, that Article 86 literal e) and three spe-
cific rules included in the modification were 
unconstitutional.
4.   “Ley Mulder”: law regulating state ad-
vertising expenditure
An example of a law with a positive back-
ground at first sight, but then leaving a stale 
aftertaste, is the so-called “Law Mulder”.4
(The name derives from the APRA congress-
man who had proposed the bill, Mauricio 
Mulder.) This law aimed at reducing public 
spending on state publicity. This should have 
been achieved through the prohibition of 
state publicity in private means of communi-
cation. All state entities, including state busi-
nesses, were bound by the prohibition. State 
publicity, including information campaigns, 
was thus limited to state media. 
Yet, state media cannot cover the whole ter-
ritory of Peru. The consequence is that send-
ing information to the population is only 
possible to a limited extent. This means that 
people in remote areas cannot receive infor-
mation about public interest matters.
Members of Congress and the executive 
challenged the law before the Constitution-
al Court, which decided the case in October 
(Exp. 0012-2018-PI/TC and 0013-2018-PI/
TC).
The main concerns pointed at the reduction 
of channels of information for the popu-
lation, because the term “publicity” in the 
context of Law Mulder also encompasses 
“institutional publicity”. In fact, institutional 
4 Ley que regula el gasto de publicidad del estado peruano, Ley Nº 30793.
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publicity is advertising by the state to inform 
the population. It serves to disseminate in-
formation on matters of public interest.
Moreover, the claimants stated that the Inter-
net as a means of information could not yet 
serve as such. Access to the Internet, espe-
cially in remote areas, is not yet guaranteed. 
The Court found a violation of the principle 
of proportionality with regard to the liberty 
of information. It held that there would have 
been other means to regulate publicity, such 
as more effective tools of public spending in 
this area. Instead of a complete prohibition, 
more proportionate solutions were available. 
Moreover, the Court found a violation of the 
freedom of contract and of the principle of 
criminal legality. 
Thus, the Court struck down the law because 
of its content. Yet, it also examined formal 
arguments raised by the claimants. Congress 
had passed the bill using an accelerated proce-
dure; therefore, the claimants argued that the 
bill had lacked proper discussion in Congress.
Relying on an earlier decision, the Court em-
phasized the importance of public debate for 
democracy. According to the Court, this im-
plies that the “decision making must be based 
on a constant and rich exchange of argu-
ments, which requires that all those involved 
have the necessary data to enable them to 
give an informed opinion that is geared to 
the needs of the community” (p. 25, para 
19). The Court tested the law against this 
background but found no violation. Yet, the 
fact that it discussed the formal arguments in 
detail is a signal. It can be seen as a warning 
directed to Congress of the importance of 
taking public debates there seriously.
These decisions show one of the problems 
of the actual political situation. The power 
relations in Congress (majority with the Pop-
ular Force Party, supported by the APRA) 
allow the majority not only to dominate the 
law-making process but to use law-making 
power in an abusive way. Moreover, the use 
of accelerated law-making procedures re-
sults in less public discussion of proposed 
laws. An example for the problems men-
tioned is the bill on the “law establishing a 
humanitarian execution of prison sentences” 
(Ley que establece la ejecución humanitar-
ia de la pena, Ley N° 3533). It is aimed at 
establishing the possibility of house arrest 
instead of a prison sentence for vulnerable 
people. It was passed in accelerated proceed-
ings, just in time to be applied to Alberto Fu-
jimori, whose pardon had been lifted a few 
days earlier. President Vizcarra, however, 
chose not to sign the bill and to send it back 
to Congress, where the parliamentary Com-
mission on Justice and Human Rights had to 
issue a report taking into consideration the 
President’s concerns. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
One does not have to be a fortune teller to 
predict that the severe corruption cases will 
continue to hold the Peruvian people in sus-
pense in 2019. People involved in corruption 
cases have usually been influential. This in-
cludes the leader of the Popular Force Party, 
Keiko Fujimori, who is currently in custo-
dy, and former Presidents Toledo, García, 
Humala, and Kuczynski, who are currently 
subject to judicial measures of restriction of 
liberties.
Apart from that, challenges arise from the 
further implementation of constitutional 
changes following the referendum. New leg-
islation has to follow the amended Constitu-
tion. Like in the past, one question will prob-
ably have to be discussed once again: should 
3HUXJREDFNWRDELFDPHUDOV\VWHPRUQRW"
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PHILIPPINES
I. INTRODUCTION
Rodrigo Duterte was elected in 2016, riding 
on a “law and order” campaign that exploit-
ed popular anxieties about social disorder. 
Duterte promised to restore law and order 
in three to six months largely through the 
extrajudicial killing of criminals. Besides 
promising a quick fix to the growing crime 
problem, he also pledged to rebuild crum-
bling infrastructure and to end corruption. 
This helps explain why his support was mid-
dle-class driven, particularly strong among 
taxi drivers, small shop owners, and over-
seas workers who were worried their fragile 
economic gains after years of growth would 
be threatened unless order was restored by 
any means necessary.
Duterte is a new kind of politician who 
promises to use violence and strong-arm tac-
tics in the quest to solve social and politi-
cal problems; a platform known as “voting 
against disorder.” Voting against disorder 
entails the emergence, within a democratic 
system, of support for a political platform 
that either implicitly or explicitly promises 
to undermine the rule of law—and with it, 
democracy itself.
Duterte and his allies have been brought be-
fore the Supreme Court, but they have never 
lost a single case. Rather than operate as the 
guardian of the Constitution, the Supreme 
Court rules in favor of the President, imper-
iling the separation of powers and consoli-
dating power in the Executive Branch.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Philippine politics is presently dominated by 
two themes: constitutional change and the 
complicity of the judicial branch in demo-
cratic erosion. 
A majority of Filipinos reject the shift to a 
federal system of government now. Only two 
out of ten agree that the 1987 Constitution 
should be revised at this time. Nevertheless, 
shortly after assuming power, Duterte signed 
an executive order (Exec. Ord. No. 10, Cre-
ating a Consultative Committee to Review 
the 1987 Constitution [Dec. 7, 2016]) creat-
ing a 25-member panel to propose specific 
amendments to the Constitution. On July 
3, 2018, the Consultative Committee an-
nounced that it had accomplished its task and 
completed a draft constitution for a federal 
form of government. The draft was submit-
ted to Congress supposedly to guide its work 
on constitutional changes.
The House of Representatives approved on 
the third and final reading its version of a 
federal constitution. This draft removes the 
term limits for House members and other 
local officials in the present Constitution. 
Unlike the draft commissioned by President 
Duterte, the House version does not have 
any provisions on the regulation on politi-
cal dynasties, barely cloaking the attempt to 
keep themselves in power.
In the judiciary, the Duterte administration’s 
campaign to remove constitutional checks 
continues to gain traction. Two Supreme 
Court decisions stand out: The first, Lagman
v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935, February 
6, 2018, upheld the power of the President 
to extend the implementation of martial 
law for an entire year. This case continues 
the Court’s consistent crusade to undermine 
checks on the President’s power to declare 
martial law. The second case is Republic of 
the Philippines v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, 
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May 11, 2018. In this case, a majority of the 
Court granted a petition for quo warranto
and removed the Chief Justice ostensibly on 
the ground that she had failed to submit com-
plete statements of assets and liabilities.
The “Philippines” case is astonishing be-
cause the damage to the judiciary is self-in-
IOLFWHG :LWKRXW DQ\ RYHUW WKUHDW WKH 6X-
preme Court has been ruling consistently for 
the President.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Lagman v. Senate President, G.R. No. 
235935, February 6, 2018
This case questioned the constitutional-
ity of the extension of the proclamation of 
martial law and suspension of the privilege 
of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for 
an entire year, from January 1, 2018, to De-
cember 31, 2018. The Supreme Court once 
more ruled in favor of the government and 
held that the only limitations to the exercise 
of these powers are that the extension should 
be at the President’s initiative; that there is 
an invasion or rebellion; that it is required 
by public safety; and that it is subject to the 
Court’s review of the factual bases. 
The Supreme Court has dismantled the con-
stitutional checks on the President’s power 
to declare martial law, many of which were 
placed in the 1987 Constitution as a response 
to the Philippine experience under Ferdinand 
Marcos. Under the new jurisprudence and 
quite contrary to the intent of the framers, 
the Supreme Court can review the factual 
basis of the declaration of martial law based 
only on the President’s report, which does 
not need to be either complete or accurate. 
Congress does not have to convene to check 
the President’s decision to impose martial 
law unless it will revoke the declaration. 
The President can extend the declaration of 
martial law for any length of time. The Court 
has facilitated this, oblivious to the coun-
try’s horrific experiences during the time of 
Ferdinand Marcos. Its concluding words are 
telling, and betray a vision of a judicial role 
that supports the imposition of martial law: 
The imperative necessity of Martial Law as a 
tool of the government for self-preservation 
is enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Con-
stitutions. It earned a bad reputation during 
the Marcos era and apprehensions still lin-
ger in the minds of doubtful and suspicious 
individuals. Mindful of its importance and 
necessity, the Constitution has provided for 
safeguards against its abuses.
Martial law is a constitutional weapon 
against enemies of the State. Thus, Mar-
tial law is not designed to oppress or abuse 
law abiding citizens of this country.
Unfortunately, the enemies of the State 
have employed devious, cunning and 
calculating means to destabilize the gov-
ernment. They are engaged in an uncon-
ventional, clandestine and protracted war 
to topple the government. The enemies of 
the State are not always quantifiable, not 
always identifiable and not visible at all 
times. They have mingled with ordinary 
citizens in the community and have un-
wittingly utilized them in the recruitment, 
surveillance and attack against govern-
ment forces. Inevitably, government forc-
es have arrested, injured and even killed 
these ordinary citizens complicit with the 
enemies.
Admittedly, innocent civilians have also 
been victimized in the cross fire as unin-
tended casualties of this continuing war.
These incidents, however, should not 
weaken our resolve to defeat the enemies 
of the State. In these exigencies, we cannot 
afford to emasculate, dilute or diminish 
the powers of government if in the end it 
would lead to the destruction of the State 
and place the safety of our citizens in peril 
and their interest in harm’s way.
It is no wonder then that there are barely any 
checks on the President’s emergency pow-
ers.1 The Court does not see itself as an insti-
tution that checks constitutional powers but 
as a partner in the campaign against enemies 
of the State. The Supreme Court, in its own 
words “cannot afford to emasculate, dilute 
or diminish the powers of government if in 
the end it would lead to the destruction of 
the State and place the safety of our citizens 
in peril and their interest in harm’s way.” It 
misconstrues the purpose behind judicial re-
view of the exercise of emergency powers.
On February 19, 2019, the Court, in the case 
of Lagman v Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, 
upheld the third extension of martial law in 
Mindanao for another year.2
2. Republic of the Philippines v. Sereno, G.R. 
No. 237428, May 11, 2018
On May 11, 2018, the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of the Philippines promulgated a 
historic ruling. In an 8-7 decision, the ma-
jority removed Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno 
from office, abandoning in the process case 
law that had limited removal of justices of 
the Supreme Court to impeachment.
Article XI, section 2 of the Constitution 
states:
SECTION 2. The President, the 
Vice-President, the Members of the Su-
preme Court, the Members of the Consti-
tutional Commissions, and the Ombuds-
man may be removed from office, on 
impeachment for, and conviction of, cul-
pable violation of the Constitution, trea-
son, bribery, graft and corruption, other 
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. 
All other public officers and employees 
may be removed from office as provided 
by law, but not by impeachment.
The Supreme Court has always interpreted 
the Constitution to mean that the public offi-
cials listed (which include the Chief Justice) 
can be removed only by impeachment. 
1 See Dante Gatmaytan, ‘Duterte, judicial deference, and democratic decay in the Philippines’ (2018) 28 Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 553.
2 Lian Buan, ‘Supreme Court upholds 3rd extension of Mindanao martial law’ (Rappler, 19 February 2019) <https://www.rappler.com/nation/223839-su-
WYLTLJV\Y[KLJPZPVUYKL_[LUZPVUTPUKHUHVTHY[PHSSH^%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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An impeachment complaint against the Chief 
Justice was filed in the House of Representa-
tives but it was not gaining any ground. The 
case was so weak that incumbent and retired 
Supreme Court justices queued in the House 
of Representatives’ committee hearings 
to shore up the case against the Chief Jus-
tice. The justices raised personal and some 
administrative issues but nothing remotely 
constituting an impeachable offense. 
The Duterte administration then decided to 
try a different track: file a petition for quo
warranto to skirt impeachment and trial at 
the Senate.
This strategy should have been disallowed 
as well. The Court has decades-old case law 
that barred the Solicitor-General from filing 
a quo warranto case against public officers 
a year beyond the time they took office. The 
Supreme Court has always held that in ac-
tions of quo warranto involving the right 
to an office, the action must be instituted 
within the period of one year from the time 
the cause of action arose. Sereno had been 
appointed six years before Duterte launched 
the campaign to remove her from office.
The justices who appeared before the House 
of Representatives refused to recuse them-
selves, contributing five of the eight votes 
towards removing the Chief Justice. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling was that an 
impeachment is not necessary because the 
Chief Justice’s appointment was defective. 
It was defective because she did not posses 
“integrity”—a qualification for appointment 
to the Supreme Court. She did not possess 
integrity because she did not file a complete 
set of Statement of Assets and Liabilities.
The Court held as follows:
• The Court distinguished between im-
peachment and an action for quo war-
ranto. Impeachment is a proceeding 
exercised by the legislature, as represen-
tatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the 
breach of the trust reposed by the people 
in the hands of the public officer by de-
termining the public officer’s fitness to 
stay in the office. An action for quo war-
ranto involves a judicial determination of 
the eligibility or validity of the election 
or appointment of a public official based 
on predetermined rules.
• The Court held that quo warranto and 
impeachment may proceed independent-
ly of each other as these remedies are dis-
tinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds (3) 
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, 
filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
• A quo warranto proceeding is the proper 
legal remedy to determine the right or ti-
tle to the contested public office or to oust 
the holder from its enjoyment. In case of 
usurpation of a public office, when the 
respondent is found guilty of usurping, 
intruding into or unlawfully holding or 
exercising a public office, position or 
franchise, the judgment shall include the 
following:
the respondent shall be ousted and ex-
cluded from the office;
the petitioner or relator, as the case 
may be, shall recover his costs; and
such further judgment determining the 
respective rights in and to the public 
office, position or franchise of all the 
parties to the action as justice requires.
• The remedies available in a quo warranto 
judgment do not include correction or re-
versal of acts taken under the ostensible au-
thority of an office or franchise. Judgment 
is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may 
not be imposed retroactively upon prior ex-
ercise of official or corporate duties.
• Quo warranto and impeachment are not 
mutually exclusive remedies and may 
even proceed simultaneously. The ex-
istence of other remedies against the 
usurper does not prevent the State from 
commencing a quo warranto proceeding.
• The causes of action in the two pro-
ceedings are different. In quo war-
ranto, the cause of action lies on the 
usurping, intruding or unlawfully hold-
ing or exercising of a public office, 
while in impeachment, it is the com-
mission of an impeachable offense. 
• The controversy in quo warranto pro-
ceedings is the determination of wheth-
er respondent legally holding the Chief 
Justice position is to be considered an 
impeachable officer in the first place. 
On the other hand, impeachment is 
for respondent’s prosecution for cer-
tain impeachable offenses. Respon-
dent is not being prosecuted herein for 
such impeachable offenses enumer-
ated in the Articles of Impeachment.
• Impeachment is not an exclusive rem-
edy by which an invalidly appointed or 
invalidly elected impeachable official 
may be removed from office. Section 2, 
Article XI of the Constitution does not 
foreclose a quo warranto action against 
impeachable officers. The provision uses 
the permissive term “may,” which, in 
statutory construction, denotes discre-
tion and cannot be construed as having 
a mandatory effect. An option to re-
move by impeachment admits of an al-
ternative mode of effecting the removal. 
• The courts should be able to inquire into 
the validity of appointments even of im-
peachable officers. To hold otherwise is 
to allow an absurd situation where the 
appointment of an impeachable officer 
cannot be questioned even when, for 
instance, he or she has been determined 
to be of foreign nationality or, in offic-
es where Bar membership is a quali-
fication, when he or she fraudulently 
represented to be a member of the Bar. 
To construe Section 2, Article XI of the 
Constitution as proscribing a quo war-
ranto petition is to deprive the State of a 
remedy to correct a “public wrong” aris-
ing from defective or void appointments. 
• An action quo warranto is not barred 
by prescription. “A quo warranto ac-
tion is a governmental function and not 
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a propriety function, and therefore the 
GRFWULQHRIODFKHVGRHVQRWDSSO\:KHQ
the government is the real party in inter-
est, and is proceeding mainly to assert 
its rights, there can be no defense on 
the ground of laches or prescription.”
• The Court held that a member of the 
Judiciary must be a person of proven 
competence, integrity, probity and inde-
pendence. Having filed an incomplete set 
of Statements of Assets and Liabilities 
(which is required by the Constitution), 
she could not rightfully claim to be a per-
son of integrity. 
Chief Justice Sereno filed a motion for jus-
tices who appeared at the House of Repre-
sentatives impeachment hearings to inhibit 
themselves from the case, claiming that they 
were biased. The majority opinion denied 
the motion, holding that:
:H GHHP LW EDVHOHVV QRW WR PHQWLRQ
problematic, the respondent’s prayer 
that the matter of inhibition of the six 
Associate Justices be decided by the 
remaining members of the Court En
Banc. The respondent herself was cog-
nizant that the prevailing rule allows 
challenged Justices to participate in the 
deliberations on the matter of their dis-
qualification. Moreover, exclusion from 
the deliberations due to delicadeza, or
sense of decency, partakes of a ground 
apt for a voluntary inhibition. It bears 
to be reminded that voluntary inhibi-
tion leaves to the sound discretion of 
the judges concerned whether to sit in 
a case for other just and valid reasons, 
with only their conscience as guide. In-
deed, the best person to determine the 
propriety of sitting in a case rests with 
the magistrate sought to be disqualified. 
Moreover, to compel the remaining 
members to decide on the challenged 
member’s fitness to resolve the case 
is to give them authority to review the 
propriety of acts of their colleagues, a 
scenario which can undermine the inde-
pendence of each of the members of the 
High Court.
The Supreme Court, instead of protecting its 
independence, crafted another avenue for the 
removal of a member of the Court. Despite 
its previous rulings on the use of impeach-
ment as an exclusive remedy to remove a 
member of the Court; despite its previous 
rulings on the temporal limitations on the 
use of an action for quo warranto; despite 
its rulings on protecting impeachable offi-
cials from collateral attacks (disbarment, for 
example); and despite the fact that the Chief 
Justice’s qualifications had been assessed 
and not found defective by the Judicial and 
Bar Council (the body that vets appointees 
to the judiciary), the Supreme Court still 
decided to hand over its Chief to the Chief 
Executive.
The Court denied a motion for reconsider-
ation on June 19, 2018.
The implications of the Court’s ruling are 
dire: Such logic could be applied to any gov-
ernment appointee, regardless of how long 
they have served. The ruling could even be 
applied to a President. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The Supreme Court already held oral argu-
ments in Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 
238875, where Senators are questioning the 
President’s decision to withdraw from the 
International Criminal Court. 
This case is extremely significant. If the 
Duterte administration prevails, then the de-
cision would remove probably the only sig-
nificant check on his “war on drugs,” which 
some have argued is genocide.3
President Duterte continues to silence his 
critics. On August 31, 2018, he issued Proc-
lamation 572 and voided the amnesty grant-
ed to Senator Antonio Trillanes IV, his most 
outspoken critic in the Senate. Trillanes os-
tensibly failed to comply with the require-
ments for a valid amnesty after he participat-
ed in a mutiny to protest corruption in the 
military in 2003.
In issuing Proclamation No. 572, Duterte 
assumed judicial functions by declaring the 
amnesty void and then ordering Trillanes’s 
arrest. This case is already working its way 
up to the Supreme Court.
On February 13, 2019, the Philippine Na-
tional Police arrested the CEO of Rappler, 
a news organization critical of the Duterte 
administration, for cyberlibel, a crime she 
allegedly committed in May 2012, even 
though the crime was not defined until Sep-
tember that year. The CEO, Maria Ressa, has 
a pending case for tax evasion, and Rappler 
is under investigation for allegedly being 
foreign controlled.4
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the case of the Polish Constitutional Court 
(“the Court”), analysis of constitutional de-
velopments in 2018 must start with a recap 
of the period 2015-2017 to set the context.1
One cannot simply go about analysing the 
case law of the Court in 2018 as if nothing 
had previously happened. Just as 2017 was, 
so 2018 continued to deliver on the promise 
of the capture of state and institutions that 
has been in full swing in Poland since 2015.2
This legacy of the capture lives on, rede-
fines the Court and its role, exerts perturbing 
effects on the judicial review and dramati-
cally decreases the efficiency of the Court. 
:ULWLQJ IRU WKH HGLWLRQRI WKHSUHVHQW
book, it was remarked that the Polish Con-
stitutional Court, “once a proud institution, 
and an effective check on the will of the ma-
jority, entered 2017 as a shell of its former 
self with constitutional scars. The latter af-
fect not only the legitimacy of the institution 
but also the very constitutionality of the ‘de-
cisions’ rendered by the new court in 2017 
[…]”. 2017 analysis identified scars that had 
transformed the constitutional identity of the 
Court: i) unconstitutional composition, both 
at the level of the judges and the President 
and Vice President; ii) the “irregular judges” 
have not only been sitting on the cases heard 
by the Court in 2018 (see infra) but they have 
also validated ex post facto their selection to 
the Court; and iii) the statutory scheme of in-
tricate legislative provisions adopted by the 
majority brought the Court to heel and para-
lysed its day-to-day functioning.3
In 2018, this sad state of affairs not only con-
tinued but also further aggravated the health 
of liberal democracy in Poland. 2018 added 
new plots, themes and manifestations. Last 
but not least, it invited us to step back for 
a moment and ask a more general question: 
how does the capture of the Polish Constitu-
tional Court affect the tenets of liberal con-
VWLWXWLRQDOLVPEH\RQG3RODQG"
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
The combined effect of the changes intro-
duced in 2015-2016, the management of the 
Court’s workload by the (irregular) President 
RIWKH&RXUW-XGJH-XOLD3U]\áĊEVNDDQGWKH
continued adjudication by “irregular judges” 
marginalized the significance of the jurispru-
dence of the Court in the Polish legal order. 
Its overall institutional efficiency took a hit. 
The Court lacks in staff, the proceedings 
1 T. T. Koncewicz, ‘Understanding the Politics of Resentment. Of the Principles, Institutions, Counter-Strate-
gies and ... the Habits of Heart’ (2019) 26(2)0UKPHUH1V\YUHSVM.SVIHS3LNHS:[\KPLZ 501. 
2 W. Sadurski, ‘How Democracy Dies (in Poland): A Case Study of Anti-Constitutional Populist Backsliding’, 
Sydney Law School Research Paper 18/01 at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3103491.  
3 T. T. Koncewicz, -HYL^LSS[V[OL7VSPZO*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[, at http://verfassungsblog.de/fare-
well-to-the-polish-constitutional-court/. At the time of this writing, the ruling political majority in Poland has 
total control of the Court, as 9 out of 15 judges have been elected by the new Sejm after the parliamentary 
elections in November 2015. Three judges have been elected unconstitutionally since there was no vacancy 
on the Court at the moment of their appointment. 
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last longer and there is a problem with the 
execution of the judgments.4 The number of 
cases filed with the Court, as well as those it 
decided, decreased significantly. Before the 
constitutional crisis, the Court accepted about 
500-600 cases annually. In 2016, this number 
decreased to 360 cases, and in 2017 to 282 
cases. The Court that was once known for its 
efficiency (in 2014 alone the Court rendered 
119 judgments; and 173 decisions in the year 
2015) has become an institution in slow mo-
tion: in 2016 and 2017, the Court issued 99 
and 89 judgments, respectively.5  In 2018, the 
number dropped to an all-time low of 65 deci-
sions (36 judgments and 29 orders).6 This is a 
picture of an institution in decline. 
The practice of configuring adjudicating 
panels raises serious concerns. In general, in 
2017, in 18 out of 36 cases, the Court con-
sisted of unconstitutionally elected judges. 
In 2018, this situation occurred in 28 out 
of 65 cases.7 In addition, the composition 
of the judicial panels has been anything but 
predictable. In January and February 2017, 
the President of the Court changed the com-
positions of the panels in an unprecedented 
49 cases (53 orders). To make things even 
worse, the President acted contra legem: in 
all 49 cases, there was no statutory legal ba-
sis for making the changes to the adjudicat-
ing panel. In 21 cases, decisions were made 
without providing any grounds.8 In one case, 
it was indicated by one of the irregular judg-
es that it is possible to change the composi-
tion of the panels by, for example, “changing 
the rapporteur for the case as a result of the 
lack of acceptance of the composition of the 
presented draft judgment”.9 As a result of all 
this, the Court steered from within to mini-
mise the uncertainty of a result and deliver 
on the expectations of the powers that be. 
The judges rushed to the bench by the ruling 
party were treated with preference. In 2018, 
the judges (both regular and irregular) elect-
ed by the current Parliament acted as rappor-
teurs and presided over 41 cases. Add to all 
this the personal attacks by irregular judges 
on the independent institutions still in exis-
tence in Poland, like the Ombudsman. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
:KLOH LQ  WKH &RXUW GHFLGHG IHZ
non-controversial cases,10 for the most part, 
it was a forum for political scuffles and “rub-
ber-stamping” the illegal actions of the rul-
ing party. 
Case K 1/1811 shows the operation of the 
legislative process in Poland under the right-
wing government. The allegations concerned 
the course of legislative procedure followed 
by the Parliament. The deadline for consul-
tations with representative organizations of 
employers, employees and the Social Dia-
logue Council has been shortened, but the 
Sejm (lower house of Parliament) adopted 
the act before the end of the designated pe-
riod. The Court (irregular judges sat on this 
case) supported the position presented by the 
Prosecutor General (who is also the Minister 
of Justice) and the Speaker of the Sejm. It 
was stated that failure to complete the opin-
ion-making procedure was a violation of the 
law, but not of a constitutional intensity. Vio-
lation of statutory provisions did not exclude 
4 ++é\NVZaº;HR7P:ZWHYHSPǏV^Hé;Y`I\UHé2VUZ[`[\J`QU`»;OPZPZOV^70:WHYHS`ZLK[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[5L^Z^LLR, 13 February 2019, at https://www.
newsweek.pl/polska/tak-pis-sparalizowal-trybunal-konstytucyjny/xf4shpr. 
5 /LSZPǉZRH-\UKHJQH7YH^*aéV^PLRHº7YHJ\QL[HRQHRWV^PUPLU&;Y`I\UHé2VUZ[`[\J`QU`^YVR\»WH[O[[WZ!^^ ^OMOYWS^WJVU[LU[\WSVHKZ
HFPC-Pracuje-tak-jak-powinien-raport-TK-2017.pdf. 
6 The statistics come from the website: http://trybunal.gov.pl/. 
7 The question of the legality of the election of persons sitting on the Court was raised in a few cases and happened by way of dissenting opinions. Every time she 
ZH[VU[OLILUJO^P[O[OLQ\KNLHWWVPU[LK^P[OV\[SLNHSIHZPZ1\KNL7YVMLZZVY:éH^VTPYH>YVURV^ZRH1HǋRPL^PJaZPNULKHZLWHYH[LVWPUPVUPU^OPJOZOLWVPU[LK
out the procedural irregularity of the decision as a result of the defective composition of the Court. For example, see her dissents in case P 3/16, OTK ZU A/2018, 
P[LTHUKJHZL26;2A<( P[LT0U[\YU\UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSQ\KNLHUK\UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHS=PJL7YLZPKLU[VM[OL*V\Y[4HYP\Za4\Za`ǉZRPYL[VY[LK
I`HSSLNPUN[OH[1\KNL>YVURV^ZRH1HǋRPL^PJaOLYZLSM^HZZ^VYUPUHU\UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSTHUULY-PYZ[OLHYN\LK[OH[OLYZLSLJ[PVU^HZJVU[YHY`[V[OL9\SLZVM
Procedure of the Sejm. Secondly, he questioned the validity of her oath given before the Speaker of the Sejm, who at that time performed presidential duties. It is to 
ILUV[LKOLYL[OH[[OL:WLHRLYVM[OL:LQTWLYMVYTLK[OLZLK\[PLZPUHJJVYKHUJL^P[O[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHM[LY[OLWYLZPKLU[PHSWSHULJYHZOPU:TVSLǉZR[OH[JSHPTLK
[OLSPMLVM7YLZPKLU[32HJa`ǉZRP:LL4\Za`ǉZRP»ZKPZZLU[ZPUJHZL<6;2A<(P[LTHUKPU76;2A<(P[LT
8 -VYTVYLKL[HPSZ!è>VǍUPJRPº9HWVY[a\WHKR\;Y`I\UHé\:[H[`Z[`RPUHQNVYZaLVKSH[»9LWVY[VU[OLJVSSHWZLVM[OL*V\Y[>VYZ[Z[H[PZ[PJZPU`LHYZ.HaL[H
>`IVYJaH-LIY\HY` "º-\URJQVUV^HUPL;Y`I\UHé\2VUZ[`[\J`QULNV^SH[HJO¶»9HWVY[ALZWVé\,RZWLY[}^7YH^U`JO-\UKHJQPPT:[LMHUH)H-
torego>HYZaH^HH[O[[W!^^ ^IH[VY `VYNWS\WSVHKÄSLZ7YVNYHT`VWLYHJ`QUL-VY\T0KLP-\URJQVUV^HUPL;Y`I\UHS\2VUZ[`[\J`QULNV
WKM:LLHSZV4.VZ[RPL^PJaº3PJaI`UPLRéHTPǃ7VWYaLQǇJP\WYaLa7P:;Y`I\UHé2VUZ[`[\J`QU`WYHJ\QLNVYaLQ»5\TILYZKVUV[SPL(M[LY[OL7P:HJX\PZP[PVU[OL
Constitutional Tribunal works worse), at http://weekend.gazeta.pl/weekend/1,152121,22239134,pol-roku-dobrej-zmiany-w-trybunale-konstytucyjnym-duzo-spot-
RHUO[TSHUK47HURV^ZRHº¸7HéHJ5V^VZPSJV^H¹;21\SPP7Ya`éǇIZRPLQSLUP\JO\QLPSHUZ\QLLSP[`7P:+^HSH[H;Y`I\UHé\»;^ V`LHYZPU[OLSPMLVM[OL*V\Y[!;OL
*V\Y[VM1\SPH7Ya`éǇIZRHPZSHa`HUKWYVTV[LZ[OLLSP[LZ7P:H[O[[WZ!VRVWYLZZWHSHJUV^VZPSJV^H[RQ\SPPWYa`SLIZRPLQVKKHSHZPLVKVI`^H[LSPPSHUZ\QLLSP[`
pis-dwa-lata-trybunalu/. 
9 Case K 9/16, OTK ZU A/2018, item 48.
10 By non-controversial cases, we mean cases of no political salience that take a backseat to political controversy. Every time the Court is called upon to adjudi-
JH[LHUVUJVU[YV]LYZPHSJHZLP[PZYLÅLJ[LKPUP[ZJVTWVZP[PVU(ZHYLZ\S[YLN\SHYQ\KNLZJHUIL[Y\Z[LKHUKZP[VUZ\JOJHZLZ0[PZHS^H`ZQ\KNL7Ya`éǇIZRH^OV
OHZHÄUHSZH`PUL]HS\H[PUN[OLJHZLZSVKNLKHUK[OLPYPTWVY[HUJLMYVT[OLWLYZWLJ[P]LVM[OLWV^LYZ[OH[IL-VYHUL_HTWSLVMHUVUJVU[YV]LYZPHSJHZLZLL
SK 25/15. The Court decided that a minimal attorney’s fee in the amount of 60 PLN (ca. 15 EUR) is consistent with the right to a fair trial, but regulation interfered 
inadmissibly in the right of property. In another case (K 2/17), the Court stated that a two-month limitation period for compensation claims was irreconcilable with 
the right of property. In turn, in case SK 18/17, the Court was called on to decide the constitutionality of the limitation period for bringing an action for denial of 
WH[LYUP[ `7VSPZOSH^WYLJS\KLZHJOPSK»ZJSHPTHM[LY[OYLL`LHYZMYVTYLHJOPUN[OLHNLVMJVUZLU[YLNHYKSLZZVM^OLUZOLVYOLMV\UKV\[HIV\[HKPɈLYLU[VYPNPU0U
the Court’s opinion, this regulation was unconstitutional.
11 OTK ZU A/2019, item. 4.
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compliance with legislative procedure at the 
constitutional level. The Court took issue 
with the procedure followed by the Senate, 
though. Doubts were raised whether Parlia-
ment adopted the act because some basic 
technical irregularities vitiated the act of vot-
ing. The Court had doubts as to whether the 
challenged act was adopted at all. It proved 
enough to find the act incompatible with Art. 
7 of the Constitution. Three judges (elected 
after 2015) submitted a dissenting opinion. 
They pointed out that the Court violated the 
principle of ne ultra petita. They argued that 
the application did not concern voting irreg-
ularities, and as a result, the Court did not 
have jurisdiction to go beyond its scope. 
Case K 9/17 provides the best example of the 
use of the courtroom as a shield by the major-
ity as an extension of the political process.12
It was a direct consequence of the 2015 par-
dons granted by the President to the Head 
of Special Forces and a high-level politician 
of the ruling party. The President decided to 
use his prerogative before a final conviction 
by the competent court. The District Court 
LQ :DUVDZ GLVFRQWLQXHG WKH SURFHHGLQJV
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed and 
recognized that “the application of the right 
to pardon before the date of the judgment’s 
validity does not create procedural effects”. 
The Court, for its part, pointed out that the 
right to grant pardons could take the shape 
of an individual amnesty (applied to a person 
who has been convicted) or individual abo-
lition (applied to a person who has not yet 
been convicted). The Court interpreted the 
Constitution as granting the President large 
discretion to apply individual abolition and 
interfere with the pending cases. The deci-
sion was made by a majority of votes. Im-
portantly, but purely symbolically, one of the 
judges (regular judge elected before 2015) 
filed a separate opinion. He considered that 
proceedings had to be dismissed as inadmis-
sible. There were no grounds to conclude 
that the omission of the individual abolition 
from the list of negative prerequisites of the 
proceedings is inconsistent with the Consti-
tution. The presidential prerogative of par-
don covers only the repeal or reduction of 
a penalty made by way of a judgment that 
has become final. As long as the proceedings 
have not been completed, there is a presump-
tion of innocence. This excludes the use of 
individual abolition. Otherwise, the juris-
diction of an ordinary court deciding a case 
would be rendered. He argued that individu-
al abolition may violate the dignity of an ac-
cused person and limit his right to a fair trial. 
The accused has a right to a final judicial de-
cision in his case. Undeterred discretion of 
the President to resort to individual abolition 
upsets the equilibrium between the judiciary 
and the executive. 
The significant development of 2018 was the 
escalating warfare between one of the irregu-
ODUMXGJHV0DUFLQ0XV]\ĔVNLDQGWKH3ROLVK
Ombudsman. The Ombudsman kept point-
ing out the lack of a legal basis to change the 
adjudicating panel (see analysis supra) and 
consequently kept lodging applications for 
the irregular judges to be excluded from the 
panels.13 Case K 9/1614  is only one example. 
In this case, his application was rejected and 
as a result was withdrawn by the Ombuds-
man. In his opinion, decisions made by irreg-
ular judges are illegal and as such would lead 
to the non-existence of all judicial decisions 
taken afterwards. That would in turn deep-
HQ OHJDO FKDRV LQ3RODQG:LWK QR SHQGLQJ
and valid application, the Court was no lon-
ger seised of the case, and as a result decid-
ed to discontinue the proceedings. Mariusz 
0XV]\ĔVNL VXEPLWWHG D VFDWKLQJ GLVVHQWLQJ
opinion. He considered the Ombudsman’s 
decision to be unfavourable and incompre-
hensible to society; that the Ombudsman’s 
requests to exclude persons from the panel 
were a manifestation of a “judicial barratry” 
that disturbs the functioning of the Court and 
have nothing to do with the Ombudsman’s 
systemic role of protecting constitutional 
rights and freedoms. His dissent was a thinly 
veiled incitement addressed to the Sejm to 
capture such recalcitrant offices still roam-
ing free in the space of an otherwise captured 
state.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD (AND  
BEYOND POLAND)
The picture painted here is one of a com-
promised institution that lost the ethos of 
inde-pendent and impartial constitutional 
DGMXGLFDWLRQ:KDW1:DONHUFDOOHGWKHVHF-
ond lock of the control of the political sys-
tem - the independence of the constitutional 
court - has been irreparably broken.14 Cases
are decided in camera, and the assignment 
of cases to individual judges is opaque and 
depends on the whim and caprice of an un-
constitutionally elected President who tailors 
the composition of the bench to the political 
importance of cases. The more important 
the case from the perspective of the politi-
cal majority, the more likely it will be heard 
exclusively by judges elected by the new 
Parliament. The Court decides less and few-
er cases, as the cloud of unconstitutionality 
hangs over its decisions. The transparency 
of the proceedings has reduced to zero. Most 
important decisions are made by the one-
PDQ WHDPRI-XGJH3U]\áĊEVNDZKRDORQJ
ZLWKLUUHJXODU-XGJH0XV]\ĔVNLKDVEHFRPH
the most trusted guardian of the new uncon-
stitutional order. 
Granted, these are all momentous develop-
ments, and yet to stop here would be like 
focusing on the means while missing out 
on the journey. 2018 in the life of the Polish 
Constitutional Court corroborated that there 
was more to the destruction of judicial re-
view, as the new authoritarians engaged to 
an increasing extent in constitutionalism and 
constitutional reform.16 Constitutional talk 
12 OTK ZU A/2018, item 48. Judgment of the Court of July 17, 2018. 
130U[^LU[`HWWSPJH[PVUZ^LYLÄSLKMVY[OLL_JS\ZPVUVMHQ\KNL;OLTHQVYP[`JVUJLYULKPYYLN\SHYQ\KNLZ5VULVM[OLT^LYLNYHU[LK0U[OYLLZ\JO
cases, the members of the panels were themselves unconstitutionally sworn.
14 Decision of the Court of March 22, 2018 in case K 9/16. 
15 ‘Populism and Constitutional Tension’, New York School of Law, Jean Monnet Working Paper 15/17, p. 9. 
16 P. Blokker, Populist Constitutionalism and Meaningful Popular Engagement (The Foundation for Law, Justice and Society, 2018).
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was used and abused to cloak the illiberal 
agenda with the veneer of constitutionalism. 
A new constitutional doctrine of the politics 
of resentment, still on the rise in 2017, be-
came entrenched in Poland in 2018. A core 
concept of the politics of resentment and 
populism is constitutional capture. Constitu-
tional capture is a generic and novel concept. 
It connotes a systemic weakening of checks 
and balances and the entrenchment of power 
by making future changes in control diffi-
cult. Constitutional capture has an inherent 
spillover effect, and as such seemingly iso-
lated constitutional capture in Poland and 
elsewhere risks the potential of adverse con-
sequences throughout the entire continent.17
It travels in time and space, and, just like the 
politics of resentment, it has its trajectory. As 
there is simply no place for a veto emanat-
ing from within the government other than 
from majoritarian parliaments, the “politics 
of resentment” target institutions that other-
wise might be seen as a brake on the power 
of the people’s representatives. Institutions 
are only accepted as long as they are seen 
as “their” institutions and translate only mes-
sages that the controlling parties believe to 
deserve to be in the public sphere. Such an 
understanding leads to an important tweak 
to the established narrative: institutions that 
have been channelling (for populists, “dis-
torting”) the rule of law must be dealt with 
DV H[SHGLWLRXVO\ DV SRVVLEOH:LWK H[WUHPH
majoritarianism as one of the cornerstones 
of the new doctrine, disabling constitutional 
courts and judicial review is the first order 
of the day for constitutional capture.18 All 
institutions, domestic and supranational, 
stand in the way and are not part of the new 
populist constitutionalism.19 Gaining power 
thus does not soften populist animus. Quite 
the contrary, once elected, populist leaders 
are ready to deliver on their promises, and 
they do so through a constitutional doctrine 
that competes with the dominant liberal con-
stitutionalism.  This new emerging doctrine 
includes the following, often interrelated, el-
ements: (i) a new understanding of the role 
of the Constitution, no longer as protecting 
against the state, but as safeguarding the 
uniqueness of the state; (ii) the Constitution 
ceases to be the supreme law of the land; (iii) 
the Constitutional Court is not only incapac-
itated but also “weaponized” to be used as a 
tool against political enemies; (iv) the polit-
ical dominates the legal; (v) the rule of law 
is seen as an obstacle to protecting the col-
lectivity; (vi) the rule of law is to facilitate 
the expression of the will of the people; (vii) 
political power is no longer subject to checks 
and balances; (viii) supranational institutions 
are dismissed as enemies of the people; (ix) 
collectivity is trumpeted above individual 
citizens; and (x) human rights evolve from 
a dignitary conception to that of community.
2018 in the life of the Polish Constitutional 
Court evoked the dark legacies of what O. 
Kirchheimer famously called “political jus-
tice”. Political justice aims to enlarge the area 
of political action by enlisting the services 
of courts on behalf of political goals.20 It is 
only half true. Courts apply laws, so with-
out carefully crafted legislative schemes, the 
courts would be like craftsmen without tools. 
Law must be adapted to enable the judges to 
mete out political justice. The correct law 
both circumscribes and empowers the judges 
in their mission. On the other hand, the law 
that traces its roots to, and espouses ideolo-
gies of, the old regime cannot be trusted. As 
political always prevails over the legal, law 
must reflect the political at all times, not the 
other way around. The resort to court thus 
becomes a mere technical device for dispos-
ing of a vanquished rebel. It may signify a 
more or less concerted effort to rid the com-
munity of its stock of political foes, or it may 
be directed towards creating effective polit-
ical images.21
So understood political justice is the domain 
of populist constitutionalism and chimes in 
well with the avowed objective of constitu-
tional capture: taking over institutions and 
making them “our institutions”. Political 
justice that is intuitive and plays on emo-
tions and fleeting grievances along the lines 
of “we the righteous” will now go after the 
corrupt and rotten elites that have been op-
pressing the silent majority. The normal 
course of proceedings, following the rules, 
is derided as a ritual devoid of meaning, one 
that strips the popular sense of justice of its 
essence. People neither understand nor care. 
:KDWPDWWHUV LV WKH YLVXDO WKH JXLOW\PXVW
be found and punished, and it must be in the 
public eye with pomp and circumstance. The 
contact between the political power and the 
people must be direct, immediate, instan-
taneous. Planned justice understood as fol-
lowing the rules is tainted by its uncertainty 
and slowness, both held in low esteem by the 
politics of resentment as mere legal techni-
calities that deceive the public and serve the 
wealthy. 
In the trajectory of constitutional develop-
ments, 2018 in Poland was about much more 
than cases that were decided. It was as much 
about dangerous processes launched and 
snowballing abuse of judicial review. The 
Court accepted its new role to act as an ex-
tension of the will of the Parliament, whose 
main role is to minimise uncertainty and 
deliver decisions that are swift and predict-
able from the vantage point of the political 
majority. The most important and ominous 
constitutional takeaway from Poland in 2018 
is that judicial institutions do indeed become 
increasingly relevant to political life in au-
thoritarian polities.22 The Polish Constitu-
tional Court is the prime example of how 
courts matter to authoritarian regimes. The 
Court is now gripped by, and fully at the ser-
vice of, political justice and the politics of 
17 T. T. Koncewicz, ‘The Politics of Resentment and First Principles in the European Court of Justice’, in in: F. Bignami, (ed.,), ,<3H^PU7VW\SPZ[;PTLZ*YPZLZHUK
Prospects, (Cambridge University Press, 2019).  
18 K. L. Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’ (2018) 85;OL<UP]LYZP[`VM*OPJHNV3H^9L]PL^ 545. 
19-VYPTWVY[HU[JSHYPÄJH[PVUZHSZV7)SVRRLYº7VW\SPZ[*VUZ[P[\[PVUHSPZT»=LYMHZZ\UNZISVN May 4, 2017, http://verfassungsblog.de/populist-constitutionalism/.  
20 O. Kirchheimer, 7VSP[PJHS1\Z[PJL;OL<ZLVM3LNHS7YVJLK\YLZMVY7VSP[PJHS,UKZ (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 419.
21 Ibid, p. 423.
22 T. Moustafa, T. Ginsburg, ‘Introduction: The Functions of Courts in Authoritarian Politics’, in T. Ginsburg, T, Moustafa, (eds.), R\SLI`3H^!;OL7VSP[PJZVM*V\Y[ZPU
(\[OVYP[HYPHU9LNPTLZ (Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 2. 
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resentment. And 2019 shapes up already as 
a continuation of these dark dynamics and 
processes. Therefore, and unfortunately so, 
“Polish capture story to be continued” … 
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I. INTRODUCTION
ZDVDVLJQL¿FDQW\HDUDVWKH3RUWXJXHVH
Constitutional Court (PCC) repositioned it-
self as a non-deferent Court and as a faith-
ful guardian of constitutional fundamental 
rights and liberties. As Jorge Pereira da Silva 
provocatively stated, “the Portuguese Consti-
tutional Court is back!”2 After years of what 
some labelled the “judicial activism” of the 
jurisprudence of crisis—during and after the 
2011-2014 bailout—that, for better or worse, 
hit the news and scholarship internation-
ally, the PCC seemed more silent and cau-
WLRXVWRZDUGVWKHOHJLVODWRU:LWK5XOLQJQR
225/2018, the Court declared that the legisla-
tive power can change the legal framework of 
assisted reproductive techniques if protection 
to the most vulnerable parties to a contract of 
gestation by substitution—the children and 
the surrogate mother—is granted. 
:HFDQWUXO\VWDWHWKDWZDVWKH\HDURI
family rights, since many rulings consisted of 
major constitutional developments regarding 
the subjects of family life, development of 
one’s personality, right to personal identity 
and human dignity.   
It was foreseeable that 2018 would be the 
year of a much-awaited electoral system 
reform that would create more favourable 
conditions for a closer relationship between 
voters and their representatives within con-
stituencies. Yet, the recent rejection of a 
popular initiative to reform the Portuguese 
electoral system shows that the main political 
parties are still strongly divided over the right 
path towards achieving that goal. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Surrogacy 
Ruling no. 225/2018—“surrogacy”/“gesta-
tion by substitution”—can be considered a 
landmark in the Portuguese Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence.3 The rapporteur was 
Justice Pedro Machete, and out of the twelve 
remaining Justices, only one did not sub-
PLW D FRQFXUULQJ RSLQLRQ UHJDUGLQJ VSHFL¿F
grounds of the decision. This comes as no 
surprise at all when a Constitutional Court 
faces very problematic subjects, since it is 
not immune to societal, religious, ethical and 
ideological worldviews.  
The ruling, in tune with the PCC’s ex post 
abstract review, is exhaustive (almost 100 
SDJHVLQWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRIWKHRI¿FLDOMRXUQDO
³'LiULRGD5HS~EOLFD´RULQDQRUPDO:RUG
document, around 200 pages4) and very well 
JURXQGHGZLWKVLJQL¿FDQW&RPSDUDWLYH&RQ-
stitutional (case) Law references.5
1 I am grateful to Justice Gonçalo Almeida Ribeiro (Portuguese Constitutional Court) for his helpful sugges-
tions. The usual disclaimers apply.  
2 < https://www.publico.pt/2018/05/06/sociedade/opiniao/barrigas-de-aluguer-o-constitucional-es-
[HKL]VS[H%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
3 [OVM(WYPS#O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JLUHJVYKHVZZO[TS%HJJLZZLK
February 2019. 
4 #O[[WZ!KYLW[HWWSPJH[PVUÄSLH%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
5 See Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Is there a middle ground between constitutional patriotism and constitutional 
cosmopolitanism? The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the use of foreign (case) law’, in G. F. Ferrari (ed.), 
<ZLVM-VYLPNUHUK*VTWHYH[P]L3H^I`*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS:\WYLTL*V\Y[Z)YPSS5PQOVɈ 
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From 2006 onwards, any woman (regardless 
of her civil status or sexual orientation) could 
access assisted reproductive techniques, ex-
cept surrogacy.6 Ten years later, the new Law 
on Medically Assisted Procreation (hereinaf-
ter Law on MAP)7 evolved from conceiving 
assisted reproduction as “a subsidiary con-
ceiving mechanism” to “an alternative meth-
od of procreation for women.”8
7KH¿UVWYHWRRIWKH3RUWXJXHVH3UHVLGHQWRI
the Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, was 
precisely the veto on the introduction of sur-
rogacy, grounded on the opinions of the Na-
tional Council of Ethics for the Life Sciences 
DQGRQWKHLQVXI¿FLHQF\RIWKHSURWHFWLRQRI
children’s rights. After the veto, the President 
sent the law back to the Parliament for revi-
sion. However, many of the President’s con-
cerns were not fully taken into consideration. 
:KHQWKHODZZDVVHQWEDFNWRWKH3UHVLGHQW
for promulgation, he neither vetoed the law 
nor did he start a preventive abstract review 
of constitutionality.9
It was instead a Group of Parliament Deputies 
from centre-right (PSD) and right (CDS) par-
ties that requested an ex post abstract review 
of the constitutionality of the Law on MAP.10
In question were the following issues: “(i) the 
insertion in the Law on MAP of a number of 
norms with regard to surrogate gestation; (ii) 
the rule of anonymity of donors and that of 
the surrogate mother vis-à-vis those born as 
a result of MAP methods; and (iii) the rule 
that waives the H[RI¿FLR investigation of the 
paternity of a child whose mother, regardless 
of her marital status and sexual orientation, 
has resorted to MAP techniques.”11
2QWKH¿UVWWRSLFWKH3&&KDGWRGHFLGHRQ
the admissibility of the right to start a family 
with recourse to surrogate gestation in cases 
where becoming a parent could not otherwise 
occur due to clinical grounds that were an 
impediment to pregnancy. In other words, the 
Court had to stand either in favour or against 
surrogate gestation. The PCC held that sur-
rogate gestation did not violate the “dignity 
of the pregnant woman, of the child born as 
a result of this method or the obligations of 
the State towards the protection of children”, 
since surrogacy is legalised as “an excep-
tional method of procreation, subject to the 
autonomous consent of the interested parties 
and decided upon by means of an altruistic 
agreement, subject to the prior authorisation 
of an administrative authority.” More blunt-
ly, surrogacy, which shares some similarities 
ZLWKWKHDGRSWLRQ¿JXUHEHLQJLQWKLVFDVH
a “scheduled adoption”) was considered con-
stitutionally valid.12   
Nevertheless, although surrogacy per se was 
not considered unconstitutional, the PCC 
invalidated several norms of MAP: (a) the 
norms that established the limits for the au-
tonomy of the parties as well as the restric-
tions that could be imposed on the behaviour 
of the surrogate mother in the surrogate ges-
tation agreement were too indeterminate, 
therefore violating the principle of determin-
ability of the law, which is a corollary of the 
principle of the democratic rule of law;13 (b) 
the norm that did not allow for the revoking 
of the consent of the surrogate mother from 
the beginning of MAP therapeutic proce-
dures until the child was delivered to the ben-
H¿FLDULHVZDV LQEUHDFKRI WKH fundamental
right to the development of one’s personality, 
interpreted in accordance with the principle 
of the dignity of the human person, and of 
the right to start a family;14 (c) as the legal 
regime did not allow for a consolidation of 
legal positions of persons as a result of a sur-
rogate gestation agreement being declared 
null and void—as parents, as son/daughter—
nor differentiate according to the time or 
seriousness of the grounds invoked in order 
for the agreement to be declared invalid, it 
violated the right to personal identity and the 
principle of legal certainty arising from the 
principle of democratic rule of law.15
The Court therefore stated that the right to re-
gret needed to be granted. If not, the surrogate 
PRWKHUZRXOGEHVKDGRZHGDQGREMHFWL¿HGWR
a mere live “incubator”. This would degrade 
women’s dignity as inferior to men’s and 
therefore violate the equality principle.16 It 
is worth mentioning that besides sanctioning 
the fact that the Law on MAP did not foresee 
a right to regret, the PCC also provided some 
guidelines for future legislative amendments 
that would be in tune with the Portuguese 
Constitution. If the separation of powers is 
the bulwark of democratic and balanced so-
cieties, it is not at stake when constitutional 
courts interact with sovereign organs (such 
as the legislator) in order to offer (and not 
to impose), in a cooperative dialogue, some 
guidelines or even a “guiding compass”17 for 
hard cases.  
As I have written elsewhere: “It is quite an 
illusion or a fallacy to separate, with a per-
IHFWGLYLGLQJOLQHODZIURPSROLWLFV:HFDQ
perform conceptual divisions and undertake 
complex line-drawing manoeuvres, but in 
the end there will always be some kind of in-
6 Law 17/2006, of 20 June. 
7 Law 32/2006, of 26 July.
8 Teresa Violante, ‘(Not) Striking Down Surrogate Motherhood in Portugal’ (=LYMHZZ\UNZISVN, 2018), < https://verfassungsblog.de/not-striking-down-surrogate-moth-
LYOVVKPUWVY[\NHS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
9 That could be possible through Articles 278 and 279 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
10 In accordance with Articles 281 and 282 of the Portuguese Constitution.
11 #(]HPSHISLH[!O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JLUHJVYKHVZZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
12 Paras. 12 to 17.
13 Articles 8 (4), (10) and (11) and, therefore, Article 8 (2) and (3) of the MAP. 
14 Article 8 (8) in conjunction with Article 14 (5). 
15 Article 8 (12). 
16 See the articles of Paulo Otero and João Carlos Loureiro cited in the PCC ruling. 
17 Fernando Alves Correia, 1\Z[PsH*VUZ[P[\JPVUHS (Almedina, 2019) 414. 
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tersection.18 Notwithstanding areas of signif-
icant blurriness, the reign of politics should 
refrain from overpowering the reign of law. 
Macro-economic decision-making pertains 
to democratic deliberation and popular sov-
ereignty, albeit fertile exchanges of ideas 
amongst state powers is always welcome”.19  
Regarding the rule of donor/surrogate moth-
er anonymity, the PCC found no violation of 
the  dignity of the human person. However, 
and in contrast with the position it had de-
fended in Ruling no. 101/2009 and in tune 
with the dissenting opinion of Justice Ben-
jamim Rodrigues,20 the PCC highlighted the 
growing importance attributed to the right 
to know one’s origins. In this sense, it ruled 
that “the legislator’s option for the rule of 
the anonymity of the donors in the case of 
heterologous procreation, as well as that of 
the surrogate mother (...) although not abso-
lute, imposed an unnecessary limitation on 
the fundamental rights to personal identity 
and to the development of the personality of 
persons born as a result of MAP techniques 
using donated gametes or embryos, namely 
in cases of surrogate gestation.” In my per-
spective, this ruling should be praised for not 
ignoring children’s right to their identity in 
order to protect donors or surrogates’ ano-
nymity. Furthermore, several North Europe-
an states (except Denmark) and Anglo-Sax-
on states have either already reversed their 
legislation on donors/surrogates anonymity 
or altered it, adopting dual systems with the 
SRVVLELOLW\RILGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
:LWK UHJDUG WR WKH IRXUWK DQG ODVW WRSLF
the waiver of the H[RI¿FLR investigation 
of paternity in respect of a child born to a 
woman who has engaged in MAP individ-
ually (outside the context of a marriage or 
of a non-marital partnership) in order to get 
pregnant, the PCC found no violation of the 
constitutional principles and rights invoked 
(principle of the dignity of the human per-
son, principle of equality and right to per-
VRQDO LGHQWLW\ ,W KHOG WKDW ³LQ WKH VSHFL¿F
circumstances where it was envisaged, such 
investigation would be pointless since the 
donor could not legally become the father 
of the born child even in the case where his 
identity was known”.
It is very important to stress that the elimi-
nation of the norms deemed unconstitution-
al with a general binding force (Article 282 
(1) of the Portuguese Constitution) would 
imply that all surrogate gestation agree-
ments already authorised by the National 
Council for Medically Assisted Procreation 
(NCMAP) would have to be subsequently 
overruled. Nevertheless, using the possi-
bility of restriction of effects given by the 
following paragraphs of Article 282, the 
PCC unanimously decided, on grounds of 
legal certainty and in compliance with the 
State’s obligation to protect children, that 
“the effects of the declaration of unconsti-
tutionality would not apply to the surrogate 
gestation agreements authorised by the NC-
MAP in execution of which the medically 
assisted procreation procedures referred to 
in Article 14 (4) of Law 32/2006, of July 26 
had already been initiated.”
This confusion could have been avoided if 
the President of the Republic had exercised 
his right to ask for a preventive constitution-
al review before the Law on MAP entered 
into force, in accordance with Articles 278 
and 279 of the Portuguese Constitution. 
2. Failed electoral reform in Portugal 
The increasing level of electoral abstention 
DQGWKHGHFOLQLQJOHYHOVRIFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKH
political system and political actors are relat-
HGWRWKHFLWL]HQV¶ODFNRILGHQWL¿FDWLRQZLWK
the current party system.21
The debate over electoral system reform has 
gone on since the Portuguese transition to de-
mocracy (1976/78), but it has become more 
intense over the last two decades. Portugal 
has a “proportional representation system”, 
and this proportional representation system 
is also found in an entrenchment clause, as 
stated in Article 288, h).22
Although the constitutional amendment of 
1997 allowed proposals for a closer relation-
ship between constituents and their repre-
sentatives within constituencies that would 
change a stricto sensu proportional system 
to a mixed one (with single-member dis-
tricts and a national constituency as compen-
sation), there seems to be an obstacle. The 
main critique is the closed list system and 
the fact that some districts return a very large 
number of deputies. 
The major political parties agree that the 
system must change, but in the end, they 
cannot reach consensus on the appropriate 
electoral reform path: A mixed-member sys-
tem with some single member districts or a 
multiple-tier system with small multimem-
EHUFRQVWLWXHQFLHVDWWKHORZHUWLHU"5HGXFH
the number of Deputies or maintain it (180 
WR'HSXWLHV"6WXGLHVVKRZWKDWWKHSHU-
sonalization of the vote raises political fears, 
such as “parochialism, clientelism and par-
ty-political polarization”; the fear of “losing 
control of the selection of candidates”; “in-
tra-party divisions”; and the ‘fear of the un-
known’”. As any constitutional amendment 
must be approved by “a majority of two-
thirds of the Members of the Assembly of the 
5HSXEOLFLQIXOOH[HUFLVHRIWKHLURI¿FH´$U-
ticle 286/1 of the Portuguese Constitution), a 
wide political consensus is needed.23
18 Jutta Limbach, ‘The Law-Making Power of the Legislature and Judicial Review’, 3H^4HRPUN3H^-PUKPUNHUK3H^:OHWPUN!;OL+P]LYZL0UÅ\LUJLZ 174 (Oxford 
University Press, 1997).  
19 Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Aspirational constitutionalism, social rights prolixity and judicial activism: trilogy or trinity?’ (2017) 3 (4) CALQ 87. 
20 #O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JLUHJVYKHVZ ZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` ;OL*V\Y[Z[H[LK[OH[¸[OLVW[PVU^OPJO[OLSLNPZSH[P]LH\[OVYP-
[PLZJOVZL^OLU[OL`LZ[HISPZOLKHTP[PNH[LKYLNPTLNV]LYUPUNKVUVYHUVU`TP[`JHUUV[ILJYP[PJPZLKMYVTHJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSWVPU[VM]PL^¹
21 The think-action tank ‘Portugal Talks’ theme for 2018 was ‘Voter Turnout in Portugal: diagnosis and possible solutions’. See < https://www.pttalks.pt/en/homep-
HNL%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
22 For a deeper understanding of the Portuguese entrenchment clauses, see Catarina Santos Botelho, ‘Constitutional Narcissism on the Couch of Psychoanalysis: 
Constitutional Unamendability in Portugal and Spain’ ((2019) 21 (3) EJLR 346) ,\YVWLHU1V\YUHSVM3H^9LMVYT. < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
Z[YHJ[FPK$%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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In 2018, the Association for Economic and 
Social Development and the Association for 
a Quality Democracy presented a popular ini-
tiative to reform the electoral system.24 This 
new channel of political participation must 
be praised. A concrete avenue of change, it 
also had a major advantage: all the electoral 
reform proposals were designed to not re-
quire a constitutional amendment. In other 
words, the proposals were conceived with-
in the Portuguese constitutional framework. 
Not surprisingly, though, the Parliament just 
recently rejected it and delayed this discus-
sion until after the legislative elections.25
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Ruling 242/2018: Right of for-profit (or lim-
ited liability) legal persons to legal aid
At the request of the Public Prosecutor, the 
Constitutional Court declared Article 7(3) of 
the Law on Access to the Law and the Courts 
unconstitutional.26 The norm under appreci-
ation denies legal protection, which encom-
SDVVHVOHJDODGYLFHDQGOHJDODLGWRIRUSUR¿W
(or limited liability) legal persons regardless 
RIWKHLUVSHFL¿FHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQ27 No in-
quiry is done in order to understand if they 
objectively are in a condition to pay the pro-
ceedings costs in a timely manner. 
Article 20 (1) of the Portuguese Constitution 
grants all subjects of law the right of access 
to the courts. A fundamental dimension of 
this right is, therefore, the prohibition of the 
GHQLDORIMXVWLFHRQDFFRXQWRIRQH¶VLQVXI¿-
FLHQW¿QDQFLDOUHVRXUFHV
If, previously, the PCC had excluded for-prof-
it legal persons from the scope of protection 
of Article 20 (1) solely on the basis of their 
legal nature,28 the PCC reversed its jurispru-
dence and applied the EU law and interna-
tional regional law (European Convention 
on Human Rights) as more than obiter dicta. 
In fact, the PPC stated that “nothing in the 
case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) precludes the granting of le-
JDODLGWRIRUSUR¿WOHJDOSHUVRQV´DQGWKHQ
interpreted the Portuguese Constitution in 
consonance with the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, in particular 
“the latest developments in the interpretation 
of Article 47 (1) of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (here-
inafter Charter), on the right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial”. In this sense, “the 
right to effective judicial protection guaran-
teed by Article 47 of the Charter may require 
WKHJUDQWLQJRIOHJDODLGWRIRUSUR¿WOH-
gal persons, without this being considered as 
dysfunctional in relation to the competition 
UXOHVLQDQHI¿FLHQWPDUNHW´
2. Ruling 242/2018: Mental disabilities and 
equality principle 
In a concrete review case, the PCC decided 
that the rule of Article 131 (1) of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, which establishes 
the absolute incapacity to testify of a person 
with mental disability, even as a victim or of-
fender of a crime, infringes the principle of 
equality (Article 13 of the Constitution) with 
regard to the prohibition of discrimination 
and the right to a fair trial, enshrined in Arti-
cle 20 (4) of the Constitution in conjunction 
with the principle of proportionality (Article 
2 of the Constitution).29
The Court considered that Article 131 (1) 
treats “all psychic anomalies radically and 
LQ WKH VDPHZD\ UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH VSHFL¿F
and concrete degree of their respective ca-
pacity to testify on any event in criminal pro-
FHHGLQJVZKLFKLVQRWVXEMHFWWRYHUL¿FDWLRQ
VSHFL¿HG LQ WKH LQWHUGLFWLRQ SURFHVV« ,W
happens, however, that in many situations, 
the mental health of the person, and the re-
spective degree of affection of cognition or 
volition, taken into account in the evaluation 
of the presuppositions of judicial interdic-
tion, do not project relevantly on the capaci-
ty (…) to understand and respond with truth 
to the questions put to him, in order to obtain 
a reliable account of facts that he observed 
RU H[SHULHQFHG«:H DUH WKHUHIRUH IDFHG
with a legislative measure which not only vi-
olates the principle of proportionality, in its 
¿UVW WZR WHVWV²VXLWDELOLW\ DQG QHFHVVLW\²
but also proves to be discriminatory in re-
lation to a category of persons—the victims 
of research crimes declared to be prohibited 
by psychic anomalies—showing as we have 
VHHQ ODFNLQJVXI¿FLHQWJURXQGVIRU WKHGLI-
ferent treatment that operates”.30
3. Ruling 488/2018: Dismissal of paternity 
proceedings
In its Ruling no. 23/2006, the PCC ruled that 
the previous text of Article 1817 § 1 of the 
Civil Code,31 which established a two-year 
time limit from the date of reaching the age 
of majority or the date of emancipation of 
the minor for the exercise of his or her right 
23 André Freire and Manuel Meirinho, ‘Institutional Reform in Portugal: From the Perspective of Deputies and Voters Perspectives’ (2012) Pôle Sud 107-125. 
24 #O[[WZ!^^ ^KUW[S\ZHPU[LYPVYHZZVJPHJVLZZLKLZLHWKXSHUJHTPUPJPH[P]HKLJPKHKHVZLWL[PJHVWHYHYLMVYTHLSLP[VYHS  O[TS%HJJLZZLK 
February 2019. 
25 #O[[WZ!^^ ^KUW[LKPJHVKVKPHML] PU[LYPVYWZLWZKJO\TIHTYLMVYTHKVZPZ[LTHLSLP[VYHSO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
26 Law 34/2004 of July 29, amended with the wording of conferred by Law 47/2007 of 28 August.
27 4H`#O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JLUHJVYKHVZZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
28 9\SPUN#O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JHJVYKHVZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
29 #O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JHJVYKHVZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
30 Para. 7. 
31 Adopted by Decree-law no. 496/77 of 25 November 1977.
32 #O[[W!^^ ^[YPI\UHSJVUZ[P[\JPVUHSW[[JHJVYKHVZO[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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to start paternity proceedings, violated the 
right to family and to know one’s biological 
parents (Articles 26 § 1 and 36 § 1 of the 
Constitution).32  Articles 1873 and 1817 § 1 
of the Civil Code now determine that a claim 
for establishing paternity can be brought at 
any time until the child reaches the age of 
majority.33 However, the right to seek pater-
nity recognition by judicial decision lapses 
ten years after the person has attained the age 
of majority.34
After the legislative amendment of the pre-
vious short-time limit (the two-year time 
limit was upgraded to a ten-year time limit), 
the PCC was again called upon to rule on 
whether Article 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code 
was compatible with the Constitution.35 The 
Court ruled (by seven votes to six) that the 
provision in question was not disproportion-
ate in that it did not violate the constitutional 
right to know one’s biological parents. The 
Court argued that “there was a public inter-
est in having both biological and legal pa-
ternity established as soon as possible” and 
that  “there was an interest in ensuring legal 
certainty in respect of the putative father and 
his family due to the personal and patrimonial 
consequences of the recognition of paternity”.
In the case of Silva and Mondim Correia 
v. Portugal, the applicants alleged that the 
dismissal of the paternity proceedings con-
stituted a breach of their rights under Ar-
ticle 8 of the Convention.36 The European 
Court of Human Rights ruled that the ap-
SOLFDQWV ³KDG VKRZQ DQ XQMXVWL¿DEOH ODFN
of diligence in instituting paternity pro-
FHHGLQJV LQ WKDW WKH\ KDGZDLWHG ¿IW\ DQG
twenty-six years, respectively, since reach-
ing the age of majority to seek to have their 
paternity legally established”.37 The Court 
found no violation of the right to respect for 
their private and family life under Article 
8 of the Convention, “given the margin of 
appreciation afforded to States in respect of 
paternity proceedings legislation, the non 
absolute nature of Article 1817 § 1 of the 
Portuguese Civil Court, and the case-law of 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court”.  
In the recent Ruling 488/2018, the PCC, in 
a concrete review case, stated that Articles 
1873 and 1817 § 1 of the Civil Code violated 
Articles 18 § 2, 26 § 1 and 36 § 1 of the Con-
stitution on the grounds that the requirement 
for protection of the interests pertaining to 
the investigating party should not be limited, 
and that even if it were, such limitation was 
QRWMXVWL¿HGZKHQWKHSURSRUWLRQDOLW\RIWKH
YDULRXVFRQÀLFWLQJLQWHUHVWVZDVZHLJKHG38
According to Article 79 § 1 of the Law of the 
Constitutional Court, since in this concrete 
review ruling the Court decided “there has 
been unconstitutionality (…) in a manner 
different to what was previously adopted for 
the same rule by any of the Court’s sections” 
(in the case, contrary to Ruling 401/2011), 
“an appeal can be made on this decision 
before the Court’s plenary, compulsory for 
the State Attorney when he intervenes in the 
case as appellant or respondent”.39
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
In 2019, there will be three main elections: 
the European Parliament elections (in May), 
the regional elections for the Parliament of 
Madeira (in September), and the elections 
for the Parliament of the Portuguese Repub-
lic (in October). Also, the Portuguese Con-
stitutional Court will most likely decide on 
recent legislation (or legislative projects) 
regarding the following issues: (a) access to 
metadata (data about data) by information 
services of the Portuguese Republic; (b) le-
galisation of cannabis; and (c) legalisation of 
prostitution.
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ROMANIA
I. INTRODUCTION
In Romania, the 2018 constitutional year 
came with a failed attempt to revise the Con-
stitution. The trend of conflicts between the 
President and the Government we noted in 
2017 experienced a dramatic escalation and 
resulted in further limitations to the powers 
of the President, while controversies related 
to the changes in the laws on the judiciary 
and to the case law of the Constitutional 
Court continued. Significantly more often 
than during previous years, the Constitution-
al Court went beyond the limits of its juris-
diction, overstepping the realm of ordinary 
courts or replacing self-regulatory tools pro-
vided by the constitutional system and get-
ting involved in political questions.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1. Failed attempt to amend the Constitution 
through a popular initiative
The popular initiative to amend the Consti-
tution started in 2016 and ended through a 
failed referendum in 2018. Indeed, 2,6 mil-
lion citizens had signed an initiative to mo-
dify Article 48 of the Constitution as regards 
the definition of family to: “Family is based 
on the free consented marriage between a 
man and a woman” instead of the current 
formulation, “Family is based on the freely 
consented marriage between spouses”. Par-
liamentary debates took place in 2017 and 
2018 and encountered some procedural 
hurdles, including a misinterpretation of 
parliamentary standing orders duly noted 
by the Constitutional Court in Decision no. 
431/2017. Following the adoption of the 
popular initiative with a two-thirds majo-
rity of the total number of members of each 
chamber, the draft law went ex officio to the 
Constitutional Court, a compulsory step in 
the constitutional amendment procedure. In 
Decision no. 539/2018, the Constitutional 
Court maintained its opinion on the subs-
tantive issues as expressed in Decision no. 
580/2016, and stated that the new definition 
of the family is not contrary to the substan-
tive limit of the revision of the Constitution 
set forth by Article 152 (2), which says that 
no amendment can be proposed if it sup-
presses fundamental rights and freedoms or 
their guarantees. Restricting the right of mar-
riage to only heterosexual couples, excluding 
the same right for homosexual couples, was 
not considered by the majority of the Court 
as a “suppression” of a fundamental right or 
one of its guarantees, but declared a “mere 
precision” regarding the original intent of 
the constituent power. This last decision was 
accompanied by a separate opinion, in which 
a dissenting judge (Daniel Marius Morar) 
stated that “by replacing the gender-neutral 
expression ‘between spouses’ with ‘between 
a man and a woman’, [the text] is not only 
making a precision as regards the exercise 
of the fundamental right to marriage, as the 
majority claims. The express entrenchment 
of the condition of biologically different sex 
removes any other interpretation, by restrai-
ning in an impermissible manner the sphere 
of incidence of the institution of marriage 
and thus suppressing the right to marriage of 
same-sex couples”. 
Following the Constitutional Court’s de-
cision, the last step of the constitutional 
amendment procedure was organised, i.e., 
the compulsory referendum provided by Ar-
ticle 151(3) of the Constitution. The Govern-
ment decided to convene the voters on two 
days—6 and 7 October 2018—but, despite 
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that, only 21% of the voters participated. 
As the turnout quorum of 30%, required by 
Referendum Law no. 3/2000, had not been 
reached, the referendum was invalidated and 
the draft law amending the Constitution was 
not approved. 
The general approach of the Constitutio-
nal Court on this constitutional amendment 
seems to place the jurisdiction on the conser-
vative side regarding same-sex couples’ 
rights. However, it is important to stress that 
in 2018, on the same matter, the Court issued 
another decision which focused on the reco-
gnition in Romania of some effects (freedom 
of circulation within EU) of same-sex mar-
riages concluded abroad and of a derived 
right of residence (see below III.3.). The out-
come of this decision was heavily influenced 
by the ECJ case law and did not formally 
block the constitutional amendment proce-
dure, although it brought substantial changes 
in the interpretation of the right to private 
and family life protected by the Constitution.
2. Conflicts between the President and the 
Government 
The Romanian Constitution has provided for 
a directly elected President and a Govern-
ment invested by the Parliament upon the 
proposal made by the candidate for the posi-
tion of Prime Minister designated by the Pre-
sident (Article 85 of the Constitution). This 
requires cooperation between the two heads 
of the executive power while allowing for 
cohabitation in case they are not on the same 
side in political terms. A rather conflictual 
cohabitation has been taking place since the 
parliamentary elections of 2016, and in 2018 
it reached a new peak. This is reflected not 
only in the statistics pertaining to the case 
law of the Constitutional Court referring to 
laws in 2018 (43 decisions on a priori ju-
dicial review against 9 in 2017) but also in 
the area of decisions on legal conflicts of a 
constitutional nature. Out of the six (com-
pared to four in 2017) such decisions issued 
in 2018 at least two bear serious conse-
quences on the functioning of the political 
regime in Romania. 
In decision no. 875/2018, the Constitutio-
nal Court declared that a legal conflict of a 
constitutional nature did occur when the Pre-
sident refused to agree with the reshuffling 
of the Government proposed by the Prime 
Minister. Considering Article 85(2) of the 
Romanian Constitution, which provides that 
“In the event of government reshuffle or va-
cancy of office, the President shall dismiss 
and appoint, on the proposal of the Prime 
Minister, some members of the Govern-
ment”, the Court declared that the President 
does not enjoy discretionary powers in this 
respect and has to limit his evaluation only 
to legal considerations that might impede 
upon the reshuffle, otherwise s/he is obliged 
to follow the proposal made by the Prime 
Minister. Therefore, it ordered the President 
to immediately issue decrees for the vacancy 
of the respective positions of ministers and 
to provide the Government with written and 
argued answers as to why he is refusing to 
appoint the minister/s proposed by the Prime 
Minister. Thus, rather than being a complex 
political and strategic decision framed by 
constitutional provisions, the reshuffle of 
the Government has been transformed by the 
Court into a merely legal issue. 
In decision no. 358/2018, the President was 
ordered to dismiss a specific person from the 
position of head of a prosecutor’s office. In 
a procedure which, according to the law, is 
initiated by the Minister of Justice, has to 
receive an advisory opinion of the Superior 
Council of Magistracy and is ended through 
the decision of the President of Romania, 
the proposal made by the Minister of Justice 
to revoke the incumbent of the position of 
Head of the National Anticorruption De-
partment faced a negative advisory opinion 
of the Superior Council of Magistracy and 
a rejection from the President. The Minister 
of Justice asked the Constitutional Court to 
decide whether the motivated refusal of the 
President to accept his order triggered a le-
gal conflict of a constitutional nature able 
to create a blockage in the functioning of 
concerned public authorities. By declaring 
that such a conflict did exist and obliging 
the President to issue the revocation decree, 
the Constitutional Court trespassed several 
red lines: it accepted being notified by an 
authority that is not enabled by the Consti-
tution to alert it with regard to legal conflicts 
of a constitutional nature; it interfered with 
and blocked powers of administrative courts 
which, according to the law, are the only 
jurisdictions able to decide upon presiden-
tial decrees; it established that a minister 
in an appointed Government enjoys greater 
discretionary powers than a directly elected 
President of the republic; and it further dimi-
nished the powers of the President by expli-
citly limiting his attributions to only a check 
of legality over the proposal of the Minister 
of Justice and expressly declaring that the 
President cannot perform his own evaluation 
of the activity of the said prosecutor. This de-
cision of the Constitutional Court has been a 
turning point in the functioning of the poli-
tical regime in Romania: while the guardian 
of the Constitution has, apparently, trespassed 
its boundaries, the President of Romania re-
mained compliant with the principles of the 
rule of law and did issue the requested decree. 
3. The saga of the new laws on the judiciary
The major debate on the revision of laws 
pertaining to the judiciary that started in the 
second half of 2017 unfolded all along 2018 
and resulted in no less than 18 decisions of 
the Constitutional Court (spread between Ja-
nuary and October), a debate in the European 
Parliament on the threats to the rule of law in 
Romania in February 2018 (https://multime-
dia.europarl.europa.eu/en/threats-to-rule-of-
law-by-romanian-justice-debate_I150531-
V_v), the first Ad-hoc report on Romania 
(Rule 34) adopted by GRECO at its 79th Ple-
nary Meeting on 19-23 March 2018 (http://
www.just.ro/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
Greco-AdHocRep20182-Final-eng-Ro-
mania.pdf), and Preliminary Opinion no. 
924/2018 of the Venice Commission on the 
draft amendments to Law no. 303/2004 on 
the statute of judges and prosecutors, Law 
no. 304/2004 on judicial organization and 
Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior Coun-
cil of Magistracy (https://www.venice.coe.
LQWZHEIRUPVGRFXPHQWVGHIDXOWDVS["SGI-
file=CDL-PI(2018)007-e).
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All these internal and external evaluations 
of the controversial reform of the judicial 
sector concluded that the measures intended 
would represent an important setback for the 
rule of law in Romania. At the European le-
vel, comparisons with the current situation 
in Hungary and particularly in Poland have 
been made, to no effect. Indeed, some solu-
tions promoted by the Romanian package of 
laws pertaining to the reform of the judicia-
ry resembled ideas promoted by Polish laws 
adopted in 2017, particularly that of the an-
ticipated retirement of an important number 
of magistrates and the creation of a special 
unit within the General Prosecutor’s Office 
for the investigation of deeds of magistrates.
An impressive number of decisions issued 
by the Constitutional Court found many pro-
visions of these laws non-compliant with 
the Constitution. Thus, notified iteratively 
to the Court by the President of Romania, 
the High Court of Cassation and Justice and 
parliamentary opposition, Law no. 303/2004 
on the statute of judges and prosecutors has 
been checked through Decision nos. 45/2018, 
66/2018, 252/2018, 417/2018, 533/2018 and 
583/2018 and found wanting in most of them. 
The same happened with Law no. 304/2004 
on judicial organization through Decision 
nos. 33/2018, 67/2018, 250/2018, 357/2018, 
457/2018 and 483/2018 and, respectively, 
with Law no. 317/2004 on the Superior 
Council of Magistracy through Decision 
nos. 61/2018, 65/2018, 251/2018, 385/2018, 
530/2018 and 562/2018. In a nutshell, the 
Constitutional Court considered that the in-
dependence of magistrates was jeopardized, 
e.g., via provisions enhancing their profes-
sional responsibility and patrimonial liability; 
that the functioning of the judicial system was 
in peril, e.g., between the potential mass reti-
ring of magistrates with only 20 years of se-
niority and 45 years of age and the new rules 
pertaining to becoming a magistrate; and that 
the constitutional guarantees of the judicial 
authority were endangered through the syste-
mic weakening and segregation of the Supe-
rior Council of Magistracy.
None of these stopped the laws from coming 
into force, albeit slightly changed in compa-
rison to the initial intentions of their promo-
ters. Towards the end of 2018, the special 
unit within the General Prosecutor’s Office 
for the investigation of deeds of magistrates 
was created while a huge haemorrhage of 
magistrates retiring or simply switching po-
sitions with barristers started to severely im-
pair the functioning of the judicial system. 
Thorough effects of this reform are to be 
evaluated in the years to come.
In the process of discussing the package 
of laws on the reform of the judiciary, the 
Constitutional Court took the opportunity to 
further limit the powers of the President. In 
an attempt to limit the number of notifica-
tions it would receive on these controver-
sial drafts, the Court created what it called 
a “hypothetical deadline” for the President 
to notify the Court with a draft law before 
its promulgation. Thus, if before Decision 
no. 67/2018 the President could wait for the 
draft to actually reach his office and only 
then calculate the deadline of 20 days, res-
pectively 10 days within which he could no-
tify the Constitutional Court for an a priori 
control of constitutionality (according to Ar-
ticle 77 of the Constitution), after the afore-
mentioned decision the President has to act 
within 20 days, respectively 10 days after 
the Parliament ended the legislative proce-
dure (“hypothetical deadline”), irrespective 
of the fact that the opposition might have 
deferred the law to the Constitutional Court, 
thus preventing it from reaching the office of 
the President. 
4. The saga of the 5-judge panels of the Su-
preme Court
One of the consequences of the controver-
sial changes of the judiciary laws was the 
“saga” of the 5-judge panels in the criminal 
law section of the High Court of Cassation 
and Justice (HCCJ), which are competent to 
rule on appeals against the Supreme Court’s 
decisions pronounced as first instance. The 
matter at stake was the composition of the 
panels, a procedural step which could in-
fluence, if irregular, the outcome of impor-
tant high-level corruption criminal cases 
against politicians. The changes brought in 
2018 to the law on the organization of the 
judiciary required the draw of all members 
of the panels, whereas the current practice 
was the draw of only four members, with the 
fifth appointed ex officio according to a de-
cision from 2014 of the HCCJ Ruling Board. 
The designation of the panels is made at the 
beginning of each calendar year by a draw 
made by the president of the HCCJ. This rule 
was maintained in 2018 despite the entry 
into force of the new laws on the judiciary. 
The Prime Minister addressed the Constitu-
tional Court with a request to solve a “legal 
conflict of a constitutional nature” between 
the Parliament and the HCCJ on grounds 
that the Supreme Court refused to immedia-
tely apply a provision of a new law. The case 
UDLVHVVRPHSUHOLPLQDU\TXHVWLRQV:K\GLG
the Government decide to address the Court 
on a procedural matter that should and could 
be invoked and solved by the judiciary it-
VHOI":K\KDVWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWEHHQ
seized by the Prime Minister and not by the 
Parliament, since the so-called “conflict” 
ZDVRQHEHWZHHQ WKH ODWWHU DQG WKH+&&-"
This is not an inadmissibility cause per se, 
but the answer to these questions may be lin-
ked to some of the corruption cases pending 
at the 5-judge panels, one of which regards 
the president of the Chamber of Deputies. 
In its attempt to evaluate the legal or consti-
tutional nature of the conflict (and establish 
its competence to solve it), the Constitutional 
Court declared that, by solving this conflict, 
it practically substituted ordinary citizens, 
who would otherwise be compelled to seek 
justice in courts due to allegedly unlawful 
FRQGXFWRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW:KHWKHUWKLV
is the role of a constitutional court in a rule 
of law and separation-of-powers-based state 
remains to be debated. The Court grounded 
its decision of acknowledging a constitutional 
conflict on the fact that “when an authority, 
by its concrete actions, opposes the legislative 
policy of the Parliament, it institutionally po-
sitions itself against the constitutional order, 
whose reestablishment can be achieved either 
by ordinary courts or by the Constitutional 
Court. (…) In the present case, potential indi-
vidual actions before ordinary courts, besides 
being a disproportionate burden for ordinary 
citizens, impose that such requests be sol-
ved by the same instance that generated the 
conflict, namely the HCCJ”. This was the jus-
tification of the Constitutional Court’s inter-
vention and final decision that there existed 
a conflict between the HCCJ and the Parlia-
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ment and that the Supreme Court should im-
mediately proceed to draw all members of the 
new 5-judge panels (Decision no. 685/2018). 
The story of this decision will continue in 
2019, as there were voices that claimed that 
all cases decided by the 5-judge panels, inclu-
ding those solved by final judgments, should 
be reopened by means of new legislation with 
retroactive effects.
III. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL 
CASES
1. The annulment of the Internal Ruling of 
the Constitutional Court on separate & con-
current opinions by the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal 
Last year’s report mentioned a controver-
sial Internal Ruling of the Constitutional 
Court which was meant to draw “the limits 
in which a constitutional judge may exer-
cise his/her legal right to write a dissenting 
or concurring opinion”. The Constitutional 
Court took the precaution to declare this In-
ternal Ruling of a jurisdictional nature, thus 
insulating it from potential administrative 
review. However, an administrative court in 
Bucharest took a different view. Based on a 
claim made by a young lawyer who argued 
that for the professional training of barris-
ters, dissenting or concurring opinions of 
judges of the Constitutional Court are highly 
relevant and have to be published in the Of-
ficial Journal at the same time as the deci-
sion they refer to, the administrative section 
of the Bucharest Court of Appeal proceeded 
to an in-depth analysis of the legal nature of 
the Internal Ruling and declared it to be an 
administrative act that contradicts impera-
tive provisions on the procedure of judicial 
review. Therefore, the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal annulled the Internal Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court on 20 June 2018 and 
obliged the constitutional jurisdiction to pu-
blish in the Official Journal of Romania the 
dissenting opinion that had been censored 
in 2017, which was done in Official Journal 
no. 1002/27 in November 2018. The issue 
made it to the Venice Commission’s Re-
port on Separate Opinions of Constitutional 
Courts, adopted at the 117th Plenary Session 
on 14-15 December 2018. (https://www.ve-
nice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.
DVS["SGIILOH &'/$'H
2. Organisation and functioning of state 
institutions
From the rich case law related to the func-
tioning of state institutions we have selected 
cases regarding the term of office of consti-
tutional judges and incompatibilities and in-
tegrity rules for public officers. 
In Decision no. 136/2018, the Court declared 
unconstitutional the provision of a draft law 
aimed at modifying its own organic Law 
no. 47/1992. Despite the express provision 
of Article 142(2) of the Constitution, which 
states that the nine-year term of office of 
judges at the Constitutional Court “cannot 
be prolonged or renewed”, the impugned 
provision of the law allowed a person who 
replaces a constitutional judge that ends his/
her term of office before nine years to be 
reappointed for a full-term office. The Court 
stated that such a possibility given by the law 
contravenes to the imperative prohibition of 
extension and renewal of the term of office 
of the members of the Constitutional Court. 
Another set of cases regarded the rules of in-
tegrity for public officers and dignitaries, in-
cluding parliamentarians. Thus, Parliament 
changed Law no. 161/2003 on transparency 
in the exercise of public offices and dignita-
ries and on the prevention and punishment 
of corruption, also known as the “law on in-
tegrity”, by abrogating the incompatibility 
between the quality of an individual trade-
owner and that of a public officer. This pro-
posed change was declared unconstitutional 
on grounds of lack of clarity and predictabi-
lity of the law, not on substantive grounds, 
in Decision no. 104/2018. The Court held 
that the legal regime of incompatibilities is 
regulated in several laws that are not clear or 
coherent and therefore the proposed change 
contravenes to the “quality of the law” re-
quirements indirectly set by the Constitution 
when it provides the principle of the rule of 
law. A similar reasoning was developed in 
Decision no. 682/2018, which declared the 
unconstitutionality of the changes to Law no. 
176/2010 of the National Integrity Agency. 
The impugned changes aimed at decreasing 
the statute of limitations period for actions 
against the incompatibility and conflict of 
interest offences committed by public offi-
cers when exercising their functions. Howe-
ver, the Court did not base its decision on the 
situation itself but on the erroneous wording 
used by the legislator. 
These two latter decisions are worth mentio-
ning also for the Court’s interesting remarks 
on the “constitutional identity” of Romania 
in the context of EU membership. The crea-
tion of the National Integrity Agency and the 
reinforcement of integrity legislation and 
anti-corruption measures were conditions 
imposed on Romania for its accession to the 
European Union, with progress to be moni-
tored via the Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism created by Decision 2006/98/
CE of the European Commission. In the 
mentioned cases, the author of the uncons-
titutionality complaints—in both cases, the 
President of Romania—invoked the fact 
that by mitigating disciplinary sanctions and 
rules against conflicts of interest and other 
corruption offences as well as by reducing 
the realm of incompatibilities, the Romanian 
legislator would be in breach of the obliga-
tions assumed through the act of accession. 
The Constitutional Court answered that 
“since the meaning of Decision 2006/928/
CE establishing a Cooperation and Verifica-
tion Mechanism has not been clarified by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union as 
regards its content, character and temporal 
limit and whether all these are circumscri-
bed to the provisions of the Treaty of acces-
1 The relevant provisions of Article 148 CR read as follows: ‘(1) Romania’s accession to the constituent treaties of the European Union, with a view to transferring 
certain powers to community institutions, as well as to exercising in common with the other member states the abilities stipulated in such treaties, shall be carried 
out by means of a law adopted in joint sitting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a majority of two-thirds of the number of deputies and senators. 
(2) As a result of the accession, the provisions of the constituent treaties of the European Union, as well as the other mandatory community regulations, shall take 
WYLJLKLUJLV]LY[OLVWWVZP[LWYV]PZPVUZVM[OLUH[PVUHSSH^ZPUJVTWSPHUJL^P[O[OLWYV]PZPVUZVM[OLHJJLZZPVUHJ[»ZV\YJL!VɉJPHS[YHUZSH[PVUH]HPSHISLVU[OL
ZP[LVM[OL*OHTILYVM+LW\[PLZH[O[[W!^^ ^JKLWYVWSZKPJZP[LWHNL&KLU$HJ[FWHY$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sion (...), the Decision cannot be considered 
as a reference norm within judicial review by 
virtue of Article 148 of the Constitution”.1  It 
therefore refused to interpret extensively the 
notion of “provisions of the act of accession” 
stipulated by the aforementioned constitutio-
nal text. As a result, the Court stated that when 
changing the “law on integrity”, save for total 
abrogation, the legislator is within its margin of 
appreciation given by the “constitutional iden-
tity” corroborated with national sovereignty 
and with the international obligations assumed 
under the Constitution.
3. Highlights of the Rights-based Review 
The law on national security was analysed 
by the Court from the point of view of the 
clarity of the provisions restricting the fun-
damental right to privacy through communi-
cation surveillance and interceptions. Thus, 
the provision that such interceptions can 
be made against any person, provided they 
are suspected of crimes that “seriously vio-
late the rights and freedoms of Romanian 
citizens”, was deemed unconstitutional for 
lack of clarity and predictability and for 
being too extensive by reference to the res-
tricted rights: “Given the fact that the law 
does not make any distinction, but refers 
generally to serious violations of rights and 
freedoms of Romanian citizens, regardless 
their quality as individual or collective vic-
tim, leads to the idea that any offence, with 
or without criminal connotation, can be cir-
cumscribed to such a violation” (Decision 
no. 91/2018). 
A very important decision for the protection 
of fundamental rights concerned the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages concluded abroad 
in conjunction with the freedom of residence 
on Romanian territory of EU citizens and 
their family members. The case had started 
in 2015, but in 2016 the Constitutional Court 
decided to address a preliminary question to 
the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
order to clarify, inter alia, the term “spouse” 
within the meaning of Directive 2004/38, 
read in the light of Articles 7, 9, 21 and 45 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and 
to answer if the Member States are required 
“to grant the right of residence in its territo-
ry for a period longer than three months to 
the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen” (see 
CJEU, Case C 673/16, Coman & Hamilton, 
Judgment of the Court, available at http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
MVI"WH[W 	GRFLG 	GRFODQJ (1
 Following the positive answer of the Euro-
pean Court, which stated that “Article 21(1) 
TFEU is to be interpreted as meaning that, 
in circumstances such as those of the main 
proceedings, a third-country national of the 
same sex as a Union citizen whose marriage 
to that citizen was concluded in a Member 
State in accordance with the law of that state 
has the right to reside in the territory of the 
Member State of which the Union citizen is 
a national for more than three months. That 
derived right of residence cannot be made 
subject to stricter conditions than those laid 
down in Article 7 of Directive 2004/38”. The 
Romanian Constitutional Court rendered its 
own decision (no. 534/2018) and held that 
“the relationship of a same-sex couple is 
included in the meaning of the notions of 
‘private life’ and ‘family life’, just like the 
relationship of a heterosexual couple, which 
makes applicable the fundamental right to 
private and family life protected by Article 7 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, by Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and by Article 26 of 
the Romanian Constitution”. Thus, the right 
of these persons to have their marriages 
concluded abroad be recognised for the pur-
pose of granting permanent residence cannot 
be restricted by Romanian authorities, and 
the Court interpreted the impugned Civil 
Code article to be constitutional only inso-
far as it allows the right of residence on Ro-
manian territory to the spouses in same-sex 
marriages concluded in a EU Member State.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2019
Some of the evolutions presented in 2018 
will remain on the agenda during 2019 as 
well, particularly the large-scale reform of 
the judicial system, which goes well beyond 
the three laws on its organisation and func-
tioning or criminal codes, and encompasses 
the still ongoing saga of the 5-judge panels at 
the Supreme Court and the recurrent issue of 
amnesty meant to absolve some politicians 
of criminal responsibility. 
Relations within the executive will most pro-
bably remain tense, and this will also be no-
ticed at the European Union since Romania 
will take over the rotating presidency of the 
EU Council as of 1 January 2019. 
In addition, in June 2019 the Constitutional 
Court will see its composition renewed with 
three judges, one to be appointed by the Pre-
sident and two to be appointed by the two 
houses of Parliament. 
Presidential elections are scheduled for De-
cember 2019, and the incumbent President 
has already announced his intention to run 
for office. According to most polls, he is fa-
voured by the majority of voters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The 25th anniversary of the Russian Consti-
tution was celebrated in December 2018. This 
is an opportunity to reflect both on the charac-
teristics and ‘solidity’ of the Russian constitu-
tional system and the role of its Constitutional 
Court, originally introduced on December 
15, 1990. Between 1991 and 1993, the Con-
stitutional Court acted within a constitutional 
framework and with competences that were 
different from its current ones. Furthermore, 
it demonstrated a more respectful attitude 
towards parliament. The role it plays within 
the context of the 1993 Constitution is differ-
ent, especially in the new political era which 
started between the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s.
Since then, the Constitutional Court has ex-
perienced a not entirely positive evolution, 
considering both legislative limitations and 
trends in jurisprudence. In this regard, the 
Court has shown a rather obsequious attitude 
towards the policies of the executive, such 
as its legitimizing the Chechen war and the 
incorporation of Crimea, and its favouring 
the clash with the Court of Strasbourg in po-
litically sensitive matters affecting important 
public interests, e.g., the Yukos case. A simi-
lar tendency can be observed in the case law 
on political rights, where the Court upheld 
the legislative restrictions on freedom of 
assembly and association while adopting a 
more assertive stance in economic and social 
rights, especially given the reduction of the 
latter as the Soviet welfare state disappeared.
In evaluating the context in which the Court 
has been operating over the past 25 years, 
we can observe the ‘extraneousness’ to the 
Russian legal system of a more considered 
approach to constitutional justice, working 
as a counterbalance to political power. This 
is evidenced by the supportive (or silent) 
behaviour of this institution when facing po-
litically sensitive issues. At the same time, 
other courts and public authorities continue 
to ignore the constitutional case law. The 
overall authority of the Court is not compa-
UDEOHZLWKWKDWRILWVFRXQWHUSDUWVLQ:HVWHUQ
countries. Despite this, or perhaps precisely 
because of it, it was decided to place on this 
Court the burden of responsibility to ‘defuse’ 
the rulings of the European Court of Human 
Rights that are unacceptable to the Russian 
executive.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
:LWKUHJDUGWRFRQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWV
the situation fluctuates between constitution-
al ‘stagnation’ and political calls for limited 
constitutional changes. Vyacheslav Volodin, 
the speaker of the State Duma and a prom-
inent exponent of the party ‘United Rus-
sia’, has recommended a few constitutional 
changes.1 He did not specify the content, but 
it is assumed that they are to legitimize the 
immediate re-election of the incumbent pres-
ident at the end of his fourth non-consecutive 
term. Putin pretends indifference towards 
these initiatives, accepting that the modifica-
tion of the fundamental law is not taboo and 
should be widely discussed within society.2
In this climate, Valery Zorkin, President of 
the Constitutional Court, in a long interview 
given in October to the government newspa-
per Rossijskaya Gazeta,3 put forward his po-
1 Speech delivered at the December 25, 2018, celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Russian Constitution.
2 Press conference, 20 December 2018: www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59455.
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sition on the subject, admitting the possibil-
ity of minor or very specific changes to the 
Constitution. Zorkin made a number of phil-
osophical observations around the concept 
of constitutional identity and the values un-
derlying the Russian Constitution, which in 
his mind counterbalance the ‘moral degener-
ation’ being brought about by globalization. 
This is a trend that has been emerging from 
his speeches in the last few years, one which 
urges a ‘nationalist’ and conservative stance 
DJDLQVW:HVWHUQFULWLFLVPRI5XVVLD1HYHU-
theless, in the interview there were critical 
references to the current configuration of 
power in Russia.
Firstly, Zorkin advised caution regarding 
the many calls from all sides for ‘cardinal’ 
constitutional changes. At the same time, 
he recognized the flaws of the Constitution: 
‘the absence of appropriate checks and bal-
ances, a preference for executive power, 
lack of clarity over distribution of powers of 
the President and the Government, as well 
as over the competences of the presidential 
administration and the powers of attorney’. 
How such significant defects of the power 
architecture could be remedied with limited 
but specific changes is not clear, but this is 
what Zorkin has proposed. The president of 
the Court also suggested using the ‘living 
Constitution’ doctrine to interpret the text 
in terms of the socio-political realities of the 
day. The Constitutional Court uses this doc-
trine in its interpretation of the Constitution, 
thus avoiding subjecting the text to disrup-
tive changes that would undermine its poten-
WLDOIRUµVRFLDOLQWHJUDWLRQ¶:LWKLQWKHLQWHU-
national context, the Constitution is a very 
important factor ‘to support and strengthen 
national identity, justified by the historical, 
socio-cultural and geopolitical peculiarities 
of Russia’s development’.
Speaking on behalf of the Court, Zorkin sup-
ported a proposition that had been gaining 
popularity among Russian intellectuals as 
well as the political elite. The idea was that 
in highlighting traditional national peculiari-
ties, it is necessary to reconcile the liberal-in-
dividualistic legal approach ‘today dominant 
in theory and in world practice’ with that of 
social solidarity. This legal approach ‘to the 
maximum extent corresponds to the mental-
ity of the people of Russia, to its legal and 
moral conscience’. According to Zorkin, the 
best solution would be ‘to merge the popular 
collectivism with a competitive economic 
and political environment’.
As inferred from the petitions to the Con-
stitutional Court, citizens are very worried 
about socio-economic problems, in particu-
lar the precarious protection of social rights. 
They were and are deeply concerned by 
social inequalities, and fatigued from three 
decades of reform much exacerbated by 
:HVWHUQVDQFWLRQV7KLV LVDQ LPSRUWDQWDV-
pect that cannot be ignored: many of today’s 
socio-economic difficulties derive from the 
unbalanced privatization of state assets in 
the 1990s, thus leading to an unequal dis-
tribution of wealth. Given Russian cultural 
traditions (the ‘community’ peasant and the 
Soviet communist past), it is understandable 
why 30 years following market reforms there 
is an overwhelming desire to reject the indi-
vidualistic idea of a lawless market as well 
as the inequalities caused by the concentra-
tion of public goods in the hands of very few. 
The same Constitutional Court is vigorous in 
protecting social and economic rights, espe-
cially those excluded from the privatization 
of assets of the former Soviet state.
In the last part of the interview, Zorkin fo-
cused on another subject that has become 
very popular in Russian legal doctrine in 
recent years, namely that of ‘constitutional 
identity’, which according to the judge is 
represented by the feeling the citizens expe-
rience by belonging to the same plurination-
al people who are united by ‘the common 
destiny on their own land’ (…preamble from 
the Constitution). 
In some respects, this identity can also in-
clude a European dimension (a sort of ‘re-
gional’ identity); in fact, however, it goes 
against a pan-European vision of shared 
legal values. At government level, Russian 
identity is the attempt to counter the erosion 
of national sovereignty and strengthen the 
constitutional identity of the state. Accord-
ing to Zorkin, citizens of the nation states 
are intolerant of supranational regulations as 
the democratic deficit of supranational bod-
ies becomes increasingly evident. In this, he 
included international organizations for the 
protection of rights to which Russia adheres: 
‘we need to highlight the democratic deficit 
of supranational bodies for the protection of 
human rights, including the European Court 
of Human Rights’.
This last statement brings to mind the fact 
that the clash between the Russian Consti-
tutional Court and the European Court of 
Human Rights began as far back as 2010. 
From that point on, the Russian Constitu-
tional Court and parliament have repeatedly 
refused to adhere to the requirements of the 
European Court of Human Rights in terms 
of both individual and general measures to 
be adopted (famous examples are the Mar-
kin, Anchugov & Gladkov and Yukos cas-
es). Over time, the scenario changed from a 
‘simple’ controversy about the relationship 
between the jurisprudence of the two courts 
(and therefore between the national consti-
tution and international treaties on human 
rights) and became a very complex debate 
about ‘sovereign’ countries, where the term 
sovereignism has become synonymous with 
‘authoritarianism’.
The position of the Constitutional Court is 
clear in asserting the unenforceability of 
the judgments of the ECtHR by resorting to 
rather convoluted legal reasoning. In fact, it 
does not challenge the European Convention 
itself, but rather its ‘evolutionary’ interpre-
tation by the Court of Strasbourg. The Trea-
ty was considered to be consistent with the 
Russian Constitution at the time of its sign-
ing and ratification. 
3 )\R]HPK\RO2VUZ[P[\[ZPPThe letter and the spirit of the Constitution), 9.10.2018, www.rg.ru/2018/10/09/zorkin-nedostatki-v-konstitucii-mozhno-ustranit-to-
chechnymi-izmeneniiami.html. 
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. General trends
As highlighted above, in recent years the 
Russian Constitutional Court has not ad-
dressed significant political issues, focusing 
instead on the protection of individual rights, 
especially in social and economic spheres. In 
fact, individual citizen petitions are predomi-
nant. In 2018, the Court issued 47 judgments 
and 3,489 ordinances. The majority of ap-
plicants were private citizens (including one 
foreigner from Vietnam). Other applicants 
included an association, a regional section of 
a political party, joint stock or limited liabil-
ity companies and some courts. On only two 
occasions have regional public institutions 
resorted to the Court. The laws challenged 
were mostly federal (the most disputed be-
ing the statute on the status of the military) 
and there were only two cases that examined 
the laws of subnational units. In 18 cases, the 
disputed provisions were declared totally or 
partially unconstitutional. The most contro-
versial case in 2018 was that of the internal 
border between the Republics of Inguscetia 
and Chechnya. The remaining cases con-
cerned social rights (employment, pensions, 
assistance to victims of Chernobyl), eco-
nomic rights (taxes), the status of the mili-
tary and foreigners.
2. Review of the constitutionality of the Law 
of the Republic of Ingushetia: ‘On Approval of 
the Agreement on Establishment of a Border 
between the Republic of Ingushetia and the 
Chechen Republic and the Agreement on Es-
tablishment of a Border between the Republic 
of Ingushetia and the Chechen Republic’
In its judgment of December 6, 2018, the 
Russian Constitutional Court was asked to 
resolve a rather thorny issue, namely the 
legitimacy of the agreement, reached fol-
lowing 26 years of negotiations between 
the (internal) Republics of Ingushetia and 
Chechnya,4 that established an administra-
tive border. During the Soviet period (from 
1934), Chechnya and Ingushetia were part 
of a single ‘Chechen-Ingush autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic’. Since their birth 
as two separate republics, which occured in 
1992,5 the administrative border has never 
been formally agreed to until the recent ac-
cord of 26 September 2018, promptly rati-
fied by the parliaments of both republics. 
The agreement provoked many tensions 
and protests in Inguscetia, whose popula-
tion felt itself disadvantaged. In fact they 
claimed that the agreement implied not a 
simple exchange of land6 but instead meant 
the transfer to Chechnya of significant an-
cestral burial sites. There are political and 
economic motivations behind these ancestral 
claims, which are deeply felt by the Russian 
Caucasus, itself a powder keg on the verge of 
conflict. Among them are firstly that the ter-
ritories ceded to Chechnya include oil fields 
(which should not be an economic advantage 
for Chechnya since natural resources fall un-
der federal ownership), and secondly and 
most importantly, that the population of In-
gushetia does not lose its administrative au-
tonomy by being reabsorbed by the Chechen 
Republic, whose leader Kadyrov is a loyalist 
ally of the Kremlin.
Regarding the legal aspects of the matter, the 
Constitutional Court trivialized the dispute 
by claiming that the agreement was purely 
formal and did not change the existing bor-
der. However, the issue is more complex, 
and the Court’s decision was both superficial 
from the point of view of legal arguments as 
well as hasty in that it ruled in record time, 
no doubt responding to civic unrest.
The Constitutional Court of Ingushetia had 
declared on October 30, 2018, at the request 
of a group of local deputies, that the agree-
ment was not consistent with the Constitution 
of the Republic, arguing that it should have 
been subject to a referendum. Furthermore, 
the standing orders of the regional assembly 
would have been violated. The Russian Con-
stitutional Court instead issued a rather Sol-
omonian decision. Although this was neces-
sary to put an end to long and complex nego-
tiations, there are many contradictory aspects 
from the point of view of legal reasoning. First 
of all, the Court underlined a difference be-
tween the initial ‘contours’ of the border and 
its ‘modification’. In the modifications to the 
border, both the Federation and its subjects 
should have been involved, especially the 
Council of the Federation and the local popu-
lation. However, in this discussion, according 
to the Court, the main question was the defini-
tion of the ‘original’ border. Consequently, the 
procedures followed to ratify the agreement, 
i.e., a simple parliamentary majority, were 
legitimate. There had been no modification 
of the municipalities’ contours, therefore no 
referendum was required. Furthermore, the 
subject of the contours was a federal constitu-
tional competence, not a regional or local one.
The emphasis on distinguishing between 
tracing the original contours and modify-
ing them seems to be based on weak legal 
arguments and is clearly aimed at avoiding 
breaking a fragile agreement. In fact, the 
border had existed for the last 26 years pri-
or to the 2018 agreement, which de facto 
changed it, partly seeking to recover territory 
that had been taken from Chechnya. Further-
more, the procedure for tracing the border 
was not clear and the deadlines indicated by 
federal legislation had long since expired. It 
also seems quite ironic that the procedure for 
the modification of the border ended up be-
4 ([[OLYLX\LZ[VM[OL/LHKVM[OL9LW\ISPJVM0UN\ZJL[PH;OLHWWSPJHU[HZRLKMVYJVUÄYTH[PVUVM[OLSLNP[PTHJ`VM[OLHJ[KLZWP[L[OLKLJPZPVUVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS
Court of Ingushetia. 
5 +\YPUN[OL[^V*OLJOLU^HYZPU[OL  Z0UN\ZOL[PHJOVZL[VYLTHPUWHY[VM9\ZZPH^OPSL*OLJOU`HZV\NO[PUKLWLUKLUJL-VSSV^PUN[OLZLWVZ[:V]PL[JVUÅPJ[Z
the leaders of the two republics signed agreements about the contours of the border that provided for the attribution of those areas that are currently being disputed 
[V0UN\ZOL[PH;OLHIZLUJLVMYH[PÄJH[PVUVM[OPZHNYLLTLU[I`LP[OLYWHY[`MVZ[LYLKHJSPTH[LVM[LUZPVUJH\ZLKI`YLJPWYVJHSJSHPTZ;OLSH[LZ[WYV[LZ[ZVM0UN\ZOL[PH
follow another historical case involving their nation, namely the war between Ingushetia and North Ossetia for the control of some border territories. Also in this case, 
Ingushetia had to renounce the reassignment of its historical territory in addition to seeing the local Ingush population subject to a real ethnic cleansing.
6 The agreement reassigned a mountainous and uninhabited area on the border, the Chechen district of Nadterechnyj, to Ingushetia. In exchange, an area of the Ingush 
district of Malgobyeksky was ceded to Chechnya (Chechnya acquired about 26,000 hectares of land while ceding only 1,000 to Inguschetia). www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.eu/
articles/44880. 
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ing far more draconian than the one used for 
its original creation.
:LWK UHJDUG WR WKH LQFRQVLVWHQF\ RI WKH UH-
public’s laws with its Constitution, the Rus-
sian Constitutional Court, while admitting 
that it was not competent to settle this con-
flict, considered that the judgment of the 
Court of the Republic was not executable. It 
cited two reasons: first, the aforementioned 
features of federal constitutional law, and 
second, the inadmissibility of the appeal by 
local deputies for failing to meet the mini-
mum number required.
Among the most obscure points of the de-
cision is one concerning the violation of the 
standing orders of the republican assembly. 
Given the considerations made around the 
adoption of federal laws, the Russian Con-
stitutional Court judged as legitimate a law 
adopted when ‘fundamental procedural pro-
visions are respected’, notwithstanding ‘mi-
nor’ violations of parliamentary standing or-
ders (three readings, secret vote, etc.).
Finally, the federal Constitutional Court 
claimed that the regional Constitutional 
Court could not examine a law ratifying an 
agreement since its proper role was to exam-
ine agreements before they enter into force, 
not to ajudicate on those already in force. 
However, it is worth noting that this is pre-
cisely what the federal Court did in 2015 
when it examined the constitutionality of the 
law of ratification of the ECHR, and there-
fore the ECHR itself, at a time when the Ac-
cession Treaty was already in force. 
3. Review of the constitutionality of Section 
15 of Article 239 of the Code of Administra-
tive Judicial Proceedings of the Russian Fed-
eration in connection with a complaint of the 
regional section of the political party ‘Fair 
Russia’ in the city of Saint Petersburg
In its judgment of November 15, 2018, the 
Court granted the regional section of a polit-
ical party, but not its individual candidates, 
the right to challenge the violation of the 
right to register and participate in elections. 
The regional party list failed to be registered 
due to gross misconduct by a member of the 
electoral commission. This gross and crimi-
nally prosecutable misconduct, forgiven by 
subsequent amnesty, amounted to the appel-
lant being delayed beyond the deadline for 
registering the party list and thus from taking 
part in the elections.
The challenged provisions allow an admin-
istrative appeal against the decisions of elec-
toral commissions for a long series of appli-
cants excluding unregistered candidates. Po-
litical parties can only appeal a formal deci-
sion by an electoral commission that refuses 
a party’s registration, which was not the case 
in this event. 
The electoral legislation and the Code of 
Administrative Judicial Proceedings of the 
Russian Federation do not provide a judicial 
remedy against the behavior of the mem-
bers of electoral commissions who commit 
crimes and are subsequently forgiven by 
amnesty. The Court enabled political parties 
to challenge electoral commission decisions 
detrimental to the electoral rights of the par-
ty and its unregistered candidates on whose 
behalf the party must appeal. The Court 
therefore considered that ‘The termination 
of the criminal prosecution of the official of 
the electoral commission for rehabilitation 
reasons makes unresolved the question (dis-
pute) concerning whether the candidates or 
lists presented by the electoral associations 
were not registered precisely following the 
unlawful action of this official. In this case, 
the electoral association must be granted the 
right to appeal, even after the expiry of the 
deadline provided for by Article 240, Section 
3 of the Code of Administrative Judicial Pro-
ceedings. This would be an administrative 
appeal asking to repeal the election commis-
sion’s certification of the election results’. 
According to the Court, this is the best way 
to assess how violations of electoral legisla-
tion affected the free expression of the will 
of voters and the objective evaluation of the 
vote’s results. At the same time, compen-
sation mechanisms to reinstate the violated 
rights could be enforced.
:KDW LV DVWRQLVKLQJ LQ WKLV GHFLVLRQ LV WKH
reference to an international act concerning 
electoral rights that was outside the frame-
work of the Council of Europe or OSCE, of 
which Russia is also a signatory, but with-
in that of the Community of Independent 
States: the CIS Convention on the Standards 
of Democratic Elections.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Constitutional challenges in the coming 
years could include, as stated above, ‘lim-
ited’ constitutional amendments very likely 
related to the mandates of the head of state. 
But the risk of further ‘sovereign’ closures 
at a political and constitutional level are far 
more worrying. Such attitudes, endorsed by 
the Constitutional Court, may lead Russia 
even further away from the standards of the 
rest of Europe.
The failure of the Constitutional Court is a 
product of the environment in which it op-
erates, characterized by a general weakening 
of the judiciary as evidenced by the elimina-
WLRQRI WKH+LJKHU&RXUWRI$UELWUDWLRQ:H
would not be astonished either by the possi-
ble suppression of the Constitutional Court 
and the transfer of its competences to a Su-
preme Court chamber (as proposed in some 
of the constitutional projects in 1993) or by 
Russia’s exit from the ECHR (as suggested 
by prominent Russian politicians). Howev-
er, despite the difficulties encountered by the 
Constitutional Court in gaining authority in 
the country and the increasing tensions be-
tween Russia and the Council of Europe, it 
would be inappropriate to give up on such 
important defenders of the rule of law. Such 
a move would signify a departure from the 
European culture of fundamental rights in 
favour of a conservative Russian-style iden-
tity, one which hides liberal and popular (as 
opposed to populist) roots that are still pres-
ent in the culture of Russia and whose citi-
zens feel European.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2018, Serbia kept its proclamatory EU 
membership-oriented policy, but only four 
negotiation chapters were opened (vs. six in 
2017): Chapter 13–Fisheries; Chapter 17–
Economic and Monetary Policy; Chapter 
18–Statistics; and Chapter 33–Financial and 
Budgetary Provisions. As was the case in 
numerous previous reports, the latest Euro-
pean Commission’s Report on Serbia (April 
2018) most often used the expressions ‘is 
moderately prepared’ (for example, in the 
area of public administration reform) and 
‘has some level of preparation’ (indicated 
mostly for the judicial system), phrases of 
the EU bureaucratic jargon most often used 
when a country’s progress is not satisfactory. 
One of the most positive developments was 
the November 2018 adoption of the Law on 
Free Legal Aid, but it remains to be seen how 
it will be implemented. In November, the 
Government also submitted to the National 
Assembly the proposition (initiative) for the 
adoption of constitutional changes, based on 
the amendments to the Constitution (fourth 
draft version) previously elaborated by the 
Ministry of Justice. Numerous controversies 
remain regarding the content of these draft 
amendments, and they will be more thor-
oughly examined in Chapter II. In 2018, the 
Constitutional Court adopted 708 various 
decisions, the majority of which (670) con-
cerned constitutional complaints regarding 
issues such as the violation of the right to a 
trial in a reasonable time or the violation of 
the right to freedom and security. The Court 
also examined the constitutionality and/or 
legality of a certain number of legislative 
and regulatory acts. Some exemplary con-
stitutional cases will be examined in Chap-
ter III. Finally, it is not difficult to estimate 
that the most important issues in 2019 will 
remain modifications to the Constitution and 
strengthening the independence of the judi-
ciary.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
As was the case in 2017,1 the ongoing 
procedure for the adoption of constitutional 
amendments represented the quintessence 
of constitutional developments during the 
entire year 2018. On November 30, the Go-
vernment finally submitted to the National 
Assembly (NA) the proposition (initiative) 
for the adoption of constitutional changes.2
This proposition was the result of the fourth 
draft version of constitutional amendments,3
which, according to the Ministry of justice 
(MJ), were improved by the comments of 
legal experts and practitioners. In any case, 
the next procedural step4 should be the ap-
1 See .SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H ^ I-CONnect-Clough Center 2018, Report on Serbia, p. 240-243.
2 The term ‘constitutional changes’ is used because the Serbian Constitution makes no mention of the term 
‘amendment’, but only the proposition (initiative) for constitutional changes (Art. 203-1). However, the entity 
submitting the initiative (according to Art. 203-1, it can be one-third of the MPs, the President of the Republic, 
the Government or 150.000 citizens) is entitled to motivate its initiative, therefore suggesting the content of the 
proposed changes.   
3 For the fourth and latest version of the constitutional amendments elaborated by the Ministry of Justice (in 
,UNSPZO#O[[WZ!^^ ^TWYH]KLNV]YZÄSLZ7YL*+P*(*LUÄUHSUP[LRZ[
HTHUKTHUHUHLUNSLZRVTKVJ_%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
4 Art. 203 of the Constitution provides a complex procedure for the adoption of constitutional changes; this 
WYVJLK\YLPUJS\KLZÄ]LTHQVYWOHZLZ!HKVW[PVUVM[OLPUP[PH[P]LMVYJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSJOHUNLZ"LSHIVYH[PVU
of the act on constitutional changes; 3) adoption of this act in the NA by 2/3 majority, potentially followed 
by 4) referendum (obligatory or not) and 5) proclamation of the act on constitutional changes.
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proval of the NA, necessitating a two-thirds 
majority, regarding adoption of the initiative 
for constitutional changes. The NA is not 
formally tied by the content of the proposed 
amendments, given that it is formally entitled 
to autonomously elaborate the act compri-
sing constitutional amendments (Art. 203-5 
of the Constitution) once it adopts the initia-
tive for constitutional changes (Art. 203-3). 
However, the stable governmental majority 
in the NA and the strong control of the ruling 
political party over parliamentary processes, 
as well as the overall absence of the political 
culture favourable to the independence of 
the parliament and the separation of powers, 
would, most probably, lead to the NA’s de-
cision to follow the fourth draft version of 
constitutional amendments elaborated by the 
MJ, at least when it comes to the most im-
portant provisions. Consequently, the focus 
of this chapter will be on draft constitutional 
amendments as they were formulated by the 
MJ. Numerous controversies remain regar-
ding the content of these draft amendments, 
out of which the following three are giving 
rise to major concerns: 1) the composition of 
the High Judicial Council; 2) conditions for 
the first appointment of judges; and 3) pro-
visions on the relations of the three branches 
of power.
1) According to draft constitutional 
amendment XIV, the High Judicial 
Council (HJC) ‘shall be composed of 
ten members: five judges elected by 
the judges and five prominent lawyers 
elected by the National Assembly’.5
Primo, this provision allows the subs-
tantial influence of the NA on the HJC 
and, consequently, on the appointment 
of judges, diminishing the existing le-
vel of guarantees for the independence 
of the judiciary. Secundo, the criteria for 
‘a prominent lawyer’ are inexistent and 
leave considerable room for interpreta-
tion, potentially leading to purely politi-
cal appointments, a situation that initial-
ly was one of the main motives of the in-
tended constitutional changes. As some 
independent associations of judges have 
pointed out, it is possible that one half 
of the HJC would be ‘an interconnected 
group of like-minded people under the 
influence of the ruling majority’.6 Ter-
tio, even the provisions related to the 
election of the members of the HJC do 
not guarantee the independence of the 
judiciary—if two-thirds majority in the 
NA is not obtained, a five-member com-
mittee elects the members of the HJC. 
Three members of this committee are not 
judges: the president of the NA, Chief 
Public Prosecutor and Ombudsman.
2) According to draft constitutional 
amendment VII, a person to be elected 
as a judge for the first time ‘may be 
elected only if he or she has completed 
training at the Judicial Academy’. In the 
context of weak constitutional and legal 
guarantees of the independence of the 
Judicial Academy, this well-intended 
provision—officially aimed at rai-
sing the competences of newly elected 
judges—could jeopardize the indepen-
dence of the judiciary.
3) Finally, the draft constitutional 
amendments, in some important aspects, 
contain unclear and potentially worrying 
provisions regarding the relationship 
between the three branches of power. 
For example, the first draft amendment 
provides that this relationship be based 
on ‘mutual control’ (proveravanje in 
Serbian) while the English translation is 
‘checks and balances’.7 Apart from the 
fact that the translation is inadequate, 
the noun (in Serbian) used in the draft 
amendment is very unusual in national 
constitutional terminology and inap-
propriate to describe the relationship 
between the three branches of power 
that should lead to their separation. Fi-
nally, some experts8 have also noticed 
that this term only appeared in the four-
th draft version of the constitutional 
amendments and was not submitted to 
the Venice Commission, as was the case 
of previous versions. In conclusion, one 
can only reiterate the assessment given 
in our report for 2017—the path before 
the initiated constitutional changes in 
Serbia is still long and unpredictable.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ser-
bia (CCS) adopted 708 various decisions, 
out of which the overwhelming majority 
(670) concerned constitutional complaints, 
while other decisions treated the issues of 
the constitutionality and/or legality of laws 
and general acts adopted by the National 
Assembly (11) and the constitutionality or 
legality of other general acts (27), either by-
laws or acts adopted by the authorities of 
ORFDO VHOIJRYHUQDQFH:LWKLQ WKH JURXS RI
constitutional complaints, numerous deci-
sions were taken regarding the violation of 
the right to a trial in a reasonable time (Art. 
32 of the Constitution), while some CCS 
decisions treated the issue of violation of 
other rights, including the right on freedom 
and security (Art. 27 of the Constitution). 
Concerning the issue of the constitutionality 
of laws, in one of its most interesting deci-
sions, the CCS examined the amendments to 
the Law on Copyright and Related Rights. 
Finally, within the group of CCS decisions 
on the constitutionality or legality of other 
general acts, 17 out of 27 rulings concerned 
various legal acts of cities and municipali-
ties. In this chapter analysis will be made on 
the CCS decisions regarding 1) two consti-
tutional complaints, 2) the constitutionality 
of one law and 3) the constitutionality and 
legality of one act adopted by the authorities 
of local self-governance.
5 See note 3.
6 Statement of the Judges’ Association of Serbia, <http://www.sudije.rs/index.php/en/aktuelnosti/constitution/435-press-release-regarding-draft-constitutional-amend-
TLU[ZO[TS%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
7 :LL#O[[WZ!^^ ^TWYH]KLNV]YZÄSLZ<Z[H]UPHTHUKTHUPRVUHJHU[LRZ[KVJ_%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
8 :LL#O[[WZ!^^ ^KHUHZYZKY\Z[]VZWVYUVTLKQ\ZVIUVWYV]LYH]HUQL%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
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plaint for violation of the right to a trial in a 
reasonable time: Judicial review
In May 2002 before the First Municipal 
Court in Belgrade, plaintiff D.S. initiated 
civil proceedings against his employer for 
wrongful dismissal, asking its annulation 
and his return to work. Two successive de-
cisions of the First Municipal Court non-fa-
vourable to the plaintiff were annulled by 
the hierarchically superior Belgrade District 
Court. In April 2014, the lower court adopted 
the plaintiff’s request and annulled the em-
ployer’s decision, but this time the employer 
attacked it. In March 2016, after a lengthy 
procedure before three judicial instances, 
the Supreme Court of Cassation finally gave 
reason to the plaintiff. Considering that the 
entire judicial procedure was excessively 
lengthy, in July 2016 the plaintiff filed a 
constitutional complaint before the CCS for 
violation of the right to a trial in a reasonable 
time. Using the general formulations that 
are systematically reiterated in all similar 
cases, in its decision of 27 September 2018, 
the CCS first indicated that the reasonable 
duration of judicial process is ‘a relative 
category and has to be estimated separa-
tely in every case, according to its specific 
circumstances’. More specifically, the CCS 
identified four relevant concrete elements to 
assess whether a trial is accomplished in a 
reasonable time: 1) the complexity of factual 
and legal questions in the concrete case, 2) 
the behaviour of the plaintiff as a party in the 
initial trial for which the plaintiff claims that 
it was not accomplished in a reasonable time, 
3) decisions of the court during the procee-
dings and 4) the nature of the demand and its 
importance for the plaintiff. Moreover, the 
CCS underlined that the primary obligation 
of every court is to treat every case without 
protraction, to react timely and efficiently 
and to take all necessary measures in order 
WREULQJWKHSURFHHGLQJVWRWKHLUHQG:KHQ
the CCS applied all those general principles 
to the concrete case, everything led to the 
conclusion that the plaintiff’s right to a trial 
in a reasonable time was violated. The ove-
rall duration of 14 years for a civil procee-
ding on a labour-related dispute is, undoub-
tedly, unreasonably long, not only according 
to the criteria established in the internal legal 
system but also pursuant to the criteria of in-
ternational organisations for the protection 
of human rights. In addition, the provisions 
of Serbian national legislation regarding 
court proceedings demand expressis verbis 
that all labour-related disputes be treated as 
urgent, which was blatantly disregarded in 
the plaintiff’s case. Every annulation of the 
court’s ruling by a superior judicial instance 
required additional time, while the repeated 
assessment by the lower court can, by itself, 
reveal some serious deficiencies in the natio-
nal legal system. It is particularly important 
that, in this particular issue, the CCS refers 
to two decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights (Pavlyulynets vs. Ukraine and 
&YHWNRYLüYV6HUELD). Consequently, by this 
decision, through its motivation and thanks 
to the reference to the ECHR’s case law, the 
CCS has created a series of relatively precise 
and generally applicable standards for the 
assessment of a reasonable duration of a trial 
before all national judicial instances.
&DVH8å±&RQVWLWXWLRQDOFRP-
plaint for violation of the right on freedom 
and security: Judicial review
On 28 March 2016, S.M. was arrested by 
the police in the city of Leskovac under the 
accusation of violent conduct; he was offi-
cially informed of the fact that he was un-
der arrest more than 14 hours later, and was 
brought before the public prosecutor on 
March 29, more than 24 hours after being 
forcefully withheld. In April 2016, D.S. filed 
a constitutional complaint before the CCS, 
claiming that the fact he was detained in the 
local police station for more than 14 hours 
and, during that time, was not brought be-
fore the public prosecutor represents the vio-
lation of Art. 291 of the Criminal Procedure 
Code (CPC). According to the plaintiff, the 
police officers had been entitled to forceful-
ly withhold him as long as they did (and up 
to 48 hours) only in compliance with Art. 
294 CPC, which requires the approval of the 
public prosecutor. In view of all these cir-
cumstances, the plaintiff considers that his 
constitutional right (Art. 27 of the Constitu-
tion) on freedom and security was violated. 
In its decision of 8 November 2018, the CCS 
underlined that, from the aspect of the pro-
tection of human rights, the right to perso-
nal freedom is one of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Constitution. However, 
this right is not absolute, and the act of ar-
rest and detention represents a particularly 
sensitive measure of the lawful limitation of 
the right to personal freedom. This is why 
Art. 27 of the Constitution allows the arrest 
only for reasons and according to procedure 
specifically provided for by the law. At this 
point, the CCS specified that, for an arrest to 
be lawful, two conditions have to be cumu-
latively fulfilled: 1) the arrest has to be made 
for a reason specifically indicated by the 
law, and 2) the process of the arrest has to be 
carried out according to the procedural rules 
provided for by the law. According to the 
CCS, the motivation of this constitutional 
guarantee is to prevent arbitrary and unlaw-
ful arrest and detention. Further reasoning of 
the CCS was based on a separate and suc-
cessive examination of the two conditions 
QHFHVVDU\IRUDODZIXODUUHVW:KHQLWFRPHV
to the first condition, the CCS established 
that the plaintiff was arrested because there 
was a reasonable doubt that he committed 
the criminal offence of violent conduct (Art. 
344-2 of the Criminal Code); moreover, the 
plaintiff was duly informed about his rights. 
In view of these circumstances, the CCS es-
tablished that the police officers were acting 
within their authority and that the material 
conditions for the arrest had been met. On 
the other hand, the CCS had to examine 
more thoroughly the question whether the 
plaintiff was arrested and detained according 
to procedural rules. In this respect, the CCS 
observed two violations of the provisions of 
the CPC. Firstly, the police authorities had 
not issued to the plaintiff the formal decision 
on detention, in spite of the fact that he was 
de facto detained, and that is in clear viola-
tion of Art. 294-2 of the CPC. Secondly, the 
police officers held the hearing of the plain-
tiff in violation of procedural rules. As the 
CCS pointed out, the formal hearing of an 
accused person can only be effectuated by 
the public prosecutor, and not by the police 
(Art. 289 and 291-1 of the CPC). Moreover, 
even when the police officers are entitled to 
collect information from a person regarding 
whom exist the elements of doubt that he/
she is a perpetrator of a criminal offence, 
the hearing can only be done in his/her ca-
pacity as a person charged with an offence, 
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with due information on his/her rights, and 
especially the right to have a defendant du-
ring the hearing (Art. 68-1 of the CPC). On 
the basis of all the established violations of 
the procedure of plaintiff’s arrest and deten-
tion, the CCS came to the conclusion that his 
constitutional right on freedom and security 
was violated.
3. Case IUz-41/2016 – Constitutionality of 
the law amending the Law on Copyright and 
Related Rights
The examination of the constitutionality 
and/or legality of laws and other general 
acts adopted by the NA represents a rela-
tively small, but very important portion of 
the CCS’s work. One of the most interesting 
cases the Court treated in 2018 concerned 
the conformity with the Constitution and ra-
tified international treaties of the law amen-
ding the Law on Copyright and Related 
Rights, adopted by the NA on December 15, 
2012. In substance, the law introduced a new 
Art. 171a, entitled ‘The determination of the 
fee in the tariff for public communication 
of musical works, interpretations and pho-
nograms’. The introduced article comprised 
three paragraphs, out of which three (para. 1, 
2 and 5) were already declared unconstitu-
WLRQDOLQE\WKH&&6:KHQLWDGRSWHG
this decision, the CCS formed a special, in-
dependent case regarding the two remaining 
paragraphs (3 and 4). They provided that the 
fee for public communication of musical 
works, interpretations and phonograms was 
not to be paid in craft shops (para. 3), a ‘craft 
shop’ being considered every independent 
craft store or other place where retail or ser-
vice providing business is taking place, pro-
vided that the craftsman is selling his own 
products (or independently providing ser-
vices) and that the taxes paid by this craft 
shop are determined as a lump sum (para. 
4). In such a context, the main constitutional 
question was to determine whether the pro-
vision of para. 3 introduces the unlawful li-
mitation of the right of author, interpreter or 
producer of a phonogram to allow or prohibit 
the public communication of their musical 
works or other related rights subject matters 
(interpretations and phonograms). Copyright 
and related rights—as key components of a 
wider category of intellectual property (IP) 
rights—represent the exclusive rights over 
intangible values, and they are guaranteed by 
two important international conventions rati-
fied by Serbia: 1) the Berne Convention for 
WKH3URWHFWLRQRI/LWHUDU\DQG$UWLVWLF:RUNV
DQGWKH:,32:RUOG,QWHOOHFWXDO3URSHU-
W\ 2UJDQLVDWLRQ &RS\ULJKW 7UHDW\ :&7
Both Art. 9-2 of the Berne Convention and 
$UWRI WKH:&7DOORZFHUWDLQ OLPLWD-
tions of copyright and related rights, but it 
still remains unclear if the provision of na-
tional legislation meets the criteria for lawful 
limitation of these rights set by international 
conventions. Apart from a potential violation 
of a ratified international treaty, the other im-
portant constitutional question was to know 
whether the disputed provision violated the 
principle of the interdiction of unequal le-
gal treatment of economic operators in the 
market (Art. 84-1 of the Constitution), given 
that the owners of craft shops would not be 
obliged to pay the fee for public communi-
cation of musical works, interpretations and 
phonograms while all other economic ope-
rators would still have to pay this fee. After 
thoroughly considering both international 
conventions and national constitutional and 
legal provisions, the CCS determined that 
the provisions of Art. 171a (para. 3 and 4) 
are not unconstitutional because the public 
communication of musical works, interpreta-
tions and phonograms in craft shops ‘cannot 
be causally related with products or services 
offered by craftsmen to their customers (and 
that) it is not relevant for the overall amount 
of income of a craft shop’,9 especially given 
that ‘the customers come to those shops to 
buy a specific product or service, and not to 
listen to the music’.10:KHQLWFRPHVWRWKH
issue of the possible unequal legal treatment 
of economic operators in the market, the 
CCS estimated that the abolition of the obli-
gation to pay the fee for public communica-
tion of musical works, interpretations and 
phonograms is ‘actually allowing to put the 
persons who perform the same professional 
activity in the same position’.11 In spite of 
the alleged economic motivation of its rea-
soning, this decision of the CCS is, to say the 
least, problematic both from the point of IP 
rights and of equality of economic operators. 
Copyright and related rights are exclusive 
property rights, and their limitations can only 
be introduced with meticulous observance of 
the principle exceptiones sunt strictissimae 
interpretationis. Moreover, the CCS’s as-
sessment that customers do not come to craft 
shops in order to listen to music is applicable 
to many other economic operators (restau-
rants, hotels, shopping malls) for which the 
obligation to pay the fee was not abolished. 
If the motivation of the newly introduced 
provision of the Law on Copyright and Re-
lated Rights was to stimulate the economic 
survival of small craft shops, the legislator 
could have found numerous other ways to 
achieve this objective without harming ex-
clusive IP rights.
4. Case IUo-173/2017 – Constitutionality and 
legality of an act adopted by the authorities 
of local self-governance
In September 2013, the president of the 
PXQLFLSDOLW\ RI %HþHM LQ QRUWKHUQ 6HUELD
adopted a municipal regulation on the cri-
teria and procedure for financial support to 
churches and religious communities. Accor-
ding to the provisions of the national law on 
churches and religious communities adopted 
in 2006, the competent central and local au-
thorities are entitled: 1) to allocate in their 
budgets certain financial resources for the 
construction, maintenance and renovation of 
buildings used for religious purposes (Art. 
32-6) and 2) in order to improve religious 
freedom and cultural activities, to provi-
de direct grants to churches and religious 
communities for their cultural and scientific 
institutions and programs (Art. 44). Conse-
quently, rationae materiae, the local self-go-
vernance was entitled to adopt an act regu-
lating its financial support to churches and 
religious communities. However, the muni-
cipal regulation was not adopted according 
9 *OHW[LY000VM[OL**:KLJPZPVUPU*HZL0<a[YHUZSH[LKI`<Ǆ
10 Ibid.
11 *OHW[LY000VM[OL**:KLJPZPVUPU*HZL0<a[YHUZSH[LKI`<Ǆ
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to the provisions of the national law on local 
self-governance, according to which only the 
municipal assembly is entitled to adopt local 
legislative and other general acts (Art. 32-1, 
6). Given that the regulation in question was 
undoubtedly a general act, the president of 
the municipality was not entitled to adopt it; 
and since it disregarded the provision of the 
law on local self-governance, the local regu-
lation was adopted in violation of the consti-
tutional principle of the hierarchy of national 
legal acts (Art. 195-2 of the Constitution). 
The importance of this decision of the CCS 
does not reside only in the differentiation 
between the competences of the authorities 
of local self-governance, on the one hand, 
and the concrete entity entitled to adopt mu-
nicipal regulations on the other; it is also an 
example for all other local authorities on 
how to perform their regulatory activities in 
a constitutional and legal manner. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The most important issues during the for-
thcoming months in Serbia will remain the 
potential adoption of the modifications to 
the Constitution (see Chapter II) and fur-
ther reforms of the judiciary in the context 
of the EU membership negotiation process 
(Chapter 23 of the EU acquis). The Euro-
pean Commission’s Report, published in 
April 2018,12 underlined that Serbia should, 
in particular, 1) make significant progress 
in strengthening the independence of the 
judiciary and the autonomy of the prosecu-
tion, 2) ensure that the High Judicial Coun-
cil and the State Prosecutorial Council can 
fully assume their roles and 3) adopt and 
implement a human resources strategy for 
the entire judiciary.13 It still remains to be 
seen whether and how the Law on Free Le-
gal Aid, adopted in November 2018, will be 
effectively implemented. 
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SINGAPORE
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2018 saw courts further 
grappling with difficult issues concerning 
constitutional interpretation. Constitutional 
changes to the elected presidency and the 
subsequent elections held under the terms 
of those changes continued to reverberate 
in a case that challenged the government’s 
refusal to call for a by-election to replace 
the parliamentarian who became the current 
president. Furthermore, there were several 
important initiatives to change the law 
with potentially significant implications on 
constitutional rights as well as the separation 
and balance of powers in Singapore. 
Nonetheless, one interesting phenomenon 
to note is the increasing reliance on public 
consultation as part of the law-making process. 
This is evidenced by the public consultation 
on the amendments to the Films Act as 
well as the Select Committee on Deliberate 
Online Falsehoods. This follows a trend in 
the past years, particularly with the invitation 
to the public to submit representatives to 
the Constitutional Commission in 2016.1
Presumably, such public consultations could 
serve not only as a ‘crowd-sourcing’ of ideas 
but also to play a legitimating role in the final 
legislative product. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
There were three major legislative devel-
opments in 2018 impacting constitutional 
law—amendments to the Films Act, changes 
to the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) 
Act (CLTPA), and a proposal to introduce 
legislation regulating ‘fake news’. There 
were concerns that these changes would 
broaden executive powers, which could ad-
versely impact freedom of speech and ex-
pression as well as restrict access to justice. 
The amendments to the Films Act were in-
troduced and passed in Parliament in 2018 
following consultation with industry stake-
holders and the public. The entire consul-
tation process took more than a year. The 
Films Act provides a regulatory framework 
for the distribution, exhibition and posses-
sion of films in Singapore. It is a form of 
prior restraint as, under the Act, distributors 
and exhibitors of films are required to ob-
tain a licence from the Info-communications 
Media Development Authority (IMDA) and 
all films have to be classified by a Board of 
Film Censors. The use of a licencing frame-
work to regulate speech is not uncommon in 
Singapore. Such regulation is often justified 
as seeking to strike a balance between free-
dom of speech and broader public interests 
such as the maintenance of racial and reli-
1 1HJS` U35LV1HJR;3LL/V1PH`\U4HRV[V/VUNº:PUNHWVYL!;OL:[H[LVM3PILYHS+LTVJYHJ`»PU9PJOHYK
(SILY[:PTVU+Y\NKH7PL[YV-HYHN\UH+H]PK3HUKH\LKZ0Ç*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY!.SVIHS9L]PL^VM
Constitutional Law (I·CONnect 2018). 
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gious harmony, national security and pub-
lic morality as well as the protection of the 
young and vulnerable.2  
The current regime has been criticized for 
restricting speech, particularly political 
speech. Under the Act, ‘party political films’ 
are absolutely banned. A party political film 
is defined fairly broadly to refer to ‘an ad-
vertisement made by or on behalf of any po-
litical party in Singapore or any body whose 
objects relate wholly or mainly to politics in 
Singapore, or any branch of such party or 
body’ or ‘which is made by any person and 
directed towards any political end in Singa-
pore’. During a parliamentary debate on the 
proposed changes to the Films Act, the gov-
ernment defended the continuing ban on the 
basis that such films ‘seek to sensationalise 
or distort serious issues to evoke emotional 
rather than logical debate based on facts’.3
There were important changes and clarifica-
tions for free speech protection. For instance, 
in the revised section 21 of the Films Act, it 
remains an offence to distribute and public-
ly exhibit unclassified films, but it is no lon-
ger an offence to merely possess unclassified 
films. Furthermore, the IMDA clarified that the 
section does not cover private viewings with 
family members and friends, though the ques-
tion of whether a viewing is private or public 
is subject to a certain degree of judgment. An-
other important clarification is that, in response 
to the criticism that the scope of the Films Act 
may even cover the sharing of ‘home’ videos, 
the IMDA stated that ‘the online distribution 
of content over the Internet where there is no 
physical copy of the content does not fall with-
in the ambit of the Films Act.’4
The second major legislative development is 
the enactment of the Criminal Law (Tempo-
rary Provisions) (Amendment) Act 2018 (No 
12 of 2018), which ‘clarified’ the scope of 
the government’s powers to detain without 
trial and the scope of judicial review by the 
courts. The Criminal Law (Temporary Provi-
sions) Act5 (CLTPA) empowers the Minister 
for Home Affairs to issue a detention order 
of up to 12 months if he is satisfied that the 
person ‘has been associated with activities of 
a criminal nature’, and where ‘it is necessary 
that the person be detained in the interests 
of public safety, peace and good order’ with-
RXWDFULPLQDOWULDOKDYLQJEHHQKHOG:KLOH
termed ‘temporary’, the law has been in force 
since pre-independence days, as it has been 
legislatively renewed every five years with 
little change. On 6 February 2018, however, 
Parliament made two important amendments 
to the law. First, the Act now spells out in 
a new Fourth Schedule the activities that 
are regarded as ‘activities of a criminal na-
ture’. This amendment appears to have been 
prompted by the Court of Appeal’s judgment 
in Tan Seet Eng v Attorney-General,6 which
we discussed in last year’s report.7 In this 
case, the Court had struck down detention 
orders on the basis that they fell outside the 
scope of the CLTPA. Following the amend-
ment, the CLTPA now sets out that ‘[p]ar-
ticipating in, or facilitating, any organised 
crime activity as defined in section 48(1) 
of the Organised Crime Act 2015 (Act 26 
of 2015)’ falls within the scope of the Act. 
This includes ‘any activity […] carried out 
by a person in Singapore that amounts to a 
serious offence and—[…] is carried out in 
furtherance of the illegal purpose of a group 
which the person knows or has reasonable 
grounds to believe is an organised crimi-
nal group’.8 The definition of an ‘organised 
criminal group’ in section 2(1) of the Organ-
ised Crime Act includes a group that seeks 
to obtain a financial or other material ben-
efit from the commission of any act outside 
Singapore that, if it occurred in Singapore, 
would constitute a serious offence as defined 
under the Act. 
Secondly, the CLTPA amendments inserted 
a finality clause to the Act. A new section 
30(2) reads: ‘Every decision of the Minis-
ter on a matter in subsection (1) is final’. 
The Law Minister explained that this pro-
vision seeks to clarify that the Court is not 
to scrutinize the evidential basis for deten-
tion under the CLTPA. However, he empha-
sized that the finality clause is not intended 
to oust judicial review of detentions on the 
well-established grounds of illegality, irra-
tionality and procedural impropriety.9 This 
clarification is important as there is an ar-
gument that ouster of judicial review would 
violate the judicial power-vesting clause in 
the Constitution of the Republic of Singa-
pore (‘the Constitution’).10 The substantive 
provisions of the amendment Act came into 
force on 1 January 2019.
The third major development is the con-
vening of a Select Committee on Deliberate 
Online Falsehoods, which invited propos-
2 Ministry of Communications and Information/Info-communications Media Development Authority, ‘Closing Note to Public Consultation on Proposed Amendments to 
the Films Act’ (IMDA, 20 February 2018) <www.imda.gov.sg/regulations-licensing-and-consultations/consultations/consultation-papers/2017/public-consultation-on-pro-
WVZLKHTLUKTLU[Z[V[OLÄSTZHJ[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`  
3,4 @\LU:PUº)HUVUWHY[`WVSP[PJHSÄSTZZOV\SKZ[H`!*OLL/VUN;H[»;OL:[YHP[Z;PTLZ:PUNHWVYL4HYJO#^^ ^Z[YHP[Z[PTLZJVTWVSP[PJZIHUVUWHY[`WVSP[PJHS
ÄSTZZOV\SKZ[H`JOLLOVUN[H[%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
5 Cap 67, 2000 Rev Ed (CLTPA). 
6 [2016] 1 SLR 779.
7 :LL1HJS`U35LV1HJR;3LL/V1PH`\U4HRV[V/VUNº:PUNHWVYL!+L]LSVWTLU[ZPU:PUNHWVYLHU*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^»PU9PJOHYK(SILY[:PTVU+Y\NKH
7PL[YV-HYHN\UH+H]PK3HUKH\LKZ0Ç*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY!.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^ (I·CONnect 2017) 175-180.
8 CLTPA, s 48(1)(a)(ii).
9 K Shanmugam (Minister for Law), speech during the Second Reading of the Criminal Law (Temporary Provisions) (Amendment) Bill, Singapore Parliamenta-
Y`+LIH[LZ6ɉJPHS9LWVY[-LIY\HY`]VS 
10 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, Art. 93. See also the discussion of this point by the Court of Appeal in Per Ah Seng and another v Housing and 
Development Board and another [2016] 1 SLR 1020.
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als and conducted public hearings over two 
weeks in March 2018. The Committee hear-
ings became highly contentious at certain 
points, particularly in exchanges with Face-
book executives11 and a contrarian histori-
an-cum-civil society activist.12 Besides the 
fireworks, key issues raised included how 
to define ‘fake news’ or ‘deliberate online 
falsehoods’, which is the term preferred by 
the government, and whether retransmission 
of such deliberate online falsehoods would 
constitute an offense. There were also im-
portant discussions about who has the final 
say on defining something as a ‘falsehood’ 
and whether the government is in the best 
position to determine truth from falsehood. 
The role of technology in fostering and ac-
celerating the transmission of fake news was 
also widely debated. Following the public 
consultation and hearings, the Committee 
proposed wide-ranging policy measures,13
which will have to be drafted into legislation 
EHIRUHEHLQJGHEDWHGLQ3DUOLDPHQW:KDWLV
interesting is that these policy measures took 
into account representations from the public 
and adopted a holistic rather than a strictly 
legalistic approach. The Committee empha-
sized, for instance, the need to nurture an in-
formed public and to encourage fact-check-
ing as well as to promote social cohesion and 
trust. It further refined its proposals to state 
that the laws should be targeted at deliberate 
falsehoods. Fearful of election meddling, the 
Committee particularly stressed the need to 
safeguard the integrity of Singapore’s elec-
tions, prevent companies from advertising 
on platforms deemed to be spreading online 
falsehoods and for the government to ‘swift-
ly disrupt the spread and influence’ of false 
information and impose criminal sanctions 
on those who spread them. These policy 
measures, if adopted by the government as 
law, are likely to have constitutional implica-
tions for freedom of speech and expression, 
though they may be justifiable in light of re-
cent events around the world.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General: Group 
Representation Constituencies
The case of Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-Gen-
eral raises important interpretive issues, 
particularly in the relationship between the 
constitutional text and a later statutory text. 
In particular, it raises the issue of whether 
it is appropriate to ‘update’ the Constitu-
tion to take into account more specific text 
contained in a more recently enacted stat-
ute.14 :KHQ 6LQJDSRUH¶V FXUUHQW 3UHVLGHQW
Madam Halimah Yacob, resigned her seat 
in Parliament to contest the 2017 presiden-
tial election, which she won, a question was 
raised as to whether it was necessary for the 
government to call a by-election to fill her 
seat. Madam Halimah was a Member of Par-
liament representing a Group Representation 
Constituency (GRC) together with three 
other candidates. The applicant, who was a 
voter resident in Madam Halimah’s GRC, 
applied to the High Court for mandatory 
orders that the remaining MPs in that GRC 
vacate their seats and that the Prime Minis-
ter advise the President to call a by-election 
for the whole GRC. This case of Wong Souk 
Yee v Attorney-General15 turns on the inter-
pretation of Article 49(1) of the Constitution 
and its application to the GRC system (as 
opposed to the single-member constituency). 
Article 49(1) of the Constitution provides 
that whenever the seat of an elected MP be-
comes vacant for any reason other than a dis-
solution of Parliament, the vacancy must be 
filled by election ‘in the manner provided by 
or under any law relating to Parliamentary 
elections for the time being in force’, name-
ly the Parliamentary Elections Act16 (PEA). 
The PEA, on the other hand, states that all 
elections (including by-elections) in a GRC 
are to be held on the basis of the number of 
candidates designated for that GRC by the 
President. Further, section 24(2A) of the 
PEA requires all the members of that GRC 
to have vacated their seats in Parliament 
before a writ may be issued for an election 
to fill any vacancy in it. The application of 
Article 49(1) to GRCs was unclear because 
the GRC scheme, which was introduced by 
Article 39A of the Constitution, did not exist 
when Article 49(1) was enacted. 
At first instance, the High Court held that the 
applicant’s interpretation was unworkable 
because there is no basis in law to compel the 
three remaining MPs to resign. The fact that 
a seat in a GRC has been vacated is neither a 
ground to disqualify the remaining MPs in the 
GRC under Article 45 of the Constitution nor 
a ground to compel the vacation of their seats 
under Article 46.17 Instead, the Court accepted 
the respondent’s interpretation by applying an 
updating construction. This rule of statutory 
construction posits that the Court may fill a 
gap in a statute where an amendment to anoth-
er statute gives rise to any ambiguity or uncer-
tainty in the interpretation of the first statute. 
The key requirement is that what is missing 
must be self-evident within the overall spirit 
of the legislation, and is needed to give effect 
to the legislative intent. Applied to the facts, 
the Court held that references to ‘the seat of a 
Member’ in Article 49(1) should be interpreted 
to mean ‘the seats of all the members’ in the 
case of a GRC so that Article 49(1) reflects the 
changes introduced by Article 39A. Alterna-
11 See e.g., Siau Ming En, ‘Lively exchange between select committee and tech companies’ (Today Online, 23 March 2018) <www.todayonline.com/singapore/live-
S`L_JOHUNLIL[^LLUZLSLJ[JVTTP[[LLHUK[LJOJVTWHUPLZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
12 See e.g., Tang See Kit, ‘Select Committee concludes hearings on fake news after 8 sessions marked by tense ex-changes’ (Channel News Asia, 29 March 2018) 
#^^ ^JOHUULSUL^ZHZPHJVTUL^ZZPUNHWVYLZLSLJ[JVTTP[[LLJVUJS\KLZOLHYPUNZMHRLUL^Z[LUZLL_JOHUNLZ%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
13 Parliament of Singapore, ‘Report of the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehood’ (20 September 2018) <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/selectcommittee/search-
7HNL&MYVT$ [V$ %HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` "ZLLHSZV-HYPZ4VRO[HYº:LSLJ[*VTTP[[LLWYVWVZLZ^PKLYHUNPUNTLHZ\YLZ[VJV\U[LYVUSPUL
falsehoods, including new laws and criminal sanctions’ (Today Online, 20 September 2018) <www.todayonline.com/singapore/select-committee-proposes-wide-rang-
PUNTLHZ\YLZJV\U[LYVUSPULMHSZLOVVKZPUJS\KPUNUL^%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` 
14 See e.g., Rosalind Dixon, ‘Updating Constitutional Rules’ [2009] ;OL:\WYLTL*V\Y[9L]PL^ 319. 
15 [2018] SGHC 80. 
16 Cap 218, 2011 Rev Ed.
17 >VUN:V\R@LL [23]-[26].
266 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
tively, a rectifying construction may be applied 
to correct Parliament’s inadvertent omission to 
amend Article 49(1) by adding language simi-
lar to section 24(2A) of the PEA.
The application of the updating construction 
rule raises further important questions about 
the hierarchy of norms in Singapore. The 
Constitution is declared to be the supreme 
law of the land. It is not an ordinary statute. 
Therefore, an account needs to be provided 
as to why an amendment to statute (ordinary 
law) could ‘update’ the Constitution (higher/
supreme law). Nonetheless, the High Court 
in Wong Souk Yee held that this construction 
of Article 49(1) furthers its purpose with re-
spect to the GRCs. The Court held that as 
Article 39A requires elections in a GRC to 
be held on the basis of a group of candidates 
as designated by the President, it follows that 
the legislative purpose is for all elections (in-
cluding by-elections) to be held on the ba-
sis of such number of candidates, and that 
no by-election needs to be held to fill any 
vacancy in a GRC unless all the MPs in that 
GRC have vacated their seats.18  
Two alternative arguments by the applicant 
that the Court examined are worth noting. 
The first is that voters have an implied right 
under the Constitution to be represented by 
an elected MP until the dissolution of Par-
liament, and the second is that a by-election 
must be held because the right to vote is part 
of the basic structure of the Constitution. On 
the first alternative argument, the Court took 
the view that voters in Madam Halimah’s 
GRC have not lost their right to be repre-
sented in Parliament. This is because voters 
in the GRC vote not for individual MPs but 
for a GRC team, which represents the GRC 
in Parliament. On the facts, Madam Hali-
mah’s GRC has continued to be represented 
in Parliament by the GRC team, albeit with 
one fewer parliamentarian. On the second 
alternative argument, the Court held that it 
was unnecessary to decide whether the basic 
structure doctrine is part of Singapore law 
because the applicant was not challenging 
the validity of a constitutional amendment.19
The appeal on this decision was recently 
heard by the Court of Appeal, which re-
served judgment. 
Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolo-
van: Freedom of Speech
Another constitutional law case that came 
up in 2018 implicates the proper relationship 
between freedom of speech and the public 
interest protected under the offence of con-
tempt of court. Freedom of speech is pro-
tected under Article 14 of the Constitution, 
which also contains express qualifications, 
one of which is that Parliament may pass 
laws providing against contempt of court. 
Prior to 2016, however, contempt of court 
was defined in common law. In 2016, Par-
liament passed the Administration of Justice 
(Protection) Act (AJPA),20 which came into 
operation on 1 October 2017. The proper 
application and interpretation of this new 
Act came up for consideration in the case of 
Attorney-General v Wham Kwok Han Jolo-
van.21 The respondents were charged under 
the new Act for the offence of contempt by 
scandalising the court. Under section 3(1)
(a), a person commits a contempt of court if 
the person intentionally publishes any matter 
or does any act that ‘imputes improper mo-
tives to or impugns the integrity, propriety or 
impartiality of any court’ and ‘poses a risk 
that public confidence in the administration 
of justice would be undermined’. 
The respondents challenged the constitution-
al validity of section 3(1)(a) of the AJPA, 
with the key issue being whether that sec-
tion is consistent with Article 14(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. The respondents argued that if 
the ‘risk’ mentioned in section 3(1)(a)(ii) in-
cludes a ‘remote or fanciful possibility’ that 
public confidence in the administration of 
justice would be undermined, then this pro-
vision would violate a Singapore citizen’s 
right to freedom of speech and expression 
under Article 14 of the Constitution and is 
therefore void. This is because the ‘real risk’ 
test at common law represented the balance 
under Article 14 that the constitutional fram-
ers carefully struck between the right to 
freedom of speech and expression and the 
protection of public confidence in the admin-
istration of justice.22 The Court rejected the 
constitutional challenge. It held that the new 
law fell within the limitation set out in the 
Constitution itself. It was therefore within 
Parliament’s legislative power and the pur-
pose of Article 14 for Parliament to decide 
how the balance should be struck between 
this constitutional right and the protection 
of public confidence in the administration of 
justice.23  
Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam v Attor-
ney-General: Judicial Power
As briefly mentioned above, Article 93 of 
the Constitution vests the judicial power of 
Singapore in the judicial branch. Howev-
er, when, if at all, can legislation oust the 
Court’s power to review discretionary exec-
utive action without violating the Constitu-
tion and the principle of separation of pow-
HUV"7KLVZDVWKHNH\LVVXHEHIRUHWKH+LJK
Court in Nagaenthran a/l K Dharmalingam 
v Attorney-General (‘Nagaenthran’).24 Un-
der the Misuse of Drugs Act (MDA),25 drug 
trafficking is a capital offense. However, a 
person charged and convicted of drug traf-
ficking could escape the death penalty if he 
proves that he is a courier and also obtains 
a certificate from the Public Prosecutor (PP) 
stating that he had ‘substantively assisted’ in 
disrupting drug trafficking activities. Under 
18 Ibid [47]-[48].
19 Ibid [54]-[57].
20 No. 19 of 20162
21 [2018] SGHC 222.
22 Ibid [22].
23 Ibid [24].
24 [2018] SGHC 112.
25 Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed. See s 33B(2)(b).
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 267
section 33B(2) of the MDA, the Court would 
then have the discretion to consider sentenc-
ing the applicant to life imprisonment and 
caning instead of death. The applicant chal-
lenged the PP’s decision not to grant him a 
certificate of substantive assistance. The ap-
plicant alleged that the PP had reached his 
decision: (a) in bad faith; (b) unconstitution-
ally; (c) without taking into account relevant 
considerations; (d) without establishing facts 
precedent to his exercise of jurisdiction; and 
(e) irrationally. 
Notably, section 33B(4) of the MDA oust-
ed the Court’s power to review decisions by 
the PP to issue such certificates except on 
the grounds of bad faith and malice.26 Ear-
lier cases had established that the PP’s de-
termination was reviewable on constitutional 
grounds as well. However, there was no con-
clusive determination as to whether the PP’s 
decision was open to challenge on further 
grounds.27 In Nagaenthran, the applicant ar-
gued that the ouster clause in section 33B(4) 
was unconstitutional because judicial power 
to review the executive’s exercise of discre-
tion could not be ousted or curtailed under 
the Constitution, and in accordance with the 
principles of separation of powers and the 
rule of law.28 Further, the applicant argued 
that even if the ouster clause was valid, it 
would not protect a decision from review if 
it was a nullity because it was made on the 
basis of an error of law.29
The High Court ruled that section 33B(4) 
of the MDA ousted the Court’s jurisdiction 
to review the PP’s decision except on the 
grounds of bad faith, malice or unconstitu-
tionality, but also that such ouster was con-
stitutional. The vesting of judicial power 
in the judicial branch by Article 93 of the 
Constitution did not dictate that all legal 
disputes should be adjudicated by the ju-
dicial branch, but that most legal disputes 
should. Certain decisions that were ‘intrin-
sically incapable of submission to an adju-
dication’ could legitimately be vested in the 
executive branch.30 The Court’s position as 
a co-equal branch of government meant, in 
this context, that it was obliged to respect 
the legislature’s vesting of certain decisions 
in the executive branch.
The controlling principle, according to the 
High Court, was that judicial review could 
be ousted for non-justiciable matters. Justi-
ciability was to be determined by the sub-
ject matter of the decision in question, the 
need for democratic representation and ac-
countability for that decision and the rela-
tive competence of the respective branches 
to take that decision.31 In this case, the PP’s 
discretion whether to issue certificates of 
substantive assistance was adjudged to be a 
non-justiciable determination. As the Court 
of Appeal has previously opined,32 this de-
termination is affected by operational con-
siderations relating to the disruption of drug 
trafficking activities, which the courts are 
ill-equipped to examine. Far from being a vi-
olation of the separation of powers principle, 
the Court regarded this allocation of power 
as an exemplar of the separation of powers, 
noting that the ouster was only partial.33  
One significant qualification, however, was 
that an ouster clause did not exclude the 
Court’s power to review decisions for ju-
ULVGLFWLRQDOHUURUVRI ODZ:KHUHD MXULVGLF-
tional error of law is committed in the course 
of making a determination, that determina-
tion would be considered a nullity, with the 
effect that the Court’s jurisdiction to review 
on the basis of this error is not ousted. This 
meant that, in addition to bad faith and un-
constitutionality, it was open to the applicant 
to challenge the PP’s determination on the 
ground of a failure to establish a jurisdic-
tional precedent fact. 
This revival of the legal concept of jurisdic-
tional error of law is curious, as it is derived 
from English administrative law, which has 
long abandoned the distinction between ju-
risdictional and non-jurisdictional errors of 
law.34 Nonetheless, the High Court is not 
wrong insofar as the Singapore courts have 
yet to renounce this distinction conclusive-
ly. The High Court’s decision is cur-rently 
pending an appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Abdul Kahar bin Othman v Public Prosecu-
tor: Judicial Power 
Another case that raised the question of 
the scope of judicial power and the proper 
boundary between judicial and executive 
power was Abdul Kahar bin Othman v Pub-
lic Prosecutor.35 In prior proceedings, the 
applicant had been sentenced to the manda-
tory death penalty for drug trafficking and 
was adjudged to not qualify for the discre-
tionary sentencing regime, which would 
have allowed the Court to sentence him to 
life imprisonment and caning instead of the 
death penalty.36 This decision was affirmed 
26 0IPKZ)!º;OLKL[LYTPUH[PVUVM^OL[OLYVYUV[HU`WLYZVUOHZZ\IZ[HU[P]LS`HZZPZ[LK[OL*LU[YHS5HYJV[PJZ)\YLH\PUKPZY\W[PUNKY\N[YHɉJRPUNHJ[P]P[PLZZOHSS
be at the sole discretion of the Public Prosecutor and no action or proceeding shall lie against the Public Prosecutor in relation to any such determination unless it is 
proved to the court that the determination was done in bad faith or with malice.’
27 4\OHTTHK9PKa\HUIPU4VOK(SP]([[VYUL`.LULYHS [2015] 5 SLR 1222, [35] (Court of Appeal).
28 5HNHLU[OYHU(n 23) [31].
29 (UPZTPUPJ3[K]-VYLPNU*VTWLUZH[PVU*VTTPZZPVUHUK(UV[OLY [1969] 2 AC 147 (House of Lords).
30 5HNHLU[OYHU(n 23) [85].
31 0IPKB DHɉYTPUN3LL/ZPLU3VVUN]9L]PL^7\ISPZOPUN*V3[K[2007] 2 SLR(R) 453 [98].
32 4\OHTTHK9PKa\HUIPU4VOK(SP(n 26) [66]; 7YHIHNHYHUHS:YP]PQH`HU]7\ISPJ7YVZLJ\[VYHUKV[OLYTH[[LYZ[2017] 1 SLR 173 [52] [78] [80] (Court of Appeal).
33 5HNHLU[OYHU (n 23) [97]-[98].
34 See e.g., In re Racal Communications [1981] AC 374 (House of Lords); O’Reilly v Mackman [1983] UKHL 1; R v =PZP[VYVM[OL<UP]LYZP[`VM/\SS, ex p Page [1993] 1 All 
ER 97 (House of Lords).
35 [2018] 2 SLR 1394.
367\ISPJ7YVZLJ\[VY](IK\S2HOHYIPU6[OTHU [2013] SGHC 164; 7\ISPJ7YVZLJ\[VY](IK\S2HOHYIPU6[OTHU [2013] SGHC 222.
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on appeal.37 On further appeal, the applicant 
sought to argue that the regime breached the 
constitutional principle of the separation of 
powers as it prescribed the PP’s certification 
of substantive assistance as a precondition to 
the Court’s discretionary sentencing powers. 
The Court of Appeal reiterated that this did 
not amount to an unlawful allocation of pow-
ers because the power to pronounce the sen-
tence remained with the Court.38 The PP’s 
determination related only to the operational 
assessment of substantive assistance and was 
not premised on the PP’s view of the appro-
priate punishment.39 Further, it was not nec-
essarily an intrusion into judicial power for 
legislation to enable the executive to make 
administrative decisions that had an impact 
on an accused person’s sentence.40
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The separation of powers and the need for 
checks and balances will remain significant 
in the coming year, particularly in determin-
ing the proper boundaries of judicial power. 
This is especially since two court challenges 
have been filed against Singapore’s colo-
nial-era sodomy laws, specifically section 
377A of the Penal Code. In the 2015 judg-
ment of Lim Meng Suang v PP,41 the Court 
of Appeal had upheld the constitutionality of 
that provision on the basis that the law did 
not violate the reasonable classification test 
applicable to determining whether the Con-
stitution’s equal protection clause is violated. 
The Court of Appeal also further determined 
that the challenges based on the morality or 
sociological basis of the law are outside the 
scope of its judicial function, emphasizing 
that the courts are not to act as ‘mini-legisla-
tures’. This view of the judicial function and 
the boundaries between judicial power and 
legislative power serves to limit the scope of 
judicial review. It will be more than interest-
ing to see how the courts address these two 
new challenges to the law. 
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SLOVAKIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2018 started on a high note after 
the resolution of a prolonged inter-branch 
conflict between the President, the Constitu-
tional Court (CC), and the National Coun-
cil (NaCo) over the appointment of consti-
tutional judges.1 President Andrej Kiska 
DSSRLQWHG MXGJHV -DQD /DããiNRYi 0RMPtU
0DPRMNDDQG0LURVODY'XULã WR WKH&RXUW
late in December 2017, filling three vacan-
FLHVWKDWKDGRSHQHGXSLQ:LWKDOO
judges in place, the Court was finally able to 
start working at full capacity.
The resolution of the conflict in the CC Ap-
pointments Case carried a promise of im-
proved relations between political branches 
of power, which was necessary in order to 
change the Constitution in time for the next 
CC appointments due in mid-February 2019. 
The Ministry of Justice initiated the drafting 
and consultation of an amendment to fix the 
selection and appointment mechanism for 
constitutional judges in the summer, ostensi-
bly to make good on its promise in the Pro-
gramme Proclamation of the Government. 
The government proposal was submitted 
to the NaCo after several months of public 
debate and critique, but efforts to change 
the Constitution failed after a dramatic late-
night NaCo session in late autumn.2 The se-
lection and appointment mechanism did not 
change, and due to the failure, the relation-
ship between President Kiska and the gov-
ernment coalition further deteriorated. Since 
the key constitutional moment of the year 
failed to deliver, we focus on the develop-
ment of sub-constitutional rules governing 
the selection and appointment of constitu-
tional judges. Changes to legislation still had 
an impact on the upcoming selection round, 
and we will review them in the next section.
At the time of writing this report, the CC has 
not yet published its annual statistics for the 
year 2018. However, the available data for 
the first six months provides us with a rough 
measure to estimate the judicial output of the 
Court for the whole year. The Court received 
1 332 petitions (constitutional complaints 
and judicial review petitions combined) in 
the first half of 2018 and addressed 1 469 
cases. These cases include all pending lit-
igation, which kept accumulating during 
the time the Court had been incomplete.3 A 
single judge decided 113 cases on average, 
with most being constitutional complaints 
handled by one of the four three-member 
Senates. The Plenum decided six cases of 
review of litigation on merits.4 Three of the 
decisions found a statute in part or wholly 
contrary to, and one in conformity with, the 
&RQVWLWXWLRQ:HUHYLHZVRPHRIWKHVHFDVHV
which may be interesting to a global audi-
ence, in the third section. The report con-
1 See our contributions to an online symposium on ‘The Slovak Constitutional Court Appointments Case’ 
(I·CONnect, 23 January 2018) <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2018/01/symposium-slovak-appoint-
TLU[ZJHZLPU[YVK\J[PVU%
2 Max Steuer, ‘On the Brink of Joining Poland and Hungary: The Night of Surprises in the Slovak Parliament’ 
(=LYMHZZ\UNZISVN, 25 October 2018) <https://verfassungsblog.de/on-the-brink-of-joining-poland-and-hungary-
[OLUPNO[VMZ\YWYPZLZPU[OLZSV]HRWHYSPHTLU[%
3 Press release no. 53/2018.
4 Press release no. 61/2018.
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cludes with two observations on the future 
development of Slovak constitutional law.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Late in October 2018, the Slovak Nation-
al Council tried to amend the selection and 
appointment mechanism for constitutional 
judges. Two proposals were on the table at 
the time. The first was to raise the threshold 
for the NaCo selection vote, and the second 
proposal was to raise entry-level standards 
for the candidates. Just before the first de-
bate on the draft constitutional amendment 
concluded, one of the government MPs filed 
a controversial substitute motion to change 
the bill’s contents, but because of drafting 
irregularities that the motion created in the 
original proposal, the entire amendment 
failed. The controversy in the Parliament, 
however, generated enough buzz to put the 
CC at the centre of public attention.
Article 134 of the Constitution established 
the ground rules for the selection and ap-
pointment of constitutional judges, pre-
scribing that:
The President of the Slovak Republic 
shall, on the nomination of the National 
Council, appoint the judges of the Con-
stitutional Court for a period of twelve 
years. The National Council shall pro-
pose a double number of candidates who 
are to be appointed by the President.
The threshold for the selection vote in the 
NaCo is not escalated, so the general rule 
applies. The NaCo selects candidates to the 
Court by a simple majority of the MPs pres-
ent (39 votes with the lowest quorum). The 
proposal by the Ministry of Justice would 
raise the threshold to an absolute majority 
of all MPs (76 votes). The proposal would 
also raise the age of eligibility from 40 to 45 
years and introduce qualitative criteria for 
the candidates. A candidate for the office of 
a constitutional judge was to be a “person 
of renown in the field of law, whose life 
provides a guarantee that she will perform 
her duties properly, honestly, independent-
ly and impartially”. None of these changes 
passed the NaCo, but they still managed to 
frame the debate about judicial candidates 
in the upcoming selection. Even though 
the eligibility requirements did not change, 
many questions in the upcoming round 
of selection hearings of candidates to the 
Court showed that the MPs were looking 
for renowned legal professionals, or at least 
trying to flag those whose moral integrity 
lagged behind the standard expected of a 
constitutional judge.
1. Changes to legislation
Despite failing at the constitutional level, the 
NaCo successfully changed the sub-constitu-
tional rules for the selection of candidates for 
the job, which are detailed in the new Act on 
the Constitutional Court5 and parliamentary 
rules of procedure.6 The selection and ap-
pointment process takes place at three levels: 
1) the entry level where nominators present 
individual candidates for consideration; 2) 
the mid-level of the NaCo selection; and 3) 
the output level of presidential appointment. 
:HVSHDNRIQRPLQHHVDWWKHHQWU\OHYHOFDQ-
didates if they are selected in the NaCo floor 
vote, and finally CC judges who are appoint-
ed to the Court by the President. The new 
rules were meant to improve the through-
put legitimacy of selections at the entry and 
mid-levels by live-broadcasting candidate 
hearings in the NaCo Constitutional Com-
mittee and several other minor changes. 
2. Selection Hearings
The NaCo received 40 nominations by Janu-
ary 7, which was the deadline for nominators 
to support individual candidates for consid-
eration. The Constitutional Committee of the 
1DWLRQDO&RXQFLOKHOG VWDUWLQJRQ:HGQHV-
day, 22 October, three rounds of selection 
hearings to question the nominees. The se-
lection hearings were an interesting innova-
tion that attracted a lot of attention. The Con-
stitutional Committee had to make available 
audio-visual transmission of the hearings. 
Clips from the selection hearing were viewed 
thousands of times on streaming platforms 
such as YouTube, and also on the website of 
the National Council and media. The nomi-
nees appeared before the committee in al-
phabetical order. Robert Fico, a three-time 
Prime Minister, who surprised many by 
his last-minute application, spoke seventh. 
Each nominee had to present his or her (ra-
tio 1:4) motivation to apply for the position; 
work experience; publications; attendance 
at lectures, seminars, and academic confer-
ences; and professional accomplishments. 
MPs and the attending representative of 
the President then had time to question the 
nominee. The nominees received questions 
in blocks of three and had unlimited time to 
respond. The shortest presentation took less 
than 20 minutes, while the longest, includ-
ing questioning, took two hours. All doc-
uments about a nominee were made avail-
able to members of the committee ahead of 
the hearing. The statutory period set by the 
parliamentary rules of procedure is 45 days, 
but this period was reduced to 15 days for 
all positions that vacated in 2019. So the 
background documents on each nominee 
and their applications were published on-
line at the webpage of the National Council 
two weeks prior to the selection hearing.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
The following section examines four salient 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHVIURPWKH\HDU:H
focus on cases of judicial review of legisla-
tion under Article 125 of the Constitution and 
leave out most constitutional complaints and 
electoral disputes. Constitutional complaints 
under Article 127 make up most of the Court 
docket but are generally of low salience. 
Electoral disputes are unique in that they 
are seasonal; they follow an election taking 
place and require prompt resolution, so they 
do not stay on the docket for long. The Court 
has 90 days to resolve a complaint about un-
constitutionality or illegality of local elec-
tions, according to Article 63(6) of the CC 
5 Act No. 314/2018 Coll. on the Constitutional Court.
6 Act No. 350/1996 Coll. on the Rules of Procedure of the National Council of the Slovak Republic.
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organising statute.7 The last communal elec-
tion took place on November 10, 2018. Since 
most of the constitutional judges were to end 
their term of office on February 16, the Court 
had to shift all of its decision-making capac-
ity to the resolution of the sudden surge of 
electoral disputes arising out of communal 
elections. Had some of the cases been left 
unresolved after February, the results of 
many elections would invite distrust.
The Court managed to deal with all 92 
electoral disputes by February 6, 2019. 87 
challenges to communal elections across 
Slovakia were filed by individuals and five 
by political parties. The Court declared elec-
tions in six municipalities invalid and an-
nulled results of three other elections wholly 
or in part. In five cases, the Court annulled 
the decision of the electoral commission on 
the winner of an election to pick individuals 
elected in their place.8
1. PL. ÚS 1/2017 on State Immunity in Do-
mestic Execution Proceedings
One of the leading cases of last year con-
cerned the permissible scope of State immu-
nity in domestic execution proceedings. A 
district court challenged the constitutionality 
of two provisions of the Act on Heat Power 
Engineering that protected assets of conces-
sion holders on production and distribution 
of heat owned by the State or State-managed 
entity from execution. All claims against 
such entities in execution proceedings were 
recognised as mere natural obligations, 
which enjoyed broad protection. The Court 
found in decision PL. ÚS 1/2017 that the 
provision was unconstitutional.
In its reasoning, the Court relied on one of 
its previous decisions in which it concluded 
that similar statutory regulation, albeit in a 
different field, was unconstitutional.9 The 
Court first stressed public interest in the en-
ergy industry and the importance of smooth 
production and distribution of heat to con-
sumers, but on the other side, the Court also 
recognised the need for protection of assets 
of companies in the energy business. How-
ever, it held that such interest is subject to 
the proportionality test because it infringes 
RQWKHULJKWWRSURSHUW\:KLOHWKH&RXUWZDV
satisfied that the regulation had a clear legal 
basis, pursued a legitimate aim, was suitable 
to achieve the pursued aim, and also neces-
sary in given circumstances (there were no 
other available and effective alternatives), it 
failed the balancing exercise. In the last step, 
the CC juxtaposed public interest with the 
right to property using the classic weighing 
formula conceptualised by Robert Alexy. 
:KLOH DWWDFKLQJ KLJK LPSRUWDQFH WR SXEOLF
interest, it stated that the legal regulation 
rendered property rights illusory. De jure and 
de facto means at the disposal of a creditor 
to have his or her claim enforced against the 
State were limited to zero. The Court, there-
fore, ruled that regulation violated the right 
to property. The CC also suggested that the 
legislator must do a better job to reconcile 
public interest on the one hand with the right 
to property on the other. Aside from the find-
ing of a violation of the right to property, the 
regulation was also found to be discrimina-
tory, retroactive, and incompatible with the 
right to a fair trial because it deprived credi-
tors of an effective legal remedy and access 
to the court of law.  
2. PLz. ÚS 2/2018 on the Recall of Members 
of the Judicial Council
Another influential decision of the Court 
concerned the recall of members of the Ju-
dicial Council (JC). The Constitution stipu-
lates that JC members are elected or select-
ed for five years and also that they may be 
removed by the same entities that selected 
or elected them (the NaCo, President, gov-
ernment, and judges). However, neither the 
Constitution nor the Act on Judicial Coun-
cil provides reasons for the removal of a JC 
member. This gap in the legal regulation be-
came a subject of controversy when the new 
government recalled several members of 
the Judicial Council after 2011 and replaced 
them with new members. A JC member who 
was recalled filed a constitutional complaint 
to the Constitutional Court. One of the Sen-
ates dismissed the complaint, stating that 
absent any reasons for removal, and accord-
ing to the theory of the rational legislator, 
the relationship between a member and the 
entity that selected him is based on political 
accountability. JC members serve as agents 
on behalf of the institutions that selected or 
elected them.
This approach was not met by the approval 
of other Senates of the Court, and several at-
tempts to reverse the decision followed. In 
2018, the Court succeeded and in judgment 
PLz. ÚS 2/2018, which was a unifying ruling 
by the Plenum, overruled the previous case 
law. The Plenum first stressed the indepen-
dence of the Judicial Council and its mem-
bers vis-à-vis other institutions based on leg-
islative history, the principle of separation of 
powers, and its prior case law. JC members 
have terms of office that run independently 
from those of the institutions that select or 
elect them. Second, the CC interpreted the 
constitutional right to have access to a public 
office in a generous way as including also 
the right to stay in the office for a full term. 
And finally, the CC opined that removal from 
office without objective reasons is arbitrary 
and undermines the rule of law. According to 
the principle of legality, the gap or silence of 
legal regulation as far as specific reasons for 
removal are absent, and this has to be inter-
preted as prohibiting the recall of a member 
of the Judicial Council. Consequently, mem-
bers of the Judicial Council enjoy liberty 
from removal before the expiration of their 
term of office unless the legislator passes a 
new regulation that will specify objective le-
gal reasons for their dismissal.
3. PL. ÚS 11/2016 on Consumer Protection 
and Statute of Limitations
At the heart of the controversy in case PL. 
ÚS 11/2016 was the protection of the con-
sumer. A district court initiated a challenge 
7 The old Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 38/1993 Coll. on the Organization of the Constitutional Court, on Proceedings before the Court, and on 
the Position of Its Judges.
8 Press release no. 11/2019.
9 PL. ÚS 111/2011.
272 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
to the constitutionality of a provision in the 
Act on Protection of Consumers that had es-
tablished an automatic jurisdiction of courts 
and arbitrators to review whether legal ac-
tions stemming from consumer contracts are 
(not) time-barred. The CC declared the pro-
vision unconstitutional for violating the right 
to fair trial because it created a procedural in-
equality and imbalance in civil matters. The 
CC tested the provision, mainly utilising the 
test of necessity, which it failed to pass. The 
reasoning of the Court oscillated between 
arguments on the equality of parties and un-
warranted protection of consumers by such 
drastic legal means. The necessity analysis 
was concluded by pointing out several other 
available, but less effective, alternatives that 
the legislator could have used instead of es-
tablishing an ex officio review, such as legal 
aid; notification requirements for consum-
ers; different social and credit policy by the 
State; etc. An interesting part of the decision 
was devoted to a comparative analysis of the 
law of the European Union. After the analy-
sis of the applicable case law, the Court con-
cluded that the need for such an expansive 
regulation neither followed from the EU law 
(including the case law of the CJEU) nor was 
it required by the effet utile doctrine.
Another line of the argument criticised the 
challenged provision for confusing the ter-
minology of two different civil law insti-
tutes: the legislator adopted time-bar regula-
tion (natural obligation), but the result was 
the extinction of a right. The regulation was 
also found to be retroactive in its effect. For 
all of these reasons, the Court held that the 
challenged legislation violated principles of 
the rule of law. 
In a follow-up, the legislator adopted a very 
similar provision but corrected the termino-
logical confusion. The provision is a part of 
the Civil Code (Article 54(a)) and has not yet 
been challenged.
4. PLz. ÚS 1/2018 on Cumulation of Reasons 
for an Extraordinary Appeal
The decision in PLz. ÚS 1/2018 is an exam-
ple of a unifying ruling, which is rendered 
when the legal opinion of multiple Senates of 
the Constitutional Court split. In a situation 
when such a unification of legal opinions is 
required, the Court decides in full composi-
tion, sitting in the Plenum. The decision of 
the Plenum binds all Court Senates. 
The main legal challenge in the case at hand 
concerned the permissibility of invocation of 
multiple reasons for an extraordinary appeal 
before the Supreme Court, also known as 
“the cumulation of reasons for an extraor-
dinary appeal”. The extraordinary appeal in 
Slovakia is allowed exclusively to the Su-
preme Court and is strictly limited to spec-
ified circumstances defined by the Code of 
Civil Procedure (CPC). The Supreme Court 
had ruled, in a unifying decision of its own, 
that the practice of invocation of multiple 
reasons for extraordinary appeal (i.e., cumu-
lation) by the appellant was not permissible. 
It stated that in the case of cumulation, the 
Supreme Court would only consider the most 
significant reason invoked. It linked the level 
of importance of these extraordinary appeal 
reasons to their chronological position in the 
CPC. In other words, in the case of cumula-
tion, only the reason listed first in the CPC 
would be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
This highly controversial rationale with sig-
nificant practical ramifications was chal-
lenged before the Constitutional Court on 
multiple occasions, mainly on the grounds of 
the constitutional right of equal protection of 
the procedural parties as well as the right to a 
fair trial. During the first challenge, the 2nd 
Senate of the Constitutional Court upheld the 
mentioned procedural rationale. After several 
months, however, the 1st Senate did not agree 
with the constitutionality of this approach. 
Thus, the final unifying decision by the Ple-
num was required to resolve the issue. The 
Plenum agreed with the opinion of the 1st 
Senate. It criticised the limitation of the rea-
sons for an extraordinary appeal just for the 
sake of efficiency of the judicial proceedings. 
It labelled such an approach as a pure legal 
formalism with possible serious overreach 
into the constitutional right of access to the 
Court that could ultimately lead to the restric-
tion of the fundamental right to a fair trial. 
Moreover, the Plenum condemned the logic 
of prioritising those reasons for an extraordi-
nary appeal that were stated earlier in the CPC 
with no consideration of their intensity.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Two important events unfolded right at the 
time of the submission of this annual report. 
:HEULHIO\GHVFULEHHDFK LQSODFHRIDSUH-
diction, because they are guaranteed to in-
fluence the development of Slovak constitu-
tional law in the year 2019 and beyond.
On January 30, 2019, the CC, for the first 
time in the history of the republic, invalidat-
ed a direct amendment to the Constitution 
because it breached its material core. Direct 
amendments change the master-text Consti-
tution and have until now been considered 
outside of the Court’s scope of review. It was 
in theory recognised that some stand-alone 
(indirect) constitutional acts can in principle 
contradict the Constitution, such as consti-
tutional acts on shortening the term of the 
NaCo, but even they were not reviewable. 
The Court established a new power for itself 
and found that the Constitution contains an 
implicit material core, with the basis in Ar-
ticle 1(1), which declares that the republic is 
“is a sovereign, democratic state governed 
by the rule of law”. This important but po-
tentially controversial ruling came in case 
PL. ÚS 21/2014, which involved a challenge 
to eligibility requirements for the appoint-
ment to and retention of judicial office in 
the form of “background checks”. The Court 
held that the vetting of judges was in breach 
with the principle of judicial independence, 
which is a corollary to the rule of law. The 
direct amendment from 2014, already being 
part of the Constitution itself by 2019, was 
therefore unconstitutional.
Then on February 15, the National Council 
failed to select any candidates for appoint-
ment to the Constitutional Court. The next 
day, nine constitutional judges hung up their 
robes and retired from the bench, which has 
left the Court dysfunctional with only four 
remaining judges left to salvage the image of 
the institution as a co-equal branch of pow-
er. The next selection round was scheduled 
for the end of March, which will leave the 
Court depopulated and unable to decide on 
cases that constitutionally require the abso-
lute majority of all judges (e.g., judicial re-
view of legislation) for at least a month and 
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a half. The ruling coalition commands the 
majority in the NaCo, however, and can ob-
struct the vote. If it is successful in delaying 
the selection for long enough, the appoint-
ments could be made after a new president 
takes office in June. It is unclear how long 
the Court will remain dysfunctional, and 
whether the NaCo will choose to stymie the 
selection process. The political branches of 
power do not have amicable relations with 
one another, and it is plausible that they will 
engage in constitutional hardball tactics at 
the expense of the Court.
These two issues will likely be on the agen-
da in the upcoming presidential election that 
will take place in March 2019. The decision 
on constitutional unamendability put the 
spotlight on the CC, so the political battle 
to appoint the majority of the Court will be 
fierce. At the end of our report on constitu-
tional developments in Slovakia in 2015, we 
expressed the hope that the difficulties with 
appointments will be resolved and the Court 
will soon have all 13 judges. Our hope for 
the upcoming year remains the same.
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I. INTRODUCTION
7KH  UHYLHZ LGHQWL¿HG ³WKH QHHG IRU
fundamental adjustments of government 
FRQGXFW DQG WKH UHDI¿UPDWLRQ RI FRQVWLWX-
tionalism”. 2018 did see a change of lead-
ership of the governing majority (the ANC), 
allowing for confrontation with the immense 
challenges brought about in the preceding 
decade, now frequently referred to in the 
vernacular as “the lost years”. Most of the 
developments in 2018, and realistically, most 
probably for some time to come, concern the 
need to deal with the aftermath of the Jacob 
Zuma years.
Functioning constitutionalism depends heav-
ily on public access to information and trans-
parency. Various facets of such transparency 
required the attention of the courts, including 
the decision-making procedures for selecting 
candidates for judicial appointment. 
Given the upcoming general election in May 
2019, litigation concerning the registration 
of voters and the transparency of the funding 
of political parties may be seen to have fa-
cilitated the timely correction of some short-
comings in the system.
The delinquency of the Zuma administra-
tion in its conduct of international relations 
was revealed in a case concerning the con-
sequences of the neutralisation of the SADC 
Tribunal in support of land grabs by the 
Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. South Afri-
ca’s complicity in the matter was itself found 
to be unconstitutional.
The prospect of amending the Constitution 
to empower the government to expropri-
DWHSURSHUW\ZLWKRXWFRPSHQVDWLRQ(:&
loomed large following the leadership 
change in the ANC. It would appear that this 
was a last “success” of the Zuma faction in 
the ANC regarding policy determination, 
leaving the new leadership with the politi-
cal obligation to plan the implementation of 
(:&IRUWXQDWHO\DPLGVWWKHQHHGWRRYHU-
come stringent constitutional limitations. 
Although the courts were not seized with 
(:&DV VXFK LQ  WKH ¿QGLQJV RI WKH
Constitutional Court in a case concerning 
the land rights of a traditional community, 
balanced against the government’s manage-
ment of mineral resources, may later prove 
WREHVLJQL¿FDQW
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
Section 25(1) of the Constitution prohibits 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Section 
25(2) allows expropriation of property “for 
a public purpose or in the public interest” in 
terms of law of general application, subject 
to compensation. Since the adoption of the 
Constitution, it had been possible, in terms 
of Section 25(4), to effect land reform, inter
alia, “to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa’s natural resources”. A minis-
try, department and permanent commission 
for rural development and land reform had 
been established a number of years ago. Over 
time, however, the department and commis-
VLRQEHFDPHQRWRULRXVIRUWKHLULQHI¿FLHQF\
and much frustration exists regarding their 
unsatisfactory performance. This frustration 
was the (mostly unspoken) motivation for 
the populist faction in the ANC to push for 
a policy resolution to discard compensation 
for expropriation—in effect, to facilitate the 
nationalisation of property.
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7KHDQQRXQFHPHQWRI(:&DV DNH\FRP-
ponent of ANC policy drew much public 
attention concerning its possible implica-
tions—economically, socially, politically 
and constitutionally. In February, the two 
Houses of Parliament mandated a joint com-
mittee to:
[r]eview Section 25 of the Constitution 
and other clauses where necessary, to 
make it possible for the state to expro-
priate land, in the public interest without 
compensation, and propose the neces-
sary constitutional amendments where 
necessary. In doing so, the Committee is 
expected to engage in a public participa-
tion process in order to get the views of 
all stakeholders about the necessity of, 
and mechanisms for expropriating land 
without compensation.1
For six weeks from June to August, the joint 
committee held town hall-type public hear-
ings in various locations across the country 
where a sometimes rowdy campaign was ev-
LGHQWLQZKLFKGLVVDWLV¿HGORFDOFRPPXQLWLHV
demanded relief from poverty by means of 
land allocation to the landless. The commit-
tee also called for written and oral submis-
sions, which produced much more reasoned 
responses, the majority being critical of the 
project. Nevertheless, the (majority) recom-
mendation of the committee was:
a. That Section 25 of the Constitution 
must be amended to make explicit that 
which is implicit in the Constitution, 
with regards to Expropriation of Land 
without Compensation, as a legitimate 
option for Land Reform, so as to address 
the historic wrongs caused by the arbi-
trary dispossession of land, and in so do-
ing ensure equitable access to land and 
further empower the majority of South 
Africans to be productive participants in 
ownership, food security and agricultur-
al reform programs.
b. That Parliament must urgently estab-
lish a mechanism to effect the necessary 
amendment to the relevant part of Sec-
tion 25 of the Constitution.
c. Parliament must table, process and 
pass a Constitutional Amendment Bill 
before the end of the 5th Democratic 
Parliament in order to allow for expro-
priation without compensation.2
On 6 December, the report was tabled in the 
National Assembly, which then resolved to 
establish an ad hoc committee to initiate and 
introduce legislation amending Section 25 of 
the Constitution. It consisted of 11 members, 
6 of whom being members of the ANC. 31 
March 2019 was set as the deadline by which 
the committee must report. Neither the Joint 
Committee Report nor the National Assem-
bly proposed a concrete formulation for the 
amendment, leaving it to the ad hoc commit-
tee to develop the amending wording.
The procedure for amendment of the Con-
stitution is complex and lengthy, involving 
publication of the draft bill for comment 30 
days before tabling in both Houses of Parlia-
ment, the canvassing of public submissions, 
putting it to the vote at least 30 days after 
its introduction, etc. It was therefore unlike-
ly that an amending bill would reach a stage 
where it could be passed by Parliament be-
fore the upcoming elections.
An amendment to the Constitution requires, 
inter alia, at least a two-thirds majority vote 
in the House of Assembly, and there are 
those that argue that an amendment of Sec-
tion 25 may, in terms of Section 74(1), re-
quire the support of 75% of the members of 
the House because it would imply an amend-
ment of Section 1, where the rule of law is 
entrenched as a founding value.
Another major development of constitution-
DOVLJQL¿FDQFHWKDWHPHUJHGLQZDVWKH
establishment of the Judicial Commission 
of Inquiry to Inquire into the Allegations of 
State Capture, Corruption and Fraud in the 
Public Sector Including Organs of State un-
der the chairmanship of Deputy Chief Jus-
tice Zondo. Ironically, this commission was 
established under the signature of Jacob 
Zuma shortly before the end of his presi-
dency. The initial procedural regulations 
would have rendered evidence presented to 
the commission inadmissible in later crim-
inal proceedings, therefore allowing admis-
sions of wrongdoing to become privileged, 
but before the commission’s investigation 
got underway, this was amended by Presi-
dent Ramaphosa to limit the inadmissibility 
in court before Justice Zondo of evidence of 
self-incriminating statements by witnesses. 
Right from the outset, remarkable revela-
tions came to light before the commission 
regarding the extent to which private enti-
WLHVKDGJDLQHGFRQWURORYHULQÀXHQWLDOSRO-
iticians, civil servants and governing bodies 
of state-owned companies. The work of the 
commission is scheduled to continue until 1 
March 2020, and the impact of the evidence 
received by it in public and its eventual re-
port can be expected to be profound, both 
legally and politically.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Helen Suzman Foundation v Judicial Ser-
vice Commission 2018 (4) SA 1 (CC): Delib-
erations of the JSC
Judges of the superior courts are, in terms of 
Section 174(6) of the Constitution, appoint-
ed by the President on the advice of the Ju-
dicial Service Commission (JSC). The JSC 
is composed, in terms of Section 178 of the 
Constitution, of serving judges, other law-
yers and various political appointees, the lat-
ter category constituting the majority. 
:KHQ WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ IRU HOHYDWLRQ WR WKH
bench of a widely experienced and respect-
ed senior counsel (both SC in South Afri-
ca and QC in the UK) did not obtain the 
support of the JSC in 2012, and another, 
relatively unknown candidate was put for-
ward for appointment, an NGO (the Helen 
Suzman Foundation (HSF)) applied for an 
order to compel the JSC to provide it with 
a full recording of its post-interview delib-
1 :LL[OL1VPU[*VTTP[[LL»Z9LWVY[KH[LK5V]LTILY#O[[WZ!^^ ^WHYSPHTLU[NV]aHZ[VYHNLHWWTLKPH+VJZH[JH ɈMK ML JKLKL
WKM%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY` WHNL
2Ibid, pp 34-35.
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erations to make a case for the review of the 
choice of candidates. 
In review proceedings, it is settled law that 
all parties, including those seeking the re-
view, must have identical copies of all rel-
evant documents available to them. The 
JSC produced records of its proceedings, 
excluding, however, the recordings of the 
deliberations crucial to the HSF’s case. The 
provincial division of the High Court denied 
the application of the HSF to obtain the re-
cordings in 2015, and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision. On appeal to 
the Constitutional Court, however, the HSF 
succeeded, and the JSC was ordered in April 
2018 to deliver the full recording of the pro-
ceedings to be reviewed.
Although this judgment concerned a proce-
dural matter (the application was based on 
Rule 53 of the Uniform Rules of Court), it 
was clear from the majority and two minori-
ty judgments that its outcome turned on the 
weight that should be accorded the values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness. 
According the the majority (paragraph 65):
These values are of singular importance 
in South Africa coming—as we do—
from a past where governance and ad-
ministration were shrouded in secrecy. 
If we are truly to emancipate ourselves 
from that past, all our democratic con-
stitutional institutions must espouse, 
promote and respect these values. The 
blanket secrecy that the JSC is advocat-
ing is at odds with this imperative. And 
this is especially so, regard being had to 
the fact that the JSC’s claim to secrecy 
does not bear scrutiny.
The HSF stated that it was concerned with a 
growing perception that talented candidates 
for judicial appointment were being over-
looked by the JSC for undisclosed reasons.
2. My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice 
and Correctional Services Patriation Refer-
ence 2018 (5) SA 380 (CC): Access to infor-
mation on private funding of political parties
Section 32(1)(b) of the Constitution grants 
everyone the right of access to information 
“that is held by another person and that is 
required for the exercise or protection of any 
rights”. The Promotion to Access to Infor-
mation Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) was adopted to 
give effect to the right of access to informa-
WLRQ$QRQSUR¿WFRPSDQ\0\9RWH&RXQWV
said to have been founded to improve the ac-
countability, transparency and inclusiveness 
of elections and politics in South Africa, ob-
WDLQHGDQRUGHU IURP WKH:HVWHUQ&DSH'L-
vision of the High Court in 2017 in which 
PAIA was declared constitutionally inval-
id due to its failure to regulate the recordal 
and disclosure of information on the private 
funding of political parties and independent 
candidates. In June 2018, the Constitutional 
&RXUWFRQ¿UPHGWKHRUGHUDQGUHTXLUHG3DU-
liament to amend PAIA accordingly within 
18 months.
The Court linked the need for the transparen-
cy of private funding with the right of every 
citizen in terms of Section 19 of the Consti-
tution to make political choices, stating (in 
paragraph 34) that “[f]or every citizen to be 
truly free to make a political choice, includ-
ing which party to join and which not to vote 
for or which political cause to campaign for 
or support, access to relevant or empowering 
information must be facilitated”.
Unrelated to the attack on PAIA, which is 
the statutory instrument generally available 
to obtain access to recorded information, 
Parliament had in the meantime (June 2018) 
passed a new Political Party Funding Bill, 
which had not been signed and promulgat-
ed by the President by the end of the year. 
The bill purports to regulate public and pri-
vate funding of political parties, inter alia, 
by requiring disclosure of donations above 
a set threshold that a political party receives, 
and prohibits political parties from accepting 
donations from foreign governments, for-
eign government agencies and South African 
state-owned enterprises. The statutory Elec-
toral Commission (IEC), primarily respon-
sible for the management of all elections, 
administers other public and private money 
received for the funding of political parties. 
The My Vote Counts case did not concern 
this bill, although the Constitutional Court 
did take note of it, distinguishing its content 
from the issue of access to the funding infor-
mation held by political parties.
3. Electoral Commission of South Africa v 
Speaker of the National Assembly (CCT55/16) 
[2018] ZACC 46 (22 November 2018): Re-
cording of addresses of voters 
Originating in proven irregularities in the 
registration of voters during local govern-
ment by-elections held in 2013 in Tlokwe 
(Potchefstroom), the Constitutional Court 
set aside the outcome of those elections in 
2015 (Kham v Electoral Commission 2016 
(2) SA 338 (CC)) and effectively ordered the 
IEC to obtain the addresses of all voters on 
the voters’ roll before the next local govern-
PHQWHOHFWLRQV7KHUHFWL¿FDWLRQRIWKHYRW-
ers’ roll was necessary (paragraph 7 of the 
2018 judgment) “to guard against bogus reg-
istrations, phantom voters and bussing-in—
which is the large-scale transportation into 
a voting area, for vote-rigging purposes, of 
voters resident elsewhere”. These practic-
es have on occasion occurred in previous 
elections with little consequences due to the 
ZHDNQHVVHVLQWKHV\VWHPLGHQWL¿HGLQWKHVH
proceedings.
For the IEC to comply with the order would 
be no mean feat, especially in residential 
areas euphemistically known as “informal 
settlements” where street names and house 
numbers do not exist. In 2016, the Constitu-
tional Court declared the failure of the IEC to 
have recorded voters’ residential addresses to 
be inconsistent with its constitutional respon-
sibilities, but the consequential invalidity of 
the voters’ roll was suspended, subject to full 
compliance by 30 June 2018. The commis-
sion was required to report its progress to the 
Court every six months, which it did.
However, with the next general elections 
coming up in 2019, the commission urgently 
requested a further extension of the suspen-
sion of the order of invalidity in May 2018, 
when 21% of voters’ addresses had not yet 
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been recorded. It was concerned that if the 
extension were not allowed, it would open 
the possibility of successful challenges to 
the validity of the 2019 election results. 
(Although the address issue concerned lo-
cal government elections, it did not affect 
the general election, which uses a purely 
proportional list system with less scope for 
vote-rigging by bussing-in voters.) In oppo-
sition to this, it was argued that some scope 
for vote-rigging would remain regarding a 
voters’ roll without all voters being associat-
ed with an address.
The Court stated (in paragraph 6) that its 
primary concern was to ensure that the 2019 
HOHFWLRQV IXO¿OOHG WKH HOHFWRUDO SURPLVHV RI
the Bill of Rights, which allows every cit-
izen’s freedom to make political choices 
and the right to free, fair and regular elec-
tions. The outcome was an order extending 
the time for the commission to comply un-
til 30 November 2019, subject, however, to 
two monthly progress reports to the Court 
in which the commission would set out “a 
means by which it proposes to indicate 
clearly on the voters’ roll which voters have 
incomplete, inadequate or no addresses; re-
quire voters with incomplete, inadequate 
or no addresses who wish to vote to supply 
their addresses before voting on voting day; 
and enable political parties to access and 
scrutinise the addresses and any other details 
supplied in this way”.
Two aspects of this judgment are remark-
DEOH¿UVWO\WKHDFWLYHVXSHUYLVRU\UROHWKDW
the Constitutional Court is prepared to take 
upon itself, and secondly the practical and 
creative manner in which the Court went 
about exercising its jurisdiction in terms of 
Section 172(1) of the Constitution to, when 
deciding a constitutional matter, “make any 
order that is just and equitable”.
4. Law Society of South Africa v President of 
the Republic of South Africa (CCT67/18) [2018] 
=$&&   'HFHPEHU  :LWKGUDZ-
al from SADC Tribunal Protocol unlawful
The systematic assault on constitutionalism 
by the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe 
is well known.3 The South African govern-
ment’s complicity in this process, at least 
since the Mbeki presidency beginning in 
1999, mostly took the form of implied ap-
proval by default. However, when Mugabe’s 
actions were threatened by judicial restric-
tion, President Zuma had no scruples to 
openly support him (the Court, at paragraph 
45, described it thus: “Zimbabwe had a will-
ing ally in South Africa, as represented by our 
President”). The Southern African Develop-
ment Community (SADC) had established a 
tribunal in 2000 with jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate disputes between individual citizens and 
member states. Having been deprived of all 
legal avenues for relief within Zimbabwe, a 
number of landowners approached the tribu-
nal to review the government’s expropriation 
of their land without compensation, which 
was granted in 2008.4 However, in 2010, the 
SADC Summit of Heads of State decided to 
suspend the tribunal and adopted a protocol 
in 2014 in terms of which its jurisdiction 
ZRXOGEHUHFRQ¿JXUHGE\H[FOXGLQJLQGLYLG-
ual access to it.
The Law Society of South Africa obtained an 
order from the Gauteng High Court in March 
2018 declaring President Zuma’s participa-
tion in the SADC decision-making process 
and his decision to suspend the operation of 
the tribunal to be “unconstitutional, unlaw-
ful and irrational”, and directing him to with-
draw his signature from the Protocol signed 
in 2014. On 11 December 2018, the Con-
VWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW FRQ¿UPHG WKH RUGHU 7KH
Court was careful to point out that the pres-
idential powers as head of state and head of 
government should not lightly be interfered 
ZLWKE\WKHFRXUWVEXWTXDOL¿HGWKLVFDYHDW
in paragraph 3 of its judgment:
All presidential or executive powers 
must always be exercised in a way that 
is consistent with the supreme law of 
the Republic and its scheme, as well as 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights, our domestic legislative and 
international law obligations. Our Pres-
ident is never at large to exercise power 
that has not been duly assigned. Crucial-
ly, public power must always be exer-
cised within constitutional bounds and 
in the best interests of all our people.
7KH&RXUWMXVWL¿HGLWV¿QGLQJVE\VWDWLQJDW
paragraph 77) that as long as fundamental 
rights such as the right to access to justice are 
protected by the Constitution and an interna-
tional agreement, a president is not at liberty 
to neutralise those rights or to participate in 
a process that may threaten their protection.
Interestingly, and perhaps in anticipation of 
future litigation regarding expropriation (see 
the discussion below of the Maledu case), 
the Court interpreted this matter (paragraph 
11 of the judgment) to be:
fundamentally about challenging the 
expropriation of land without compen-
sation and the intended removal of the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction to determine the 
validity of that kind of land expropria-
tion that was done in terms of the Con-
stitution of Zimbabwe.
5. Maledu v Itereleng Bakgatla Mineral Re-
sources (Pty) Limited [2018] ZACC 41: Ex-
propriation of land
In late December 2017, the ANC held a “na-
tional consultative conference” where it was 
crucially determined that a change in leader-
ship of the organisation, and therefore of the 
presidency of the country, would take place: 
Zuma was replaced by Ramaphosa. Apart 
from the leadership issue, the most promi-
nent outcome was the adoption of the resolu-
tion that the Constitution should be amend-
ed to allow private land to be expropriated 
without compensation. Consequently, in the 
course of 2018, very strong political focus 
was placed on the implementation of this res-
olution and its implications. Feverish public 
and parliamentary debate ensued, culminat-
3 See, e.g., Martin Meredith, 4\NHIL!7V^LY7S\UKLYHUK[OL:[Y\NNSLMVYAPTIHI^L»Z-\[\YL (Jonathan Ball Publishers, 2002).
4 4PRL*HTWILSS7][3[K];OL9LW\ISPJVMAPTIHI^L [2008] SADCT 2.
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ing in the adoption by the National Assem-
bly of a committee report recommending the 
desired amendment against the recommen-
dation of the majority of the written public 
submissions received by the committee (see 
II above for more detail). The wording of a 
possible amendment has not yet been put for-
ward, but it is likely to weaken the protection 
of property entrenched in Section 25 of the 
Constitution in some way. The matter will 
inevitably take a central position in the polit-
ical campaigns in the run-up to the national 
and provincial elections scheduled for May 
2019. It is very likely that the constitutional 
validity of the parliamentary procedure will 
be challenged in the courts, and the capacity 
of the ANC to effect the amendment in terms 
of the entrenched procedures will depend on 
the outcome of the 2019 elections and pos-
sibly also its ability to garner the support of 
smaller parties.
The Constitutional Court has not yet been 
engaged to determine the constitutionality 
of the political intentions of the government 
regarding expropriation without compensa-
WLRQ (:& EXW LW GLG GHOLYHU D MXGJPHQW
in October 2018 which touched on the mat-
ter. Ironically, this case did not concern the 
GLPLQXWLRQRISURSHUW\ULJKWVRIWKHDIÀXHQW
ZKLFKLVWKHFOHDUJRDORI(:&7KHFDVH
was concerned with the rights of a compo-
nent of a larger traditional community. The 
component community have held the rights 
concerned for almost a century, protecting 
them from eviction. The government had, 
however, granted platinum mining rights to 
companies controlled by the traditional com-
munity of which the holders of the rights are 
a component. For present purposes, the tenor 
of the judgment, which annulled a high court 
eviction order, is noteworthy.
The judgment started with a quotation from 
a book by the radical Marxist and Pan-Af-
ricanist activist Frantz Fanon emphasizing 
the link between land ownership and dignity. 
Paragraph 2 of the judgment states:
Currently, in South Africa, the clamour 
for redistribution of land has not only 
heightened interest in land but has also 
put at the centre stage the socio-political 
discourse raging on in the country.
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources De-
velopment Act 28 of 2002 effected the stat-
utory transfer of rights to mineral resources 
from landowners, conferring such rights on 
the state “as the custodian of such resources 
on behalf of all South Africans”. It was the 
exercise of this “custodianship” that caused 
WKHFRQÀLFWZLWKWKHULJKWVRIWKHDSSOLFDQWV
rooted in customary law. The courts are re-
quired to apply customary law in terms of 
Section 211(3) of the Constitution “when that 
law is applicable”. Based on Section 25(6) 
of the Constitution, which purports to ensure 
legally secure tenure of land to communities 
“whose tenure of land is legally insecure as 
a result of past racially discriminatory laws 
or practices”, the Court determined that the 
property rights of the applicant community 
trumped the mineral rights awarded by the 
state to others.
,I(:&EHFRPHVDUHDOLW\LQWKHIXWXUHLWLV
expected that the courts will be called upon 
to resolve many disputes that are as complex 
in nature as the Maledu matter, and beyond. 
Be that as it may, the outcome of the debate 
RQ (:& LV GLUHFWO\ UHODWHG WR DQGZLOO VH-
verely test South Africa’s commitment to 
constitutionalism.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
:KHWKHU WKH $1& ZLOO EH DEOH WR UHDOLVH
its intended weakening of the protection of 
private property by means of constitution-
al amendment will depend largely on the 
outcome of the 2019 elections. If not, the 
populist faction of the organisation, mostly 
supportive of the destructive approach insti-
WXWLRQDOLVHGLQWKH=XPDHUDZLOOEHGLI¿FXOW
to keep in check. If the outcome allows the 
incoming government to effect the constitu-
tional amendment, it is certain that elements 
of civil society strongly inclined to defend 
constitutionalism will rely on the courts for 
relief. In any event, the level of maturity of 
South African democracy achieved over the 
past quarter century will be gauged by the 
upcoming ballot. Equally, the existence of 
the political will to prosecute wrongdoing 
related to “state capture” of all, including 
WKRVHLQLQÀXHQWLDOSRVLWLRQVZLOOSURYLGHD
clear indication of the survivability of con-
stitutionalism in the country.
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In 2018, one year had passed since the de-
parture of the Jae-in Moon administration in 
the previous year. After almost 10 years of 
conservative rule, Korea achieved leadership 
by a liberal party. Former President Geun-
hye Park strongly antagonized the people to-
wards the end of her reign, so initially, Pres-
ident Moon’s new administration seemed to 
be well received by the people.
To resolve the popular discontent, Moon’s 
administration pursued the previous admin-
istration’s injustices. In 2018, former con-
servative President Myung-bak Lee (two 
presidencies before Moon) was arrested and 
charged, after Park’s arrest.
Under the current administration’s foreign 
policy, Japan-Korea relations have deterio-
rated significantly compared to that of previ-
ous governments. On the other hand, Moon’s 
administration is persistently promoting In-
ter-Korean Summits with North Korea’s 
leader Jong-un Kim. Kim promised that he 
would visit Seoul in the near future, but this 
has not yet happened.
Although Moon’s administration has eagerly 
attacked previous leaders, the current admin-
istration has not succeeded in improving the 
Korean economy. Consequently, in December 
2018, it showed high disapproval ratings. Pub-
lic evaluation of Moon has grown negative.
The most prominent decision by the Constitu-
tional Court in 2018 was that the Military Ser-
vice Act did not conform to the Constitution, 
as it did not provide alternative services for 
conscientious objectors for religious reasons. 
This article outlines the political trends in Korea 
and the significant cases on which the Korean 
Constitutional Court made decisions in 2018.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
(1) Eradication of Deep-Rooted Evils
In Korea, new governments tend to pursue 
the injustices of previous administrations in 
order to strengthen their legitimacy.1 Since 
the Moon administration started in 2017, 
former conservative presidents have been 
arrested and prosecuted under the concept of 
jeokpye cheongsan, which means “eradica-
tion of deep-rooted evils.”2
For example, former President Geun-hye 
Park was arrested for bribery in April 2017 
after the Constitutional Court impeached 
her. On April 6, 2018, the Seoul Central Dis-
trict Court sentenced Park to 24 years’ im-
prisonment and an 18 billion won fine.3 Sub-
sequently, the Seoul High Court sentenced 
Park to 25 years in jail with a 20 billion won 
fine on August 24.4
1 Jin-il Byeon, Korea – ;OL*V\U[Y`[OH[2PSSZ7YLZPKLU[Z (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 
2014 [in Japanese]), p. 212.
2 For the English translation of the termQLVRW`LJOLVUNZHU, refer to Moo-jong Park, ‘Eradication of deep root-
ed evils’, the Korea Times, March 16, 2017, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/opinion/2018/11/636_225839.
html, retrieved February 3, 2019.
3 ‘South Korean court jails former president Park for 24 years’, Reuters, April 6, 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-park/south-korean-court-jails-former-presi-
dent-park-for-24-years-idUSKCN1HD0MN, retrieved January 10, 2019.
4 ‘South Korean court raises ex-president Park’s jail term to 25 years’, August 24, 2018, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-park/south-korean-court-raises-ex-president-parks-jail-
term-to-25-years-idUSKCN1L905P, retrieved January 10, 2019.
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Furthermore, on March 23, former conser-
vative President Myung-bak Lee was ar-
rested for receiving bribes from the National 
Intelligence Service (NIS). The Seoul Central 
District Court imposed a prison sentence (15 
years) and a 13 billion won fine on October 5.5
(2) Deteriorating Japan-Korea Relations
In 2018, the relationship between Japan and 
Korea deteriorated significantly. After the 
impeachment bill against former President 
Park was passed on December 9, 2016, the 
President’s power was suspended. Under 
these circumstances, Korean society began 
WRGLVPDQWOH WKH ³&RPIRUW:RPHQ´$JUHH-
ment, which had been reached in December 
2015 during the Park administration. After 
the Moon administration began, the new 
government officially announced that the 
Japan-funded “Reconciliation and Healing 
Foundation” would be dissolved.6
On October 30, the Korean Supreme Court 
ordered Japan’s Nippon Steel & Sumitomo 
Metal Corporation to compensate wartime 
laborers from the Korean peninsula.7 The 
Supreme Court ruled that “the Agreement 
on the Settlement of Problems concern-
ing Property and Claims and on Economic 
Co-operation between Japan and the Repub-
lic of Korea”, which was concluded in 1965, 
did not fully discuss the illegality of Japan’s 
colonization of the Korean peninsula. There-
fore, the Court decreed that wartime laborers 
could demand compensation for the “illegal” 
Japanese colonization. 
After the decision, former Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court Seung-tae Yang was ar-
rested for abuse of power and delaying a de-
cision on the wartime laborers issue during 
the Park administration.  Yang’s arrest can 
be considered a part of the “eradication of 
deep-rooted evils” regarding the previous 
administration.8
Furthermore, on December 20, Korean na-
val vessel Gwanggaeto Daewang locked its 
fire-control radar on a Japanese Maritime 
Self-Defense Force patrol plane in the Sea 
of Japan.9 However, on January 2, instead of 
admitting that the vessel had locked its ra-
dar on the plane and making an apology to 
Japan, the Ministry of National Defense in 
Korea accused the patrol plane of threaten-
ing the vessel by flying at low altitude10 and 
demanded an apology.   
On January 10, President Moon confront-
ed the Japanese government and argued 
that Japanese politicians’ politicization of 
the wartime laborers issue was unwise.11
Moon’s statement aroused strong antipathy 
in Japan; currently, it seems almost impos-
sible to mend Japan-Korea relations in the 
near future.
(3) Realization of Inter-Korean Summits
Due to the reinstatement of a liberal gov-
ernment in Korea, inter-Korean summits—
long avoided by conservative administra-
tions since former President Moo-hyun 
Roh’s 2007 visit to Pyongyang—were re-
vived. In 2018, President Moon held three 
inter-Korean summits in April, May, and 
September, respectively.
The first summit on April 27 was held at 
the inter-Korean Peace House (located on 
the south side of the Military Demarcation 
Line in Panmunjom). At this time, President 
Moon and Jong-un Kim, Chairman of the 
State Affairs Commission of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), signed 
a joint declaration called “Panmunjom Dec-
laration for Peace, Prosperity and Unifica-
tion of the Korean Peninsula”. The decla-
ration discusses three important matters: 
co-prosperity and independent unification; 
removing the danger of war; and cooperat-
ing to build peace and stability on the Kore-
an peninsula.12
During the second summit, held on May 26 
at Tongil Gak (located on the north side of 
the Military Demarcation Line in Panmun-
jom), Moon and Kim agreed to implement 
what they had signed in the Panmunjom 
Declaration in April and ensure the success 
of the US-DPRK summit,13 which was to be 
held on June 12 in Singapore.
5 ‘[Full Text] Former President Myung-bak Lee, Judgment of First Instance’, YTN, December 5, 2018, https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0103_201810051506269893 (in Kore-
an), retrieved January 9, 2019.
6º:LV\S[VKPZZVS]L1HWHUM\UKLK¸JVTMVY[^VTLU¹MV\UKH[PVU»;OL4HPUPJOP5V]LTILYO[[WZ!THPUPJOPQWLUNSPZOHY[PJSLZ
p2a/00m/0na/023000c, retrieved January 31, 2019.
7 Supreme Court 2013 Da 61381, October 30, 2018.
8 ‘Ex-Chief Justice of South Korea Is Arrested on Case-Rigging Charges’, the 5L^@VYR;PTLZ, January 23, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/asia/
south-korea-chief-justice-japan.html, retrieved February 5, 2019.
98º1HWHUHJJ\ZLZ:V\[O2VYLHVM¸L_[YLTLS`KHUNLYV\Z¹YHKHYSVJRVUWSHUL»9L\[LYZ+LJLTILYO[[WZ!^^ ^YL\[LYZJVTHY[PJSL\ZQHWHUKLMLUJLZV\[-
hkorea/japan-accuses-south-korea-of-extremely-dangerous-radar-lock-on-plane-idUSKCN1OK11O, retrieved February 5, 2019.; ‘South Korea and Japan remain at 
odds over radar lock-on row’, the 1HWHU;PTLZ, January 15, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/01/15/national/south-korea-japan-remain-odds-radar-
lock-row/#.XFwSS-R7ldg, retrieved February 6, 2019.
10º:LV\SHJJ\ZLZ1HWHULZLWH[YVSWSHULVM[OYLH[LUPUNÅPNO[»[OL>HZOPUN[VU7VZ[1HU\HY` O[[WZ!^^ ^^HZOPUN[VUWVZ[JVT^VYSKHZPHFWHJPÄJZLV\S
HJJ\ZLZQHWHULZLWH[YVSWSHULVM[OYLH[LUPUNÅPNO[  MJJ JLLL H IIIILFZ[VY `O[TS&UVYLKPYLJ[$VU\[TF[LYT$JIMLMLIK
retrieved February 5, 2019.
11 ‘South Korean President Moon Jae-in accuses Japan of politicizing wartime labor issue’, the 1HWHU;PTLZ, January 10, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2019/01/10/national/politics-diplomacy/south-korean-president-moon-jae-accuses-japan-politicizing-wartime-labor-issue/, retrieved February 1, 2019.
12 ;OL,UNSPZOM\SS[L_[VM[OL7HUT\UQVT+LJSHYH[PVUMVY7LHJL7YVZWLYP[`HUK<UPÄJH[PVUVM[OL2VYLHU7LUPUZ\SHPZH]HPSHISLH[[OL^LIZP[LVM[OL4PUPZ[Y`VM
-VYLPNU(ɈHPYZ9LW\ISPJVM2VYLHO[[W!^^ ^TVMHNVRYLUNIYKTF]PL ^KV&ZLX$ ZYJO-Y$HTW)ZYJO;V$HTW)ZYJO>VYK$HTW)ZYJO;-
W$HTW)T\S[PFP[TFZLX$HTW)P[TFZLXF$HTW)P[TFZLXF$HTW)JVTWHU`FJK$HTW)JVTWHU`FUT$YL[YPL]LK1HU\HY`  
13 ‘President Moon to announce results of second inter-Korean summit’, The World on Arirang, May 27, 2018. http://www.arirang.com/News/News_View.as-
p?nseq=217957, retrieved February 5, 2019.
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The third summit was held on September 18 
and 19 in Pyongyang, DPRK. At the third 
summit, Moon and Kim adopted the “Pyong-
yang Joint Declaration”. The Declaration 
includes the following: ending hostile rela-
tions, developing economic exchanges and 
cooperation, reuniting separated families, 
propelling cultural exchanges, denucleariza-
tion of the Korean Peninsula, and a visit to 
Seoul by Chairman Kim in the near future.14
Because of this declaration, the South Kore-
ans expected Chairman Kim to visit Seoul, 
but this has not yet been realized.
(4) The “Jobs President”: Failure to Raise 
Minimum Wage and Worsening Korean 
Economy 
During the presidential election, President 
Moon made a public commitment to raise 
the minimum wage to 10,000 won by the 
year 2020 and increase employment oppor-
tunities. After inauguration, he pushed to 
raise the minimum wage, shorten working 
hours, and increase opportunities to attain 
full-time jobs, but this was ineffective; in-
stead, it worsened the Korean economy.15
Because of the minimum wage raise, per-
sonnel expenses hindered companies, and 
employment opportunities decreased.16 The 
minimum wage raise was especially fatal for 
small companies. Moon then withdrew his 
public commitment to raising the minimum 
wage to 10,000 won until 2020.
During Moon’s administration, the Kore-
an economy did not improve. In December 
2018, Moon’s disapproval rating exceeded 
his approval rating for the first time.17 It was 
now time for Moon, who was expected to be 
the “jobs president”, to show his capability.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
(1) Decision of Nonconformity to the Con-
stitution regarding the Assembly and 
Demonstration Act, Article 11 (2013 Hun-
Ba 322, 2016 Hun-Ba 354, 2017 Hun-Ba 
360·398·471, 2018 Hun-Ga 3·4·9 [consolidat-
ed], May 31, 2018) (2015 Hun-Ga 28, 2016 
Hun-Ga 5 [consolidated], June 28, 2018) 
(2018 Hun-Ba 137, July 26, 2018)
In 2018 (May, June, and July), the Constitu-
tional Court made a decision of nonconfor-
mity to the Constitution regarding the As-
sembly and Demonstration Act.18 Article 11 
prohibits holding an assembly or a demon-
stration within a hundred-meter radius of 
places such as the National Assembly, presi-
dential residence, and courts.
In May, the Constitutional Court made a de-
cision against the act for nonconformity to 
the Constitution, as it prohibited assembling 
within hundred meters from the National As-
sembly under the principle of proportionali-
ty. The Court also made the same decision in 
the Prime Minister’s official residence case 
in June and the case of courts in July.
Interestingly, the Constitutional Court had 
already made a decision of unconstitution-
ality against the act for prohibiting demon-
strations within hundred meters of foreign 
countries’ diplomatic offices in 2003.19
Therefore, the act already provided specific 
provisions regarding demonstrations near 
diplomatic offices.
(2) Decision of Nonconformity to the Con-
stitution regarding Military Service Act, 
Article 5 (1) (2011 Hun-Ba 379, 383, 2012 
Hun-Ba 15, 32, 86, 129, 181, 182, 193, 227, 
228, 250, 271, 281, 282, 283, 287, 324, 2013 
Hun-Ba 273, 2015 Hun-Ba 73, 2016 Hun-Ba 
360, 2017 Hun-Ba 225 [consolidated]; 2012 
Hun-Ga 17, 2013 Hun-Ga 5, 23, 27, 2014 
Hun-Ga 8, 2015 Hun-Ga 5 [consolidated], 
June 28, 2018)
The Korean Constitution stipulates the du-
ties of the national defense in Article 39 (1). 
Furthermore, the Military Service Act, Arti-
cle 3 (1), stipulates that male Korean nation-
als should serve mandatory military service. 
Article 88 (1) decrees that any person who 
does not enlist in the military without “jus-
tifiable grounds”—even after the enlistment 
date—shall be punished. Therefore, for a 
long time, there were discussions on whether 
religious conscientious objections could be 
considered “justifiable grounds.” 
In 2004 and 2011, the Constitutional Court 
did not recognize conscientious objectors’ 
freedom of conscience because it prioritized 
national security above individual freedom 
of conscience.20 Therefore, many conscien-
tious objectors have remained incarcerated; 
in recent years, district courts have begun to 
acquit innocent people for conscientious ob-
jection. There was high interest, then, to see 
how the Constitutional Court would make a 
decision on conscientious objection under 
the new government.
On June 28, although the Constitutional Court 
considered the Military Service Act, Article 
88 (1), constitutional, it made a decision of 
14 ;OL,UNSPZOM\SS[L_[VM[OL7`VUN`HUN1VPU[+LJSHYH[PVUVM:LW[LTILYPZH]HPSHISLH[[OL^LIZP[LVM[OL4PUPZ[Y`VM-VYLPNU(ɈHPYZ9LW\ISPJVM2VYLH
O[[W!^^ ^TVMHNVRYLUNIYKTF]PL ^KV&ZLX$ ZYJO-Y$HTW)ZYJO;V$HTW)ZYJO>VYK$HTW)ZYJO;W$HTW)T\S[PFP[TFZL-
X$HTW)P[TFZLXF$HTW)P[TFZLXF$HTW)JVTWHU`FJK$HTW)JVTWHU`FUT$WHNL$[P[SL5T$YL[YPL]LK1HU\HY`  
15,JVUVT`JVU[PU\LZ[V^VYZLU¯7YLZPKLU[4VVUZLLRZHIYLHR[OYV\NO[OYV\NO9LN\SH[VY`9LMVYT»*OVZ\U)Pa(\N\Z[ PU2VYLHUO[[W!IPaJOVZ\UJVT
site/data/html_dir/2018/08/09/2018080900263.html, retrieved February 4, 2019.
16 ‘Most vulnerable hit hardest as positions vanish – Minimum wage rise is one factor in the sharp drop in available jobs’, 2VYLH1VVUNHUN+HPS ` November 20, 2018, 
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=3055843, retrieved February 4, 2019.
17 ‘Moon’s disapproval rating exceeds approval for 1st time’, 2VYLH1VVUNHUN+HPS ` December 22, 2018, http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.
aspx?aid=3057265, retrieved February 4, 2019.
18 The English versions of Korean Acts are available at the website of the Korea Legislation Research Institute (KLRI): http://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/main.do, retrieved 
February 6, 2019.
19 Constitutional Court 2000 Hun-Ba67·83 [consolidated], October 30, 2003.
20 Constitutional Court 2002 Hun-Ga 1, August 26, 2004; Constitutional Court 2008 Hun-Ga 22 et al., August 30, 2011.
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nonconformity to the Constitution against it, 
as Article 5 (1)21  did not provide for alter-
native service—that did not include military 
training—for conscientious objectors. 
After the Constitutional Court’s decision, the 
Supreme Court recognized conscientious ob-
jection and remanded the case to the lower 
court on November 1.22  After its ruling, 57 
conscientious objectors were released.23
(3) Decision of Constitutionality regarding 
Credit Information Use and Protection 
Act, Article 40, Item 4 (2016 Hun-Ma 473, 
June 28, 2018)
On June 28, the Constitutional Court made 
a decision of constitutionality regarding the 
Credit Information Use and Protection Act, 
Article 40. Under the Act, Item 4 of Article 
40 prohibits finding out about a person’s 
house or investigating their life if the inves-
tigating company is not a credit information 
company. Furthermore, the Article’s Sub-
paragraph 5 prohibits using titles such as 
“detective”. Therefore, Korea does not rec-
ognize detective work as an occupation.
The plaintiff, a retired police officer, intend-
ed to become a detective, but the act prohib-
ited the use of the title “detective”. Thus, 
the plaintiff insisted that the act violated the 
freedom of occupation, which was secured 
in the Constitution (Article 15).
The Constitutional Court stated that some 
people were violating others’ privacy by 
using devices such as candid cameras and 
Global Positioning System (GPS). Further-
more, the Court decided that the act was con-
stitutional because some of the plaintiff’s op-
erations, such as finding lost property, were 
still allowed under the act. 
Based on the Constitutional Court’s deci-
sion, the Korean media cynically comment-
ed that Sherlock Holmes would not be able 
to use the title “detective” in Korea.24
(4) Decision of Constitutionality regarding 
Distribution Industry Development Act, 
Article 12-2
(2016 Hun-Ba 77, 78, 78 [consolidated], June 
28, 2018)
The Korean Constitution, Article 119 (2), 
stipulates the democratization of econom-
ics and allows the government to intervene 
in the market in order to maintain a sound 
market economy. Since the hypermarket 
emerged in Korea, bankruptcy has threat-
ened small privately run stores. 
To protect them, the Distribution Industry 
Development Act was established. Under 
the act, Article 12-2, the mayor of a spe-
cial self-governing city or the head of a ba-
sic municipality can order hypermarkets to 
restrict their business hours and designate 
mandatory days off for two days per month. 
Therefore, the plaintiff, who operated hyper-
markets in several cities, such as Incheon, 
Bucheon, and Cheongju, insisted that the act 
violated the right to equality and freedom of 
occupation secured in the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court noted that the Con-
stitution’s Article 119 (2) allows the govern-
ment to intervene in the market to democ-
ratize the economy. Furthermore, the Court 
decided that it is necessary to restrict hyper-
markets’ business hours in order to revive 
privately owned small stores and maintain 
sound competition.
(5) Decision of Nonconformity to the Con-
stitution regarding Protection of Commu-
nication Secrets Act (2012 Hun-Ma 191·550, 
2014 Hun-Ma 357 [consolidated], June 28, 
2018; 2012 Hun-Ma 538, June 28, 2018)
Article 13 of the Protection of Communica-
tion Secrets Act allows prosecutors or judi-
cial police who have the permission of the 
court to order telecommunications business 
entities to submit communication confirma-
tion data. Furthermore, Article 2, Item 11 
stipulates that “communication confirmation 
data” includes data on tracing the location of 
information communications.
The plaintiff insisted that narrowing the 
focus of the police dragnet by tracing the 
location of information communications 
violated their right to secrecy of communi-
cations and the due processes of law stipu-
lated by the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court decided that it was 
a case of nonconformity with the Constitu-
tion because the articles of the act did not 
maintain the principle of proportionality and 
therefore violated the plaintiff’s secrecy of 
communications.
(6) Decision of Nonconformity to the Con-
stitution regarding the Act on the Estab-
lishment, Operation, etc., of Teachers’ 
Unions (2015 Hun-Ga 38, August 30, 2018)
The Korean Constitution, Article 33 (1), pro-
tects workers’ rights to independent associ-
ation, collective bargaining, and collective 
action. Furthermore, the Trade Union and 
Labor Relations Adjustment Act (Article 5) 
decrees that workers have the right to es-
tablish a trade union or join one, but public 
officials and school teachers are subject to 
other acts.
21 4PSP[HY`:LY]PJL(J[(Y[PJSLWYV]PKLZÄ]LJH[LNVYPLZHZMVSSV^Z!HJ[P]LK\[`ZLY]PJLYLZLY]LZLY]PJLZ\WWSLTLU[HY`ZLY]PJLWYLSPTPUHY`TPSP[HY`ZLY]PJLHUK
wartime labor service.
22 Supreme Court 2016 Do 10912, November 1, 2018.
23 ‘South Korea releases 57 conscientious objectors after landmark ruling on military service’, the >HZOPUN[VU7VZ[, November 30, 2018, https://www.washington-
WVZ[JVT^VYSKHZPHFWHJPÄJZV\[ORVYLHYLSLHZLZJVUZJPLU[PV\ZVIQLJ[VYZHM[LYSHUKTHYRY\SPUNVUTPSP[HY`ZLY]PJL  HMHLK
ML KMFZ[VY `O[TS&UVYLKPYLJ[$VU\[TF[LYT$HKLMJIIYL[YPL]LK-LIY\HY` 
24 ‘Constitutional Court made a decision that disenables Sherlock Holmes to be a detective in Korea’, /\ɉUN[VU7VZ[1\S`O[[WZ!^^ ^O\ɉUN[VUWVZ[RY
entry/sherlock_kr_5b443e2ee4b048036ea1badc (in Korean), retrieved January 8, 2019.
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However, the Act on the Establishment, Op-
eration, etc., of Teachers’ Unions, Article 2, 
only stipulates that the definition of “teach-
ers” is the same as the definition in the Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act, Ar-
ticle 19 (1). Since the definition of teachers 
is equivalent only to that of elementary and 
secondary teachers, university professors 
are not included in the act, and they are not 
allowed to form trade unions. The plaintiff, 
a member of a trade union consisting of the 
faculties of higher education institutes, in-
sisted that the article violates workers’ rights 
to collective action and equality secured in 
the Constitution.
Although the Constitutional Court rec-
ognized the special nature of university 
professors compared to elementary and 
secondary school teachers, it decided that 
it was not rational to deny university pro-
fessors entire rights to collective action. It 
made a decision of nonconformity to the 
Constitution in this case.
(7) The Constitutional Court’s Best 30 De-
cisions in the Past 30 Years, as chosen by 
the People
Korea achieved democratization in 1987, 
and the Constitutional Court was established 
in the following year. The year 2018 was the 
30th anniversary of its establishment. The 
Constitutional Court conducted a survey of 
15,754 people to choose the best decisions 
made by the Court in the past 30 years.25  
The most popular vote was for the decision 
of unconstitutionality regarding the govern-
ment’s inaction on the “comfort women” 
issue,26 and 3848 people voted for this de-
cision.27 In second place was the impeach-
ment of the President (both Moo-hyun Roh 
in 2004 and Geun-hye Park in 2017),28 with 
3113 votes. The decision of nonconformity 
to the Constitution regarding the Decree on 
Public Officials Appointment Examinations, 
which provided an age restriction of up to 
32 years for the civil service examination,29
came in third, with 2543 votes.30 In fourth 
place was the decision of unconstitutional-
ity regarding the Criminal Act, Article 241, 
which punished adultery,31 with 1780 votes.32
The other ranked decisions are as follows: 
the unconstitutionality of the Act of Promo-
tion of Information and Communications 
Network Utilization and Information Pro-
tection, etc., which enforced the use of real 
names on the internet33 (1699 votes [fifth 
place]); nonconformity to the Constitution 
regarding the Civil Act that prohibited mar-
riage between citizens sharing the same fam-
ily surname and ancestral home34 and non-
conformity to the Constitution regarding the 
Protection of Communications Secrets Act, 
Article 6 (7) proviso, which allowed for ex-
ceeding the period of communication restric-
tions35 (1502 votes [tied for sixth place]); 
constitutionality of the Improper Solicitation 
and Graft Act, which considers mass media 
and faculty members as “public officials”36
(1317 votes [eighth place]); nonconformity 
to the Constitution regarding the Land Ex-
cess-Profits Tax Act37 (1296 votes [ninth 
place]); and nonconformity to the Constitu-
tion regarding the Assembly and Demonstra-
tion Act, which prohibited demonstrations 
within a hundred-meter radius of the Nation-
al Assembly38 (1258 votes [tenth place]).39
IV. LOOKING AHEAD  
In 2012, the Constitutional Court decided 
that prosecuting abortion under the Criminal 
Act was constitutional because it prioritized 
fetal right to life above women’s right to 
self-determination.40 However, after the re-
instatement of a liberal administration, the 
people’s demand for abortion legalization 
was strongly boosted,41 and the Constitu-
tional Court was widely expected to make a 
decision on abortion in 2018. 
The current Mother and Child Health Act, 
Article 14, only allows limited abortion, 
such as in cases where the maintenance of 
25 ;OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[»Z4VZ[7VW\SHY+LJPZPVUPZ[OL+LJPZPVU(ɉYTPUN[OL¸<UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSP[`VM[OL.V]LYUTLU[»Z0UHJ[PVUVU[OL*VTMVY[>VTLU0ZZ\L»¹
Hankyoreh, August 26, 2018, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/859225.html (in Korean), retrieved January 25, 2019.
26 Constitutional Court 2006 Hun-Ma 788, August 30, 2011.
27 Hankyoreh, supra note 25.
28 Constitutional Court 2004 Hun-Na 4, May 14, 2004; 2016 Hun-Na 1, March 10, 2017.
29 Constitutional Court 2007 Hun-Ma 1105, May 29, 2008.
30 Hankyoreh, supra note 25.
31 Constitutional Court 2009 Hun-Ba 17·205, 2010 Hun-Ba 194, 2011 Hun-Ba 4, 2012 Hun-Ba 57·255·411, 2013 Hun-Ba 139·161·267·276·342·365, 2014 Hun-Ba 
53·464, 2011 Hun-Ga 31, 2014 Hun-Ga 4 [consolidated], February 26, 2015.
32 Hankyoreh, supra note 25.
33 Constitutional Court 2010 Hun-Ma 47, August 23, 2012.
34 Constitutional Court 95 Hun-Ga 6·13 [consolidated], July 16, 1997.
35 Constitutional Court 2009 Hun-Ga 30, December 28, 2010.
36 Constitutional Court 2015 Hun-Ma 236·412·662·763 [consolidated], July 28, 2016.
37 Constitutional Court 92 Hun-Ba 49·52 [consolidated], July 29, 1994.
38 Constitutional Court 2013 Hun-Ba 322, 2016 Hun-Ba 354, 2017 Hun-Ba 360·398·471, 2018 Hun-Ga 3·4·9 [consolidated], May 31, 2018.
39º;OL5\TILY6UL+LJPZPVU*OVZLUI`[OL7LVWSLPZ[OL¸<UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSP[`VM[OL.V]LYUTLU[»Z0UHJ[PVUVU*VTMVY[>VTLU0ZZ\L»¹Legal Times, August 27, 
2018, http://www.legaltimes.co.kr/news/articlePrint.html?idxno=41993 (in Korean), retrieved February 12, 2019.
40 Constitutional Court 2010 Hun-Ba 402, August 23, 2012.
41º)S\L/V\ZLYLZWVUKZ[VWL[P[PVUMVYHIVY[PVUYPNO[Z^P[OSH\UJOVMMHJ[ÄUKPUNZ[\K`»/HUR`VYLO5V]LTILYO[[W!LUNSPZOOHUPJVRYHY[PLUNSPZOFLKP[PVU
e_national/820904.html, retrieved February 18, 2019.
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pregnancy endangers a woman’s health, 
cases where the woman was raped, etc.42
Furthermore, the Ministry of Health and 
:HOIDUHDPHQGHGWKHDGPLQLVWUDWLYHUXOHWR
toughen punishments for physicians who 
assist in abortions.43 Under these circum-
stances, the Korean Association of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (KAOG) insisted 
that punishing physicians and women with-
out analyzing the causes of abortion and 
providing a better solution was unhelpful, 
and they officially refused their commit-
ment to illegal abortions.44
According to KAOG, although 23 of the 
30 OECD member countries have legalized 
abortion for economic reasons, Korea still 
has not recognized it, and Korean citizens 
travel overseas where abortion is legal.45
Furthermore, it is reported that 90% of wom-
en who undergo illegal surgery belong to 
poor and minority communities.46
Although it was highly expected that the 
Constitutional Court would recognize wom-
en’s right to self-determination, it did not 
make a decision in 2018. Therefore, the de-
cision of the Court is still attracting keen at-
tention in 2019.
V. FURTHER READING
Byeon, Jin-il. Korea – The Country That 
Kills Presidents (Tokyo: Kadokawa Sho-
ten,2014 [in Japanese]).
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pones decision of unconstitutionality.’ Kyun-
ghyang Shinmun, August 28, 2018, http://
news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.
KWPO"DUWBLG LQ.RUHDQ
retrieved January 23, 2019.
42 º.YV^PUN¸JVU[YV]LYZ`V]LYHIVY[PVU¹+VJ[VYZYLQLJ[Z\YNLY `*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS*V\Y[WVZ[WVULZKLJPZPVUVM\UJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSP[ `»2`\UNO`HUN:OPUT\U(\N\Z[
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SPAIN
I. INTRODUCTION
From a political perspective, 2018 was 
marked by the change in Government on the 
1st of June. Following a trial for corruption 
and sentencing involving important members 
of the Popular Party, the Socialist Group in 
Congress raised a motion of censure, which 
according to Article 113 of the Spanish Con-
stitution is constructive. The alternative can-
didate for the position of president was Sr. 
Pedro Sánchez, who was sworn in as pres-
ident after winning the vote by an absolute 
majority. This majority was possible thanks 
to the votes from the Socialist group, Unidos 
Podemos, Esquerra Republicana de Catalu-
nya, the Democratic Party of Catalonia, the 
Basque Nationalist Party, Compromise, EH 
Bildu and New Canaries.
After losing the vote on the motion, Sr Rajoy 
resigned the presidency and his seat in Con-
gress, and retired from political life. Some 
months later, following an intense primary 
process, Pablo Casado was elected as the 
new Secretary General of the Popular Party.
The other main focus of political attention 
continued to be Catalonia and the political 
and legal fallout from the constitutional 
breakdown following the approval of laws 
related to the self-determination referendum 
and the process of transition to independence 
in the Catalan Parliament in September 
2017. These acts were declared unconstitu-
tional and void by the Constitutional Court, 
along with the illegal referendum and the 
false unilateral declaration of independence. 
2018 was a year of criminal investigation of 
the independence movement leaders, most of 
whom are in pre-trial detention, and some of 
whom remain abroad, seeking refuge from 
the action of the Spanish criminal justice 
system.
,Q WKH OHJDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDO¿HOG WKH&RQVWL-
WXWLRQDO&RXUWKDGWRJUDSSOHZLWKVLJQL¿FDQW
topics such as universal justice, sex-segre-
gated education and the scope of the right to 
EH IRUJRWWHQ$QRWKHU VLJQL¿FDQW MXGJPHQW
was the Constitutional Court pronouncing 
IRUWKH¿UVWWLPHRQWKHSRVVLELOLWLHVRISDU-
liamentary control of an acting government.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
Two decisions stood out in 2018: 31/2018 
and 58/2018. STC 31/2018 was in response 
to the appeal raised by the Socialist Parlia-
mentary Group in Congress against vari-
ous articles of Organic Law 8/2013, for the 
improvement of educational quality. The 
appeal of unconstitutionality was rejected 
HQWLUHO\ :LWK UHIHUHQFH WR VH[VHJUHJDWHG
teaching, the Constitutional Court stated 
that this pedagogical model was protected 
in the constitution by the right of creation of 
schools and by freedom of teaching. In con-
sequence, sex-differentiated education may 
not be considered an obstacle to receiving 
SXEOLFIXQGV:LWKUHVSHFWWRWKHIRUPXODRI
choosing between subjects of religion and 
social values and civics or ethics, which the 
appellants claimed violated the principle of 
state neutrality, the judgment declared that 
the law includes cross-subject education in 
civics and the constitution in all subjects 
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during basic education. In this way, the re-
lationship between the subjects of religion, 
social values, civics and ethics is not exclu-
sive. The judgment included three dissenting 
opinions and one concurring opinion.
Judgment 58/2018 responded to an appeal 
of the violation of the right to honour, priva-
cy and one’s own image against the El País 
newspaper. In the 1980s, the newspaper pub-
lished news of the appellants’ conviction for 
GUXJWUDI¿FNLQJODEHOOLQJWKHPGUXJDGGLFWV
In 2007, El País established free access to 
their digital archives, so that entering the 
names of the appellants in Google gave this 
news story as the top result. The CC partially 
supported the appellants’ claim. It declared 
the violation of personal data protection 
rights on the side of “the right to be forgot-
ten”, and ordered the suppression of that data 
since it was no longer necessary in terms of 
the original objectives. The court also de-
clared the violation of the right to honour 
DQGSULYDF\7KHMXGJPHQWDI¿UPHGWKDWWKH
passage of so much time reduced public in-
terest in the matter, while the harm caused by 
the current diffusion of the news was partic-
ularly severe.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. STC 3/2018. Age discrimination.
The CC responded to an appeal for amparo 
(protection of fundamental rights) raised by a 
person with a severe psychological disability 
who requested to be included in an individual-
ised care program in a care centre for disabled 
people in the Autonomous Community of Ma-
drid. Their application was rejected because 
of the application of an age-related exclusion 
in the autonomous community regulations, 
as they were over 60, disregarding a medical 
evaluation of their condition and needs for 
specialised treatment. The CC recognised that 
this was age-related discrimination.
2. STC 10/2018. Judgment on the legislative 
proceedings in the Parliament of Catalonia. 
The CC responded to an appeal for protec-
tion of fundamental rights raised by the so-
cialist parliamentary group against the Mesa 
(governing body) of the Catalan Parliament, 
which rejected their request for a judgment 
by the Council for Statutory Guarantees re-
garding the proposed law for the referendum 
on self-determination. (The law was passed 
on the 7th of September and declared un-
constitutional by the CC some months later.) 
The CC granted protection, stating that the 
possibility of requesting a judgment from the 
Council for Statutory Guarantees could not 
be abrogated without negatively affecting 
the essence of the legislative process. The 
CC declared that this had violated the rights 
of citizens to participate in public affairs 
through their representatives.
3. STC 12/2018. Calling a strike in education.
The CC responded to an appeal for protec-
tion of fundamental rights raised by a pri-
mary school teacher who was sanctioned 
for sending a letter to his pupils’ parents 
informing them of a strike action and his 
intention to support it, along with his inten-
tion to spend ten minutes in his class telling 
his pupils his reasons for doing so. This was 
punished by the educational authorities as 
they considered this behaviour as personal 
use of public goods and resources, and an in-
fraction of the requirement of neutrality. The 
CC granted the teacher protection because 
the type of information transmitted in the 
class and the little time spent explaining his 
reasoning could not be considered as person-
al use of public resources. Furthermore, the 
information in the letter sent to parents did 
not violate the public sector worker’s need 
to remain neutral, and the information given 
to the students about his intention to support 
the strike did not in itself represent an inten-
tion to indoctrinate or bias the students.
4. STC 14/2018. State competences in 
education. 
The CC addressed the constitutionality of 
various precepts of Organic Law 8/2013, for 
the improvement of educational quality, for 
supposed infringement on the competences 
of the Autonomous Community of Catalo-
nia. The CC partially approved the appeal 
and declared unconstitutional and void: a) 
the carte blanche of the national government 
to establish, by regulation, multilingual edu-
cation from the second stage of infant educa-
tion up to students of 18 years old, because 
there was no criteria by which to determine 
what was basic in this subject, and b) the au-
thority granted to the Ministry of Education 
to decide, if autonomous authorities fail to 
comply, on the schooling of pupils in private 
schools and to take on the expenses for the 
corresponding educational authority (local 
or at the autonomous community level), giv-
en that it does not respect the limits set out 
by the CC on school inspectors, nor does it 
satisfy the minimum guarantees of legal cer-
tainty about the fundamentals of the subject. 
Conversely, the CC ruled the constitutional-
ity of state regulation on: a) common con-
WHQWRIFRUHVXEMHFWVDQGE¿QDOHYDOXDWLRQ
tests, it being necessary to pass these tests to 
DFKLHYHDFDGHPLFTXDOL¿FDWLRQVZKLFK LVD
competence of the state.
5. STC 17/2018. Healthcare for irregular 
immigrants.
:LWK5R\DO'HFUHH/DZWKHQDWLRQ-
al government removed free healthcare from 
immigrants with irregular status. The Parlia-
ment of Navarra, in law 8/2013, recognised 
the right of all resident persons in Navarra, 
including irregular immigrants, to access 
free healthcare from its public health system. 
The CC judged that the autonomic law vio-
lated the basic competences of the state and 
declared the Navarra law unconstitutional. 
The judgment had 5 dissenting opinions.
6. STC 34/2018 and 94/2018. Government 
budgetary veto.
The CC responded to an appeal by the na-
tional government against the Mesa of Con-
gress. The government, in accordance with 
the power granted in the constitution, im-
posed a veto on the parliamentary legislative 
process which suspended the timetable for 
implementation of Organic Law 8/2013, for 
the improvement of educational quality. The 
reason for the government’s veto was that 
the law represented a reduction of income 
planned in the current budget. The Mesa ig-
nored the government’s veto and decided to 
continue with the legislative process, believ-
LQJWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQWYHWRKDGLQVXI¿FLHQW
REMHFWLYH MXVWL¿FDWLRQ RU VXI¿FLHQW UHGXF-
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tion of budgeted income. The CC agreed 
with the Mesa, reasoning that the govern-
ment a) must explicitly justify the connec-
tion between a measure they propose and 
budgeted income and spending, and b) the 
connection must be direct and immediate, 
not merely hypothetical.
In the second judgment, the CC dealt with 
a case in which the Mesa refused to pro-
cess a law closing nuclear power plants in 
Spain, applying the government-imposed 
veto which alleged that this law would affect 
multi-year budgets. The CC, applying the 
VDPHGRFWULQHDVWKHSUHYLRXVFDVHDI¿UPHG
that the government could not limit the au-
tonomy of Las Cortes Generales (the two 
chambers, Congress and the Senate) to adopt 
initiatives if they did not truly affect the cur-
rent budget. In 2018, the “budgetary veto” 
was a particular protagonist in the CC as a 
consequence of the weakness of parliamen-
tary support for the different governments in 
the last two legislations.
7. STC 46/2018. Appearance of the President 
of Catalonia and the secession process.
The court dealt with another case related to 
the Catalan secession process. It involved 
an appeal for amparo raised by Miquel Ice-
WDDQG¿IWHHQRWKHUGHSXWLHVLQWKH6RFLDOLVW
Parliamentary Group in the Parliament of 
Catalonia related to agreements made by the 
Mesa, which authorised the appearance of 
the President of the Generalitat of Catalonia 
“to evaluate the results of the referendum of 
the 1st of October and its effects, in accor-
dance with Article 4 of the Law on the Ref-
erendum on Self-determination”. The court 
judged that authorising the appearance of 
the president in the Parliament violated the 
rights of the appellant deputies to exercise 
their representative functions, as it acknowl-
edged a parliamentary initiative that meant 
the application of a law that had previously 
been suspended by the CC and which affect-
ed the condition and institutional position of 
the autonomic legislative assembly.
8. STC 80/2018. Energy poverty.
The CC ruled as unconstitutional various 
precepts of Law 2/2012, on the social func-
tion of housing in the community of Valen-
cia. Valencian law established the obligation 
for providers of gas and electricity who were 
cutting off a supply to request a report from 
municipal social services beforehand to de-
termine whether the people affected were at 
risk of social exclusion. The court judged 
that this obligation contradicted the funda-
mental state rules on the matter. The judg-
ment had dissenting opinions. In one, the 
magistrate Xiol Ríos disputed the majority 
opinion, stating that the rules for protection 
of energy consumers at risk of social exclu-
sion set out in the law were not necessarily 
binding on the competences of the state in 
general economic planning and energy but 
rather in the areas of “consumption” and “so-
cial services”, thus the measure in question 
should not have been ruled unconstitutional. 
9. STC 85/2018. The law courts and the “right 
to the truth”.
The CC responded to a petition raised by the 
president of the government against the 2015 
law in the Autonomous Community of Na-
varra “of recognition and compensation for 
victims of politically motivated acts by ex-
treme right groups or public workers”. The 
law created a Commission of Recognition 
and Compensation with the responsibility 
to investigate events which had resulted in 
the death, or serious or permanent injury, 
of the persons concerned in the context of 
politically motivated violence since the 1st 
of January, 1950. In the opinion of the CC, 
setting up this commission, which is not part 
of judicial power, does not conform with the 
constitution, as it affects the constitution-
DOO\ FRQ¿JXUHG V\VWHP RI FULPLQDO MXVWLFH
This judgment had four dissenting opinions. 
Three of those judged that there had been a 
failure to address the requirements of the so-
called “right to the truth”, referring to Res-
olution 2005/66 from the Commission on 
Human Rights, passed on the 20th of April, 
7KLVLVWKH¿UVWWLPHWKDWWKLVTXHVWLRQ
has come up in the court’s deliberations.
10. STC 100/2018. Cannabis. 
The CC ruled unconstitutional a law from 
the Parliament of Catalonia which regulated 
the supply and distribution of cannabis. The 
CC judged that this law granted legal cover 
to criminal behaviour, affecting the exclu-
sive state competence to regulate what is 
considered a crime.
11. STC 111/2018. Paternity leave and 
non-discrimination.
The CC addressed an appeal presented by a 
father who had enjoyed the 13 days of pa-
ternity leave provided for in the law. The 
father had previously requested an increase 
of his paternity leave to 16 weeks to make 
it the same length as the legally recognised 
maternity leave available to the mother. The 
ordinary courts rejected this increase. The 
CC judged that this was not sex discrimina-
tion as the longer length of maternity leave 
in the law has an objective that does not exist 
in the case of fathers: to allow the physical 
recovery of the mother following childbirth. 
The judgment contains an interesting dis-
senting opinion that the majority decision 
of the court is, at its heart, discriminating 
against women. Recognising that mothers 
can always have longer maternity leave than 
fathers does not contribute to improving the 
traditional discrimination that some women 
face in the labour market. Firstly because it 
does not encourage hiring women, and sec-
ondly because it restricts prospects for ad-
vancement at work.
12. STC 124/2018. Control of the acting 
government.
The CC responded to an appeal raised by 
Congress against the government for having 
refused to submit to parliamentary control. 
The Socialist Parliamentary Group had re-
quested the appearance of the Ministry of 
Defence in Congress to report on matters 
arising from the NATO Council of Ministers. 
The government was in an acting capacity 
following general elections and was wait-
ing for the investiture of the new president 
by the newly elected Congress. The acting 
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government refused to submit to parliamen-
tary control on the basis that it did not have 
SDUOLDPHQWDU\ FRQ¿GHQFH LQ WKH QHZ &RQ-
gress, but in the previous Congress, which 
had been dissolved for the elections. The CC 
DI¿UPHGWKDWWKHDFWLQJJRYHUQPHQWDOVRKDG
to submit to parliamentary control.
13. STC 129/2018, 130/2018 & 131/2018. Judi-
cial competence to try the actors in the Cata-
lan secessionist process.
The CC addressed various appeals present-
ed by those linked to the Catalan secession-
ist process, either in prison or in self-im-
posed exile outside Spain, who were being 
prosecuted for crimes of rebellion, sedition, 
misuse of public funds and disobedience. 
The appellants believed that the appropri-
ate court to try them was not the Supreme 
Court, which had been declared the proper 
court, but rather the Catalan Superior Court 
of Justice. The CC rejected the appeals, 
reasoning that they had not exhausted all 
available resources in the Supreme Court to 
defend their claim.
14. STC 136/2018. The Catalan secession 
process and failure to comply with CC res-
olutions.
The CC addressed a complaint against reso-
lution 5/XII in the Catalan Parliament from 
the 5th of July, 2018. In that, the Parliament 
UHDI¿UPHGLWVZLOOWRFRQWLQXHZLWKWKHGHP-
ocratic actions to complete the process of 
Catalan independence. To that end, the par-
liamentary resolution urged the Catalan gov-
ernment to continue the application of vari-
ous laws that had previously been annulled 
by the CC for violating the constitution. Spe-
FL¿FDOO\WKHSULQFLSOHRISRSXODUVRYHUHLJQW\
and the principle of the unity of the Spanish 
nation. The Constitutional Court declared 
resolution 5/XII from the Catalan Parliament 
unconstitutional for having again violated 
those principles.
15. STC 140/2018. Universal criminal justice.
The CC addressed a complaint presented 
against the amendment of Law 6/1985, on 
judicial power. This change would limit the 
initial universal jurisdiction of the Spanish 
courts to try, among other things, crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and ter-
rorism committed by Spaniards or foreign 
nationals anywhere in the world. The new 
text would limit the jurisdiction to prose-
cute those crimes and would only permit it 
where there was a point of connection with 
the Spanish state: a) if the suspect were a 
Spanish citizen or b) a foreign national 
present in Spain. 
The petitioners believed that this limitation 
of universal criminal justice violated the 
constitution because it would restrict the 
ability of the courts to guarantee fundamen-
tal rights. They also believed that it breached 
international treaties in which Spain required 
extraterritorial persecution of those crimes. 
The CC judged that the limitation of judicial 
competence in the amended law did not vi-
olate the constitution, as it established that 
the competence of the Spanish criminal 
courts was guaranteed in terms recognised in 
WKHODZ7KHUHIRUHWKHODZFRXOGGH¿QHWKH
extent of universal criminal justice. The CC 
decision had one dissenting vote from the 
majority opinion.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2019
The 2019 calendar is marked by elections 
(municipal, autonomic and European Parlia-
ment elections in May) and by jurispruden-
tial pronouncements.
Amongst those will be the extremely im-
portant pronouncements from the criminal 
courts related to the legal responsibilities of 
those responsible for the Catalan secession-
ist process. In relation to this, the Constitu-
tional Court will have to respond to appeals 
raised by some of the secessionist leaders in 
pre-trial detention and deprived of the right 
WRH[HUFLVHWKHLUSXEOLFRI¿FHE\MXGLFLDOGH-
FLVLRQ:H DUH DOVR DZDLWLQJ D GHFLVLRQ RQ
the constitutionality of the measures taken 
by the state, which determined the dismiss-
al of these members of the Catalan govern-
ment, the dissolution of its parliament, and 
the calling of elections. On a separate issue, 
the Constitutional Court will have to address 
such controversial questions as the current 
regulation of abortion (pending since 2010) 
DQG UHYLHZDEOH LQGH¿QLWH LPSULVRQPHQW
(pending since 2015).
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I. INTRODUCTION
2018 was one of the most eventful years in 
6UL /DQNDQ FRQVWLWXWLRQDO KLVWRU\ :KLOH D
fitful constitution-making process carried 
laboriously on within Parliament, and an un-
usual attempt was made by way of a Private 
Member’s bill to transform the presidential 
constitution into a parliamentary model, by 
far the most significant events concerned 
those surrounding an attempted constitution-
al coup by the President of the Republic to 
illegally dismiss his own government and re-
place it with another. The constitutional cri-
sis ended with the restoration of constitution-
al rule, with a mobilised public, Parliament, 
and the courts all playing prominent roles 
in the resistance to presidential authoritari-
anism. However, the aftermath of the crisis 
has been disappointing, with the President 
escaping legal and political accountability 
for his violations of the constitution, and 
providing no apparent impetus for further 
constitutional reform. In revealing the po-
tential for both democratic backsliding and 
institutional resilience, the crisis revealed the 
paradoxical nature of Sri Lanka’s political 
culture. That paradox teaches us that while 
strengthening democratic institutions is both 
worthwhile and effective, the ultimate chal-
lenge for democratisation lies in the more 
nebulous sphere of political culture, where 
authoritarian practices of the past might be 
more difficult to eliminate.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
The process of drafting a new constitution, 
begun in 2016, continued throughout 2018, 
although by then due to its lack of transpar-
ency and public engagement, the process 
was increasingly marked by public indiffer-
ence and apathy. The Steering Committee of 
the Constitutional Assembly (as Parliament 
is known from time to time when it sits in 
its constitution-making capacity) had pub-
lished an Interim Report in November 2017. 
The Interim Report had been intended to re-
flect an agreed consensus on the principles 
of a new constitution between all the parties 
represented in the Constitutional Assembly. 
However, due to the deterioration of the re-
lationship between President Maithripala 
6LULVHQD DQG 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU 5DQLO :LFN-
remesinghe, and thus a fraying governing 
coalition between the two largest parties, the 
Interim Report did not reflect a consensus. 
Virtually all its main recommendations were 
opposed in a separate dissent entered by the 
President’s party. In order to overcome this 
impasse, the Steering Committee instructed 
the Panel of Experts (comprising lawyers 
and academics nominated by political par-
ties) resourcing the process to produce a 
Discussion Paper that could bridge the dif-
ferences. This was anticipated in November, 
but one of the most serious constitutional 
crises in Sri Lanka’s post-colonial history 
erupted in October.
On the night of 26 October, the Presidential 
Secretariat made three announcements in 
quick succession that took the entire coun-
try by complete surprise. The first was that 
the President’s party had withdrawn from the 
National Government, the second that the 
President had appointed Mahinda Rajapak-
sa MP (the former populist President Siris-
ena had defeated in the 2015 elections) as 
Prime Minister, and the third that stated that 
WKH3UHVLGHQWKDGUHPRYHG5DQLO:LFNUHP-
esinghe from the office of Prime Minister. 
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$OWKRXJKFDXJKWXQDZDUH:LFNUHPHVLQJKH
swiftly responded that he remained the Prime 
Minister, as he continued to enjoy the confi-
dence of Parliament and had not therefore 
been lawfully dismissed. The Nineteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which had 
been passed by the National Government of 
6LULVHQD DQG:LFNUHPHVLQJKH LQ  KDG
curtailed the President’s power to dismiss 
the Prime Minister so long as the latter en-
joyed the confidence of Parliament. The next 
day, the President prorogued Parliament to 
buy time to cobble together a majority for 
his nominee as Prime Minister, and from 29 
October onwards, Sirisena and Rajapaksa 
started making appointments with the new 
Cabinet while pursuing strenuous attempts, 
including through patently corrupt means, to 
LQGXFH FURVVRYHUV IURP :LFNUHPHVLQJKH¶V
coalition to provide Rajapaksa with a parlia-
mentary majority.
On 9 November, with still no majority in 
place, the President gazetted the dissolution 
of Parliament for an early election in Janu-
ary. On 12 November, the dissolution or-
der was challenged by way of fundamental 
rights petitions before the Supreme Court 
by political parties and a civil society group. 
On the same day, the Supreme Court issued 
an interim stay on the dissolution order un-
til the court could determine the legality of 
the action after a full hearing. In the wake of 
the Supreme Court’s interim order that Par-
liament had not been legally dissolved, Par-
liament reconvened the next day and passed 
a vote of no-confidence in Rajapaksa’s pur-
ported government. Although pro-Rajapaksa 
MPs tried to disrupt proceedings through vi-
olence and intimidation of the Speaker with-
in the chamber, the vote was carried. On 16 
November, due to the violence and lack of 
clarity during the previous sittings, Parlia-
ment passed a second vote of no-confidence 
in the purported Rajapaksa government, 
which was boycotted by pro-Rajapaksa MPs.
On 3 December, the 122 MPs constituting 
the parliamentary majority against the pur-
ported Rajapaksa government filed a petition 
in the Court of Appeal seeking a writ of quo
warranto against Rajapaksa and his minis-
ters. The purpose of the writ application was 
to determine the legal authority by which 
Rajapaksa and his ministers claim to act as 
a government. As with the separate action in 
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal also 
issued an interim order restraining Rajapak-
sa from functioning as Prime Minister until 
it had heard and determined the case. On 12 
December, Parliament passed a vote of con-
ILGHQFHLQ5DQLO:LFNUHPHVLQJKHDVWKHODZ-
ful Prime Minister, and on 13 December, the 
Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the 
fundamental rights applications against the 
purported dissolution of Parliament by the 
President on 9 November. The Court found 
the presidential action to be illegal and un-
constitutional (the decision is discussed in 
more detail in the next section), and on the 
following day, the Supreme Court refused 
to vacate the stay order issued by the Court 
of Appeal in the quo warranto application. 
On 15 December, Mahinda Rajapaksa “re-
signed” as Prime Minister, and on 16 De-
FHPEHU5DQLO:LFNUHPHVLQJKHZDVUHLQVWDW-
ed by being sworn in before the President as 
Prime Minister.
As noted, the impugned presidential acts 
were carried out under previous unilateral 
presidential powers that were severely limit-
ed (e.g., dismissal/appointment of the Prime 
Minister) or removed (e.g., the dissolution of 
Parliament in the first four and half years of 
its five-year term, except by a resolution of 
Parliament passed by a two-thirds majority) 
E\ WKH1LQHWHHQWK$PHQGPHQW:KLOH LW LV
inexplicable how Sirisena was advised he 
could exercise powers he no longer had, and 
that too by a constitutional amendment intro-
duced no more than four years previously by 
his own National Government, it would ap-
pear that the Nineteenth Amendment passed 
the stress test of the crisis well. The im-
proved framework for judicial appointments 
doubtless had a role in bolstering the inde-
pendence and impartiality of the courts, and 
the improved framework for the de-politi-
cisation of public services and independent 
bodies did have a more general effect in re-
sisting presidential authoritarianism. 
The President did not have the benefit of any 
legal uncertainty to even indirectly justify 
his actions; his actions were quite plainly un-
constitutional on the face of the text after the 
Nineteenth Amendment. How he felt able to 
act this way begs deeper questions about a 
Sri Lankan political culture that permits, or 
at least tolerates this behaviour at the highest 
level. On the other hand, the crisis and par-
ticularly its denouement with the restoration 
of constitutional rule highlighted well-func-
tioning checking mechanisms in Sri Lanka’s 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO V\VWHP :LFNUHPHVLQJKH¶V
parliamentary majority held against severe 
odds, the Speaker felt able to assert the rights 
and privileges of Parliament against the dep-
redations of the executive, and the courts 
stepped boldly into a political controversy 
they would normally have chosen to avoid. 
More broadly, the prominent role of social 
media activism during the crisis revealed 
a changing country, especially in the atti-
tudes of younger sections of the electorate, 
who seem to be less motivated by blind par-
ty or ethnic loyalties than older voters, and 
more by democratic values. Spontaneous 
civic protests by ordinary citizens heralded 
a remobilisation of the middle class, which 
had generally retreated from the political 
sphere since the 1950s, around the defence 
of constitutional values. The international 
community, too, refused the legitimacy of 
recognition to the Sirisena-Rajapaksa power 
grab—not an inconsiderable factor in the de-
feat of the constitutional coup.
:KLOHWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHFULVLVZDVZLWKRXW
any doubt, a clear victory for constitutional 
democracy, its aftermath is more amorphous. 
It has not acted as a spur to revitalise the 
flagging constitutional reform process, or 
even of the style and personnel of the gov-
HUQPHQW DQG :LFNUHPHVLQJKH KDV PLVVHG
a chance to rejuvenate the reforming zeal 
that inspired the country in 2015 in mandat-
ing a new constitution. Sirisena has almost 
entirely escaped accountability for the seri-
ous breaches of the constitution for which 
he is responsible, there being no two-thirds 
majority for a successful impeachment, and 
the only solace might be that his political 
career is most likely to be over by the next 
presidential election. Rajapaksa, too, was 
damaged, but did contrive to muster enough 
numbers to be recognised as the Leader of 
the Opposition in Parliament following the 
crisis. He is using this position as a platform 
for an electoral return, condemning among 
other things the Nineteenth Amendment 
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restraints on presidentialism as a fetter on 
strong government. But having been elected 
twice previously as President, the Nineteenth 
Amendment debars him from running again, 
and so he has a considerable dilemma about 
the choice of a proxy as President while he 
governs as Prime Minister. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution 
Bill Special Determination (SC SD 29/2018 
– SC SD 40/2018) – Pre-enactment Judicial 
Review of Constitutional Amendment to 
Abolish the Executive Presidency
Abolishing or curtailing the executive presi-
dency has been an unfulfilled promise made 
by virtually every serious candidate to the 
office since 1994. The semi-presidential 
constitution of 1978 has been consistent-
ly criticised for the over-concentration and 
over-centralisation of power and authority 
in the hands of one person. The Nineteenth 
Amendment in 2015 made substantial reduc-
tions in the scope of presidential power, but it 
did not abolish presidentialism as originally 
intended. In July 2018, the Janatha Vimuk-
thi Peramuna (JVP or People’s Liberation 
Front), a minor leftist party in Parliament 
which has consistently advocated the aboli-
tion of the executive presidency, submitted 
a Private Member’s bill titled the “Twenti-
eth Amendment to the Constitution” aimed 
at achieving this end. The bill contemplated 
two central changes: first, the abolition of the 
direct election of the President as provided 
in Article 4(b) of the 1978 Constitution, and 
secondly, the curtailment of the President’s 
substantive executive powers.
A bill for the amendment of the constitution 
is under the Supreme Court’s sole and exclu-
sive jurisdiction to determine whether it re-
quires popular approval at a referendum (Ar-
ticle 120(a)). Twelve petitions invoked this 
special jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to 
determine if the Twentieth Amendment Bill 
required a referendum. The 1978 Constitu-
tion can be amended by a two-thirds ma-
jority in Parliament, save for the provisions 
entrenched by Article 83. Any amendment, 
repeal, or replacement of the entrenched pro-
visions requires a referendum in addition to a 
two-thirds majority in Parliament. The peti-
tioners argued that clauses 1 to 38 of the bill 
violated some of the entrenched provisions, 
including Articles 3, 4, and 30(2), and thus it 
required a referendum. 
In holding with the petitioners, the Supreme 
Court, inter alia, stated that the “franchise 
that would be exercised at a Presidential 
election, a Parliamentary election, or a Ref-
erendum is a part of Sovereignty”, and that 
“Sovereignty is inalienable”. Therefore, if a 
bill is enacted removing the franchise of the 
people, which would be exercised at a pres-
idential election, the principle enshrined in 
Article 3 that “Sovereignty is inalienable” 
would be violated. The Twentieth Amend-
ment Bill’s intention to remove direct elec-
tion of the President would thus violate the 
entrenched Article 3, and therefore require 
referendum approval. The Court also deter-
mined that some clauses of the bill seeking 
to curtail the substantive executive powers 
of the President also violated Article 3 in 
that the presidential character of the 1978 
Constitution would be transformed into a 
parliamentary executive, which would be a 
constitutional change that again required ref-
erendum approval. 
No bill that has been declared by the Su-
preme Court to require a referendum has 
ever progressed any further, and that too was 
the fate of the JVP’s Twentieth Amendment 
Bill. On its face, the text is a form of proce-
dural entrenchment, but in practice it has be-
come a substantive protection against certain 
categories of constitutional amendments. 
2. Ranil Wickremesinghe & Others v Mahin-
da Rajapaksa & Others&$:ULW
±:ULWRIQuo Warranto on the Legal Basis 
of the Offices of Prime Minister and Cabinet
This case arose from the constitutional cri-
sis of October-December 2018 described 
in the previous section. As noted, the crisis 
was triggered by the President’s attempt to 
remove and replace the serving Prime Min-
ister. After the Nineteenth Amendment was 
enacted in 2015, the Prime Minister can 
only cease to hold office by death, resigna-
tion, by ceasing to be a Member of Parlia-
ment, or if the government as a whole has 
lost the confidence of Parliament by a de-
feat on the annual statement of government 
policy (throne speech), the budget, or a vote 
of no-confidence (Articles 46(2) and 48). 
Since the constitution after the Nineteenth 
Amendment specifies these ways in which 
the Prime Minister ceases to hold office, and 
has impliedly removed the previous power 
of the President to remove the Prime Minis-
ter at will, it follows that there are no other 
ways in which this can happen. In particular, 
the President can only appoint another Prime 
Minister where the serving Prime Minister 
has lost office in any one of these ways.  
On 26 October, it was clear that the serving 
Prime Minister had not ceased to hold office 
in any one of these ways. Rather, the Pres-
ident had purportedly removed the Prime 
Minister from office by acting under the 
provisions of Article 42(4), which states that 
the President shall appoint as Prime Minister 
the Member of Parliament, who, in the Pres-
ident’s opinion, is most likely to command 
the confidence of Parliament. The President 
seems to have taken these words rather too 
literally than is constitutionally permissible. 
:KHQWKLVSURYLVLRQVSHDNVRIWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V
opinion, it contemplates not the subjective 
and personal opinion of the President as to 
which MP is best suited to be Prime Minis-
ter but an objective and constitutional view 
formed by reference to who can command 
the confidence of Parliament. This is usually, 
although not always, the leader of the largest 
party represented in Parliament. Prime Min-
LVWHU :LFNUHPHVLQJKH KDG VXUYLYHG D YRWH
of no-confidence by a substantial majority 
earlier in the year. No other canvassing of 
Parliament’s confidence had occurred since 
then, or before the purported appointment of 
Rajapaksa, and therefore it followed that the 
President could neither constitutionally re-
move a Prime Minister who has not lost the 
confidence of Parliament nor appoint anoth-
er in his place. Article 42(2) also speaks only 
of the appointment of the Prime Minister 
by the President and says nothing about the 
removal of the Prime Minister by the Pres-
LGHQW:KLOH WKH SRZHU RI GLVPLVVDO FRXOG
be assumed as inherent to the power of ap-
pointment in the constitution prior to 2015, 
the Nineteenth Amendment had changed this 
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by providing expressly for the specific ways 
in which the Prime Minister can be removed 
(under the previously noted Articles 46(2) and 
48). That these procedures were not followed 
rendered the presidential acts on 26 October
prima facie illegal and unconstitutional.  
This resulted in the existence of two differ-
ent “governments”—de facto and de jure—
in the country. The ousted Prime Minister 
and the majority of MPs, including those 
not on government benches, declared the 
removal unconstitutional and demanded 
the immediate summoning of Parliament. 
This was followed by peaceful mass pro-
tests in the capital Colombo and elsewhere 
and international pressure to summon Par-
liament. Amidst mounting pressure, Presi-
dent Sirisena, by Gazette notification on 4 
November, summoned Parliament to meet 
RQ1RYHPEHU:KHQ3DUOLDPHQWPHWRQ
that date, amidst the eruption of chaos in 
the house, standing orders were suspended, 
and a no-confidence motion against the un-
constitutionally appointed Prime Minister 
Rajapaksa and his cabinet was passed by 
a majority. Despite the Speaker declaring 
the motion as passed, the President and Ra-
japaksa refused to yield. On 15 November, 
when Parliament convened again, the Speak-
er stated that in view of the no-confidence 
vote passed on 14 November, there was no 
government and that he did not recognise 
Rajapaksa as the Prime Minister. However, 
despite the no-confidence vote, Rajapaksa 
and his cabinet continued to function as the 
government, and thus on 16 November, Par-
liament once again passed a vote of no-con-
fidence against the Rajapaksa government. 
Given the blatant disregard for the will of 
3DUOLDPHQW E\ WKH H[HFXWLYH 5DQLO :LFN-
remesinghe, otherwise a well-known ad-
vocate of parliamentary sovereignty, and 
121 other MPs constituting the majority in 
the 225-member Parliament, were left with 
no alternative but to pray for a writ of quo 
warranto from the Court of Appeal, chal-
lenging Rajapaksa and his ministers from 
functioning as the cabinet. The Court of Ap-
peal on 3 December granted an interim order 
preventing Rajapaksa from functioning as 
Prime Minister, and he and his cabinet from 
functioning as the government. In granting 
the interim order, the President of the Court 
of Appeal, Surasena J, stated that: “the dam-
age that may be caused by temporarily re-
straining a lawful Cabinet of Ministers from 
functioning would in all probabilities be 
outweighed by the damage that would be 
caused by allowing a set of persons who are 
not entitled in law to function as the Prime 
Minister or the Cabinet of Ministers or any 
other Minister of the Government. The mag-
nitude of the latter damage would be very 
high. Such damage would be an irreparable 
or irremediable one”. Despite the interim 
order being immediately challenged before 
the Supreme Court by way of an appeal, the 
Supreme Court refused to vacate it. 
3. Rajavarothiam Sampanthan v Attor-
ney-General & Others (SC FR 351/2018) and 
9 Other Applications (SC FR 352 to 361/2018) 
– Unconstitutional Presidential Dissolution 
of Parliament
President Sirisena’s second major act of 
questionable constitutionality during the cri-
sis was to attempt to dissolve Parliament on 
9 November. This was challenged by way of 
fundamental rights applications before the 
Supreme Court on 12 November seeking to 
quash the dissolution and declare it unconsti-
tutional. As noted, the petitioners also sought 
interim relief in the form of suspending the 
dissolution until the final determination of 
the case, which the Court granted.
The Nineteenth Amendment limited the 
President’s power to dissolve Parliament 
by the proviso to Article 70(1), which cat-
egorically provided that “the President shall 
not dissolve Parliament until the expiration 
of a period of not less than four years and 
six months from the date appointed for its 
first meeting, unless Parliament requests the 
President to do so by a resolution passed by 
not less than two-thirds of the whole number 
of Members (including those not present), 
voting in its favour”. In this instance, the 
President ex mero motu dissolved the Parlia-
ment before the expiry of four years and six 
months from the first meeting of the current 
Parliament, which is a conspicuous violation 
of the constitution.
Due to the significance of the issue and the 
prevailing constitutional chaos in the coun-
try, Chief Justice Nalin Perera appointed a 
seven-judge bench presided over by himself. 
The case was heard over four consecutive 
days from 4–7 December amidst extraordi-
nary public interest in the proceedings. On 13 
December, the Court delivered its unanimous 
decision that the presidential proclamation 
dissolving Parliament had violated the peti-
tioners’ right to equal protection of the law 
(Article 12 (1)), and quashed it. The leading 
judgment was delivered the Chief Justice, 
with whom five other judges agreed. How-
ever, Justice de Abrew, while arriving at the 
same decision based on similar if not identical 
reasoning, delivered a separate opinion. 
A substantial portion of the 88-page judgment 
by Perera CJ was dedicated to questions per-
taining to the jurisdiction and maintainabil-
ity of the petitions, and a discussion of the 
constitutional limits of the President’s pow-
ers. The Chief Justice rejected the Attorney 
General’s contention that the President dis-
solving the Parliament was not an executive 
or administrative action falling within the 
purview of the fundamental rights jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court, and was thus not 
justiciable. Perera CJ further highlighted that 
the President does not enjoy absolute legal 
immunity after the Nineteenth Amendment, 
and held that the pre-Nineteenth Amendment 
judgments of the Supreme Court pertaining 
to the immunity of the President were “of 
little relevance today”. He also rejected the 
argument that the President enjoyed a ple-
nary executive power, and stated that “the 
words ‘plenary power’ simply mean full 
power or complete power and should not 
be taken to and cannot be taken to mean a 
species of inherent unrestricted omnipotent 
power held by a Head of State which is akin 
to royal prerogative power”. He unequivo-
cally declared that the President is a creature 
of the Constitution, a Head of the State under 
the Constitution, his powers derive from the 
Constitution, and these powers are circum-
scribed by the provisions of the Constitution 
and the law. 
One of the major points of contention arose 
from the convoluted drafting of the consti-
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tution where the President was vested with 
the power to dissolve the Parliament in Arti-
cles 33(2)(c) and 62 of the constitution, but 
the limitation to it was provided for in Ar-
ticle 70(1), and the absence of any explicit 
link between the provisions raised a serious 
question pertaining to interpretation. This 
was compounded by a purported disparity 
between the English and Sinhala language 
versions of the constitution. In answering 
the question of interpretation, the Court opt-
ed for a harmonious, cohesive, and holistic 
approach enabling “the statute to achieve its 
purpose”. Perera CJ reiterated the principles 
of “Supremacy of the Constitution”, “Rule 
of Law”, and “Separation of Powers”, and 
stated that “our Law does not recognise that 
any public authority, whether they be the 
President or an officer of the State or an or-
gan of the State, has unfettered or absolute 
discretion or power”. He then held that, al-
though Article 33(2)(c) vests the President 
with the power to dissolve Parliament, “the 
only provision in the Constitution which sets 
out the manner in which Parliament may 
be summoned, prorogued, or dissolved by 
the President is Article 70”. It is Article 70 
which enables the President to issue procla-
mations of dissolution, subject to the limita-
tions set out therein. Consequently, the Court 
held that Article 33(2)(c) must be read along 
with Article 70, and the power vested by Ar-
ticle 33(2)(c) can be “exercised only within 
and in conformity with the provisions of Ar-
ticle 70”. The Court also pointed out that a 
contrary interpretation would render Article 
70 “redundant and superfluous and thereby 
offend the rule that statutory interpretation 
must ensure that no provision of the Consti-
tution is ill-treated in that manner”. In con-
sidering the contended language disparity, 
the Court held that there is “no appreciable 
difference between the text in Sinhala and 
English in Article 62 (2)”.
The conclusion of the Court on the main 
point thus was that Article 70 “stipulates in 
no uncertain terms that the President shall 
not dissolve Parliament during the first 
four and a half years from the date of its 
first meeting unless the President has been 
requested to do so by a resolution passed 
by not less than two-thirds of the members 
of Parliament”.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The crisis thus demonstrated both the weak-
nesses and the strengths of Sri Lanka’s con-
stitutional democracy. That a President felt 
able to act so egregiously contrary to the 
constitution showed the potential for dem-
ocratic backsliding that remains inherent in 
the political culture. Yet the firm resistance 
against unconstitutional behaviour shown 
by Parliament, political parties, the courts, 
civil society, and social media activism also 
demonstrated the resilience of Sri Lanka’s 
political system. This tells us that constitu-
tional reform can improve and strengthen 
institutional frameworks, as through the 
Nineteenth Amendment, and while this is of-
ten difficult to achieve, it is not impossible. 
However, in the ongoing process of deepen-
ing constitutional democracy in Sri Lanka, 
the more difficult challenge seems to lie in 
transforming the prevailing political culture 
away from the often-unspoken authoritarian 
assumptions, tendencies, habits, understand-
ings, attitudes, and practices towards those 
that can support the flourishing of democra-
cy and constitutionalism.
That said, the developments of 2018 under-
scored a number of reform priorities. The 
conclusion of the courts in the two crisis 
cases further consolidated a line of judicial 
pronouncements that has reaffirmed the su-
premacy of the constitution against executive 
overreach as well as the judicial thinking of 
previous generations of judges steeped in the 
tradition of parliamentary sovereignty. In the 
public mind, President Sirisena’s ill-advised 
peradventures have reinforced the view that 
constitutional democracy in the context of 
Sri Lanka’s political culture demands a com-
plete abolition of presidentialism. For that to 
happen, though, the reluctance of politicians 
to put the matter to a referendum will have to 
be overcome. 
V. FURTHER READING
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SWEDEN
I. INTRODUCTION
In Sweden, the principle of popular sover-
eignty (folksuveränitetsprincipen) is the fun-
dament of the constitutional system (Instru-
ment of Government (IG) 1:1). This means 
that the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) is the 
most important constitutional actor. There 
is no constitutional court in Sweden, but all 
courts and public authorities have the power 
to engage in judicial review in concrete cas-
es (IG 11:14 and IG 12:10). During the last 
couple of decades, the relationship between 
Swedish constitutional law and Sweden’s 
international commitments, mainly through 
EU membership and through being a party to 
the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Freedoms (ECHR), has been the subject 
of ample debate. This background serves to 
explain why some of the constitutional cases 
LQFOXGHG LQ WKLVRYHUYLHZPLJKWQRWDW¿UVW
sight appear as overly “constitutional” in the 
eyes of a non-Swedish constitutional lawyer. 
Several of the cases accordingly focus on the 
relationship between Swedish law and the 
ECHR, which was incorporated into Swed-
ish law in 1995. Additionally, the Swedish 
constitution prohibits the adoption of laws 
RU RWKHU UHJXODWLRQV WKDW FRQÀLFW ZLWK WKH
ECHR (IG 2:19).
II. CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS 
Parliamentary Elections
On September 9, 2018, Sweden elected a 
new parliament. The Swedish Parliament has 
349 members. Seats are divided proportion-
ately amongst registered political parties that 
have obtained more than four percent of the 
votes cast, IG 3:7. The Swedish system is a 
negative parliamentary system. Accordingly, 
LW VXI¿FHV WKDWDPDMRULW\RI WKH3DUOLDPHQW
tolerates (as opposed to supports) the prime 
minister. As a result, Sweden has a long 
tradition of minority governments. During 
the last decade, however, the political land-
scape has changed dramatically. First, a 
center-right alliance was created in 2006, 
breaking the political dominance of the So-
cial-Democratic Party. In the 2010 elections, 
a new political party entered the Parliament, 
the Swedish Democrats. This political party, 
which has its roots in nationalist and fascist 
movements, has quickly grown to become 
the third largest political party in Sweden. 
In the 2018 elections, none of the traditional 
blocs (the left-center or the center-right) ob-
tained a majority. As a result, Sweden was 
left without a government for 115 days, after 
which a new left-center government was in-
stalled. It is supported by two members of 
the former center-right alliance (the Liberals 
and the Center Party). In essence, this means 
that the logic of the old blocs has been swept 
away by the political turmoil caused by the 
major electoral success of the Swedish Dem-
ocrats. This is the longest time in history that 
Sweden has not had an ordinary government 
after an election. The implications on bud-
getary issues have been substantial and the 
long-term political and legal consequences 
are hard to assess at this point.
Judicial Review 
One of the main constitutional developments 
in 2018 is connected to the scope of judicial 
review by courts and the question whether a 
piece of legislation has been passed in a pro-
cedurally correct manner (IG 11:14). This 
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particular question has been debated since 
2015. In 2018, two decisions were rendered 
that settled the matter. Constitutional review 
in Sweden builds on three main principles: 
First, in preparing draft legislation, the gov-
ernment is obliged under constitutional law 
(IG 7:2) to consult with the relevant public 
authorities, including local authorities and 
organizations and individuals, as necessary 
(beredningstvång). Second, an a priori and
in abstracto constitutional review is ex-
ercised by the Council on Legislation (IG 
8:21-22). The council is to assess, among 
other things, if legislative drafts are in con-
gruence with the constitution. Third, courts 
can exercise judicial review when the law 
has been passed and is applied in concrete 
FDVHV 6KRXOG D FRXUW ¿QG WKDW D SURYLVLRQ
FRQÀLFWV ZLWK WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ RU RWKHU VX-
perior statute, the provision should not be 
applied (IG 11:14). The same applies if the 
legislative process was wrought with a sub-
VWDQWLDO SURFHGXUDO GH¿FLHQF\1RQFRPSOL-
ance with the procedure laid down in IG 7:2 
FRXOGDPRXQWWRVXFKDSURFHGXUDOGH¿FLHQ-
cy. Taking into consideration that Sweden is 
a parliamentary democracy with a tradition 
of weak courts and limited judicial review, 
the quality of the legislative procedure is 
especially important. Moreover, the a pri-
ori constitutional review conducted by the 
&RXQFLORQ/HJLVODWLRQVHUYHVDVDMXVWL¿FD-
tion for limited judicial review. Therefore, 
the recent trend (since 2015) of the Council 
on Legislation to harshly criticize the proce-
dure leading up to the draft proposal, and the 
quality of the proposal per se, is noteworthy 
and important. Even more noteworthy is the 
frequency with which the government has 
chosen to disregard the criticism put forward 
by the Council on Legislation when present-
ing the proposal to the Parliament. Granted, 
the government is not constitutionally bound 
by the opinion of the council, but the recent 
trend is a clear shift away from constitution-
al tradition, a shift that might jeopardize the 
balance between the government, Parliament 
and courts. This development has not only 
provoked a heated political debate but has 
also forced the courts to rule on the scope of 
IG 11:14 in relation to the legislative proce-
dure and requirements by IG 7:2. 
In a decision adopted on September 28, 2018 
(B 2646-18), the Supreme Court ruled that 
the procedure laid down in IG 7:2 does fall 
under the scope of judicial review exercised 
by courts according to IG 11:14. However, 
the precise content of the procedure and its 
GHWDLOV DUH QRW GH¿QHG LQ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQ
which means, according to the Court, that 
any deviation from the procedure must be 
VLJQL¿FDQW,QDGGLWLRQLQWKHLUMXGLFLDOUH-
view, courts should focus on whether issues 
of legal certainty (with important implica-
WLRQVIRU LQGLYLGXDOVKDYHEHHQVXI¿FLHQW-
ly analyzed in the preparation of the draft 
proposal. A piece of legislation passed, 
absent such considerations, may be subject 
to judicial review. Moreover, the second 
paragraph of IG 11:14, which should be 
read as stating the prerogative of the leg-
islature to assess constitutionality, must be 
taken into account. In this context, it means 
that if the Parliament has adopted the law 
it is presumed that the procedure has been 
FRUUHFWRUDW OHDVWQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\ LQYLR-
lation of IG 7:2. This is especially the case 
if the legislature refers to the opinion of the 
Council of Legislation. Nota bene, it is not 
required that the legislature change the pro-
posal as a result of comments by the Coun-
cil on Legislation. Finally, taking all of 
the above into consideration, the Supreme 
Court concluded that only in exceptional 
cases, where strong rule of law objections 
could be made, should the courts disregard 
the intention and will of the legislature. In a 
subsequent decision on September 25, 2018 
(MIG 2018:18), the Supreme Migration 
Court came to the same conclusion. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
1. NJA 2018 s. 562 (The Facebook Case): 
Applicability of the Freedom of 
Expression Act
The Supreme Court held that criminal re-
sponsibility for the live transmission of a rape 
via Facebook could be determined in accor-
dance with ordinary criminal law, and that 
the constitutional Freedom of Expression 
Act was not applicable to the transmission. 
,QWURGXFLQJDQHZGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHFRQFHSW
“program”, the Supreme Court determined 
that the Freedom of Expression Act is only 
applicable to live transmissions via the In-
ternet if what is being transmitted conforms 
WRWKHQHZSURJUDPGH¿QLWLRQZKLFKHQWDLOV
requirements relating to format, orientation 
and time. In the case at hand, the Supreme 
Court held that the Facebook transmission 
was too indeterminate for the Freedom of 
Expression Act to be applicable. 
2. NJA 2018 s. 103 (Citizenship Case No. 
2): Damages for violations of constitutional 
rights
In NJA 2014 s. 323 (Citizenship Case No. 1), 
the Supreme Court decided that an individu-
al whose citizenship had been revoked was 
entitled to damages—revocation of citizen-
ship is not permitted under the constitution. 
This was groundbreaking since violations of 
the constitution had, prior to the ruling, not 
been thought to give rise to state liability in 
the form of damages. Citizenship Case No. 2 
also concerned an individual claiming dam-
ages, his citizenship having been rescinded in 
violation of the constitution. The case raised 
two constitutional law issues before the Su-
preme Court: Firstly, what factors should be 
determinative when deciding on the level of 
GDPDJHV" 6HFRQGO\ VKRXOG RUGLQDU\ UXOHV
on statutory limitations apply to claims relat-
LQJWRYLRODWLRQVRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOULJKWV"7KH
6XSUHPH&RXUW DQVZHUHG WKH ¿UVW TXHVWLRQ
by declaring that the level of damages was to 
be determined, primarily taking into account 
the duration of the violation (i.e., how long 
the citizenship had been rescinded). The Su-
preme Court’s answer to the second question 
was that ordinary statutes of limitation do 
not apply in relation to claims for damages 
relating to violations of fundamental consti-
tutional rights (the judgment, however, does 
not make clear which constitutional rights 
are fundamental in this regard). According 
to the Supreme Court, statutory limitations 
are to be calculated from the moment the 
relevant violation has ceased—not from the 
moment when the violation occurs, which is 
the general rule in Swedish law concerning 
FLYLOFODLPV7KHUXOLQJ LVVLJQL¿FDQWVLQFH
it means that state liability for ongoing vio-
lations of fundamental constitutional rights 
cannot be subject to statutory limitations. 
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3. HFD 2018 ref. 17: Access to Information 
under the Freedom of the Press Act
The Supreme Administrative Court was 
faced with an access to information request, 
ZKLFK UHODWHG WR ¿OHV FRQWDLQHG RQ D FRS\
of a hard drive that had been seized by the 
police. The original hard drive had been de-
clared forfeit by a court order and had sub-
sequently been destroyed by the police. The 
copy of the hard drive, however, was still 
intact. The Supreme Administrative Court 
KHOG WKDW WKH¿OHVFRQWDLQHGRQ WKHFRS\RI
the hard drive were public documents for the 
purposes of the Freedom of the Press Act. 
The fact that the original hard drive had been 
declared forfeit and destroyed in accordance 
with criminal procedural law was immateri-
al to this determination. This meant that the 
¿OHVZHUHWREHGLVFORVHGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWK
the access to information request unless the 
¿OHV FRQWDLQHG FRQ¿GHQWLDO LQIRUPDWLRQ²D
question that the Supreme Administrative 
Court ordered the Police Authority to assess.
4. HFD 2149-18: Public Order and Begging
Under a delegation laid down in a statute 
(Ordningslagen 1993:1617), Swedish mu-
nicipalities are authorized to adopt regu-
lations in order to uphold public order and 
security locally. Such measures must be nar-
row as to their impact and scope. In addition, 
they must be necessary to achieve the pur-
pose at hand, i.e., to uphold public order and 
security. Thus, a proportionality test is built 
into and hence restricts the delegated powers. 
A municipality in southern Sweden amend-
ed its local regulations in order to prohibit 
begging in certain public places. The amend-
ment was appealed to the County Adminis-
trative Board (Länsstyrelsen), which exer-
cises review of cases like this. The County 
Administrative Board decided to abolish the 
amendment to the local regulation on the ba-
sis of it not serving the purpose of upholding 
public order and security. The municipality 
appealed the decision to the Administrative 
Court and the Administrative Court of Ap-
peal. Both instances rejected the municipali-
W\¶VDSSHDODQGKHQFHFRQ¿UPHGWKHGHFLVLRQ
by the County Administrative Board. The 
matter ended up in the Supreme Adminis-
trative Court (SAC), which had to rule on 
whether begging can be regulated by a lo-
FDOUHJXODWLRQ7KH¿UVWUHTXLUHPHQWRQVXFK
a regulation is that it aims to uphold public 
order and security. Secondly, local self-de-
termination is protected by the Swedish 
constitution. As a result, the SAC declared 
that a decision of the municipality should 
only be overruled in cases of overbreadth 
or violations of the principle of proportion-
ality in the local context. Thirdly, the local 
regulation must be clear enough for it to be 
enforced. This means, for example, that it 
must be clear to the public in general what 
it entails; and for the authorities entrusted 
to enforce the rules, it must be clear when 
they have been violated. The SAC ruled 
that the amendment in question served to 
uphold public order and security, pointing 
out that there is no legal requirement on the 
municipalities to prove that begging actu-
ally causes disturbance to public order and 
security. The SAC further concluded that 
the measure was neither unnecessary nor 
disproportional. Its geographical boundar-
LHVZHUHFOHDUO\GH¿QHGDQGOLPLWHGDQGLW
did not lead to disproportional restrictions 
RILQGLYLGXDOULJKWV7KH¿QDOTXHVWLRQZDV
whether the measures were clear enough as 
WRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGGH¿QLWLRQRIEHJ-
ging. The SAC ruled that it was. Hence the 
municipality was within its powers when it 
amended the local regulation. 
5. AD 51-18: Discrimination, Freedom of 
Religion
In this case, the Swedish Labour Court (Ar-
betsdomstolen) held that it constituted in-
direct discrimination when a company dis-
continued an employment procedure with 
a Muslim woman who had, for religious 
reasons, refused to shake hands with a male 
representative of the employer. The relevant 
provision in the Swedish Discrimination Act 
(diskrimineringslagen 2008:567) imple-
ments an EU Directive,1 and the Court in-
terpreted it in light of the ECtHR’s case law 
on freedom of religion guaranteed in Art. 9 
of the ECHR. According to the Court, a re-
ligiously motivated refusal to shake hands 
with a person of the opposite sex is such a 
manifestation of religion that is protected un-
der Art. 9. The Court maintained that such a 
refusal was accordingly also protected under 
the Discrimination Act’s prohibition against 
an employer applying a provision, a criterion 
or a procedure that put people with a certain 
religion at a particular disadvantage. The 
company’s policy that prohibited employees 
from refusing to shake hands with a person 
of the opposite sex was found by the Court 
to put Muslims, who for religious reasons 
refuse to shake hands with members of the 
opposite sex, at a particular disadvantage. 
The Court concluded that while the policy 
had legitimate aims that focused on promot-
ing equal treatment between the sexes, it was 
neither appropriate nor necessary in order to 
achieve these aims. As a result, the policy 
amounted to indirect discrimination.
6. NJA 2018 s. 394: Judicial Review, Right to 
a Fair Trial 
The question in this case was whether the 
application of a provision in the Swedish 
5RDG 7UDI¿F 2IIHQFHV $FW WUD¿NEURWWVOD-
gen 1951:649), which, inter alia, makes it 
a crime to abscond from the site of a traf-
¿FDFFLGHQWZLWKRXWJLYLQJRQH¶VQDPHDQG
place of residence (smitning), violated the 
safeguards against self-incrimination in 
Art. 6 of the ECHR. A driver had been in-
YROYHGLQDWUDI¿FDFFLGHQWWKDWKDGUHVXOWHG
in damages on his car and a road sign, but 
not in any personal injuries. After the acci-
dent, the driver, who could be suspected of 
WUDI¿FRIIHQFHVLQFRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHDFFL-
dent, ran away without leaving the informa-
tion required by law. Both the District Court 
(tingsrätt) and the Court of Appeal (hovrätt)
acquitted the driver, as they found that con-
victing him would have infringed on the 
privilege against self-incrimination in Art. 
6. The Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen),
however, concluded that the responsibility 
to give information about one’s name and 
residence under such circumstances did not 
destroy the very essence of the right to not 
1 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
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self-incriminate. According to the Court, the 
driver could thus be prosecuted and convict-
ed for absconding from the site of the acci-
dent without there being a violation of the 
right to a fair trial under Art. 6.
Decisions by the European Court of 
Human Rights
1. Case of X v Sweden: Expulsion of a 
permanent resident for national security 
reasons, Art. 3 ECHR
The Swedish Security Services had applied 
to the Swedish Migration Agency for X, a 
Moroccan citizen residing permanently in 
Sweden, to be expelled for national securi-
ty reasons related to terrorism. The Swedish 
Migration Agency decided to expel X and re-
jected X’s application for asylum in Sweden. 
The question before the European Court 
of Human Rights and Freedom (ECtHR) 
was whether the decision to expel X was 
in violation of his rights under Art. 3 of the 
ECHR. X argued that there was a real risk of 
him being subjected to torture upon arrival 
in Morocco. The ECtHR found that taking 
X’s personal situation into account, there 
was a real risk that he would be subjected 
to ill treatment or torture in Morocco due to 
the fact that the Moroccan authorities were 
made aware of the reasons why X was being 
expelled, and that Moroccan authorities still 
engaged in torture or ill treatment in national 
security and terrorist-related cases. The fact 
that the Swedish Migration Agency and Mi-
gration Courts were not provided the infor-
mation that the Security Services had been in 
contact with Moroccan authorities rendered 
the ECtHR to raise concerns “as to the rigour 
and reliability of the domestic proceedings” 
(para 60). The ECtHR unanimously found 
the decision to expel X from Sweden to Mo-
rocco to violate X’s Art. 3 rights. 
2. Centrum för rättvisa v Sweden: Signal 
Intelligence and Art. 8 ECHR
&HQWUXP I|U UlWWYLVD D QRQIRUSUR¿W RUJD-
nization representing individuals against the 
state, claimed that its rights under the ECHR 
had been violated by the signal intelligence 
regime set up by the Swedish state. The 
ECtHR unanimously held that there had been 
no violation of Art. 8, ECHR. According to 
the Court, it falls within the state’s margin 
of appreciation to set up a bulk interception 
regime in order to identify threats to nation-
al security. However, the state’s discretion 
when operating such a system is narrower. 
After reviewing the Swedish law regulating 
the collection of intelligence, including over-
sight mechanisms, the ECtHR found, after 
an in abstracto assessment, that it provided 
VXI¿FLHQW VDIHJXDUGV WR SURWHFW WKH SXEOLF
from abuse. In February 2019, the case was 
referred to the Grand Chamber.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The constitutional protection of freedom 
of expression has a long history in Sweden 
and there are currently two fundamental 
laws that exclusively focus on safeguard-
ing it: the Freedom of the Press Act (tryck-
frihetsförordningen) and the Fundamental 
Law on Freedom of Expression (yttrande-
frihetsgrundlagen). In January 2019, sev-
eral amendments to both fundamental laws 
with the purpose of better adapting them to 
the exercise of freedom of expression online 
entered into force. Among the most debated 
changes are amendments concerning liabili-
ty for Internet publications. One of the basic 
principles of the Swedish system is that all 
constitutionally protected media must have 
a responsible editor, who alone can be held 
liable for unlawful content. Until now, the 
responsible editor has been liable also for 
online content published before he or she as-
sumed their role, provided that the content 
is still available. The new amendments limit 
the liability of the responsible editor for In-
ternet content older than twelve months if 
the content is removed within two weeks af-
WHU WKH UHVSRQVLEOH HGLWRU KDV EHHQ QRWL¿HG
about its potentially unlawful nature.2 In ad-
dition, balancing Sweden’s long tradition of 
strong constitutional protection of freedom 
of expression against the increasing salience 
of privacy rights continues to be one of the 
PDLQ FRQWURYHUVLHV LQ WKH ¿HOG RI FRQVWLWX-
tional law.
2 The amendment has, for instance, been criticised for giving rise to situations where no one can be held liable for unlawful online content during a two-week period. 
See Mårten Schultz, 14 dagar av ostoppbar terror, SvJT 2018 s. 837. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE  
“GLOBALIZATION PARADOX” IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
Switzerland is the most globalized country 
LQWKHZRUOGEDVHGRQYDULDEOHVUHÀHFWLQJ
the economic, political, and social dimen-
sions of globalization.1 Though not being a 
member of the European Union (EU), it is 
closely linked to the latter by a densely knit 
network of bilateral treaties allowing, among 
other things, for free movement of persons.2 
Switzerland furthermore undertakes to abide 
by the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). The Court has con-
strued the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) as a “living instrument” 
since 1978,3 expanding the ECHR in both 
scope and relevance. At the same time, the 
Swiss Federal Constitution (Fed Const)4 is a 
“popular constitution”.5 All amendments to 
the Constitution are subject to a referendum. 
Such referenda are abundant: In 2018 alone 
Swiss voters were called to the ballot box 
on four different occasions to vote on a to-
tal of eight constitutional draft amendments. 
Switzerland’s constitutional design therefore 
emphasizes popular sovereignty and dem-
ocratic self-governance. Being a small and 
open economy, Switzerland is, at the same 
time, vulnerable to changes in its political, 
economic, and legal environment, having 
only limited political clout to shape world 
markets and the rules and regulations there-
of. It is thus often left with little choice but 
WRÀH[LEO\DGDSWWRFKDQJLQJFLUFXPVWDQFHV6
The inherent tensions between self-gover-
nance, democracy, and economic globaliza-
tion, for which Dani Rodrik coined the term 
“globalization paradox”, are well known.7
Constitutional developments of the past year 
in Switzerland bear witness of this globaliza-
tion paradox.
1 Savina Gygli, Florian Haelg, Niklas Potrafke and Jan-Egbert Sturm, ‘The KOF Globalisation Index Revisited’ 
(2019) Rev Int Organ#O[[WZ!KVPVYNZ  %PUJS[OLYLSL]HU[YHURPUNH]HPSHISL\UKLY
#O[[W!^^ ^RVML[OaJONSVIHSPZH[PVU%BPUZ[LHKVM#O[[WZ!^^ ^L[OaJOJVU[LU[KHTL[OaZWLJPHSPU[LYLZ[
K\HSRVMKHTKVJ\TLU[Z.SVIHSPaH[PVU9HURPUNFF_SZ_%(SSVM[OLKVJ\TLU[ZJP[LKPU[OPZYL]PL^
^LYLSHZ[HJJLZZLKVU6J[VILY 
2 See Agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the Swiss 
Confederation, of the other, on the free movement of persons [21 June 1999] O J L 114, 30/04/2002, 6-72.
3 ECtHR, Tyler v UK, App no 5856/72 (25 April 1978).
4 -LKLYHS*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM[OL:^PZZ*VUMLKLYH[PVUVM(WYPS   \UVɉJPHS,UNSPZO[YHUZSH[PVUH]HPSHISLH[
#O[[WZ!^^ ^HKTPUJOVWJLUJSHZZPÄLKJVTWPSH[PVU    PUKL_O[TS%
5Johannes Reich, ‘Switzerland: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Richard Albert et al (eds), .SVIHS
Review of Constitutional Law (2018) 280-285, 280.
6 See the seminal work on the matter by Peter J Katzenstein, *VYWVYH[PZTHUK*OHUNL!(\Z[YPH:^P[aLYSHUK
HUK[OL7VSP[PJZVM0UK\Z[Y` (1984) 84, 112-132.
7 See Dani Rodrik, ;OL.SVIHSPaH[PVU7HYHKV_ (2011) xviii (according to whom the term “globalization para-
KV_¹JVU]L`Z[OH[VUL¸JHUUV[ZPT\S[HULV\ZS`W\YZ\LKLTVJYHJ `UH[PVUHSKL[LYTPUH[PVUHUKLJVUVTPJ
NSVIHSPaH[PVU¹
8 The results of all federal popular votes since 1848 can be accessed at the site of the Swiss Federal Chancel-
SLY`PU.LYTHU-YLUJOHUK0[HSPHUH[#^^ ^IRHKTPUJOJOKWVYL]H]HIFFFFO[TS%
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II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS8 
1. “Self-determination Initiative”: Choosing 
Economic Globalization and International 
Human Rights over “Taking Back Control”
The popular initiative “Swiss Law Instead of 
Foreign Judges (Self-determination Initia-
tive)”, put to a popular vote on 25 November 
2018, illustrates the tensions embraced by the 
globalization paradox in an exemplary man-
ner. The campaign in favor of the Self-de-
termination Initiative stressed the relevance 
of democratic self-governance undeterred by 
international and supranational courts (“for-
eign judges”). Those opposing the constitu-
tional draft amendment, including both the 
Federal Assembly (federal legislative branch) 
and the Federal Council (federal executive 
branch), underscored the importance of the 
ECtHR as an independent judicial authority in 
human rights law and Switzerland’s reliability 
in the international arena.
In its Article 190, the Swiss Federal Consti-
tution commits all courts to adhere to both 
Federal Statutes enacted by Federal Parlia-
ment and international law even in the event 
RIDFRQÀLFWZLWKWKH)HGHUDO&RQVWLWXWLRQ$V
the ECtHR, in turn, monitors Switzerland’s 
compliance with the ECHR unhindered by 
a similar clause limiting the scope of its 
review, the Federal Court (Switzerland’s 
federal supreme court) held that the ECHR 
and other international human rights trea-
ties take precedent over Federal Statutes.9 
In a controversial obiter dictum of 2012, the 
Court went further, stating that the ECHR 
could also “precede norms of the Federal 
Constitution itself”.10 Elevating this line of 
argument to the ratio decidendi of its case 
law would have far-reaching consequences 
given the Constitution’s emphasis on popu-
lar sovereignty and democratic self-gover-
nance. The Federal Constitution allows for 
amending it by way of popular initiatives if 
100,000 citizens, whose signatures must be 
collected within 18 months, back the draft 
amendment put forward by a committee of 7 
to 27 citizens.11 For the ECHR in its evolu-
tive interpretation by the ECtHR to take in-
variable precedent over federal constitution-
al law “would transform the ECHR into an 
additional (supra-)constitutional layer above 
the actual domestic constitution”,12 limiting 
the scope of future constitutional amend-
ments. According to the text of the Constitu-
WLRQVXFKDPHQGPHQWVDUHPHUHO\FRQ¿QHG
by the “peremptory norms of international 
law” (ius cogens), such as the prohibition of 
genocide, torture, slavery, or inhuman and 
degrading treatment.13
The aforementioned Article 190, Fed Const, 
however, provides Federal Parliament with 
some margin of appreciation in making its 
RZQ DVVHVVPHQW RI KRZ WR VTXDUH FRQÀLFW-
ing obligations deriving from constitutional 
provisions and international law. Enshrined 
in a Federal Statute, such an assessment be-
comes binding on all domestic courts as a 
FRQVHTXHQFHRI$UWLFOH)HG&RQVW:LWK
regard to the courts, the provision according 
to which the Swiss Federation “shall respect 
international law” (Article 5, Section 4, Fed 
Const)—consciously avoiding the verb “to 
precede”—provides courts with some lee-
way in their assessment of the relation be-
tween domestic and international law in their 
case law. In contrast, the constitutional draft 
amendment put forward by the Self-determi-
nation Initiative sought to establish an abso-
lute and retroactive precedent of the Federal 
Constitution over international law with the 
sole exemption of the aforementioned pe-
remptory norms of international law.
:KHUHDV VXSSRUWHUV RI WKH 6HOIGHWHUPLQD-
tion Initiative claimed that the constitution-
al amendment would save direct democra-
cy and “re-establish” popular sovereignty 
(or in short, allow the People “to take back 
control”), opponents pointed out that an in-
variable precedent of constitutional over in-
ternational law would seriously jeopardize 
not only Switzerland’s treaty with the EU 
on free movement of persons given the con-
stitutional obligation to restrict the “number 
of residence permits for foreign nationals in 
Switzerland (…) by annual quantitative lim-
its and quotas”14 but also, in view of the so-
called “guillotine clause” declaring a num-
ber of bilateral agreements with the EU to be 
mutually dependent,15 the treaties on areas 
such as technical barriers to trade, research, 
and civil aviation. It was furthermore ques-
tioned whether Switzerland could remain a 
reliable signatory state of the ECHR in view 
of an effective constitutional reservation to 
comply with judgments of the ECtHR. In 
that perspective, Swiss voters were offered 
a choice between the promise to re-establish 
direct democracy and self-government on 
the one hand and upholding both interna-
tional human rights law and economic glo-
balization on the other hand. Accustomed to 
such trade-offs at least since the rejection of 
the treaty on joining the European Economic 
Area in a popular vote on 6 December 1992, 
Swiss voters favored international human 
rights law and economic globalization over 
the promise of “taking back control” by a 
large margin: Two-thirds (66.2%) of the vot-
ers rejected the Self-determination Initiative. 
The proposal failed to prevail in any of the 
26 Cantons (states).
2. Constitutional Draft Amendments: From 
Privatizing Public Broadcasting Service to 
Subsidizing Horned Cows
As to the other seven constitutional draft 
amendments put to a popular vote in 2018, 
the voters on 4 March 2018 approved pro-
9 See BGE 125 II 417 para 4 (26 July 1999).
10 BGE 139 I 16 para 5 (12 October 2012).
11 See Reich, op. cit. 5, at 282.
12 Reich, op. cit. 5, at 283.
13 :LL1VOHUULZ9LPJOº+PYLR[L+LTVRYH[PL\UK]SRLYYLJO[SPJOL=LYWÅPJO[\UNLUPT2VUÅPR[»/LPKLSILYN1VM0U[3979, 1024–25 (available at <www.ivr.uzh.ch/
YLPJO%
14 Art 121a, Clause 2, Fed Const.
15 See, e.g., Article 25, Clause 4, Agreement on Free Movement, op. cit. 2.
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longing the powers of the Federation to levy 
direct federal tax and VAT beyond 2020 until 
the year of 2035 by a large margin of over 
84%. On the same day, a popular initiative 
seeking to privatize public-service broad-
casting by rendering federal subsidies in fa-
vor of TV and radio stations unconstitution-
al was voted down by a ratio of 3 to 1. The 
“Sovereign Money Initiative”, aimed at lim-
iting money creation to Switzerland’s central 
bank and barring private banks from creating 
money, in particular through granting loans, 
met the same fate at the ballot box on 10 June 
2018. Three months later, on 23 September 
2018, the aforementioned tensions between 
self-governance and economic globalization 
again came to light, albeit merely limited to 
food and agriculture. The “Fair Food Initia-
tive” sought to limit food imports to agri-
cultural goods produced in compliance with 
high standards as to the environment, work-
ers’ rights, and animal welfare, whereas the 
“Food Sovereignty Initiative” aimed at lim-
iting food imports to boost eco-friendly do-
mestic production. Both constitutional draft 
amendments would have created tensions 
with obligations under international trade 
law. They were voted down by a margin of 
roughly 2 to 1. Contrary to these two popular 
initiatives, a constitutional draft amendment 
expanding the power of the Federation to en-
act “principles” with regard to bicycle paths 
ELNHZD\VDQGWKH¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWKHUHRI
was approved by three-quarters of the voters. 
Finally, a constitutional draft amendment 
put forward by the so-called “Horned Cow 
Initiative”, launched by a mountain farmer 
without any support of political parties or 
interest groups, called for federal subsidies 
to farmers refraining from dehorning their 
cows, bulls, and goats. The initiative gained 
considerable sympathy but was nonetheless 
rejected by 54.7% of the voters and 20 out of 
26 Cantons on 25 November 2018.
In sum, a mere two of the eight constitution-
al draft amendments put to a popular vote 
in 2018 were approved: one prolonging the 
powers of the Federation to levy direct fed-
eral tax and VAT, the other granting the Fed-
eration powers to enact guidelines in relation 
to bicycle paths. It is important to note that 
all of the popular initiatives put to a popular 
vote in 2018 were rejected. This underscores 
the low success rate of popular initiatives, 
currently standing at 10%, measured since 
the introduction of such initiatives at the 
federal level on 5 July 1891 until the end of 
2018. Both of the successful amendments in 
2018 were initiated by the Federal Govern-
ment and both expanded the powers of the 
Federation at the expense of the Cantons.
3. Failed Reversal of Court Rulings on the 
Constitutionality of Electoral Systems
Recent case law of the Federal Court consid-
erably limited the autonomy of the Cantons 
regarding the voting process applying to their 
parliamentary elections by committing them 
in principle to proportional representation.16
This case law mainly drew criticism due 
to the lack of any clear textual basis in the 
Federal Constitution restraining the choice 
to be made by the Cantons between elec-
toral systems. Two small Cantons brought a 
motion to the bicameral Federal Parliament, 
the Federal Assembly, seeking to reverse the 
relevant recent case law by way of a consti-
tutional amendment. The motion won the 
support of the Council of States, the equiv-
alent of the United States Senate, in which 
representatives of smaller Cantons are in a 
majority. The National Council, however, in 
which seats are allocated to the Cantons ac-
cording to their relative populations, failed 
to lend its support to the motion. The Federal 
Court’s case law on the matter thus remains 
in place.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
1. Khalaf M Al-Dulimi v Federal De-
partment of Economic Affairs, Education 
and Research: Fair Trial and Targeted 
Sanctions by the U.N. Security Council17
Pursuant to Article 25 of the Charter of the 
United Nations (U.N. Charter), Switzerland 
is, like any other member of the United Na-
tions (U.N.), under an obligation to “carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council”. 
According to Article 103, U.N. Charter, 
obligations deriving from the U.N. Charter 
³VKDOO SUHYDLO´ ZKHQ LQ FRQÀLFW ZLWK DQ\
other “obligations under any other interna-
tional agreement”. The ECHR, in its Article 
6, nonetheless commits Switzerland to pro-
vide for “a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and im-
partial tribunal established by law” in the 
determination of an individual’s “civil rights 
and obligations or of any criminal charge”.18
Targeted sanctions imposed by the U.N. Se-
curity Council against individuals without 
adequate due process therefore result in a 
dilemma for Switzerland of being caught 
EHWZHHQ FRQÀLFWLQJ REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU LQ-
ternational law. A case brought by Youssef 
Mustapha Nada, at the time a resident of the 
Italian enclave of Campione, surrounded by 
the Swiss Canton of Ticino,19 ending with a 
decision by the ECtHR holding that Switzer-
land was in violation of its obligations under 
the ECHR,20 brought this dilemma to light 
IRUWKH¿UVWWLPH
The case of Khalaf M. Al-Dulimi offered no 
escape from this dilemma but added yet an-
other layer of complexity. Mr Dulimi was, 
according to the U.N. Security Council, the 
KHDG RI ¿QDQFH RI WKH ,UDTL VHFUHW VHUYLFHV
during the regime of Saddam Hussein. As a 
consequence and in accordance with the re-
spective U.N. Security Council Resolution 
16 Reich, op. cit. 5, at 281.
17 ).,04H`PU-YLUJOHJJLZZPISLH[#^^ ^INLYJO%
18Johannes Reich, ‘Due Process and Sanctions Targeted Against Individuals Pursuant to Resolution 1267’ (1999), @HSL1V\YUHSVM0U[LYUH[PVUHS3H^ 33 (2008) S. 505-
511 (505-509).
19 See Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 507-509.
20 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), 5HKH]:^P[aLYSHUK App no. 10593/089 (12 September 2012).
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1483 (2003) of 23 May 2003, the Swiss Fed-
eral State Secretariat for Economic Affairs 
(SECO), an administrative agency forming 
part of the Federal Department of Economic 
Affairs, Education and Research, froze both 
Mr Dulimi’s own assets and economic re-
sources in Switzerland and those of Montana 
Management, a company under his control, 
as they both directly or indirectly belonged 
WRDVHQLRURI¿FLDORIWKHIRUPHU,UDTL*RY-
ernment. Mr Dulimi remained unsuccessful 
not only in his attempts to be heard (through 
the Swiss Federal Government) by the U.N. 
Security Council sanctions committee in 
order to have his name deleted from the 
blacklist but also with regard to challenging 
the asset freeze in Switzerland’s domestic 
courts. The Federal Court, in three decisions 
handed down on 23 January 2008, rejected 
Mr Dulimi’s appeals, holding that the word-
ing of the aforementioned Resolution 1483 
provided the Swiss federal administration 
with no leeway but to implement the sanc-
tions thereof in view of the aforementioned 
Article 103, U.N. Charter.21 ,Q GH¿DQFH
of Article 103, U.N. Charter, the ECtHR 
(Grand Chamber) undertook what it called 
a “harmonious interpretation”—or rather, as 
Judge Nussberger’s memorable dissent puts 
it, a “fake harmonious interpretation”—of 
Resolution 1483 in light of both the ECHR 
and the U.N. Charter in its judgment of 21 
June 2016.22 The Court held that Switzerland 
would have been entitled to a limited review 
of arbitrariness of sanctions imposed by the 
U.N. Security Council against Mr Dulimi in 
spite of the unambiguous wording in which 
Resolution 1483 spelled out Switzerland’s 
obligations. Switzerland, in the view of the 
Court, therefore violated Mr Dulimi’s right 
to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6, ECHR.
On appeal and in view of said decision by 
the ECtHR, the Swiss Federal Court, in a 
judgment dated 31 May 2018,23 repealed its 
own aforementioned decisions of 23 Janu-
ary 2008 and handed the case back to the 
SECO. It will be for the SECO to gath-
er all of the relevant information and as-
sess whether imposing targeted sanctions 
against Mr Dulimi either amounted to an 
apparently arbitrary decision or rather ap-
pears permissible weighing all of the rel-
evant factual and legal considerations in 
light of the limited review available to do-
mestic authorities according to the ECtHR’s 
harmonious interpretation approach.
The case of Al-Dulimi echoes the lessons of 
Nada:24 it is for the U.N. Security Council 
to provide for due process with regard to 
sanctions targeted against individuals. The 
persistent failure of the Security Council 
LQJHQHUDODQG WKH³3´ LWV¿YH3HUPDQHQW
Members, in particular to provide for ade-
quate due process not only seriously under-
mines the U.N.’s reputation as a champion 
of human rights but carries the risk of fur-
ther fragmenting the U.N. sanctions regime 
“along the borders of national and suprana-
tional jurisdictions”.25
2. A. and Others v Federal Office of Public 
Health: Children’s Rights and Public Aware-
ness Campaign Aimed at Preventing HIV 
and Other STDs26
More than 40 years ago, in 1987, the Feder-
DO2I¿FHRI3XEOLF+HDOWK)23+ODXQFKHG
LWV¿UVWSXEOLFDZDUHQHVVFDPSDLJQDLPHGDW
preventing the spread of the Human Immu-
QRGH¿FLHQF\9LUXV+,9DQG$FTXLUHG,P-
PXQH'H¿FLHQF\6\QGURPH$,'6UHVSHF-
tively. The campaign was soon extended to 
other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). 
From its very beginning, the messages were 
at the same time realistic, sober, and straight-
forward. The campaign advised the use of 
condoms, whereas moral suasion to abstain 
from a promiscuous lifestyle or to commit to 
marital faithfulness took a backseat. Rather 
unsurprisingly, the campaign faced political 
headwind at times, yet the substantial decline 
in new infections with HIV and other STDs, 
at least partly attributed to the well-known 
FDPSDLJQ VLOHQFHG WKHFULWLFLVP:KHQ WKH
campaign was relaunched in 2014 with a 
lower budget, it was designed to maximize 
its impact. The hedonic slogan “Love Life” 
was accompanied not only by a picture of a 
condom but by intimate and rather explicit 
images of aesthetic nude heterosexual and 
homosexual couples. A casting was adver-
tised not for models but “normal couples” to 
feature on the posters and in the video clips 
of the campaign. In line with the laws of “at-
tention economy”, media outlets were all too 
willing to cover these events, claiming with 
feigned indignation that the FOPH would 
produce “pornographic material”. This cov-
erage multiplied the campaign’s message at 
no further cost to the taxpayer.
A. and others, a group of conservative Chris-
tian children (or rather their parents), howev-
er, strongly objected to the relaunched cam-
paign. Claiming that the campaign interfered 
with the constitutional provision according to 
which “children and young people have the 
right to particular protection of their integri-
ty and to care for their development” (Arti-
cle 11, Section 1, Fed Const), they formally 
petitioned the FOPH to immediately cancel 
the campaign. A. and others lodged an un-
successful appeal with the Swiss Federal Ad-
ministrative Court challenging the FOPH’s 
refusal. Thereinafter the case reached the 
Federal Court. The Court found no violation 
of the aforementioned constitutional pro-
vision, holding that the images used in the 
campaign failed to amount to “pornography” 
in the meaning of the Criminal Code. 
Narrowly framing the case, the Court left 
unaddressed the novel challenges raised by 
awareness campaigns by the public admin-
21 BGer, 2A.783/2006, 2A.784/2006, and 2A.785/2006 (all of 23 January 2008).
22 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Dulimi and Montana Management Inc v Switzerland, App no 5809/08 (21 June 2016).
23 BGE 144 I 214.
24 See Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 510-11.
25 Reich, op. cit. n. 18 at 510.
26).,001\ULPU.LYTHUHJJLZZPISLH[#^^ ^INLYJO%"MVYHKL[HPSLKHZZLZZTLU[ZLL1VOHUULZ9LPJOº()PNNLY)HUNMVYH)\JR:[HH[SPJOL
Warnungen und Empfehlungen zwischen Grundrechtsschutz, Kindeswohl und Aufmerksamkeitsökonomie’, in: Ruth Arnet et al. (eds), +LY4LUZJOHSZ4HZZ-LZ[ZJOYPM[
MY7L[LY)YLP[ZJOTPK (2019) 185-199.
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LVWUDWLRQGHVLJQHGDWHI¿FLHQWO\PD[LPL]LQJ
their message being indistinguishable from 
advertising campaigns in the private sector. 
Among these challenges is whether media 
coverage of an awareness campaign effec-
tively amounting to a “public-private part-
nership sui generis” does indeed fail to be 
attributable to the public administration even 
if the latter intentionally designed its com-
munication in a way to provoke such sensa-
tionalist media reports.27
3. Swiss Association of Public Servants v. 
Council of State of the Canton of Ticino: 
Trade Union Rights28
The Council of State of Ticino, the execu-
tive branch of the Canton of Ticino, took 
the decision to ban activities of trade unions 
from buildings occupied by the public ad-
PLQLVWUDWLRQ 7UDGH XQLRQ RI¿FLDOV ZHUH
thus prevented from entering such prem-
ises when acting in their capacity as trade 
unionists. Meetings taking place in prem-
ises of the public administration between 
WUDGH XQLRQ RI¿FLDOV DQG SXEOLF VHUYDQWV
would, according to the decision by the 
Council of State, be only permissible out-
side of working hours, subject to approval 
by the state chancellery, granted or rejected 
on a case-by-case basis. The Administrative 
Court of the Canton of Ticino dismissed an 
appeal launched by the Swiss Association 
of Public Servants, a labor union represent-
ing public servants, holding that the right 
granted to employees and employers alike 
to establish professional associations (Arti-
cle 28, Fed Const) would not grant the right 
for trade unions to enter premises occupied 
by the public administration. On appeal, 
the Federal Court acknowledged that the 
text of the Federal Constitution failed to 
provide any indication as to whether or not 
the right to enter buildings occupied by the 
public administration would form part of 
Article 28, Fed Const. Interpreted in light 
of international law, in particular Article 11, 
Section 1, ECHR and Conventions No. 87 
and 98 of the International Labor Organi-
zation, said provision of the Constitution 
would, according to the Court, indeed entail 
such a right. The Federal Court therefore 
dismissed the regulation by the Council of 
State of Ticino as being disproportional and 
therefore unconstitutional.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
On 20 October 2019, elections of the Federal 
Parliament will take place. At the beginning 
of the four-year term, elections of the Fed-
eral Council (executive branch) will be held 
in a joint session of the Federal Assembly 
in December 2019.29:KLOHJDLQVDQG ORVV-
es tend to remain relatively low in national 
HOHFWLRQVDQGWKH¿YHSDUWLHVUHSUHVHQWHGLQ
the Federal Council have virtually remained 
the same since 1959, the dilemma captured 
by the globalization paradox is most likely 
to form a recurrent theme in the election 
campaign of 2019, as Switzerland and the 
EU have been in negotiations with regard to 
an “institutional agreement” since 22 May 
2014. On 7 December 2018, the Federal 
Council took note of the outcome of said ne-
gotiations, refrained from initialing the draft 
of the respective “Agreement facilitating the 
bilateral relations between the EU and the 
Swiss Confederation with regard to the parts 
of the Internal Market in which Switzerland 
participates” (“Institutional Agreement”),30
and launched a consultation thereof to be 
reviewed in spring 2019. The institutional 
agreement between the EU and Switzerland 
seeks to provide a legal framework for ex-
isting and future market access agreements 
between the two in order to enhance their 
equal application. Yet, such stable and pre-
dictable economic globalization comes at 
a price. Switzerland would have to commit 
to a “dynamic adoption approach” allowing 
for the regular update of the market access 
agreements in line with the EU’s secondary 
legislation. Disputes between the parties 
would be referred to an arbitration panel. In 
all matters concerning the interpretation of 
EU law, said panel would have to request a 
ruling by the Court of Justice of the Europe-
an Union (CJEU) and would then resolve the 
GLVSXWHEDVHGRQLWVKROGLQJ:KLOHERWKRI
WKHVH HOHPHQWVPLJKW EH GLI¿FXOW WR VTXDUH
with democratic self-determination from a 
Swiss perspective, the Council of the EU re-
iterated that any further development of the 
sectoral approach, such as the conclusion of 
LPSRUWDQWWUHDWLHVRQHOHFWULFLW\DQG¿QDQFLDO
services, would be conditional upon entering 
into an institutional agreement. Against this 
backdrop, the globalization paradox is likely 
WRUHPDLQDGH¿QLQJIHDWXUHRI6ZLVVFRQVWL-
tutional law and politics in 2019 and beyond.
V. FURTHER READING
Swiss Political Science Review 24 (4) 
(2018), Special Issue: The 2015 Swiss Na-
tional Elections
Matthias Oesch, Switzerland and the Euro-
pean Union (2018)
27 Reich, op. cit. 26, at 196.
28 ).,0:LW[LTILYPU0[HSPHUHJJLZZPISLH[#^^ ^INLYJO%
29 See Article 175, Section 2, Fed Const.
30 ‘Accord facilitant les relations bilatérales entre l’Union Européenne et la Confédération Suisse dans les parties du Marche Intérieur auxquelles la Suisse 
WHY[PJPWL»5V]LTILYH]HPSHISLH[#^^ ^KMHLHKTPUJOKHTKLHMYKVJ\TLU[ZHIRVTTLU(JJJVYKPUZ[7YVQL[KL[L_[LFMYWKM%
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TAIWAN
I. INTRODUCTION
2018 marked the inception of a new trend in 
Taiwan’s winding road to constitutionalism. 
As noted in the inaugural Year in Review, 
elections have been the driving force of Tai-
wan’s changing constitutional landscape in 
the past three decades.1 The year 2018 was 
no exception. Yet, their constitutional signif-
icance has not hit home because of the lo-
cal elections in November 2018 that redrew 
the political landscape and rocked the ruling 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to the 
core. More fundamentally, an election, in the 
form of a citizen-initiated referendum, has 
shaken the foundations of the existing con-
stitutional arrangement. As will be further 
discussed, the relationship between the peo-
ple and the government is being reshaped, 
and the Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC) 
as the constitutional guardian of Taiwan’s 
democracy has arrived at a crossroads amid 
a tidal wave of popular constitutionalism.
Even so, 2018 was not to be defined exclu-
sively by the theme of change. Against the 
backdrop of the popular force of referendum 
politics, it featured the TCC’s institution-
al continuity, as manifested in not only its 
run-of-the-mill constitutional interpretations 
concerning fundamental rights and local gov-
ernment but also its fuller life as envisioned 
in the transformative Constitutional Court 
Procedure Act (CCPA). As will become 
clear, this institutional reform is historic in 
that the TCC is expected to be brought closer 
to the people with the CCPA’s coming into 
force in early 2022 in the face of rising pop-
ular constitutionalism. Our story of Taiwan’s 
2018 constitutional evolution begins with a 
mix of change and continuity in the major 
constitutional developments outside judicial 
forum: game-changing referendums and the 
visionary statutory reform of the TCC.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
1.  Citizens’ Initiatives, Referendum Politics, 
and the Rise of Popular Constitutionalism 
As noted in the 2017 Year in Review, the 
amendment of the Referendum Act in late 
2017 threw a monkey wrench into Taiwan’s 
constitutional politics by loosening the 
thresholds for citizen-initiated legislative 
proposals and for referendums to be legal-
ly binding. Not much to anyone’s surprise, 
a variety of campaign groups soon took ad-
vantage of the new ease in triggering a refer-
endum introduced by the 2017 amendment, 
initiating a good many proposals on legal 
principles and government policies.2 They 
covered a diverse array of issues concerning 
domestic legislation and foreign relations, 
ranging from energy policies to the re-des-
ignation of the national Olympic team (cur-
rently Team Chinese Taipei) to Team Taiwan 
in the Tokyo Summer Games 2020. Eventu-
ally, ten initiatives gathered enough signa-
tures to qualify to get before voters on No-
vember 24, 2018, Election Day, when local 
1 1H\@\HU/^HUN4PUN:\UN2\VHUK/\P>LU*OLUº¸;OL*SV\KZ(YL.H[OLYPUN¹!+L]LSVWTLU[ZPU
;HP^HULZL*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^¶[OL@LHYPU9L]PL^»0࠮*65
2 See Yen-Tu Su, ‘Taiwan Is Revolutionizing Democracy’, ;OL>VYSK7VZ[ (5 October 2018) <https://
^^ ^^HZOPUN[VUWVZ[JVTUL^Z[OL^VYSKWVZ[^W[HP^HU&UVYLKPYLJ[$VU\[TF[LY-
T$HL  %
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elections were to take place across Taiwan. 
Aside from the one concerning the Olympic 
team mentioned above, of the ten initiatives 
eventually placed on the ballot, one aimed 
to prevent the government from lifting the 
ban on the importation of Japanese food and 
agricultural produce from the prefectures af-
fected by the 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Ac-
cident, three addressed energy policies, and 
¿YHZHUHSURPSWHGE\WKH7&&¶V,QWHUSUHWD-
tion No. 748 of 2017 on same-sex marriage.3
The institution of referendum holds a special 
position in Taiwan’s constitutional politics, 
for its connotation of national self-determi-
nation in terms of international law.4 Given 
that the current constitution has been made 
virtually unchangeable due to the extremely 
high threshold for constitutional amendment 
set in the 2005 constitutional revision,5 con-
stitutional reform through referenda gained 
currency by tapping into their association 
with popular sovereignty prior to the 2017 
statutory change. Only in light of the con-
stituent implications of a referendum to Tai-
wan’s virtually eternal Constitution of 1946 
FDQWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHWLG-
al wave of citizens’ initiatives in 2018 be ful-
O\DSSUDLVHG:KLOHVRPHRIWKHFLWL]HQV¶LQL-
tiatives convolutedly touched upon Taiwan’s 
most sensitive issues, such as statehood and 
political identity as suggested by rebranding 
WKH7DLZDQHVH2O\PSLFWHDPWKH¿YHLQLWLD-
tives prompted by the TCC’s interpretation 
of the constitutional protection of same-sex 
marriage shed alarming light on how refer-
endum politics can make an impact on con-
stitutional development. 
As discussed in the 2017 Year in Review, 
the TCC, in Interpretation No. 748, declared 
unconstitutional the current statutory provi-
sions governing the marriage institution in 
the Civil Code, paving the way for the legal-
ization of same-sex marriage in two years’ 
time after the interpretation.6 Instead of set-
tling the debate over same-sex marriage, In-
terpretation No. 748 provoked conservative 
and religious pushbacks against it and the 
¿JKW DJDLQVW VH[XDO RULHQWDWLRQEDVHG GLV-
crimination as well. Angered by the TCC’s 
liberal stance as manifested in Interpretation 
No. 748, these groups took advantage of the 
citizen-friendly Referendum Act. They initi-
ated two targeted proposals to chip away at 
the TCC’s declaration of equal protection of 
freedom of marriage with respect to same-
sex couples as well as another to curtail the 
existing LGBTQ-conscious curricula in pri-
mary and secondary education. As a counter-
measure, gay rights activists also managed 
to place two initiatives on the ballot: one 
aimed at implementing Interpretation No. 
748 in full, instructing the Legislative Yuan 
to recognize same-sex marriage through the 
amendment of the Civil Code; the other fo-
cused on the consolidation of the existing 
LGBTQ-conscious curricula that had re-
ceived incessant invective from conservative 
and religious groups. In the meantime, the 
government balked and the legislative pro-
cess of extending legal marriage to same-sex 
couples stalled. In the election, all three pro-
posals initiated in reaction to Interpretation 
No. 748 became legislative instructions or 
policy directives with binding force, whereas 
the two counter-initiatives sponsored by gay 
rights activists were rejected in the referen-
dum votes.
It should be noted that the two initiatives 
directly targeting Interpretation No. 748 
were placed on the ballot with condition. 
They only received the green light from 
the Central Election Commission after they 
KDGEHHQUHDGGRZQDQGFRQ¿QHGWRLVVXHV
concerning the statutory form, whereby In-
terpretation No. 748 would be carried out 
without contradicting the TCC’s declaration 
on the equal protection of freedom of mar-
riage, despite their intention to the contrary. 
If these two initiatives passed, same-sex 
marriage could only be adopted in special 
legislation paralleling the Civil Code. As 
things stand, the extent to which Interpreta-
tion No. 748 is affected by the referendums 
is yet to be determined as the Legislative 
Yuan is hammering out the required legisla-
tion in response to the TCC’s constitutional 
ruling and citizens’ initiatives.
Nevertheless, it has become clear that both 
WKHSXEOLF¶V¿HUFHUHDFWLRQDQGWKHSROLWLFDO
branch’s lukewarm response to Interpre-
tation No. 748 indicate that the TCC is ar-
riving at a crossroads in its winding path to 
effective constitutional review. At the height 
of Taiwan’s democratic transition, the TCC’s 
intervention was not seen as interfering 
with democratic processes but considered 
to be facilitating the realization of political 
freedom—its rights-friendly interpretations 
were embraced by not only the political 
branch but also the people.
In contrast, the praise sung to the TCC has 
been drowned out with Interpretation No. 
748 fading into the polemics of referendum 
politics. Instead of implementing the inter-
pretation in good faith, both the govern-
ment and the legislature turned to citizens’ 
initiatives for guidance. The debate over 
same-sex marriage was thrown back into the 
streets again7 until both its supporters and 
opponents took the battle from the streets to 
the polls.8:LWKWKHGHEDWHFDUULHGRYHULQWR
the political arena following Interpretation 
No.748, the TCC’s grip on the living consti-
tution seems to have been loosened.
3 For a complete list of the ten initiatives, see ‘The 10 Referendum Questions Taiwanese Are Voting On’, Focus Taiwan (24 November 2018) <http://focustaiwan.tw/
UL^ZHPWSHZW_%
4 See Jau-Yuan Hwang, Ming-Sung Kuo and Hui-Wen Chen, ‘Taiwan: The State of Liberal Democracy – The Year 2017 in Review’ in Richard Albert, David Landau, 
Pietro Faraguna and Simon Drugda (eds), ;OL0*65ULJ[*SV\NO*LU[LY.SVIHS9L]PL^VM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHS3H^0࠮*65ULJ[HUK[OL*SV\NO*LU[LYMVY[OL:[\K`VM
Constitutional Democracy at Boston Collage, 2018) 286, 287.
5 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, ;OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM;HP^HU!(*VU[L_[\HS(UHS`ZPZ (Hart Publishing, 2016) 246-47.
6 See generally Ming-Sung Kuo and Hui-Wen Chen, ‘The Brown Moment in Taiwan: Making Sense of the Law and Politics of the Taiwanese Same-Sex Marriage Case 
in a Comparative Light’ (2017) 31 *VS\TIPH1V\YUHSVM(ZPHU3H^ 72.
7 Ibid, 89-90. 
8 Tzu-Yi Lin, Ming-Sung Kuo and Hui-Wen Chen, ‘Seventy Years On: The Taiwan Constitutional Court and Judicial Activism in a Changing Constitutional Landscape’ 
(2018) 48 /VUN2VUN3H^1V\YUHS995, 1021.
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It might be argued that the TCC’s loosened 
grip on the meaning of the constitution may 
pave the way for more constitutional dia-
logue and democratic deliberation, herald-
ing the arrival of civic constitutionalism.9
As the struggle over same-sex marriage is 
still unfolding, equal constitutional pro-
tection of freedom of marriage has already 
been shrouded in the mist of galvanised ho-
mophobia and populist emotion that steered 
the raucous campaign leading to Election 
'D\:LWK WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SULQFLSOHV HV-
poused in Interpretation No. 748 cast into 
uncertainty in the wake of referendums, the 
TCC’s role as the constitution guardian is 
called into question amid the rise of uncivil 
popular constitutionalism.10   
Notably, along with the pair sponsored by 
gay rights activists, the initiative on the re-
branding of the Taiwanese Olympic team 
was also rejected. Eventually, seven of the 
ten initiatives passed the threshold to be le-
gally binding. In a way, the people have spo-
ken, mandating changes on the existing stat-
utory plan to phase out nuclear power plants 
and a potential clash with the trade rules of 
WKH:RUOG7UDGH2UJDQL]DWLRQ DV VXJJHVWHG
in the initiative on the partial ban on the im-
portation of Japanese food and agricultural 
produce. Through the citizen-friendly Ref-
erendum Act, the people have issued the 
government instructions on a wide range of 
issues, including energy security and inter-
national trade. As the referendum campaigns 
were co-opted by or allied with partisan forc-
es and the results corresponded to party lines, 
popular constitutionalism may not bring the 
constitution closer to the people, although it 
does somewhat remove it from the TCC.
2.  The Reformation of the TCC and the Con-
stitutional Court Procedure Act (CCPA)
On December 18, 2018, the Legislative Yuan 
passed the CCPA, which will replace the 
existing Constitutional Interpretation Proce-
dure Act of 1993 (CIPA) when it comes into 
force on January 4, 2022. As part of the grand 
judicial reform project, the CCPA came into 
being after a long gestation. Among the sun-
dry procedural and institutional reforms, 
three features in the reform legislation merit 
special attention.
7KH¿UVW LV WRJHDU WKH7&&IRU WKHSURWHF-
tion of individual rights through the judici-
alization of constitutional interpretation pro-
ceedings. Under the current CIPA, the TCC 
exercises jurisdiction over constitutional 
interpretation mainly in the form of abstract 
review.11 As a result, the TCC does not have 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the constitution-
ality of the rulings of the courts of last resort. 
The TCC has thus been criticized for falling 
short in the protection of individual rights. 
Drawing on the experience of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, the CCPA will 
introduce the procedure of “constitution-
al complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerde),”
through which claimants will be able to 
have the rulings of the courts of last resort 
reviewed by the TCC on the grounds of con-
stitutional rights (Articles 59-64). Related to 
the shifting of focus to the protection of indi-
vidual rights is the emphasis on transparent 
procedures, aimed at moving the privy coun-
FLOOLNH7&&FORVHU WRDIXOOÀHGJHGFRQVWL-
tutional court. Although public hearings may 
not take place frequently, they will no longer 
be a ritualistic constitutional theatre and will 
be equipped with more procedural safeguards 
(Articles 25-29). The TCC will be made more 
accessible to citizen participation through 
procedural reform, including the adoption of 
amicus curiae briefs (Article 20).
Second, the reformed TCC as envisioned by 
WKH&&3$ZLOOEHPRUHHI¿FLHQW$PRQJWKH
criticisms levelled at the TCC are the slow 
pacing of its decision-making and the ob-
scurity of its rulings. They are interrelated. 
Under the CIPA, to render a general inter-
pretation of constitutional principles or to 
decide on the constitutionality of statutes re-
quires a two-thirds majority of the attending 
justices with a quorum of two-thirds of the 
total membership. The TCC’s interpretation 
is rendered impersonal, representing the col-
OHFWLYH RSLQLRQ 6SHFL¿FDOO\ HDFK VHQWHQFH
in the holding (including the ratio deciden-
di) of a constitutional interpretation requires 
the agreement of at least two-thirds of the at-
tending justices. To reach an agreement, the 
justices tend to choose general and abstract 
wording to accommodate differing individu-
al opinions.12 To rectify the slow pacing and 
obscurity of the TCC, the CCPA lowers the 
voting threshold for constitutional interpre-
tation (Articles 30-32).13:LWK WKH UHPRYDO
of the supermajority requirement, the slow-
paced TCC will be able to improve its pro-
ductivity. Moreover, to rid the TCC of ob-
scurity, the CCPA introduces a reform in the 
style of judicial opinions, the third feature of 
the TCC reformation.
Departing from the current continental 
style of impersonal judicial opinions as 
noted above, the CCPA introduces the An-
glo-American practice: judicial opinions 
will be authored by individual judges while 
the single-authored opinion that is joined 
by most judges will become the opinion of 
the court in the future (Article 33, para. 2). 
Once this new judicial style is adopted, the 
interpretation of the TCC will no longer be 
rendered impersonal, with the current col-
lective voice replaced by majority opinions. 
From the signatures attached to the opin-
ion of the court, observers of the TCC will 
then be able to pin down the author and the 
majority in each interpretation. In this way, 
the TCC can become even more transpar-
ent to the public. The proposed “personal-
ization” will move the TCC further in the 
existing “plurivocal” direction,14 bringing 
judicial review closer to the people. In sum, 
9 See Jiunn-rong Yeh and Wen-Chen Chang, ‘An Evolving Court with Changing Functions: The Constitutional Court and Judicial Review in Taiwan’ in Albert HY Chen 
and Andrew Harding (eds), Constitutional Courts in Asia: A Comparative Perspective (CUP, 2018) 111-12, 137-38.
10 Lin, Kuo and Chen (n. 8) 1020-22.
11 Ibid, 1023.
12 Ibid, 1024-25.
13 5V[HIS `[OL]V[PUN[OYLZOVSK]HYPLZHTVUNKPɈLYLU[WYVJLK\YLZ:LLPIPKU 
14 Ibid, 1025-26.
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the CCPA reform envisions the TCC as the 
people’s court in the future. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2018, the TCC received 492 new petitions 
for either constitutional interpretations (467 
petitions, about 95%) or uniform interpre-
tation of laws and regulations (25 petitions, 
about 5%). Among the new petitions, 441 
DERXWZHUH¿OHGE\WKHSHRSOHE\
the courts, and only 12 by other governmen-
tal agencies. In response, the TCC dismissed 
353 petitions and rendered 14 interpretations 
(Nos. 760 to 773).15 About 93% of the dis-
missed cases (344 out of 353) were brought 
by the people. Of the 14 interpretations, only 
two (Nos. 772 and 773) were uniform inter-
pretations. Among the other 12 constitution-
al interpretations, seven (Nos. 760, 762, 763, 
765, 766, 770, and 771) declared unconstitu-
tional the challenged statutes or regulations, 
LQWKHLUHQWLUHW\RULQSDUW7KHUHPDLQLQJ¿YH
(Nos. 761, 764, 767, 768, and 769) upheld 
the constitutionality of the challenged laws. 
In terms of decision outcomes, the TCC re-
mained active in striking down unconstitu-
tional laws, following its path since Taiwan’s 
democratization began in the late 1980s.
Compared to the constitutional interpreta-
tions rendered in 2017, the TCC’s decisions 
in 2018 lacked an iconic decision that would 
stand out as Interpretation No. 748 on same-
sex marriage. Nevertheless, some of the 12 
constitutional interpretations still touched 
upon several issues of importance that de-
serve focused attention.
1.  Interpretation No. 760: Equal Protection
Interpretation No. 760 declared unconstitu-
tional in part the pre-entry training program 
RISROLFHRI¿FHUVIRUYLRODWLRQRIHTXDOSUR-
WHFWLRQ,Q7DLZDQDOOSROLFHRI¿FHUVDUHUH-
quired to pass a state examination, including 
a written test and a pre-entry training pro-
JUDP EHIRUH WDNLQJ RI¿FH ,Q SUDFWLFH WKH
government established a national police 
XQLYHUVLW\ WR HGXFDWH IXWXUH SROLFH RI¿FHUV
)RU \HDUV DOO SROLFH RI¿FHUV ZHUH JUDGX-
ates of this police university (hereinafter 
PU graduates). Beginning in the 1990s, the 
government opened up this examination for 
graduates of other universities (hereinafter 
non-PU graduates) in the hope of diversify-
ing the educational backgrounds of police 
RI¿FHUV ,Q VSLWH RI WKH DERYH OHJLVODWLYH
purpose, the national police administration 
developed a dual-track program for pre-en-
WU\SROLFHRI¿FHU WUDLQLQJDOO38JUDGXDWHV
were required to receive about four months 
of training at the police university while all 
non-PU graduates were to go through about 
a two-year training program at another po-
lice educational institution at a junior col-
lege level. Consequently, after completion 
of their two-year pre-entry program, those 
non-PU graduates would be appointed as 
WKH ORZHVWUDQNHGSROLFHRI¿FHUVDWDPXFK
later time compared to those PU graduates 
passing the same police examination in the 
same year. 
In its ruling, the TCC found that laws gov-
erning the state police examination did not 
mandate this different treatment. Instead, it 
was the result of the unequal implementation 
of laws by the examination and police agen-
cy collectively. Therefore, the TCC in Inter-
pretation No. 760 declared unconstitutional 
in part such de facto discrimination against 
the non-PU graduates in their right to take 
VWDWHH[DPLQDWLRQVDQGULJKWWRSXEOLFRI¿F-
es, as provided for by Article 18 of the Con-
stitution. Among the TCC’s jurisprudence 
on equal protection, Interpretation No. 760 
LV WKH ¿UVW FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKDW
expressly recognized de facto discrimination 
as a type of discrimination that violates the 
constitutional provision of equal protection. 
The TCC held that a practice with systematic 
disproportionate impacts would trigger the 
intermediate review of equal protection in 
this case, as it involves the right to public of-
¿FHV1HYHUWKHOHVVWKH7&&OHIWXQDQVZHUHG
one important question on the requirements 
of de facto discrimination: whether a dis-
criminatory purpose or intention behind the 
discriminatory practice is needed to establish 
an unconstitutional de facto discrimination.
2.  Interpretation Nos. 762 and 763: Due Pro-
cess of Law
On issues regarding the due process of law, 
the TCC, in Interpretation No. 762, declared 
unconstitutional the ban on pro se criminal 
defendants accessing court dockets. In In-
terpretation No. 763, the TCC created a no-
tice obligation on the competent authorities 
taking any private land. This interpretation 
mandated the government to give the origi-
nal landowners updated reports, in due time, 
on the actual use of their lands taken by the 
government.
3.  Interpretation No. 764: Privatization and 
Discontinuity of Civil Servant Status
2Q WKH ULJKW WR SXEOLF RI¿FHV WKH7&& LQ
Interpretation No. 764, upheld the constitu-
tionality of several provisions in the Statute 
of Privatization of Government-Owned En-
terprises and its implementing rules. These 
provisions authorized the government to 
convert those government employees who 
voluntarily work with privatized enterprise 
into workers regulated by the Labor Stan-
dards Act, after paying due compensation 
based on their respective seniorities of ser-
vice. Applying the standard of rationality 
review, the TCC found that the termination 
of their status as government employees did 
QRWYLRODWHWKHLUULJKWWRSXEOLFRI¿FHVXQGHU
Article 18 of the Constitution.
4.  Interpretation No. 768: Nationality and the 
Loyalty Required of Civil Servants
In Interpretation No. 768, the TCC also up-
held the constitutionality of several provi-
sions in the Medical Personnel Act, which 
OLPLWVWKHULJKWWRSXEOLFRI¿FHVRIOLFHQVHG
medical professionals with dual nationality. 
7KH VDLG DFW GLVTXDOL¿HV DQ\ VXFK SHUVRQ
from holding the position of a department 
director or higher ranks at any state-owned 
medical institution or any health administra-
tion, as holders of such positions are consid-
ered civil servants. 
15 :[H[PZ[PJZVM[OLUL^HUKKLJPKLKJHZLZILMVYL[OL;**PUPU4HUKHYPU#O[[W!^^ ^Q\KPJPHSNV][^JVUZ[P[\[PVUHSJV\Y[WHZW%
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5.  Interpretation No. 769: Political Account-
ability and Autonomy of Local Government  
Interpretation No. 769 was the only interpre-
tation touching upon the issues of govern-
ment powers: the vertical division of powers 
between the central and local governments. 
It is a rare interpretation concerning local au-
tonomy under the Constitution. In 2016, the 
national legislature amended the Local Gov-
ernment Law and changed the voting meth-
od of the election or recall of the speakers 
and deputy speakers of local councils from 
secret to open balloting. The Yunlin Coun-
ty Council petitioned the TCC for a ruling 
that such change infringed its legislative au-
tonomy as protected under the Constitution. 
The TCC upheld the constitutionality of the 
above-amended national legislation. In terms 
of the constitutional basis, the TCC held that 
the Constitution and its amendments do in-
clude several provisions expressly authoriz-
ing the national legislature to regulate the 
overall structure of local governments. The 
RI¿FH RI ORFDO FRXQFLO VSHDNHUV DQG WKHLU
election shall be considered important items 
of such structure and be subject to necessary 
and proper regulation of national legisla-
tion. Applying a relaxed standard of review, 
the TCC found legitimate the purposes of 
the above 2016 legislative amendment that 
aimed to enhance political accountability 
and to reduce corruption related to the elec-
tion of local council speakers in practice. 
As to the voting methods, the TCC recog-
nized that it is within legislative discretion to 
choose either secret or open balloting for the 
election and recall of local council speakers.
6.  “Deciding Not to Decide”
Of the 353 dismissed petitions in 2018, two 
decisions merited special attention. Both 
concerned the standing of governmental 
agencies to petition for constitutional inter-
pretations: one concerning the minorities 
of the Legislative Yuan and the other on the 
Control Yuan (an equivalent of the Ombuds-
man Agency).
The CIPA allows one-third of the legisla-
tors or more to petition for constitutional 
interpretation after the enactment of a new 
or revised legislation. In the past, the TCC 
once held that only those legislators who 
were opposing the laws in dispute may join 
the petition (Interpretation No. 603 of 2005). 
+RZHYHU WKH7&&KDVQRW IXUWKHUFODUL¿HG
the rather technical question of how to count 
who may be considered “opposing” the laws 
in dispute.
,QDSHWLWLRQ¿OHGE\H[DFWO\RQHWKLUG 
RI WKH OHJLVODWRUV FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH ¿UVW DQG
second reading procedures of a controversial 
budget bill, the TCC dismissed this petition 
on the ground that the real number of oppos-
ing legislators did not meet the threshold of 
one-third of the legislators as required by the 
CIPA. The TCC found that one legislator did 
not attend any meeting of either committee 
GHOLEHUDWLRQVRUÀRRUGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKLVELOO
7KRXJKRSSRVLQJDW¿UVW VRPHRUPDQ\RI
the 38 petitioning legislators changed their 
position and joined the majority to vote for 
many procedural items in dispute, or simply 
did not cast their votes. As none of the proce-
dural items in dispute were opposed by one-
third of the legislators, the TCC dismissed 
this petition for lack of standing. As this was 
WKH ¿UVW GLVPLVVDO GHFLVLRQ UXOHG RQ VXFK
grounds, it remains to be seen if the TCC 
will apply the same test to similar petitions 
in the future, and extend to the petitions the 
substantive issues of laws as well.
In another dismissal decision, the TCC denied 
a petition by the Control Yuan challenging a 
recent statute of transitional justice (on the 
liquidation of illegitimate party assets of the 
former ruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT)) 
based exclusively on its investigative power 
without any connection to its impeachment, 
FHQVXUH RU UHFWL¿FDWLRQ SRZHUV :KLOH DF-
knowledging several precedents of granting 
admission to similar petitions in the pre-de-
mocratization era, the TCC chose to follow its 
recent practice of a more tightened scrutiny 
of such petitions after Taiwan’s democratiza-
tion. The TCC held that investigative power 
is only a subsidiary power to facilitate the 
Control Yuan’s exercise of impeachment and 
other powers, and may not be cited as the only 
ground to support its standing to petition for 
constitutional interpretation. Otherwise, the 
Control Yuan would become a sort of “con-
stitutional prosecutor” that can challenge any 
law or regulation at odds with its constitution-
al or political position.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
Continuing with the development from 2016 
on, same-sex marriage will remain on the 
constitutional agenda beyond 2018. As the 
government is introducing the bill “An Act 
to Implement Interpretation No. 748” before 
the Legislative Yuan, supporters and oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage are taking their 
battle from the ballot box to the legislative 
ÀRRU$V WKH XQZLHOG\ WLWOH RI WKH JRYHUQ-
ment bill suggests, the $64,000 question of 
whether the prospective civil union of same-
sex couples is marriage is deliberately left 
unanswered in the proposed statutory frame-
work in response to the TCC’s declaration on 
the equal protection of freedom of marriage 
and its critics. Under the bill, same-sex cou-
SOHV ZLOO UHFHLYH WKH VLPLODU OHJDO EHQH¿WV
attached to marriages of opposite sexes as 
provided by the Civil Code. This strategy of 
constructive ambiguity and the limited areas 
to which the bill applies may well satisfy nei-
ther side, setting the stage for another round 
of constitutional battles before the TCC. 
Apart from issues arising under the forego-
ing government legislative bill that may well 
have to be resolved by the TCC in 2019, both 
the contentious statutory reform on veterans’ 
pensions, which was adopted in June 2018, 
and the above-mentioned special legislation 
on the liquidation of KMT’s illegitimate par-
ty assets are now in the TCC’s case docket 
pending its decisions. In 2019, the TCC will 
be engaged by the most contentious issues 
arising from the government reform agenda 
since the DPP’s electoral victory in 2016.
Although 2019 is an election-free year in Tai-
wan’s political chronology, the lead-up before 
the presidential and general elections in early 
2020 will surely dominate the country’s con-
stitutional politics in 2019. Against this back-
drop, it is worth close observation that the 
TCC will have new members in October 2019 
when the eight-year term of four sitting jus-
WLFHVFRPHVWRDQHQG:LWKERWKWKHSUHVLGHQW
and the Legislative Yuan approaching their 
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lame-duck stage before the expiry of their 
WHUPVZKR¿OOVWKH7&&YDFDQFLHVZLOOKDYH
long-term implications for Taiwan’s constitu-
tional development beyond 2019.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although enacted in April 2017, the 2017 
Constitution has yet to come into full effect. 
The long transitional period means that the 
National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO) 
could ignore much of the charter, e.g., the 
checks and balances and respect of liberties 
and rights. 
Support for the NCPO has begun to wane. 
The junta has been plagued by corruption 
and inefficiency, yet has survived its dwin-
dling popularity by reinforcing the network 
of elites. The NCPO controls all the consti-
tutional mechanisms key to sustaining the re-
gime. The junta has appointed its men to all 
watchdog agencies and raised their salaries.1
As a result, it is well protected legally. The 
National Anti-Corruption Commission re-
fuses to investigate corruption accusations.2
The National Human Rights Commission has 
been silent about abuses on dissidents. Judi-
cial reviews have been lenient. This has only 
further upset the public. The fight for rights 
and liberties remains an uphill struggle.
The general atmosphere, however, slightly 
improved as the NCPO prepared for the up-
coming election, tentatively within the first 
quarter of 2019. The political ban was lifted 
in December. Despite running out of excus-
es to delay it, in 2018, the NCPO signaled to 
the National Legislative Assembly to extend 
the waiting period for 90 days and in 2019, it 
postponed the date by another month.3 Thus, 
regardless of all the preparation and fanfare, 
an election remains an uncertain prospect.  
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Much of the constitutional debates in 2018 
concerned the upcoming election. The 2017 
Constitution decrees that the government, the 
NCPO, promulgate election laws within eight 
months, after which the Election Commis-
sion (EC) must hold an election within 150 
days.4 The date falls within the first quarter 
of 2019. This election would be the first in 
five years. The 2014 Election was obstructed 
by anti-democratic protesters, and later in-
validated by the Constitutional Court, an act 
which paved the way for the coup d’etat.5 The 
selling point of the 2014 coup was an elec-
toral reform to build a truly democratic Thai-
land. This will be the final test for the junta 
after five long years in power. However, the 
NCPO leader, Prayuth Chan-ocha, has public-
ly expressed his interest in continuing the sup-
pressive regime, this time constitutionally via 
the proxy Phalang Pracharat Party (PPRP). 
1 ‘ࡡ࡬ࡻࡒ࡬࠻ࡡࡁࡤࡐ࡯ࡘࡨࡌ࡫࠹࡭ࡼࡐࡳ࠾࡫ࡐࡳࡋ࡮ࡤࡐ࠹ࡼࡩ࡚ࡩࡁ࠸ࡩ࡚ࡶࡁࡼ࠾ࡑࡒ࡚ࡧࡘࡩࡊࡘࡩ࠸࠹࡭ࡼࡐࡴࡌࡻࡒ࡚ࡧࡡ࡫ࡎࡏ࡫ࡗࡩࡕࡷࡘࡻࡳࡒ࡜࡬ࡻ࡙ ࡐࡴࡒ࡜࠾’ [Four Years, NCPO 
YHPZLZZHSHYPLZMVYNV]LYUTLU[VɉJLYZ4VYLZWLUKPUNZHTLLɉJPLUJ`DiLaw, 27 September 2018) <https://
PSH ^VY[OUVKL &MIJSPK$0^(95@Q*KV9W41N9K/ZI+1A3)L5:<Q?<JX)8VFU7U@SMQ]J*@_TJ%
accessed 9 February 2019. 
2º;OHP(U[P.YHM[(NLUJ`+YVWZ7YVILPU[V¸9VSL_.LULYHS¹»;OL:[YHP[;PTLZ, 27 December 2018) <https://
^^ ^Z[YHP[Z[PTLZJVTHZPHZLHZPH[OHPHU[PNYHM[HNLUJ`KYVWZWYVILPU[VYVSL_NLULYHS%HJJLZZLK 
February 2019. 
3 ‘4 ࡒ࡬࠻ࡡࡁࡳ࡜࡮ࡻࡤࡐࡳ࡜࡮ࡤ࠸ࡌࡨࡼ࠾4 ࠻ ࡨ࡚ࡼ࠾࠿ࡩ࠸ࡒ࡜ࡩ࡙ࡒ࡬ 2558 ࡡࡰࡻ࠸࡯ࡘࡗࡩࡕࡨࡐࡏࡿ2562’ [Four years, NCPO Postpones election 4 times, 
from late 2015 to Feb 2019] (;OL:[HUKHYK, 25 January 2018) <https://thestandard.co/4-years-election-post-
WVULK[PTLZ%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` "7HUHYH[;OLWN\TWHUH[º;OHPSHUKT\Z[WVZ[WVULLSLJ[PVUHNHPU
\U[PS4HYJO!VɉJPHSZ»9L\[LYZ1HU\HY` #O[[WZ!^^ ^YL\[LYZJVTHY[PJSL\Z[OHPSHUKWVSP[PJZ[OHP-
SHUKT\Z[WVZ[WVULLSLJ[PVUHNHPU\U[PSTHYJOVɉJPHSZPK<:2*57 @%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
4 Thai Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017) [2017 Constitution], sec 268.
5 Const. Ct. Decision 9/2557 (2014).
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The public has speculated whether the junta 
will naturally utilize a combination of con-
stitutional and extra-constitutional means to 
coerce a desirable outcome, which unsurpris-
ingly undermines the free and fair spirit of an 
election.6 Thus, this election is proving critical 
to Thailand’s democracy.7
The election is the joint work of the NCPO and 
the EC. Because the NCPO handpicked the 
Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) and 
the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), the 
two bodies followed the NCPO’s instruction 
in drafting the 2017 Constitution and relevant 
laws on political parties and elections. The 
EC is supposed to be an independent agency 
undertaking free and fair elections. However, 
its independence has also been compromised 
by the dictatorship. They have been driven by 
two motives: first is the desire to perpetuate 
the current regime, transforming it into a far-
cically democratic government; the second is 
a fanatical desire to have an absolutely free 
and fair election. The interplay of the two 
forces can be seen in the Constitution, organic 
laws, and regulations. 
Election preparations exposed two problems 
surrounding the 2017 Constitution. First was 
the ill-intent in designing the electoral system. 
Under the pretext of producing an accurate 
representation, the CDC designed an electoral 
system that would result in a fractious parlia-
ment. A modified Multi-Member Apportion-
ment (MMA) system allows a voter to cast a 
single vote.8 Of 500 MPs, 350 are chosen di-
rectly from constituencies. Another 150 MPs 
are allocated proportionally to the remaining 
votes. Critics predicted that this arrangement 
would produce no big winner, as a party that 
wins in a constituency will automatically lose 
the right to a party list seat while a smaller 
party like PPRP would benefit.9
Becoming a candidate is not easy, as he and 
his party are subject to stringent criteria: a 
candidate must not be an owner or share-
holder of a media company and must never 
have been convicted of corruption-related 
charges.10 And a party under the influence 
of a non-party member faces dissolution.11 
These rules are specifically designed to de-
feat the NCPO’s main rival, the Pheu Thai 
Party, controlled by Thaksin Shinwatra, 
himself in self-exile.  
Moreover, the Organic Law on Political Par-
ties demands unrealistically high involvement 
from members. A member must pay an an-
nual fee to prove his sincerity in participat-
ing.12 Also, a party must have a branch in that 
constituency in order to compete.13 Initially, 
a party must recruit candidates through local 
primary elections, but this law has proven to 
be impossible to comply with so the NCPO 
granted an exemption for this election.14
Complications continue well after an election. 
For the first five years, the Senate and the 
House jointly vote on a candidate from a list 
submitted by political parties prior to an elec-
tion. Should they fail, they may pick whoever 
is appropriate to be a PM.15 The first 244 sen-
ators will be chosen by the NCPO, with six re-
served seats for armed forces commanders.16
That means the NCPO-backed Senate may 
determine the PM selection for two terms of 
actually eight—not five—years. 
Another problem with the 2017 Constitution is 
its lengthy transition under which the NCPO 
retains dictatorial power from the 2014 Inter-
im Charter.17 Despite the constitutional guar-
antee of separation of power, the NCPO has 
invoked extra-constitutional power to issue 
several orders that give it an edge over rivals 
with absolute impunity. NCPO Order 53/2560 
eliminates the membership of all political par-
ties. Another NCPO Order (16/2561) allows 
the EC to gerrymander.18  These orders directly 
interfere with the EC, an independent agency 
responsible for overseeing elections. Through-
out 2018, the PPRP recruited local mafia 
and politicians through generous awards and 
blackmailing.19 As a government, the NCPO 
has given, and promises to give more, highly 
substantial amounts of money to grassroots, 
a practice other parties have condemned as 
vote-buying in plain sight.20
6 ‘Nation cynical about election’ ()HUNRVR7VZ[1HU\HY` #O[[WZ!^^ ^IHUNRVRWVZ[JVTUL^ZWVSP[PJZ UH[PVUJ`UPJHSHIV\[LSLJ[PVU%HJJLZZLK 
February 2019. 
7 Prajak Kongkirati, ‘Why Thailand’s generals fail to co-opt elections’ (5L^4HUKHSH, 15 January 2019) <https://www.newmandala.org/why-thailands-generals-fail-to-
JVVW[LSLJ[PVUZ%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
8 *VUZ[P[\[PVUZLJ
9 Natthakarn Amatyakul, ‘࠸ࡻࡤࡐ࠸ࡩࡤ ࡻ࡙ࡩ࡜࡮ࡘࡤࡻࡩࡐಫ࠸ࡌ࡫࠸ࡩಬࡴ࡜ࡧࡵࡒ࡚ࡋ࡟ ࡨ࡚ࡎࡏࡩ࠸ࡩ࡚ࡳ࡜࡮ࡤ࠸ࡌࡨࡼ࠾ࡡ࡫࡚ ࡫ࡕ࡚࡚ࡊࡐ࠸ࡡ࡞ࡐࡡ࡞ࡨࡡࡋ࡬’ [Read the Rules before Vote. Trust in Election: Siripannee Nogsuan 
Sawasdee Interview] (;OL4VTLU[\T(\N\Z[#O[[WZ![OLTVTLU[\TJVPU[LY]PL^WVSP[PJHSZJPLU[PZ[ZPYPWOHUUVRZ\HUZH^HZKLL%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
10 2017 Constitution, sec 98. 
11 Organic Law on Political Party B.E. 2560 (2017), sec 28.  
12 Political Party Law, sec 27. 
13 Political Party Law, sec 47.
14 The National Council of Peace and Order (NCPO) Order 13/2561 (2018), sec 4. 
15*VUZ[P[\[PVUZLJ 
16 2017 Constitution, sec 269. 
17 Interim Charter B.E. 2557 (2014), sec 44.
18 Wassana Nanuam, ‘Apirat defends EC order amid govt gerrymandering concern’ ()HUNRVR7VZ[, 20 November 2018) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/poli-
[PJZ HWPYH[KLMLUKZLJVYKLYHTPKNV][NLYY`THUKLYPUNJVUJLYU%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
19 Pongpiphat Banchanont, ‘ࡳࡁࡺ࠸ࡴࡍ࡞ࡕ࡜ࡨ࠾ࡋࡰࡋ࠹ࡤ࠾ࡕ࡚࡚࠻ࡕ࡜ࡨ࠾ࡒ࡚ࡧࡁࡩ ࡨ࡚ࡇ’ [Checking Magnet Power of PPRP] (The Matter, 28 November 2018) <https://thematter.co/quick-bite/
THNUL[WV^LYWHY[`  %HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
20 4VUNRVS)HUNWYHWH(LRHYHJO:H[[HI\Y\[Oº,*[VPU]LZ[PNH[LJHZOOHUKV\[ZWYLL»)HUNRVR7VZ[, 23 November 2018) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/
NLULYHSLJ[VPU]LZ[PNH[LJHZOOHUKV\[ZWYLL%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
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Despite this, the EC raised no objections to 
the NCPO’s trespassing into its jurisdiction. 
Normally, members of independent watch-
dog agencies would be nominated by an in-
dependent commission and confirmed by the 
Senate.21 The system was designed to bar the 
prime minister’s involvement for fear of un-
due political influence so watchdog agencies 
could remain independent to scrutinize the 
political branches. However, since 2014, the 
NCPO has dominated all branches of govern-
ment. It handpicked the NLA so it was able to 
choose its men for the National Anti-Corrup-
tion Commission, the National Human Rights 
Commission, the Ombudsman, and, most im-
portantly, the Election Commission. The EC 
cites the need to have a free and fair election 
to tightly control campaigns. However, the 
reason might simply be a pretext to favor the 
PPRP. In addition to the above incident, the 
PPRP failed to disclose its campaign finances 
and cabinet members were accused of con-
flicts of interest as they helped the PPRP’s 
campaigning. Meanwhile, other parties were 
harassed by police and soldiers.22 The EC re-
fused to investigate these cases. On the con-
trary, it enthusiastically considered Prayuth’s 
recommendation that a ballot should not con-
tain any logos or names of candidates that 
would allow for easier rigging.23
The two forces have produced an overly 
complicated election, laden with unrealistic 
rules, costly to comply with, and unfair. The 
damage to the Constitution has been great. 
The handling of the upcoming election by 
the NCPO and the EC has displayed blatant 
disregard of constitutionalism. The NCPO 
saw the 2017 Constitution merely as an in-
strument to advance its interests—to perpet-
uate the regime—so the charter was drafted 
accordingly. Regardless of the form, the sub-
stance is hollow. Although it was approved 
in a referendum in 2016, the public has fi-
nally begun to feel its bite. All constitution-
al mechanisms have aimed at abusing the 
electoral process to undermine the people’s 
general will and whitewash the autocrat-
ic regime. Moreover, the NCPO’s arbitrary 
exercise of power puts the supremacy of the 
2017 Constitution ever more into question. 
Flawed constitutional designs and biased 
watchdog agencies have quickly deteriorated 
the public’s trust in it. Such resentment indi-
cates that yet another round of constitutional 
crisis is being spawned.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
Most cases involved the Constitutional 
Court (CC). After four idle years, cases fi-
nally began to arrive, but still in significantly 
lower numbers than during the democratic 
government period. The CC was vested with 
two roles: first, as the protector of rights and 
liberties; and second, as the guardian of the 
constitutional order. These cases suggest 
that, while the CC performed the first role 
well, it failed to uphold a liberal democrat-
ic spirit. There seems to be a limit on what 
the CC understands as rights and liberties. 
In other words, the CC was more rigorous 
at protecting “private” rights than “public” 
RQHV:RUVHLWZDVDFFXVHGRIEHLQJELDVHG
because of its perceived reluctance to scruti-
nize the junta regime.
1. Constitutional Court Decision 6-7/2561: 
Civil Rights
This is the first case under the 2017 Consti-
tution which the CC proclaimed unconstitu-
tional. Previously, Thai narcotic drug laws 
had a strict presumption that a person who 
possessed a certain amount of narcotic drugs 
was deemed to be a seller, whose punishment 
was significantly more severe than an ordi-
nary user. The new Narcotic Drugs Act B.E. 
2560 (2017) (6th Amendment) then allowed 
a judge to apply discretion, which would re-
sult in a more flexible and fairer sentencing. 
However, according to Section 8 of the 2017 
NDA, the new procedure was not applicable 
in a case that had already been decided by the 
Court of First Instance. Two inmates whose 
requests for retrial under the new procedure 
challenged Section 8. Their cases were then 
referred to the CC.
The CC had to balance two interests: the de-
fendants’ interest in a fair trial, especially the 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty; 
and the need for legal certainty. If a case is 
still ongoing, even on appeal, the defendant’s 
interest prevails. Denying a defendant of a 
fairer procedure fails the rule of law (Section 
3), proportionality (Section 26), and presump-
tion of innocence (Section 29) tests. The CC 
also cited the general principle of criminal 
law that as long as a case has not finished, the 
court must apply a new law if it is more bene-
ficial to a defendant.  
The ruling on presumption of innocence is 
consistent with the precedent. In recent years, 
the CC invalidated several laws that had pre-
sumption of strict liability.24  
However, if the case is finished, the interest in 
legal certainty reigns. The prohibition is not 
an unfair discrimination against a convicted 
defendant. It is a proportionate restriction on 
an individual’s right to a fair trial in order to 
maintain public order. 
2. Constitutional Court Decision 4/2561: 
Political Membership 
On 22 December 2017, shortly after the NLA 
enacted the Organic Act on Political Parties 
B.E. 2560 (2017), the NCPO issued Order 
53/2560 (2017) to amend it. First, it ordered 
members of existing political parties to re-
confirm their membership in writing and pay 
the fee within 30 days after 30 April 2017. 
Second, the order disbanded existing branch-
es and forced parties to establish branches in 
every region and province anew as a precon-
dition to being able to compete in an election. 
Failure to meet the requirement would result 
21 2017 Constitution, sec 216.
22 ‘ࡤࡐࡩ࠻ࡌࡶࡢࡘࡻರࡵ࡞࡙ࡎࡢࡩ࡚ࡌࡩࡘࡌ࡫ࡋ࡜࠾ࡕ࡮ࡼࡐࡎ࡬ࡻࡤ࡬ࡡࡩࡐࡎࡨࡼ࠾ࡎ࡬ࡻ࠹ࡤࡤࡐ࡯ࡄࡩࡌࡴ࡜ࡼ࡞࠿࡬ࡼࡍࡩࡘࡌࡰࡻࡒࡼࡤࡘ ࡨ࡚ࡑ ࡰ࡚ࡼࡢ ࡮࡚ࡤࡷࡘࡻಬ [Future Forward monitored by soldiers despite permission] (4H[PJOVU, 26 October 
#O[[WZ!^^ ^TH[PJOVUJV[OWVSP[PJZUL^ZF %HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
23 ‘EC downplays furor over ballot papers’ ()HUNRVR7VZ[, 10 December 2018) <https://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/1590694/ec-downplays-furore-
V]LYIHSSV[WHWLYZ%HJJLZZLK -LIY\HY` 
24 Const. Ct. Decision 12/2555 (2012), 10/2556 (2013), 3/2559 (2016), and 1/2560 (2017).
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in party dissolution. The two biggest par-
ties—Pheu Thai and Democrat—challenged 
the order, claiming that it imposed excessive 
burden on existing parties, putting them at a 
disadvantage compared to newly founded 
parties. This is especially true if they are still 
under the ban of convening political gather-
ings. The main parties were implying that the 
NCPO’s intervention favored the PPRP.  
The CC upheld the constitutionality of both 
measures. The focus was on Section 45 of the 
Constitution, the right to form a political par-
ty. The CC reasoned that having a democratic 
party was a crucial component of political re-
form. It then described an ideal party as hav-
ing transparent and participatory management 
as well as being independent from non-mem-
bers’ influence. Order 53/2560 did not termi-
nate party membership. Instead, it allowed 
members to reconsider, at their free will, 
whether they still would like to participate 
in that party. The order also gave the party a 
chance to review and update its bookkeep-
ing. Moreover, the order approved the EC to 
accept electronic submissions. Thus, the CC 
did not speculate as to excessive burden on 
an individual’s right to participate or form a 
party. As expected, all main parties later lost a 
significant number of their members. 
On the second count, the CC referred to the 
NCPO’s objective, as stated in Order 53/2560, 
that it intended all parties to belong to the peo-
ple, which meant they must have wide sup-
port from every constituency in which they 
wish to run. Therefore, a requirement for new 
branches was necessary as these new branch-
es demonstrate a party’s independence from 
a few politicians. Besides, the deadline could 
be extended should the EC deem it necessary. 
A political party may also later petition its 
grievance with the CC if it was disqualified. 
:LWKUHPHGLHVDYDLODEOHWKH&&EHOLHYHGWKDW
the new measure did not excessively restrict 
the political rights of the people. 
There are two notable observations from the 
decision. First, the CC dismissed the claim 
of unfair discrimination but did not discuss 
the discrepancy between existing and newly 
founded parties. A new party enjoys more 
time to recruit members long after existing 
parties have updated their membership.
Second, the NCPO and the CC emphasized 
the creation of a party independent from a 
non-member figure, a term largely believed to 
reference Thaksin Shinwatra. A need to create 
a mass-based, or popular, political party could 
possibly be a pretext to targeting Thaksin’s 
party, Pheu Thai.   
3. Constitutional Court Decision 5/2561: 
Conflict of Interest 
The EC accused the Foreign Minister, Don 
Pramudwinai, of a conflict of interest. Un-
der the 2017 Constitution, a cabinet member 
(Section 187) is prohibited from holding more 
than a 5% share in a business entity. The rest 
must be deposited in a trust. This provision 
also applies to a minister’s spouse and minor 
children. Don had assumed the office in Au-
gust 2015, when he was exempt from conflict 
of interest prohibition because he was ap-
pointed under the 2014 Interim Charter. The 
EC discovered that two months after the 2017 
Constitution came into effect, Don’s wife still 
held more than a 5% share in two companies. 
The EC filed a case with the CC to disqualify 
Don from his office.
The key issue was factual. Don argued that 
his wife had already complied with the con-
flict of interest rule. He then blamed the ac-
countant’s office for failing to submit all the 
paperwork necessary to the registrar. The 
delay was therefore only an administrative 
issue. The EC disputed the claim since it be-
lieved that the documentation presented to 
the CC was fabricated. The CC agreed with 
the defendant that his wife had duly met the 
deadline in transferring the excessive shares 
to their son as decreed by the Constitution, 
and Don was acquitted. 
The case was decided by a majority. Three 
minority judges were not convinced, as they 
found many irregularities in the testimony 
and documents. The case will have further 
implications since four more cabinet mem-
bers have been found to have breached a sim-
ilar conflict of interest prohibition. Their con-
viction would be a severe blow to the NCPO’s 
survival, providing them with an easy exit. 
4. Supreme Court Decision 1688/2561: 
Rebellion 
A group of democratic activists, known as the 
Resistant Citizens, accused the NCPO of re-
bellion under Section 113 of the Penal Code. 
The Court of First Instance and the Court of 
Appeal dismissed the case. Both courts rea-
soned that the 2014 Interim Charter prevented 
any action against the coup d’etat on 22 May 
2014 and any subsequent acts. The Supreme 
Court upheld the dismissal. 
The Resistant Citizens argued that Section 48 
of the 2014 Interim Charter, which granted 
absolute impunity to the NCPO, was directly 
against the conscience and fundamental prin-
ciples of justice; that it should not be recog-
nized as a proper law. It was drafted in bad 
faith, they argued, as a criminal enacts the law 
to shield himself from liability. The Supreme 
Court disagreed. It followed a positivistic and 
pragmatic approach. The NCPO was able to 
successfully usurp power from the previous 
government so it was a de facto government 
when it made the law. Besides, when facing 
a legal dilemma, the Supreme Court would 
prefer to be practical in order to uphold state-
hood. Here, the Court was implying that re-
jecting the NCPO’s order as law would mean 
rejecting the NCPO itself as a legitimate rul-
er, hence anarchy would follow. The NCPO 
continued to enjoy absolute protection even 
under the 2017 Constitution because Section 
279 guarantees it legality as inherited from 
the 2014 Interim Charter.
The case came as no surprise. Shortly before 
the Supreme Court delivered its decision, the 
Court of Appeal, in another case, also ruled 
that the junta’s order to ban public assembly 
was lawful. The Court of Appeal cited an ab-
sence of resistance as the sign of a success-
ful coup and power transition. The defendant 
tried to claim his freedom to assembly under 
the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, but the Court of Appeal pointed 
out that Thailand was then in a stage of po-
litical instability, which was grounds for the 
restriction of such freedom. The judiciary 
has long been known for its conservativism 
and cozy relationship with the military, so 
the Court has always confirmed the junta’s 
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legitimacy to rule.25 The judiciary valued the 
practicalities of public order over ideological 
fairness.    
5. Chiang Mai District Court: Academic 
Freedom
At the 13th International Conference on Thai 
Studies, academics and activists set up a 
sign— “An Academic Forum Is Not a Mili-
tary Camp”—in protest of the NCPO sending 
soldiers to observe, and possibly intimidate, 
international and Thai scholars. Five people 
were then charged with political gathering 
according to NCPO Order 3/2558 (2015) 
banning a political gathering of five or more 
people. The case sparked international outcry 
as an encroachment on academic freedom.26
In December 2018, to ease tension in prepara-
tion for the election, the NCPO issued Order 
22/2561 (2018), which lifted the ban but did 
not impact the prosecution of cases, proceed-
ings, or actions according to the announce-
ments and orders that were carried out prior 
to the nullifications. This was contrary to 
Section 2 of the Penal Code, which stipulates 
that if an act is no longer a crime, the accused 
must be relieved. Despite the NCPO’s order, 
the Chiang Mai District Court followed the 
Penal Code and acquitted the five defendants. 
Since the case was dismissed on a technical-
ity, the Court never had the chance to rule on 
merit whether academic freedom included a 
protest against the junta. Again, this could be 
an example of the judiciary’s inclination to 
protect an individual should the issue concern 
a more familiar subject, such as criminal law, 
than one more regarding “public” rights, such 
as academic freedom. At minimum, it could 
be a precedent for other cases. Currently there 
are at least 200 people charged under Order 
53/2558.27 Unfortunately, as merely a Court 
of First Instance, the decision had only per-
suasive, not binding, authority. It depends on 
each court to interpret Order 22/2561. Be-
sides, the order would not benefit those who 
were charged with sedition, computer crimes, 
or public assembly laws. Therefore, the impli-
cation was quite limited.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
Tension is expected to increase in 2019. 
In January, the NCPO pressured the EC to 
re-schedule the general election from late 
February to late March, raising the possibility 
that the EC might fail to meet the constitu-
tional deadline. If the election is annulled, the 
ensuing deadlock might pave the way for an-
other coup. Even if the election goes smooth-
ly, public opinion suggests that most Thais are 
skeptical that it will be free and fair. A party 
winning the popular vote might be disquali-
fied under the unrealistically strict rules ap-
plied by a prejudiced umpire.
No one believes that the 2017 Constitution 
will last very long. It is designed to limit the 
government’s capacity as much as possible. 
The incoming government must navigate 
through an increasingly powerful bureaucra-
cy and watchdog agencies. It is bound by the 
20-year master plan prepared by the NCPO. 
Many pro-democratic parties have contem-
plated amending the Constitution. However, 
this requires absolute consensus, which is al-
most impossible to reach. Potentially, such an 
initiative will clash with the pro-junta faction 
and the judiciary.   
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Turkey
6HUNDQ.|\EDúÕ$VVW3URI– %DKoHúHKLU8QLYHUVLW\,VWDQEXO
TURKEY
I. INTRODUCTION
2018 was another critical year in terms of 
DI¿UPDWLRQRIWKHVXSUHPDF\RIWKH&RQVWL-
tution in Turkey. Although the state of emer-
gency declared after the unsuccessful coup 
in 2016 was lifted in mid-year, the country 
has not witnessed a normalization process 
since then. Restrictions on human rights and 
freedoms were retained in force by way of a 
law institutionalising and maintaining them 
that had been approved just before the state 
of emergency ended and prevented ongoing 
violations from being eliminated. The Con-
stitutional Court (“the Court”), which left 
citizens alone in front of an unlimited and 
uncontrolled executive organ after the coup, 
tried to regain its position as a guardian of 
democracy through various individual appli-
cation judgments in 2018. But when the judg-
es of trial courts backed by the government 
refused to implement its orders to release 
critical journalists, the Court’s reputation 
and supremacy, and the constitutional order 
in general, was damaged irreparably. Under 
these circumstances, the Court once again 
maintained silence last year about some hot 
topic cases and those pending before it for 
years, such as the cases of conscientious 
objectors. Along with the ever-increasing 
intimidation of the Court by the executive 
organ, early general elections organised un-
der the state of emergency and the shift in 
political order from a parliamentary system 
to a Latin American-style presidential sys-
tem were marked as the most important de-
velopments in constitutional law in Turkey. 
The new system gave the President of the 
country vast powers and weakened more and 
more the roles of the legislative and judiciary 
organs.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the most important development 
in constitutional law in Turkey was the 
shift from a parliamentary system to a Lat-
in American-style presidential system. The 
constitutional amendments approved by the 
2017 referendum1 went into effect with the 
early general elections organised on 24 June. 
:LWKWKHVHDPHQGPHQWVQHZGHSXWLHVRIWKH
Turkish Grand National Assembly (the seats 
of which increased to 600) were elected and 
WKH ¿UVW URXQG RI WKH SUHVLGHQWLDO HOHFWLRQ
ZDVKHOG3UHVLGHQW5HFHS7D\\LS(UGR÷DQ
the candidate of his Justice and Develop-
ment Party ($GDOHW YH .DONÕQPD 3DUWLVL),
received crucial support from the right-wing 
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi
Hareket Partisi) by force of the amendments 
on the electoral laws, which were adopted 
just before the elections and which now al-
low alliances between political parties. He 
got more than 50 percent of the votes in the 
¿UVW URXQG7KXV KH UHQHZHG KLVPDQGDWH
rendering a second round unnecessary. In the 
weakened Parliament, the Public’s Alliance 
(&XPKXUøWWLIDNÕ), which was formed by the 
above-mentioned parties, obtained a majori-
ty but fell short of the majority required for 
a constitutional amendment. Right after the 
DQQRXQFHPHQW RI WKH UHVXOWV0U (UGR÷DQ
who became the embodiment of the entire 
executive branch of the State as the Pres-
ident, started to issue presidential decrees 
to implement the newly established system. 
1;OLYLZ\S[ZVM[OPZYLMLYLUK\THYLZ[PSSKPZW\[LK6ɉJPHSS `@LZWYL]HPSLKV]LY5VI`SLZZ[OHUTPSSPVU
]V[LZI\[[OLTHPUVWWVZP[PVUWHY[`SLHKLY2LTHS2ÛSÛsKHYVȘS\HUUV\UJLK[OYLLTVU[OZHM[LY[OLYLMLYLUK\T
that according to the real results, No won with 51.2%.
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%\WKH¿UVWGHFUHHRQ-XO\WKH2I¿FHRI
the President was organised. According to 
this decree, the President is the head of the 
State, and the power of execution belongs 
only to him/her. Sixteen ministries are es-
tablished under the presidency. The minis-
ters are appointed and can be removed from 
RI¿FH RQO\ E\ WKH 3UHVLGHQW WKH\ DUH QRW
accountable before the Parliament and no 
longer form a Council of Ministers as they 
did in the old system. 
In this new presidential system, the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly not only lost its 
previous constitutional powers but also its 
psychological superiority stemming from 
the leadership role it played in the Indepen-
GHQFH:DULQWKHHDUO\V$FFRUGLQJWR
mecliste.org2, only 323 of a total of 1,116 
questions asked by the deputies have been 
answered in time by the ministers.3 Con-
sidering that this is the only method left by 
which the Parliament can control the execu-
tive branch’s policies, it is possible to state 
that the checks and balances system does not 
function anymore. 
:LWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKLV³ODFNRIEDODQFH´
in the system, one should also consider the 
weakening impact of the Turkish Constitu-
tional Court, which continues to allow the 
misuse and abuse of power by the execu-
tive organ, especially since the failed coup. 
:LWK LWV SDQHO HQWLUHO\ FRPSRVHG RI PHQ
most of whom appointed by virtue of their 
connection to the Justice and Development 
3DUW\ DQG (UGR÷DQ4, the Court is now re-
served to annulling laws relating to the 
main policies of the Government. Although 
some judgments on individual complaints 
are welcomed by Turkish society and the 
constitutional law community, the Court 
is no longer considered a stronghold of de-
mocracy in Turkey. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
0HKPHW$OWDQDQGùDKLQ$OSD\Release of 
two journalists
At the beginning of 2018, the Court ordered 
the release of two journalists, Mehmet Altan 
DQGùDKLQ$OSD\7KHIRUPHUZURWHFROXPQV
for the newspaper Star, and the latter for 
Zaman.5,6 They argued that their pre-trial de-
tention for over a year was in contravention 
of their constitutional rights; that they were 
QRWDEOHWREHQH¿WIURPWKHJXDUDQWHHVRID
fair trial; and that the essence of the charges 
against them actually related to their journal-
istic activities. 
In these individual applications, the Court 
found that the right to personal liberty and 
security and the freedom of expression and 
press was violated and ordered the trial 
courts to remedy the violations. It was wide-
ly believed within the Turkish community 
that the case would set a legal precedent for 
the arrested and imprisoned journalists in 
Turkey. PEN International, which monitored 
the proceedings and intervened in the jour-
nalists’ cases before the European Court of 
Human Rights, welcomed the decision7 and 
the lawyers of the applicants sought their im-
mediate release from prison. However, low-
er courts refused to comply with the Court 
judgment and, by alleging that the Court 
acted ultra vires, claimed that they were not 
bound by these decisions and refused to re-
lease Mr. Altan and Mr. Alpay. Such attitude 
by the trial courts has been rightfully de-
scribed as a challenge to the authority of the 
Constitution, a revolt against constitutional-
ism and, most importantly, the start of a new 
phase of decay for the Turkish Constitutional 
Court.8 At the time, the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe alluded in one of his 
speeches9 that the Government prevented the 
lower courts from releasing the journalists 
and expressed his concerns about the rule of 
law with regard to the noncompliance with 
the decisions of the Court. Freedom House 
also made a statement, pointing at Govern-
PHQW RI¿FLDOV DFWLQJ RXWVLGH WKH ODZ ZLWK
absolute impunity as the real force behind 
the empowerment of the lower courts to 
contradict the highest court in the country.10
After the rejection by the lower courts, the 
lawyers of the journalists applied once again 
to the Court and demanded a judgment that 
imposed the applicants’ immediate release. 
Despite its earlier ruling, the Court rejected 
this application, stating that such a request 
could only be approved in the case of a seri-
ous threat to life or material and moral integ-
rity. Subsequently, Mr. Alpay’s lawyer made 
a second individual application, arguing the 
violation of the right to personal liberty and 
security due to the lower courts’ refusal to 
release his client. In this second application, 
the Court ruled on the violation of the alleged 
right due to the failure to redress the previ-
ously found violation and ordered the trial 
court to release Mr. Alpay, reminding it of its 
supremacy over the lower courts. Following 
the publishing of the reasoned judgment, Mr. 
Alpay was released in March. Mehmet Altan 
had to wait until June to be released. 
2 A non-governmental organization monitoring parliamentary activity.
3ºIPUkULYNLUPU:YLZPUKL@HUÛ[SHUKÛ»#O[[W!TLJSPZ[LVYNTLJSPZ[LVYNKHUIPUVULYNLUPU\Z\YLZPUKL`HUP[SHUKP%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
4 Can Yavuz, ‘Yeni Türkiye’nin Anayasa Mahkemesi’ [2018] Güncel Hukuk 173.
5>OPJO^HZJVUZPKLYLK[VIL[OL.SLUTV]LTLU[»ZÅHNZOPWUL^ZWHWLYUV^JSVZLK
66UJLHUHSS`VM,YKVȘHU[OLUSHILSLKHZH[LYYVYPZ[NYV\WI`OPTHUKHSSLNLKS`ILOPUK[OLMHPSLKJV\WPU
7 ‘PEN International welcomes Constitutional Court decision regarding Alpay and Altan’ < http://www.pen-international.org/newsitems/pen-international-wel-
JVTLZJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSJV\Y[KLJPZPVUYLNHYKPUNHSWH`HUKHS[HU%HJJLZZLK 
8)HȴHRhHSÛº>PSS3LNHSPZT)L[OL,UKVM*VUZ[P[\[PVUHSPZTPU;\YRL`&»]LYMHZZ\UNZISVNKL 22 January 2018) < https://verfassungsblog.de/will-legal-
PZTIL[OLLUKVMJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSPZTPU[\YRL`%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
9 Speech to the candidate judges and prosecutors of the Justice Academy, 16 February 2018, Ankara. 
10 ‘Turkey: Obey Constitutional Court Ruling to Release Imprisoned Journalists’ < https://freedomhouse.org/article/turkey-obey-constitutional-court-ruling-release-im-
WYPZVULKQV\YUHSPZ[Z
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 8PXW .ÕOÕo First Individual Application 
Judgment regarding Insulting the President
7KH ¿UVW MXGJPHQW RI WKH &RXUW RQ$UWLFOH
299 of the Turkish Penal Code, which crim-
inalizes insulting the President, was adjudi-
FDWHG LQ  8PXW .ÕOÕo DFFXVHG KLV LQ-
terviewers to be elected as a judge of being 
politically biased, yelling at them: “thief, 
PXUGHUHU(UGR÷DQ´+HZDVVHQWHQFHGWRRQH
year and six months in prison and the court 
decided to defer the announcement of the 
YHUGLFW:KLOH¿QGLQJXQDQLPRXVO\WKDWWKH
application was manifestly ill-founded, the 
Court ignored not only the European Court 
of Human Rights’ jurisprudence on Article 
299 but also its own jurisprudence set in the 
%HNLU&RúNXQ FDVH UHJDUGLQJ WKHGHIHUHQFH
of the announcement of a verdict concerning 
freedom of expression cases. 
3. Gay soldier: Dismissal from Army is con-
stitutional
A gay soldier’s dismissal from the army was 
referred to the Court by judicial reference. 
The military court’s judge argued that the 
article of the Military Penal Code permitting 
the dismissal of soldiers who practice, even 
in their private lives, “unnatural intimacy”, 
violated the right to equality and respect to 
private life. The Court rejected the argument, 
stating that the purpose of the Military Penal 
Code is to protect military discipline and the 
continuity of public service. In this regard, 
taking into consideration the fact that the pun-
ishment was nothing more than a dismissal, 
the Court expressed that the legislative organ 
had the discretion to establish stricter rules 
for soldiers than for civilians. Therefore, 
the Court rejected the request and upheld 
the provision. However, the Vice-President 
RI WKH &RXUW +RQ (QJLQ<ÕOGÕUÕPZURWH D
well-grounded dissenting opinion in which 
KHDUJXHGWKDW WKHUHDUHQRVFLHQWL¿FFULWHULD
to describe whether a relationship is natural 
and that dismissal on the ground of being gay 
without any proof of hindering military disci-
pline violated the right to private life because 
it was neither proportional nor necessary in a 
democratic society. 
4. Sex tapes of a soldier: Dismissal from 
Army is unconstitutional
In the course of a raid in his home within 
an investigation regarding military espio-
QDJH FHUWDLQYLGHRVRI(UGDO3HNWDú D VHU-
geant serving in the Turkish Army, having 
sexual intercourse with women were found 
on external hard drives. After an inquiry, Mr. 
3HNWDú ZDV GLVPLVVHG IURP WKH DUP\ GXH
to his immoral behaviour, which allegedly 
damaged the image of the Turkish Military 
)RUFHV +H ¿OHG D ODZVXLW DJDLQVW WKLV DG-
ministrative act; however, the Military High 
Administrative Court ruled that recording 
sexual intercourse with women constituted 
DYLRODWLRQRIPRUDO FRGHV DQG0U3HNWDú
had to account for the publicisation of the 
said videos. The Court decided that in cases 
regarding intimacy and sexual life, the mar-
JLQ RI DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI SXEOLF RI¿FHUV ZDV
narrower. Besides, the tapes were seized in 
a raid in which the applicant was a victim; 
therefore, the publicisation of the videos was 
not his fault. The Court concluded that the 
right to respect of private life was violated.
5. Gezi protests: Violation of freedom of 
assembly
The Court found in two cases11 related to 
the Gezi Park Protests of 2013 that the 
freedom of assembly was violated, stating 
that patience and tolerance by the State to 
peaceful demonstrations not threatening the 
public order was necessary in a democratic 
society. In the Özgürengin case, the Court 
also found a violation of the prohibition of 
ill treatment due to the continued beating of 
WKHDSSOLFDQWE\DSROLFHRI¿FHU+RZHYHULQ
two other cases,12 although the applications 
were found admissible, the Court rejected 
the applications, saying that the decisions of 
the authorities to arrest the applicants were 
MXVWL¿HG DQG QHFHVVDU\ DQG WKH DFWV RI WKH
SROLFHRI¿FHUVZHUHSURSRUWLRQDODQGGLGQRW
reach the threshold of ill treatment. 
6. Rejection of prayer in Hagia Sofia: No 
violation
The applicant association13 requested the 
RSHQLQJRI+DJLD6R¿D IRURQHGD\ IRU WKH
practice of Islamic prayer (namaz), but this 
request was rejected by public authorities. 
7KH\ ¿OHG D ODZVXLW DJDLQVW WKLV GHFLVLRQ
which they lost. Subsequently, the associ-
ation applied to the Court, arguing that its 
freedom of religion was violated. The Court 
announced that the rejection by the public 
DXWKRULWLHV WR RSHQ +DJLD 6R¿D IRU SUD\HU
was of no concern to the legal personality of 
the association and declared the application 
inadmissible ratione personae.
7. Rejection of the request to hold his own 
Quran in prison: Violation of freedom of 
conscience and religion
Ahmet Sil, who was imprisoned on charges 
of being part of the failed coup, requested to 
keep his own Quran copy in his cell, but this 
was rejected by the prison administration 
due to a general ban for members of terrorist 
organizations receiving books sent by their 
families and delivered by cargo companies. 
7KHPDLQ MXVWL¿FDWLRQ IRU VXFK D EDQ LV WR
prevent prisoners from communicating with 
others with the help of certain secret cyphers 
KLGGHQ LQ WKH ERRNV 7KH DSSOLFDQW ¿OHG D
lawsuit against this decision, but the Court 
of First Instance rejected the case, conclud-
ing that another copy of the Quran could be 
obtained from the prison library. The Court 
handled this case within the context of the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
and in light of the freedom of expression. 
The Government sent various printouts of 
the online chatting application “ByLock”  to 
prove that Mr. Sil was a terrorist. The Court 
ruled that on the basis of lack of evidence, 
the Government failed to prove that the chat 
11(SP6YHRǦYMHU.SHUKkaNLkaNYLUNPUJHZLZ
124LOTL[4\[S\HUK@VUJH=LYKPVȘS\ǸÛRJHZLZ
13 :YLRSP=HRÛÅHY;HYPOP,ZLYSLYL]LhL]YL`L/PaTL[+LYULȘP
14 A smartphone application, which is believed to be used only by members of FETÖ, the terror organization which committed the coup. 
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belonged to Mr. Sil and a general ban on 
permanently holding a Quran in the cell 
without any objective criteria violated the 
freedom of religion. 
8. Conviction of the leader of the main 
opposition party: Violation of freedom of 
expression
.HPDO .ÕOÕoGDUR÷OX WKH OHDGHU RI WKH 5H-
publican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi), alleged without giving names that 
certain members of the Kayseri municipali-
ty staff received bribes. He was convicted to 
pay non-pecuniary damages in seven differ-
ent cases, and the Court of Cassation upheld 
WKHVH GHFLVLRQV0U.ÕOÕoGDUR÷OX DSSOLHG WR
the Court, claiming that his freedom of ex-
pression was violated. The Court endorsed the 
DSSOLFDWLRQRQWKHJURXQGVWKDWSXEOLFRI¿FHUV
should tolerate criticism more than ordinary 
citizens do; that the scrutiny of bribery alle-
gations by the leader of an opposition party is 
QDWXUDOWKDW0U.ÕOÕoGDUR÷OXGLGQRWPHQWLRQ
DQ\QDPHQRUWDUJHWDQ\RQHDQG¿QDOO\WKDW
the lower courts did not consider his speeches 
as a whole, but they handpicked some parts 
of the speeches and found the expressions to 
be “rude”. The Court also stated that, though 
it could be suggested that some of the expres-
sions used by the applicant were outrageous 
and obnoxious, it is a fact that politicians only 
aim to create controversies and produce a 
strong impact in society sometimes and this 
should be tolerated. Therefore, it found a vio-
lation of freedom of expression. 
9. Appointing an administrator by the gov-
ernment to the company: No violation of the 
right to property
Relying on the reports prepared by the Finan-
cial Crimes Investigation Board (0DOL6XoODUÕ
$UDúWÕUPD .XUXOX, “MASAK”) and the se-
curity directorates, the chief prosecutor’s of-
¿FHLQLWLDWHGDFULPLQDO LQYHVWLJDWLRQDJDLQVW
+DPGL$NÕQøSHNRQHRIWKHFRIRXQGHUVRI
.R]DøSHN+ROGLQJ$ùIRUDOOHJHGRIIHQFHV
RIPDQDJLQJ SURSDJDWLQJ DQG ¿QDQFLQJ WKH
terrorist organization FETÖ, and embezzle-
ment. The expert examination revealed cer-
tain fraud and irregularities. The chief pub-
lic prosecutor, stating that the benevolence 
money collected by FETÖ was depicted as 
if it were gained through legitimate business 
activities engaged in by the holding compa-
nies and thereby laundered, requested the ap-
pointment of a trustee to the companies. The 
applicant alleged before the Court that he was 
deprived of the capacity to manage his assets 
because of the appointment of the trustee to 
his companies and that his right to property 
was violated. The Court decided that the mea-
sure of appointing a trustee had a legitimate 
aim and that administrative bodies had dis-
cretion in determining measures to be applied 
when combating organized crime. Taking into 
consideration the particular circumstances of 
the case, the panel ruled that the interference 
was in accordance with the law and neces-
sary; thus there was no violation of the right 
to property. 
10. Postponement of a strike: Violation of the 
right to a union
7KH8QLRQRI8QLWHG0HWDO:RUNHUVDQGWKH
Union of Turkish Metal Manufacturers did 
not reach an agreement during collective 
bargaining negotiations. The applicant union 
called for a strike; however, the Council of 
Ministers decided to postpone the strike on 
the ground of national security concerns. 
The lawsuit against this decision had been 
overruled by the State Council. The Court 
assessed that the Government did not present 
a concrete argument regarding the connec-
tion between the strike and national securi-
ty concerns and stated that for such a post-
SRQHPHQWWREHMXVWL¿HGLWVKRXOGKDYHEHHQ
convincingly demonstrated why and how the 
stay of production in workplaces that went 
on strike affected national security. In the 
Court’s opinion, “economic security” can-
not in itself be a reason to postpone a strike. 
Otherwise, all strikes could be considered as 
a threat to national security, and this would 
interfere with constitutional rights in an un-
necessary and disproportionate manner.
11. The acquittal of a police officer: Violation 
of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. 
Muhterem Turantaylak is the manager of a 
restaurant in Istanbul in which Kurdish folk 
and Turkish protest music plays. Four police 
RI¿FHUVFDPHWRKLVSODFHWRKDYHVRPHWKLQJ
to eat, and as soon as they went in, they or-
dered the music to be changed. The dispute 
between the parties turned into the beating 
and insulting of the applicant by the police 
RI¿FHUV DQG RQH VWDII PHPEHU RXWVLGH WKH
restaurant. The applicant obtained a medi-
cal report showing an injury to his shoulder, 
FDXVHGE\DEORZRIDULÀH¶VHGJHRIRQHRI
WKHRI¿FHUVDJDLQVWZKRPKH¿OHGDVXLW$OO
of the witnesses approved the testimony of 
0U7XUDQD\ODNLQFRXUWEXWWKHRI¿FHUKDG
been acquitted by the magistrates’ court. The 
court ignored not only most of the witness 
testimonies due to their family or business 
relations with the applicant but also the tes-
timony of a customer of the restaurant with-
out any basis, despite taking into account the 
WHVWLPRQLHVRIWKHSROLFHRI¿FHUVZKRWHVWL-
¿HGWKDWWKHLUFRZRUNHUGLGQRWEHDWWKHDS-
plicant. Consequently, the magistrates’ court 
considered the injury to be a simple trace 
FDXVHGRQO\E\WKHSROLFHRI¿FHU¶VKROGLQJRI
the applicant’s shoulder. The Court criticised 
the differential treatment of the weight given 
to witness testimonies and the application of 
surpassing self-defense limits without any 
discussion. Finally, the Court ruled on the 
violation of the substantive and procedural 
limb of the prohibition of inhuman and de-
grading treatment.
12. Sara Akgül case: A U-turn from the veil 
in universities jurisprudence
Sara Akgül was a student who wore a head-
VFDUI DW %R÷D]LoL 8QLYHUVLW\ DQG KDG UH-
ceived a scholarship from the Ministry of 
1DWLRQDO(GXFDWLRQ:KHQVKHZDVDVHQLRU
she was not able to continue attending her 
classes because of the headscarf ban in uni-
versities at that time, and consequently, she 
was expelled due to her absenteeism. By 
virtue of a pardon imposed by law, she was 
registered again in her faculty and graduat-
ed in 2012. But then, the Ministry required 
the reimbursement of the amount paid under 
the scholarship due to her dismissal from the 
university. After certain legal proceedings 
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that were of no consequence, she applied 
to the Court. The Court, which annulled in 
1989 the law permitting female students to 
cover their heads on religious grounds; made 
an interpretation of the renewed law in the 
same direction in 1991; and decided in 2008 
that students with headscarfs would harm 
“the secular atmosphere” in the universities 
by referring to the secular state principle, 
concluded in this case that the ban on veils in 
universities had no legal basis, and therefore 
the applicant’s right to express her religious 
belief and to education was violated.
13. Annulment of certain provisions of the 
rules of procedure of the Turkish Grand Na-
tional Assembly 
The Court annulled some amendments to the 
rules of procedures of the Parliament which 
were aimed at limiting deputies’ legislation 
prerogatives. One of the amendments ob-
structed the discussion in the General As-
sembly of the legislative proposals coming 
from the Members of Parliament (MP) who 
did not belong to any of the parliamenta-
ry groups; in other words, who were inde-
pendent or members of a party without a 
group. The Court declared that regardless of 
being a member of a political party group, 
all MPs are entitled to submit a legislative 
proposal and found, therefore, the impugned 
provision incompatible with the principle 
of a democratic state. Another amendment 
set forth that one-third of a month’s appro-
priation and travel expense of an MP who 
receives a reprimand and two-thirds of a 
month’s appropriation and travel expense of 
an MP temporarily suspended from the Par-
liament shall be deducted. The Court, due to 
the ambiguous nature of the reason for the 
deductions, which it considered “expres-
sions that are contrary to the administrative 
structure of the Republic of Turkey as it is 
set forth in the Constitution under the prin-
ciple of indivisible integrity with its territo-
ry and nation”, reasoned that the opponent 
MPs could face the risk of being punished 
and silenced by the majority by an abuse of 
this ambiguous, abstract and unpredictable 
provision. Therefore, the judges decided that 
this provision was, inter alia, incompati-
ble with the principle of a democratic state 
and the deputies’ freedom of expression and 
privilege to perform legislative tasks. 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
The major challenge faced by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court under the new political 
system is going to be the struggle not to lose 
its reputation and authority altogether within 
the judiciary. The rejection of the execution 
of its judgments by the lower courts created 
a psychological breakdown among the com-
munity of jurists. A majority of the judges 
of the country’s highest court are loyal to 
the executive organ and abstain from ruling 
DJDLQVW3UHVLGHQW(UGR÷DQ¶VZLOO:KLOHWKLV
timidity protects the Court from the Govern-
ment’s criticism, it also attacks and hinders 
the checks and balances mechanism, which 
has long been weak. As long as the Court 
does not show any intention to judge inde-
pendently, impartially and with the purpose 
of restraining the executive power as due, 
rights and freedoms will become ever more 
weak and unprotected in the face of the ex-
ecutive organ and its continuing violations. 
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Ukraine
Alina Cherviatsova, Associate Professor, V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University
UKRAINE
I. INTRODUCTION
Ukraine is stable in its political instabili-
ty. The year 2018 was another year of po-
litical turbulence with three main compo-
nents: Russian (Russia’s ongoing hybrid 
war against Ukraine), European (European 
integration and the implementation of the 
Association Agreement), and Ukrainian (in-
ternal reforms, namely the shadow of 2019 
presidential and parliamentarian elections).
The ongoing war in and around Ukraine’s 
Donetsk and Lugansk regions, fomented and 
perpetuated by Russia, has never wholly end-
HGGHVSLWHQXPHURXVFHDVH¿UHDWWHPSWV$O-
though through the year the Russia-Ukraine 
FRQÀLFWUHPDLQHGSUHGRPLQDQWO\IUR]HQWKH
Kerch Straight confrontation threatened to 
turn it into all-out war in November 2018. 
Responding to an act of aggression in the 
Black Sea from Russia’s side, Ukraine’s 
government introduced martial law across 
ten regions on the Russia-Ukraine border.
In 2018, the Euro-Atlantic discourse of 
Ukraine’s foreign policy got an additional 
push through the process of constitution-
al amendments to proclaim ‘the European 
identity of the Ukrainian people and the ir-
reversibility of the European and Euro-At-
lantic course of Ukraine’.1 At the same time, 
the year witnessed tensions between Ukraine 
DQGLWV:HVWHUQQHLJKERUVDVLWVDWWHPSWVWR
shape Ukrainian identity through language 
and memory policy provoked a negative re-
action from Poland and Hungary.2 This trend 
seems to be long term and damaging for 
Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspi-
rations.3 Finally, the presidential and parlia-
mentary elections, scheduled for March and 
2FWREHULQÀXHQFHG8NUDLQLDQSROLWLFDO
events and rhetoric of 2018. 
This report provides a summary of the ma-
jor constitutional developments in Ukraine 
in the context of Russia’s hybrid war in the 
Donetsk and Lugansk regions, Ukraine’s 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration as 
well as its internal reforms. Then, it gives 
a general overview of the judicial practice 
of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (the 
Court)—its decisions and opinions adopted 
in 2018. Finally, it analyses one of the most 
important and controversial opinions of 
the Court regarding the strategic course of 
8NUDLQHWRJDLQIXOOÀHGJHGPHPEHUVKLSLQ
the European Union and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
ZDVPDUNHGE\WKH¿IWKDQQLYHUVDU\RI
the Euromaidan, which stimulated a public 
discussion about the success and failures of 
Ukrainian democracy.4
19LHKTVYLVU<50(5!O[[WZ!^^ ^\UPHUPUMVWVSP[PJZJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSHTLUKTLU[ZJVUÄYTPUN\R-
raine-s-path-toward-eu-nato-enter-into-force.html
2 See, for instance: Cherviatsova A., ‘Gravity of the Past: Polish-Ukrainian Memory War and Freedom of 
Speech’, in ,103!;HSRhttps://www.ejiltalk.org/gravity-of-the-past-polish-ukrainian-memory-war-and-freedom-
of-speech/
3 ‘Ukrainian Foreign Policy: Results of 2018 and Prospects for 2019’, International Center for Policy Studies 
http://www.icps.com.ua/en/studies-icps/foreign-policy/ukrainian-foreign-policy-results-of-2018-and-pros-
pects-for-2019/
4 Cherviatsova A., ‘Lessons Learned? Fifth Anniversary of Euromaidan’, in =LYMHZZ\UNZISVN 05/12/18 avail-
HISLH[!O[[WZ!]LYMHZZ\UNZISVNKLSLZZVUZSLHYULKÄM[OHUUP]LYZHY`VML\YVTHPKHU
JVTTLU[Z
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The civil uprising, which sparked in Novem-
ber 2013, loudly called for immediate demo-
cratic reforms, demanding adherence to civil 
rights (primarily freedom of speech, peaceful 
assembly, fair trial, democratic elections), 
clearing the government of corruption, and 
signing the Association Agreement with the 
European Union. Out of all these demands, 
only the last one regarding European inte-
JUDWLRQZDVFRPSOHWHO\IXO¿OOHG2QWKHRWK-
er hand, the democratic reforms were not as 
successful. In 2018, Ukraine was still among 
the countries with widespread corruption. It 
DOVRTXDOL¿HGDVD µSDUWO\ IUHH¶ VWDWHZLWKD
‘transitional government or hybrid regime’. 
According to the Corruption Perception In-
dex of Transparency International, for in-
stance, Ukraine moved from 144 in 2013 
(with a score of 25 out of 100) to 120 (with a 
score of 32) in 2018.5  
The Freedom House Report of 2018 states 
that, despite Ukraine’s struggle with imple-
menting anti-corruption reforms under the 
strategy approved after the 2014 Revolution 
of Dignity (the country had established sev-
eral anticorruption institutions and had set 
up new mechanisms, including online pub-
lications of public-servant asset declarations 
and ensuring transparent public procure-
ments), it has had ‘little impact on citizens’ 
lives’; public perceptions of corruption re-
mains high (85 percent see no improvement 
in this sphere).
As for freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press, Ukrainian media remain under the 
control of Ukrainian oligarchs. In addition, 
restrictions to the freedom of speech were 
recently introduced under the guise of com-
bating Russian propaganda. Nevertheless, 
according to the Freedom House Report, 
Ukraine has a better score in 2018 than it had 
in 2013 (4,86 in 2013 against 4,64 in 2018, 
whereby 1 is most democratic and 7 is least 
democratic).6
The beginning of 2018 witnessed fundamen-
tal shifts in Ukraine’s approaches towards 
repulsing hostile aggression in Donbas and 
restoring its territorial integrity. On 18 Jan-
uary, Ukraine’s Parliament, the Verkhovna 
Rada, passed the Law ‘On Certain Aspects 
of State Policy on Securing State Sovereign-
ty over the Temporarily Occupied Territories 
of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts’. 
The law—popularly known as the ‘Donbas 
De-Occupation Law’ or the ‘Donbas Rein-
tegration Law’—recognizes parts of the Do-
netsk and Luhansk regions as ‘temporarily 
occupied territories’ and labels Russia an 
‘aggressor state’. It places all military and 
law enforcement activities of Ukraine’s 
forces aimed at repulsing hostile aggres-
sion in Donbas under the control of the top 
command of Ukraine’s Army, a move that 
formally ended the so-called ‘anti-terrorist 
operation’ (ATO) exercised by the State Se-
curity Service (SBU) since April 2014. Thus, 
the law on de-occupation not only optimiz-
es the command structure of the Ukrainian 
forces aimed at ‘refuting and stopping’ Rus-
sian armed aggression in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions but also changes political 
rhetoric: instead of ‘Ukrainian crises’, ‘con-
ÀLFW LQ8NUDLQH¶ µVHSDUDWLVWV¶ µSHRSOHV¶ UH-
publics’, and ‘anti-terrorist operation’, there 
is ‘Russia’s aggression’, ‘Russia’s occupa-
tion’, ‘Russian regular troops, mercenaries, 
and irregulars’, ‘Russia’s occupation admin-
istrations’, and ‘liberation of the temporary 
occupied territories of Ukraine.’ 
In the international context, the law on 
de-occupation (despite not referring to the 
Minsk Agreements) is an instrument to in-
crease pressure on Russia. In the internal 
context, being initiated by Ukrainian Presi-
GHQW3HWUR3RURVKHQNRLW¿WVZHOOKLVSODQWR
use patriotic and anti-Russian sentiments in 
the presidential campaign ahead.
,Q1RYHPEHUIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHGXULQJ
its history of independence and long-lasting 
FRQÀLFW ZLWK 5XVVLD 8NUDLQH H[SHULHQFHG
the introduction of martial law. It was a re-
sponse to Russia’s act of aggression in the 
Black Sea, known as the Kerch Straight cri-
sis, when Russian coast guard patrol boats 
¿UHGDQGFDSWXUHGWKUHH8NUDLQLDQQDYDOYHV-
sels attempting to transit the Kerch Straight 
on their way from Odessa to Mariupol. It 
ZDVDVLJQL¿FDQWHVFDODWLRQLQWKHORQJUXQ-
QLQJ5XVVLD8NUDLQHFRQÀLFWVLQFH5XVVLD¶V
unrecognized annexation of Crimea in Feb-
UXDU\WKLVZDVWKH¿UVWWLPHWKDW5XV-
sian forces had openly engaged Ukrainian 
forces (the seizure of Crimea and military 
involvement in eastern Ukraine were carried 
out by troops without insignia). 
On 26 November 2018, the day after the 
skirmish in the Kerch Strait, Ukraine’s gov-
ernment introduced martial law across ten 
regions on the Russia-Ukraine border and 
along the Black Sea coast for 30 days (un-
til 26 December 2018).7 It should be noted 
that Poroshenko’s original intent was to have 
martial law for 60 days, until the end of Jan-
uary 2019. That would automatically affect 
the presidential election campaign (under 
Ukrainian legislation, martial law excludes 
elections), which would normally start on 31 
December 2018. 
The prospect of having the presidential 
election postponed was not acceptable to 
Ukrainian society or Ukrainian elites. The 
timing of the introduction of martial law 
(just before the beginning of the election 
campaign, when there was not one day of 
PDUWLDO ODZGXULQJDOPRVW¿YH\HDUVRI WKH
5XVVLDQ8NUDLQLDQ FRQÀLFW ZKHQ 8NUDLQH
saw the loss of Crimea and parts of the Do-
netsk and Lugansk regions) and the way it 
was introduced (with a violation of parlia-
mentary procedures that resulted in confu-
sion regarding its effective days) prompted 
sharp criticism of Poroshenko’s decision, 
including an open statement by three former 
Ukrainian presidents.8
One may speculate about the reasons that 
made Poroshenko step back and revise the 
proposed martial law (30 days instead of 
60 days as originally planned), but, if pub-
5 https://www.transparency.org/country/UKR
6 https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2018/ukraine
7 https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0012525-18#n2
8 https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2018/11/26/7199370/ 
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lic opinion is among these reasons, it means 
that the Euromaidan brought Ukraine closer 
to a democratic state. On 26 December 2018, 
martial law was terminated. Ukraine started 
2019 with a presidential campaign. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES 
Although the end of 2017 found the Con-
stitutional Court of Ukraine incomplete and 
internally divided,9 by February 2018, it 
managed to overcome its internal crises and 
moved from the 2017 stalemate. On 21 Feb-
ruary, the Court elected its chairman (Stan-
islav Shevchuk);10 the next day, the Rules 
of Procedures of the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine were adopted. On 27 February, the 
President of Ukraine appointed two judges 
(Serhiy Golovaty)11 and (Vasyl Lemak).12 In 
LWVWXUQWR¿OOWKHYDFDQFLHVWKH9HUNKRYQD
Rada of Ukraine appointed two judges to the 
Court (Oleh Pervomaiskyi13 and Iryna Za-
vhorodnia14) on 20 September 2018. 
In 2018, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
adopted 13 decisions15 and delivered four 
opinions.16  
The Court’s decisions of 2018 fell into three 
PDLQ FDWHJRULHV L GHFLVLRQV UHJDUGLQJ ¿-
nancial issues and social rights; (ii) decisions 
regarding civil rights; and (iii) decisions re-
garding constitutional order. 
'HFLVLRQVUHJDUGLQJ¿QDQFLDOLVVXHVDQGVR-
cial rights. This category of cases deals with 
laws adopted in 2014 under the pressure of 
economic crises with the aim of cutting the 
state’s social expenses. It includes cases on 
social guarantees for labor veterans and old-
er people (22.05.18); on status and social 
protection of the Chernobyl catastrophe vic-
tims (16.07.18); on the social protection of 
veterans of war and members of their fami-
lies (12.12.18); and on state-sponsored sup-
port for families with children (07.11.18). 
Two cases regarding social protection and 
social guarantees for judges follow a simi-
lar line: on taxation of pensions and month-
ly lifetime maintenance of retired judges 
(27.02.18) and salary and remuneration of 
judges (04.12.18).
It worth noting that in all cases except the 
case on state-sponsored support for families 
with children, the Court declared restrictions 
and cancellations imposed on social rights 
unconstitutional: the Constitution of Ukraine 
grants social rights of veterans, older people, 
and Chernobyl victims, so by limiting these 
rights the state neglects its constitutional 
obligations. Social guarantees for judges 
constitute an integral element of their status. 
Thus, taxation of their pension or reduction 
of their salaries poses a threat to the inde-
pendence of both judges and the judiciary as 
a whole. 
&RQWUDU\ WR WKHVH WKH&RXUW FRQ¿UPHG WKH
constitutionality of the law that restrict-
ed state-sponsored support for families 
with children. Interestingly, reduction of 
childbirth and childcare assistance was in-
troduced by a law with an engaging and 
promising title: the Law of Ukraine ‘On Pre-
vention of Financial Catastrophe and Cre-
ation of Preconditions for Economic Growth 
in Ukraine’. The Court claimed that, since 
state-sponsored support for families with 
children is not enshrined in the Constitution 
of Ukraine but determined by law within the 
state’s social policy, the Verkhovna Rada is 
free to legislate on this issue (establish, mod-
ernize, or renew state assistance; change its 
size and the mechanisms for its calculation, 
etc.). Thus, the imposed restrictions are com-
patible with the Constitution of Ukraine.
The dissenting opinions on the case claimed 
that the Court’s decision contradicts the 
9 Cherviatsova A., ‘Ukraine: The State of Liberal Democracy’, in Albert Richard, Landau David, Faraguna Pietro and Drugda Šimon (eds) .SVIHS
Review of Constitutional Law (Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy, 2018, at 309. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
id=3215613
10 See information about a judge: http://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/stanislav-shevchuk
11 See information about a judge: http://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/serhiy-holovaty
12 See information about a judge: http://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/vasyl-lema
13 See information about a judge: http://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/oleh-pervomaiskyi
14 See information about a judge: http://ccu.gov.ua/en/publikaciya/iryna-zavhorodnia
15 Article 84. Decision of the Court:
‘1. Decision of the Court shall be adopted by:
1) the Grand Chamber upon considering the cases upon constitutional petitions concerning constitutionality of laws of Ukraine, and other legal acts of the 
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, acts of the President of Ukraine, acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, legal acts of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autono-
TV\Z9LW\ISPJVM*YPTLHHZ^LSSHZJVUJLYUPUNVɉJPHSPU[LYWYL[H[PVUVM[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM<RYHPULHZ^LSSHZ\WVUJVUZPKLYPUN[OLJHZLZ\WVUJVUZ[P[\-
tional complaints in the event of relinquishment of jurisdiction by the Senate in the case of constitutional complaint in favor of the Grand Chamber;
2) the Senate upon considering the cases upon constitutional complaints’.
(Law of Ukraine ‘On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’)
16 Article 85. Opinion of the Court:
‘1. An opinion of the Court shall be provided by the Grand Chamber in the cases concerning:
1) conformity to the Constitution of Ukraine of applicable international treaties of Ukraine or of international treaties to be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada 
of Ukraine for its consent to a binding nature thereof;
2) conformity to the Constitution of Ukraine (constitutionality) of the questions to be put to an all-Ukrainian referendum on a popular initiative;
VIZLY]HUJLVM[OLJVUZ[P[\[PVUHSWYVJLK\YLMVYPU]LZ[PNH[PUNHUKJVUZPKLYPUNHJHZLVUYLTV]HSVM[OL7YLZPKLU[VM<RYHPULMYVTVɉJL[OYV\NOPTWLHJO-
ment;
4) conformity of a draft law on amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine to the requirements of Articles 157 and 158 of the Constitution of Ukraine;
5) violation by the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea of the Constitution of Ukraine or laws of Ukraine;
6) conformity of normative legal acts of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to the Constitution of Ukraine and laws of Ukraine.’
(Law of Ukraine ‘On the Constitutional Court of Ukraine’)
322 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
principle of social justice (once proclaimed, 
social guarantees should not be withdrawn; 
the necessity of any reduction should be 
based on economic calculation and proved 
beyond doubt),17 and the principle of legis-
lative predictability (in reducing childbirth 
and childcare assistance, the law did not give 
the families concerned enough time to adjust 
to the new social policy).18 In addition, the 
Court was criticized for ignoring Articles 24 
and 51 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which 
proclaim the obligation of the state to ensure 
legal, material, and moral support and pro-
tection of family, childhood, motherhood, 
and fatherhood. In this interpretation, fami-
lies with children have a constitutional right 
to receive support from the state.19
Decisions regarding civil rights. This cate-
JRU\LQFOXGHV¿YHFDVHVRQWKHFRPSHWHQFH
of the State Criminal-Executive Service to 
investigate crimes committed on the territory 
or in the premises of the Service (25.04.18); 
on right of the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine 
to access personal data and bank informa-
tion contained in the informational systems 
managed by public authorities (11.10.18); 
on appeals of persons declared incapacitat-
ed by the court (11.10.18); on procedures 
of administrative arrest (23.11.18); and on 
procedures of hospitalization of incapacitat-
ed persons to the institutions of psychiatric 
care (20.12.18). In these cases, the Court de-
clared the legal provisions concerned uncon-
stitutional to ensure the right to liberty and 
security, right to a fair trial, and protection of 
personal data (privacy). 
Decisions regarding constitutional order.
In 2018, the Court declared unconstitution-
al two laws important for Ukraine’s con-
stitutional system: the Law of Ukraine ‘On 
the Principles of State Language Policy’ 
(28.02.18) and the Law of Ukraine ‘On All-
Ukrainian Referendum’ (27.04.18). Both 
laws were found unconstitutional based 
on procedural grounds: the Parliament vi-
olated constitutional procedures while 
passing them. It should be noted that these 
FDVHV UHÀHFW RQH RI WKH PDLQ SUREOHPV RI
Ukrainian parliamentarism—disregard of 
the parliamentary rules and procedures by a 
parliamentary majority. This problem is so 
widespread that it creates a real danger for 
legislative collapse, as the constitutionality 
of a big piece of Ukrainian legislation can be 
questioned based on procedural grounds. For 
instance, in 2018, the Parliament violated its 
procedures for adopting the state budget, 
amending the Constitution of Ukraine, and 
approving martial law. 
Several aspects of Ukraine’s constitutional 
order were also analyzed in four opinions of 
the Court regarding the constitutionality of 
the draft laws on amendments to the Con-
stitution of Ukraine (under Articles 157 and 
158 of the Basic Law of Ukraine). Interest-
ingly, two opinions (06.06.18 and 19.06.18) 
dealt with the amendments to Article 80 of 
the Constitution of Ukraine, which regulates 
parliamentary immunity. The question of im-
munity of people’s deputies is permanently 
at the center of heated political debates in 
Ukraine. The promise to abolish immunity 
and ensure responsibility of members of Par-
liament has been used many times in differ-
ent electoral campaigns by different political 
forces and politicians. From time to time, 
this discussion involves the Court: by 2018, 
LW KDG GHOLYHUHG   RSLQLRQV FRQ¿UPLQJ
constitutionality of different drafts aimed 
at limiting or abolishing parliamentary im-
munity. But none of these drafts became a 
law. In the opinions of 2018, the Court re-
peated its position: parliamentary immuni-
ty concerns the legal status of members of 
Parliament but not constitutional rights and 
fundamental freedoms, so it can be limited 
or abolished. At the same time, the Court 
warned Parliament about the political sig-
QL¿FDQFH RI LPPXQLW\ DV LW SURWHFWHG LWV
members against political repressions and 
unlawful interference in their activities; thus, 
according to the Court, immunity is a guar-
antee of democracy. 
Critics of the Court’s position claim that 
without immunity, the Parliament can lose 
its independence, which, in its turn, can neg-
atively affect human rights and freedoms. In 
addition, a controlled Parliament—no matter 
controlled by whom—is a bad representative 
of the people. In this regard, the abolishment 
of immunity threatens Ukraine’s state sover-
eignty and national security. The Court was 
criticized for refusing to consider parliamen-
tary immunity in this context.20
Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine brought 
new perspectives on the question of whether 
the Constitution of Ukraine can be amended 
in principle. It should be noted that according 
to Article 157(2) of the Basic Law, the Con-
stitution of Ukraine shall not be amended in 
conditions of martial law or a state of emer-
JHQF\7KH&RXUW FRQ¿UPHG WKDW VLQFH WKH
decision to introduce martial law or a state of 
emergency under the procedure established 
by Ukrainian legislation was not adopted, 
there were no legal obstacles for amending 
the Constitution. This position gave a reason 
to criticize the Court for ignoring Russia’s 
aggression against Ukraine. From this point 
of view, the Court was obliged to introduce 
a moratorium on any changes to the Consti-
WXWLRQ XQWLO WKH FRQÀLFWZDV VROYHG LQVWHDG
RI FRQ¿UPLQJ WKH FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ RI WKH
amendments to the Basic Law of Ukraine.
This critique was repeated in the decision of 
the Court on amendments to the Constitution 
of Ukraine that proclaimed the ‘irreversibili-
ty’ of its European and Euro-Atlantic course. 
Taking into account that a question regarding 
Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO 
has polarized Ukrainian society, the unusual 
way of introducing amendments to the Con-
stitution (not to the main text but to the Pre-
amble of the Basic Law), and the fact that the 
&RXUW¶VSRVLWLRQWRFRQ¿UPFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\RI
the draft law has been strongly criticized, this 
Court’s opinion deserves special attention.
The Opinion of the Grand Chamber of the 
17 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oleksandr Kasmin
18 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stanislav Shevchuk
19 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Serhii Sas
20 Dissenting Opinion of judge Serhii Sas, Dissenting Opinion of judge Mykola Melnyk, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ihor Slidenko
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Constitutional Court of Ukraine Regarding 
the Strategic Course of the State for Gain-
ing Full-Fledged Membership of Ukraine in 
the European Union and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization: Amendments to the 
Constitution (No. 3-v/2018, 22 November 
2018)
Summary. According to Article 159 of the 
Constitution of Ukraine, a draft law on in-
troducing amendments to the Basic Law is 
a subject of scrutiny by the Constitutional 
&RXUWRI8NUDLQHZKLFKVKRXOGFRQ¿UPLWV
constitutionality in terms of Articles 157 and 
158 of the Constitution. The Constitution of 
Ukraine shall not be amended if the amend-
ments foresee the abolition or restriction of 
human and citizens’ rights and freedoms, or 
if they are oriented towards the liquidation 
of the independence or violation of the ter-
ritorial integrity of Ukraine. It also cannot 
be amended in conditions of martial law or 
a state of emergency.
The draft law under consideration proposed 
WR VXSSOHPHQW SDUDJUDSK ¿YH RI WKH 3UH-
DPEOH ZLWK WKH ZRUGV µDQG FRQ¿UPLQJ WKH
European identity of the Ukrainian people 
and the irreversibility of the European and 
Euro-Atlantic course of Ukraine’ after the 
words ‘civil consent on the land of Ukraine’. 
In addition, it suggested changing Articles 
85, 102, and 116 to empower the Verkhov-
na Rada, the President of Ukraine, and the 
Cabinet of Ministry of Ukraine to implement 
the course on European and Euro-Atlantic 
LQWHJUDWLRQDQGDFTXLUHIXOOÀHGJHGPHPEHU-
ship of Ukraine in the European Union and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 
Court concluded that the draft law complied 
with Articles 157 and 158, thus the proposed 
amendments were constitutional. This posi-
tion was criticized for being too simplistic 
and formal. 
Critique. Dissenting opinions. The main 
concern of the critics was the Court’s re-
fusal to analyze the fact that the draft law 
amended the Preamble of the Constitution 
of Ukraine (to proclaim ‘the irreversibility 
of the European and Euro-Atlantic course of 
Ukraine’). The Court did not take into con-
sideration that in amending the Preamble, 
the Parliament circumvented constitutional 
procedures and avoided a referendum.21
The dissenting opinions raised several ques-
tions in this regard: (i) whether the Pream-
ble can be amended in principle, and, if yes, 
ZKDWLVWKHSURFHGXUHWREHIROORZHG"LLLV
the Preamble the right part of the Constitu-
tion for this type of amendment (taking into 
account the structure and content of the Ba-
VLF/DZRI8NUDLQH"DQG LLL FDQ WKH3DU-
liament proclaim Ukraine’s strategic course 
ZLWKRXWDUHIHUHQGXP"
The dissenting opinions demonstrated differ-
HQWDSSURDFKHVWRZDUGWKH¿UVWTXHVWLRQWKH
fact that the Constitution of Ukraine does not 
regulate the procedure of amending the Pre-
amble brought the judges to different conclu-
sions. Judge Oleksandr Kasminin claimed 
that the Preamble cannot be changed; oth-
erwise, the Constitution would foresee a 
special procedure for this. Judge Mykola 
Melnyk assumed that although there were no 
formal prohibitions to amend the Preamble, 
these changes contradicted the ‘spirit’ of the 
%DVLF/DZRI8NUDLQH7KH3UHDPEOHUHÀHFWV
the historical and political conditions, val-
ues, aims, and reasons behind the constitu-
WLRQDOSURFHVV,W¿[HVWKHKLVWRULFDOPRPHQW
Hence, any attempt to amend the Preamble 
distorts this historical moment and breaks 
the logic of the constitutional process. Judge 
Mykhailo Hultai admitted the Parliament’s 
right to amend the Preamble but only after 
the Court’s interpretation of constitutional 
procedure. According to him, the Court’s 
opinion on the merits of the draft law was 
SUHPDWXUH,QWKH¿UVWVWHSWKH&RXUWKDGWR
provide the Parliament with instructions on 
how to amend the Preamble and then deliv-
er its opinion on the constitutionality of the 
proposed amendments.
Regarding the second question, the critics 
of the Court’s position emphasized that the 
course on European and Euro-Atlantic inte-
gration is a matter of Ukraine’s civilization 
choice and as such should be regulated by 
Chapter I ‘General Principles’ of the Con-
stitution of Ukraine. Thus, to proclaim this 
course the ‘General Principles’ should be 
amended. Instead, the Parliament has cre-
ated a dangerous precedent of regulating 
fundamental issues outside Chapter I of the 
Constitution, going around constitution-
al procedures.22 In addition, the fact that 
Ukraine’s strategic course is proclaimed in 
the Preamble, instead of Chapter I, does not 
guarantee ‘irreversibility’ of this course, as 
a new majority of the Parliament can easily 
change it by introducing another portion of 
amendments to the Preamble. 
Finally, the Court was criticized for allow-
ing the Parliament to decide the fundamental 
question on the priorities of Ukraine’s for-
eign policy without a referendum.23 From 
this point of view, the Court’s position con-
tradicted the constitutional principle of peo-
ple’s sovereignty.24 In addition, the amend-
ments to the Preamble created an internal 
dissonance between its provisions. The prob-
lem here is that the Preamble refers to the 
Act of Independence of Ukraine declared on 
24 August 1991 and approved by the nation-
al vote on 1 December 1991. It was adopted 
to implement the Declaration of State Sover-
eignty of Ukraine, declared on 16 July 1990. 
Thus, the Declaration of State Sovereignty is 
21 It should be noted that the Constitution of Ukraine foresees a special procedure for amending Chapter I ‘General Principles’, Chapter III ‘Elections. Referendum’, and 
Chapter XIII ‘Introducing Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’, which includes approval of the changes by an All-Ukrainian referendum
22 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Mykola Melnyk
23 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oleksandr Kasminin. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oleksandr Lytvynov. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Oleksandr Tupytskiy 
24 Article 5 of the Constitution of Ukraine reads:
‘Ukraine is a republic. 
The people are the bearers of sovereignty and the only source of power in Ukraine. The people exercise power directly and through bodies of State power and bodies 
of local self-government. The right to determine and change the constitutional order in Ukraine belongs exclusively to the people and shall not be usurped by the State, 
P[ZIVKPLZVYVɉJPHSZ5VVULZOHSS\Z\YWZ[H[LWV^LY»
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enshrined in the Constitution. Moreover, in 
December 1991, citizens voting for the Act 
of Independence approved the Declaration 
of State Sovereignty, including its provision 
about Ukraine’s ‘intention of becoming a 
permanently neutral state that does not par-
ticipate in military blocs’. The recent amend-
ments to the Preamble mean that Ukraine’s 
strategic course should be fundamentally 
changed. These changes can be constitution-
al only if they are approved by referendum.25
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
2019 is expected to be another year of po-
litical instability, with two elections on the 
political agenda—the presidential contest at 
the end of March and the parliamentary vote 
in autumn. Considering the high level of in-
ternal political polarization, Ukraine could 
IDFH VLJQL¿FDQW SROLWLFDO WXUEXOHQFH RQ WKH
domestic front.
There is a concern that incidents such as the 
Kerch Strait crisis could happen again. The 
FRQÀLFW UHÀHFWV 5XVVLD¶V DWWHPSWV QRW RQO\
to legitimize ‘territorial waters annexation’ 
by actions around the annexed Crimean Pen-
insula but also to control the Sea of Azov 
and destabilize the work of the Ukrainian 
ports Mariupol and Berdyansk, for which 
the Kerch Strait is the only means of ac-
cess to the Black Sea (and hence the world’s 
oceans).
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I. INTRODUCTION
How to review the year 2018 in the United 
.LQJGRP"'XHWR%UH[LWLHWKHSURFHVVWR
withdraw the UK from the European Union, 
triggered by a referendum on 23 June 2016), 
achieving a summary comprehensible to a 
global audience while remaining acceptable 
to all UK lawyers (as well as politicians, cit-
izens, and EU lawyers) is surely a nigh im-
possible task. This report has been written 
with two certainties in mind: that we must 
nevertheless provide a useful account of 
Brexit; and that, despite Brexit sucking up 
much oxygen, we must also discuss other 
important constitutional matters. Brexit, and 
the other matters discussed in this report—
spanning the failure to form a government in 
Northern Ireland, same-sex marriage, direct 
discrimination, and mass surveillance—to-
gether provide a partial and impressionistic 
snapshot of the sheer complexity of the UK’s 
constitutional and territorial arrangements in 
the year 2018 during a period of intense and 
multi-level change. No doubt, many other is-
sues could also have been covered.
For any non-UK reader to delve into this 
report, a range of key features of the UK 
constitutional order must be borne in mind: 
the UK has an unentrenched constitution, 
the bedrock principle of which is the su-
premacy of Parliament, which means courts 
are not empowered to invalidate legislation 
IRU XQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\7KH8. UDWL¿HG WKH
European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) in 1951 and acceded to the full ju-
risdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in 1966 (which can de-
clare laws and State acts to be in breach of 
the ECHR). The UK joined the EU in 1973 
(thereby accepting the jurisdiction of the 
EU’s Court of Justice). 1998 began a pro-
cess of devolving power to three of the UK’s 
constituent nations (Scotland, Northern Ire-
ODQG DQG:DOHV WKURXJK HVWDEOLVKPHQW RI
national parliaments. In Northern Ireland, 
this was made possible by the Good Friday 
Agreement, an international peace treaty 
WKDW HQGHG DGHFDGHVORQJ FRQÀLFW EHWZHHQ
the nationalist and unionist communities (the 
former seeking union with Ireland; the latter 
wishing to remain in the UK) and established 
a consociational ‘power-sharing’ system in 
which both communities must be represent-
ed in government.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL  
DEVELOPMENTS
This section focuses on two major constitu-
tional developments: Brexit; and the ongo-
ing failure to form a government in Northern 
Ireland.
Brexit: a pressing challenge for the West-
minster Parliament
Throughout 2018, the UK Parliament wres-
tled with Brexit. Three principal constitu-
tional issues stood out, each highlighting 
the pressing challenges posed for a national 
legislature dealing with a multi-layered con-
VWLWXWLRQDO FULVLV LQ WKH WZHQW\¿UVW FHQWXU\
First, Parliament struggled to get a grip on 
the Government’s negotiations with the EU, 
which under the terms of the UK constitution 
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(and despite the UK Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Miller1 in 2017, discussed in the 2016 
Report) are conducted under the Crown’s 
prerogative power with little bespoke par-
liamentary oversight. Second, Parliament 
enacted legislation, most notably the EU 
:LWKGUDZDO$FWGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGH
legal certainty for all post-exit day outcomes. 
Third, Parliament attempted to constrain the 
Government’s ability to use delegated or 
secondary legislation to prepare for Brexit. 
Dealing with each of these issues has been 
PDGHPRUHGLI¿FXOWE\WKHQHHGWRDGDSWWR
the political dynamic created by a minori-
ty Government (the 2017 General Election 
gave the Conservative Party 317 seats out of 
650 in the Commons). This, combined with 
the task of delivering a referendum result 
that did not itself specify how the UK should 
leave the EU, made 2018 extremely chal-
lenging for a Parliament more used to being 
reactive than proactive in terms of resolving 
constitutional dilemmas.
The knottiest constitutional question for Par-
liament was to determine the role that the 
House of Commons (lower house) would play 
in approving the Brexit deal once the negoti-
ations were concluded: the so-called ‘mean-
ingful vote’. The idea that the vote should 
be meaningful arose from the Government’s 
opening offer: the Commons would be able 
to choose between ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’ (i.e., 
exiting the EU with or without a negotiated 
settlement). For many MPs, this choice was 
not meaningful. Instead, many MPs wanted 
the Commons to be able to say what should 
happen if and when the deal was rejected.
Matters were further complicated by the 
nature of Article 50 of the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union (TEU), which governs the exit 
process, with the result that the deal was in 
fact two distinct agreements: a detailed and 
comprehensive legally binding agreement 
RQWKHWHUPVRIZLWKGUDZDOWKH:LWKGUDZDO
Agreement) and a set of basic propositions 
for the future relationship (the Political Dec-
laration). The Government maintained that 
the two were a package to be approved to-
gether despite their distinct constitutional ef-
fects. In June 2018, a compromise between 
the Government and Parliament was agreed 
to regarding the structure of the meaningful 
vote. The deal would need to be approved 
via a resolution of the Commons before be-
LQJUDWL¿HG,IWKHGHDOZDVUHMHFWHGWKH*RY-
ernment would have to present its plan on 
how it intended to respond to the Commons. 
The problem was that this mechanism did 
not alter the fact that the UK would leave the 
EU via Article 50, a legal provision, which 
the UK’s sovereign Parliament could not 
change. In sum, a rejection or amendment to 
the plan would not change the fundamental 
nature of the choice on offer: leave with or 
without a deal.
:KHQWKH¿QDOYHUVLRQRIWKHGHDOZDVSXE-
lished and presented to the Commons, the 
constitutional mechanics of the meaningful 
vote were put to the test. It became obvious 
from the moment it was published that MPs 
were not interested in negotiating changes 
to the non-binding Political Declaration, but 
rather, intent on rejecting the deal outright. 
The vote, scheduled to take place on 12 De-
cember 2018, was cancelled at the last minute 
by the Government, which hoped to gain an 
advantage through control of the timetable. 
The gambit was unsuccessful: on 15 January 
2019, the deal was overwhelmingly rejected 
by 418 votes to 218. Two weeks later, MPs 
voted on the Government’s response, and 
passed two amendments, which highlighted 
the limits of the Commons’ constitutional 
powers. They voted to rule out no deal and 
to ask for changes to the ‘backstop’ in the 
:LWKGUDZDO$JUHHPHQWGHVLJQHGWRSUHYHQW
a hard border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland). Both amendments had no legal ef-
fect, and as of this writing, it was unclear 
whether either would happen before the UK 
is due to exit the EU on 29 March 2019.
7KH(8:LWKGUDZDO$FWZDVHQDFWHG
in June 2018. Scrutinising this gigantic and 
complex piece of constitutional legislation 
absorbed enormous amounts of parliamen-
tary time and energy in both the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords. The com-
SOH[LW\RIWKHDFWXQGHUVFRUHGKRZGLI¿FXOWLW
is for a constitutional democracy to adjust to 
leaving a supra-national legal order as highly 
integrated as the EU. Further, the legislation 
did not enable MPs and Peers to debate or 
LQÀXHQFHWKHYHU\WKLQJWKDWPRVWLQWHUHVWHG
them: the negotiations on the deal. 
7KH:LWKGUDZDO$FWJDLQHGQRWRULHW\ HYHQ
in the mainstream media, for its use of so-
called ‘Henry VIII powers’ (delegated pow-
ers that enable the Government to make 
delegated or secondary legislation, which 
requires weaker parliamentary scrutiny than 
primary legislation). Such powers became 
normalised over the course of the twentieth 
century, but their use in the Brexit context 
proved especially controversial. Firstly, it 
was thought that the powers would be used 
to produce legislation on politically sensitive 
matters and, as such, would not be suited 
to the more truncated and opaque process 
of making secondary legislation. Secondly, 
such was the level of uncertainty over how 
the powers would be used, as regards the 
outcome of the negotiations, that many par-
liamentarians were worried about entrusting 
the Government with the powers proposed 
before knowing the shape that Brexit would 
take. In the end, Parliament accepted that 
VXFKSRZHUVZHUHMXVWL¿HGLQWKH%UH[LWFRQ-
text, and a series of powers were approved in 
WKH:LWKGUDZDO$FWDQGLQRWKHU%UH[LWOHJ-
islation, although Parliament did force the 
Government to accept the case for certain 
legal limits on these powers and enhanced 
scrutiny procedures. The most notable is the 
creation of a European Statutory Instruments 
Committee, designed to ‘sift’ those instru-
ments that the Government proposed would 
be subject to the most minimal scrutiny (the 
negative procedure) and to decide whether 
more robust scrutiny is needed.
In relation to each of the three issues can-
YDVVHGKHUH3DUOLDPHQWKDVEHHQLQÀXHQWLDO
but ultimately has not altered the funda-
mental constitutional dynamics that were in 
place before the referendum result and are 
likely to continue to exist well after the UK 
has left the EU.
1 94PSSLY]:LJYL[HY`VM:[H[LMVY,_P[PUN[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU [2017] UKSC 5.
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The fallout from the collapse of the 
Northern Irish Executive continued 
throughout 2018
The collapse of the Northern Irish Executive 
in 2017 remained an ongoing issue through-
out 2018. Negotiations between nationalist 
and unionist political forces did not yield any 
solution capable of allowing resumption of 
the power-sharing government. As a result, 
Northern Ireland remains without a govern-
ment for more than two years. 
Thus far, the UK has decided not to imple-
ment direct rule. Government departments 
in Northern Ireland were allowed to contin-
ue exercising their functions in the absence 
of a Minister in charge, leaving important 
decisions in the hands of senior civil ser-
vants. This led many such decisions to be 
challenged before the courts as to whether 
politically sensitive policy matters could 
lawfully be determined by senior civil ser-
vants who lacked any democratic legitimacy 
and accountability.2 In addressing this ques-
tion, the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland 
held that it would be ‘contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the [Good Friday] Agreement 
and the [Northern Ireland Act 1998] for such 
decisions to be made by departments in the 
absence of a Minister’.3  
In response, the UK Government enacted 
the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation 
and Exercise of Functions) Act 2018, which, 
controversially, provides civil servants with 
powers to ‘exercise functions of the depart-
PHQWLIWKHRI¿FHULVVDWLV¿HGWKDWLWLVLQWKH
public interest to exercise the function’.4 
The determination of the public interest is to 
be made by reference to guidance released 
by the Secretary of State (i.e., the minister 
of the UK Government with responsibility 
for Northern Ireland).5:LWKOLWWOHKRSHRID
swift resolution to the stalemate between the 
unionist and nationalist parties, it seems that 
this practice will continue.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
7KLVVHFWLRQSURYLGHVVXPPDULHVRI¿YHNH\
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHVIURP:HKDYHLQ-
terpreted ‘constitutional’ broadly: as well as 
UK Supreme Court decisions, the Wightman
case below involved a referral from the high-
est court of Scotland to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) concerning 
%UH[LW7KH¿QDOGHFLVLRQEHORZLVIURPWKH
European Court of Human Rights, but con-
cerns fundamental issues of constitutional 
importance, primarily state surveillance, pri-
vacy, and free speech.  
1. Wightman and others v. Secretary of State 
for Exiting the European Union: Revocation 
of Article 50
The petitioners included a group of members 
RIWKH6FRWWLVK3DUOLDPHQWVHHNLQJFODUL¿FD-
tion from Scotland’s highest court (the Inner 
Court of Session) as to whether the UK could 
XQLODWHUDOO\ UHYRNH LWV QRWL¿FDWLRQRI LQWHQ-
tion to withdraw under Article 50 TEU—to 
‘untrigger’ Article 50, stopping the Brexit 
process—and whether this would change the 
state’s current conditions of membership. 
The answer to this question was intended to 
provide a third choice of ‘No Brexit’ to Par-
liament as an addition to the existing binary 
FKRLFH EHWZHHQ HLWKHU DGRSWLQJ WKH :LWK-
drawal Agreement negotiated by the Gov-
ernment with the EU or leaving the EU with-
out any agreement (so-called ‘hard Brexit’ or 
‘no deal’ Brexit) by automatic operation of 
Article 50(3) TEU on 29 March 2019.
As the matter concerned the interpretation of 
Article 50 (which was silent on the matter 
of revocation), the question could only be 
answered through a preliminary reference 
to the CJEU under Article 267 of the Treaty 
on Functioning of the European Union. Gov-
ernment lawyers attempted to block the ref-
erence, arguing that the question was merely 
hypothetical, advisory, and not a matter of 
dispute as the UK Government had shown 
no intention of revocation, while also mak-
ing an objection to the CJEU’s involvement 
in political matters.6 The UK Supreme Court 
refused to give leave to appeal the Scottish 
court’s decision to refer the question to the 
CJEU, and the UK Government’s reasoning 
was also subsequently rejected by the CJEU, 
which found the question to be of constitu-
tional importance. 
The Scottish Inner Court of Session duly 
referred the question to the CJEU, which 
adopted an expedited process to deliver its 
judgment in barely three months follow-
ing the request, sitting as a full court of 28 
judges. This expediency was primarily in 
response to the planned ‘meaningful vote’ 
LQ WKH8.3DUOLDPHQW RQ WKH UDWL¿FDWLRQRI
WKH:LWKGUDZDO$JUHHPHQWEHWZHHQWKH8.
and the EU, which was subsequently delayed 
(discussed in Part II, above).
In December 2018, the CJEU handed down 
its judgment,7 ruling that a member state may 
XQLODWHUDOO\UHYRNHQRWL¿FDWLRQDQGWKDWWKLV
possibility exists until either a withdrawal 
agreement has entered into force or the two-
\HDUSHULRGIURPGDWHRIQRWL¿FDWLRQDQGRU
any agreed extension to that period has ex-
pired. Such revocation must be decided in 
accordance with the ‘democratic process’ 
of the member state (para 66). It is current-
ly an academic question whether this would 
2 See, for instance, )\PJR»ZHWWSPJH[PVUMVYQ\KPJPHSYL]PL^ [2018] NICA 26.
3 Ibid at [54].
4 Ibid at 3(1).
5 Ibid at 3(2) and 3(3).
6 UK Government, >PNO[THUHUK6[OLYZ]:LJYL[HY`VM:[H[LMVY,_P[PUN[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU!(WWSPJH[PVUMVYWLYTPZZPVU[VHWWLHS[V[OL:\WYLTL*V\Y[ Policy Paper: 
< https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/wightman-and-others-v-secretary-of-state-for-exiting-the-european-union-application-for-permission-to-appeal-to-the-
Z\WYLTLJV\Y[%
7 Case C-621/18 >PNO[THUHUKV[OLYZ]:LJYL[HY`VM:[H[LMVY,_P[PUN[OL,\YVWLHU<UPVU judgment of 10 December 2018.
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require either primary legislation explicitly 
GLUHFWLQJWKH*RYHUQPHQWWRUHYRNHQRWL¿FD-
tion or the Prime Minister acting under the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ1RWL¿FDWLRQ$FW
7KH&-(8KHOGWKDWVXFKQRWL¿FDWLRQPXVWEH
‘unequivocal and unconditional’, meaning 
µWKHSXUSRVHRIWKDWUHYRFDWLRQLVWRFRQ¿UP
the EU membership of the Member State 
concerned under terms that are unchanged as 
regards its status as a Member State, and that 
revocation brings the withdrawal procedure 
WRDQHQG¶SDUD:KLOHXQFRQ¿UPHGWKLV
seemed to echo Advocate General Campos 
Sánchez-Barona’s Opinion, which interpret-
ed the duty of ‘sincere cooperation’ among 
member states and the EU as requiring that 
such revocation must be in ‘good faith’. 
7KH&RXUW UHDFKHG WKH GHFLVLRQE\¿UVW UH-
ferring to revocation and withdrawal in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(para 3) before considering the relevant pro-
visions of EU law (the principle of an ever 
closer Union in Article 1 TEU, fundamental 
values of the EU in Article 2 TEU, and Arti-
cle 50 TEU itself). The Court also considered 
the relevant sections of UK law in the Euro-
SHDQ8QLRQ1RWL¿FDWLRQRI:LWKGUDZDO$FW
DQG(XURSHDQ8QLRQ:LWKGUDZDO$FW
2018. The CJEU rejected the submissions 
of both the European Commission and the 
European Council that revocation must be 
predicated on the unanimous consent of the 
other member states, concluding that both 
the decision to withdraw and the unilateral 
revocation of that decision were the sover-
eign right of the state. 
In response to the Wightman decision, and 
displaying a lack of understanding about 
one of the basic tenets of EU law, some UK 
Members of Parliament argued for an appeal 
of the judgment. There is no possibility of 
appealing a preliminary reference to a higher 
national court, as the question was a matter 
of interpretation of EU law, which is solely 
within the purview of the CJEU. Similarly, 
there was reported misunderstanding of the 
necessary ‘unequivocal and unconditional’ 
nature of revocation, with some MPs con-
sidering this as an invitation to revoke and 
then retrigger Article 50 to reset the two-year 
period for negotiation. 
The Wightman case bookends the seminal 
2017 Brexit decision in the Miller judgment 
(discussed in the 2016 Report), in which the 
UK Supreme Court held that it was for Par-
liament, and not Government, to exercise a 
royal prerogative; to ‘trigger’ the Article 50 
process. Miller arguably hinged on the ac-
cepted assumption on both sides that Article 
50 could not be revoked and that once trig-
gered, the UK would inevitably withdraw 
IURPWKH(8:KLOHERWKFDVHVHPSKDVLVHG
the sovereignty of the state and Parliament, 
Wightman established that inexorable with-
drawal was a false assumption. Wightman
may ultimately prove to be a white elephant, 
however. As of February 2019, while there 
is little certainty over how and when the UK 
will withdraw from the EU, it seems highly 
unlikely that the UK will revoke Article 50 
and cancel withdrawal.
2. The European Union (Legal Continuity) 
(Scotland) Bill – A Reference by the Attorney 
General and the Advocate General for Scot-
land (Scotland) [2018] UKSC 64: Brexit and 
Devolution
:KLOH WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ :LWKGUDZDO
Bill 2018 (‘UK Bill’) was being discussed 
in the UK Parliament, the Scottish Govern-
PHQWLQWURGXFHGLWVRZQ(8:LWKGUDZDO%LOO
(‘Scottish Bill’) in the Scottish legislature. 
This was primarily due to concerns that the 
extensive Henry VIII powers granted to UK 
Ministers in the UK Bill would allow them 
to pass secondary legislation on matters of 
retained EU law that, if contained in a stat-
ute, would have fallen within the compe-
WHQFH RI WKH 6FRWWLVK OHJLVODWXUH:KLOH WKH
UK Parliament is bound by constitutional 
convention not to pass primary legislation 
that relates to devolved matters without the 
consent of the Scottish Parliament, there is 
no equivalent requirement for UK Ministers 
when passing secondary legislation on such 
matters.
Thus, the extensive Henry VIII powers in 
the UK Bill were viewed by the devolved 
governments as a power grab, a means for 
the UK Government to bypass the consent 
requirement and legislate freely on devolved 
matters by means of subordinate legislation. 
The Scottish Bill included a provision (Sec-
tion 17) that purported to bar any such sec-
ondary legislation from taking effect without 
the consent of the Scottish Ministers. The 
bill was passed by the Scottish Parliament, 
but before enactment, was referred by the 
Attorney General and Advocate General 
for Scotland to the UK Supreme Court on 
the basis that it was outside the legislative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament. The 
UK Supreme Court found that the bill was 
within competence when passed, with the 
exception of Section 17. However, by that 
WLPHWKH8.¶V(8:LWKGUDZDO$FWKDG
already been enacted and was a statute that 
could not unilaterally be altered by the Scot-
tish legislature. Therefore, key provisions of 
WKH6FRWWLVK%LOOWKDWFRQÀLFWHGZLWKWKH
Act would now also be considered outside 
Scotland’s legislative competence.
Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd and oth-
ers [2018] UKSC 49: Direct Discrimination
The US Supreme Court’s judgment in Mas-
terpiece Cakeshop8 was not the only leading 
constitutional case concerning a bakery and 
same-sex marriage in 2018. This UK Su-
preme Court case related to a bakery’s refusal 
to bake a cake carrying the message ‘Support 
Gay Marriage’ on the grounds of religious 
belief that gay marriage is inconsistent with 
ELEOLFDO WHDFKLQJ ,WZDVVXEVHTXHQWO\¿QHG
by the Equality Commission for Northern 
Ireland for refusing to provide this service. 
The Court found that the bakery’s refusal 
did not amount to direct discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, as the bakery 
8 4HZ[LYWPLJL*HRLZOVW3[K]*VSVYHKV*P]PS9PNO[Z*VTTPZZPVU 584 U.S. ___ (2018).
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objected to the message on the cake, not the 
sexual orientation of the customer: the bak-
ery would also have refused to bake a cake 
bearing such a message to a heterosexual 
customer. 
The Court reached a similar conclusion 
when examining whether the bakery’s refus-
al could amount to direct discrimination on 
grounds of political opinion, but it acknowl-
HGJHGWKDWLWPD\EHGLI¿FXOWWRGLVDVVRFLDWH
the person from the political message in this 
instance. Examining the freedom of expres-
sion dimension of the case, the Court held 
that this freedom implicitly included the 
ULJKWQRWWRH[SUHVVDVSHFL¿FRSLQLRQ&RP-
pelled speech, such as being forced to write 
a message on a cake against one’s own re-
ligious convictions, would violate freedom 
of expression. The Court distinguished this 
case from the US Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, as in that case the 
bakery had refused to provide wedding cakes 
for same-sex weddings altogether, regardless 
of the message on the cake. 
4. R (on the application of Steinfeld and 
Keidan) v Secretary of State for International 
Development [2018] UKSC 32: Civil Partner-
ships
The appellants challenged the Civil Partner-
ship Act 2004—which had been enacted to 
provide some form of recognition to same-
sex relationships in the absence of same-sex 
marriage—as discriminatory on the basis that 
it only made provision for civil partnerships 
between partners of the same sex. Follow-
ing the legalisation of same-sex marriage in 
LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHVDQGLQ6FRWODQG
through an act of the Scottish Parliament), 
the applicants argued that while same-sex 
couples had access to both civil partnerships 
and marriage, different-sex couples only had 
access to marriage as a form of recognising 
their relationships. 
The UK Supreme Court made a declaration 
of incompatibility under the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (which gives domestic effect to 
the ECHR) on the basis that the 2004 Act 
violated the right to private and family life 
taken in conjunction with the prohibition 
of discrimination. The Court was not con-
vinced by the Government’s arguments that 
the Court should not be too quick to make a 
¿QGLQJRIGLVFULPLQDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVWKDWWKH
Government needed more time to decide on 
the future of civil partnerships, and that con-
sultations were being carried out on whether 
to extend civil partnerships to different-sex 
couples or to abolish civil partnerships alto-
gether. The Court held emphatically that ‘the 
government had to eliminate the inequality 
of treatment immediately’.9
5. Big Brother Watch and others v United King-
dom (App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14, 24960/15, 
13 September 2018): Mass Surveillance
7KH )LUVW 6HFWLRQ D ¿UVW LQVWDQFH EHQFK
of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) delivered its eagerly awaited judg-
ment on the UK’s legal framework on mass 
surveillance and the bulk interception of 
communications carried out by the intelli-
JHQFH VHUYLFHV:KLOH WKH DSSOLFDQW 1*2V
won their case as the Court found that the 
framework did not comply with the right to 
privacy, the ECtHR did not deliver the re-
buke to mass surveillance the applicants had 
hoped for. 
The ECtHR dismissed the applicants’ argu-
ments that its surveillance case law should 
be updated to require authorities to provide 
objective evidence of ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
in relation to the persons whose communica-
tions were collected. The First Section also 
refused to accept that the right to privacy 
generated an obligation on states to subse-
quently notify individuals that they had been 
subject to surveillance measures. The section 
LQWKLVMXGJPHQWDI¿UPHGWKDWVWDWHVZLOOEH
granted a wide margin of appreciation in the 
DUHDRIVXUYHLOODQFHDQGEDVHGLWV¿QGLQJRI
a violation on the narrow point that there was 
no independent oversight during the process 
of the ‘selection of bearers for interception, 
WKHVHOHFWRUVDQGVHDUFKFULWHULDIRU¿OWHULQJ
intercepted communications, and the selec-
tion of material for examination by an ana-
lyst’.10 Additionally, the section found that 
the surveillance regime violated freedom of 
H[SUHVVLRQ DV WKHUH ZHUH LQVXI¿FLHQW VDIH-
guards to protect journalists from unlawful 
surveillance. At the applicants’ request, the 
case was referred to the Grand Chamber (the 
LQVWDQFHRI¿QDODSSHDO
IV. LOOKING AHEAD 
It has been said that ‘Trying to predict the 
future is like trying to drive down a coun-
try road at night with no lights while looking 
out the back window’.11 As regards Brexit, 
the road is potholed, the windows are fogged 
up, and the drivers and passengers in acute 
GLVDJUHHPHQW:LWKWKH0DUFKH[LW
deadline looming in under 6 weeks at the 
time of this writing, there is no clear picture 
of what form Brexit will take, whether ‘soft’, 
‘hard’, or otherwise. Other issues have re-
turned, including the prospect of repealing 
the Human Rights Act 1998 once Brexit has 
been concluded.12 Politics in Northern Ire-
land (and the possibility of a second indepen-
dence referendum in Scotland) appears to be 
in a holding pattern until the Brexit process 
becomes clearer, but fresh elections have 
QRWEHHQUXOHGRXW,Q:DOHVELOOVWRFUHDWH
D IRUPDO ERG\ RI:HOVK ODZ E\ RUJDQLVLQJ
legislation around subject matter and to ac-
FRUGWKH:HOVK$VVHPEO\D:HOVKODQJXDJH
moniker (the Senedd) point to a deepening 
of devolution.
9 9VU[OLHWWSPJH[PVUVM:[LPUMLSKHUK2LPKHU]:LJYL[HY`VM:[H[LMVY0U[LYUH[PVUHS+L]LSVWTLU[[2018] at [50] per Lord Kerr.
10 )PN)YV[OLY>H[JOHUKV[OLYZ]<UP[LK2PUNKVT (App. Nos. 58170/13, 62322/14, 24960/15, 13 September 2018) at [387].
11 Attributed to Peter F. Drucker, a management consultant and writer: see https://www.cgu.edu/school/drucker-school-of-management/ peter-f-drucker/.
12 Rob Merrick, ‘Theresa May to consider axeing Human Rights Act after Brexit, minister reveals’, ;OL0UKLWLUKLU[ 18 January 2019 https://www.indepen-
dent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-human-rights-act-repeal-brexit-echr-commons-parliament-conservatives-a8734886.html.
330 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
V. FURTHER READING
House of Lords Select Committee, 16th Re-
port – ‘The Legislative Process: The Delega-
tion of Powers’ (20 November 2018) https://
publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ld-
select/ldconst/225/22502.htm
House of Lords Select Committee, 15th Re-
port – ‘Northern Ireland (Executive Forma-
tion and Exercise of Functions) Bill’ (29 Oc-
tober 2018) https://publications.parliament.
uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldconst/211/21102.
htm
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ:LWKGUDZDO$FW
h t tp : / /www. leg i s l a t ion .gov.uk /ukp-
ga/2018/16/contents/enacted
‘Report of the Independent Commission 
on Referendums’ (July 2018) https://www.
ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/sites/constitu-
WLRQXQLW¿OHVBBLQGHSHQGHQWBFRPPLV-
sion_on_referendums.pdf
1DWLRQDO $VVHPEO\ RI :DOHV /HJLVOD-
WLRQ :DOHV %LOO KWWSVHQHGGDVVHP-
bly.wales/mgConsultationDisplay.aspx-
"LG 	53,' 	FS \HV
2018 Global Review of Constitutional Law | 331
Vietnam
Minh Tuan, Dang
Associate Professor, Deputy Director, Department of Constitutional and Administrative 
Law, Vietnam National University School of Law, Hanoi, Vietnam  
Fulbright Visiting Scholar, Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy,
Boston College Law School, Massachusetts, the United States of America
VIETNAM
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013,1 the National Assembly of Vietnam 
adopted a new Constitution.2 The Constitu-
tion maintained the constitutional principle 
of the leadership of the Communist Party of 
Vietnam (CPV) while it recognized some 
new principles, such as the division, coor-
dination and control of powers, and human 
rights protection.3 The 2013 constitution-
al amendment, which was led by the CPV, 
aimed to both consolidate the leadership of 
the CPV and to solve practical problems of 
political power organization such as corrup-
WLRQKXPDQULJKWVYLRODWLRQVDQGLQHI¿FLHQ-
cies of control over public power. This paper 
examines how these principles and goals 
FRH[LVW LQÀXHQFH DQG LQWHUDFW ZLWK RQH
another within the framework of Vietnam’s 
new Constitution. It does so through two re-
markable events that happened in 2018: the 
concurrent holding of the State President 
seat by CPV General Secretary Mr. Nguyen 
Phu Trong and the CPV’s unprecedented an-
ti-corruption campaign. 
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
On September 21, 2018, the President of Viet-
nam, Mr. Tran Dai Quang, one of the most 
powerful leaders in the country, suddenly 
passed away due to illness. His death opened 
up a power vacuum in the communist country. 
According to the Constitution, the National 
Assembly elects the State President;4 howev-
er, the CPV has a decisive role in choosing 
this position. After many speculations, the 
General Secretary of the CPV, Mr. Nguyen 
Phu Trong, became the State President. This 
development has generated a large amount of 
discussion and attracted great interest in polit-
ical and academic forums as well as among 
the Vietnamese people.
The CPV organizational system is estab-
lished along the state structure. Mirroring 
governmental institutions, the CPV has a na-
tionwide organizational system from central 
to grassroots levels, and in social-political 
organizations and economic entities. The top 
leadership positions of the CPV and govern-
1 There were four previous Constitutions prior to 2013: the 1946 Constitution, the 1959 Constitution, the 1980 
Constitution, and the 1992 Constitution. In addition, in the south of Vietnam during the Vietnam War, the Re-
public of Vietnam issued two other Constitutions: the 1956 Constitution and the 1967 Constitution.
2 ;OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM[OL:VJPHSPZ[9LW\ISPJVM=PL[UHTB<UVɉJPHS;YHUZSH[PVUMYVT=PL[UHTLZLI`0U[LY-
UH[PVUHS0+,(D*VUZ[P[\[PVU5L[#O[[W!JVUZ[P[\[PVUUL[VYNZP[LZKLMH\S[ÄSLZ[YHUSH[PVUFVMF]PL[UHTZFUL^F
JVUZ[P[\[PVUFLU\RFWKM%HJJLZZLK+LJLTILY
3 Nguyen Dang Dung, Trinh Quoc Toan, and Dang Minh Tuan, )yUOS\ґU2OVHOұJ/PңUWOmW5̡ҿJ*ҽUNO~H
?qOҽPJOӋUNOȞH=Pҫ[5HTUȋTB:JPLU[PÄJ*VTTLU[HY`VU[OL*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM[OL:VJPHSPZ[9LW\ISPJVM
Vietnam 2013], Vietnam National University, Hanoi 2016).
4 The Constitution of Vietnam, Art. 70, para. 7.
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ment are traditionally held by two different 
people: the General Secretary of the CPV 
and the State President, respectively. How-
ever, “integration” (QK̭WWK͋KyD)—the con-
current holding of two positions by one per-
son5—has long been discussed in Vietnam. 
But it was not until the end of 2017 that this 
model of the concentration of power was pi-
loted on a local scale under a CPV’s resolu-
tion. At the end of 2018, it was implemented 
at the central level as the General Secretary 
was elected the State President. 
7KLV LV QRW WKH ¿UVW WLPH WKDW D SHUVRQ KDV
held both top leadership positions of the par-
ty and the state in communist regimes. Un-
der Jiang Zemin’s administration in China in 
1992, the State President was in charge of 
duties as the General Secretary of the Com-
munist Party of China. After that, Laos in-
tegrated the title of State President with the 
leader of the Communist Party in 1998 under 
State President Khamtai Siphandon’s tenure. 
In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh also held the posi-
tions of head of the CPV and the state until 
his death in 1969. He was the last leader to 
hold both positions concurrently until 2018. 
The political context of Vietnam boosted the 
process of integration. In a statement before 
a group of voters, Mr. Trong declared that 
LQWHJUDWLRQZDV D WHPSRUDU\ VROXWLRQ WR¿OO
the vacancy created by the sudden death of 
the former President.6 Moreover, it does not 
require a constitutional amendment because 
the Constitution only stipulates that the State 
President must be a member of the Nation-
al Assembly and be elected by the National 
Assembly.7 As General Secretary, Mr. Trong 
DOUHDG\IXO¿OOHGWKH¿UVWUHTXLUHPHQW0RUH
importantly, the reason for the large politi-
cal consensus8 for this policy was that un-
der Mr. Trong’s leadership, the CPV made 
VLJQL¿FDQW HIIRUWV LQZHHGLQJ RXW FRUUXS-
tion, notably cracking down on several 
KLJKSUR¿OHRI¿FLDOV9 (a few cases will be 
presented in detail below). Mr. Trong also 
played a decisive role in leading a number 
of CPV reforms to more effectively con-
WUROKLJKSUR¿OHRI¿FLDOV7KHVHLQFOXGHGD
CPV’s special resolution on power control, 
adoption of the Law on Anti-Corruption, 
and practice by the National Assembly to 
FRQGXFW PRUH VXEVWDQWLDO YRWHV RI FRQ¿-
GHQFH IRU RI¿FLDOV HOHFWHG DQGRU UDWL¿HG
by the National Assembly.10  Mr. Trong’s 
leadership was perceived to improve the 
CPV’s power and image, and so CPV 
members in turn supported the increase of 
his leadership role. Mr. Trong’s expand-
ed leadership is in line with the view of 
building a Developmental State,11 a policy 
that has been discussed and implemented 
in recent years in Vietnam. In addition, af-
WHU¿YH\HDUVRILPSOHPHQWDWLRQWKH
Constitution has provided the basis for the 
improvement of the legal framework for 
a state power organization, human rights, 
and economic issues.12 Mr. Trong and 
the CPV have received wide public sup-
port thanks to their roles in creating these 
changes in the socialist political system.
Integration aims to formalize the Gener-
al Secretary’s role as the President of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam in external 
affairs with other foreign countries. It also 
enhances the power of the President in pub-
lic governance, especially in the executive 
branch. Indeed, a constitutional amendment 
of the 2013 Constitution enhanced the role 
of the President in the executive branch: 
“the State President has the authority to re-
quest the government to hold meetings to 
discuss on issues which in consideration 
of the State President is necessary to exer-
cise his duties and authorities.”13 Integra-
tion also facilitates the emerging idea of 
a semi-presidential republic, in which the 
President has the right to lead and decide 
policies, and the Prime Minister plays a role 
as a policy enforcer.14 It is also in line with 
the CPV’s policy15 of reducing the state 
5 The person performs at the same time two independent roles as the General Secretary and the State President. The organizational structure associated with these 
two titles is also independent, not being merged into one.
6 ;O\/HUNº;ҹUNIx[O̡SnT*OӋ[үJOU̡ҿJ!2OUNWO҇P]yUO҉[[OҧO}HȒo`Sn[yUOO\ҵUNB;OL.LULYHS:LJYL[HY`)LJVTLZ[OL:[H[L7YLZPKLU[!5V[HU0U[LNYH[PVU
But a Temporary Situation]’ (Vietnamnet, 8 October 2018) <https://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/chinh-tri/tong-bi-thu-lam-chu-tich-nuoc-khong-phai-vi-nhat-the-hoa-day-
SH[PUOO\VUN O[TS%HJJLZZLK+LJLTILY
7 The Constitution of Vietnam, Art. 86.
8100% of the CPV’s Central Committee members agreed to introduce General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to the position of State President while 99.79% of National 
(ZZLTIS`KLW\[PLZ]V[LKMVYOPTHZ[OL:[H[L7YLZPKLU[VUS`VUL]V[LKHNHPUZ[:LL!9LWVY[LYºǘҷUNJOx5N\`ҩU7O;YұUNȒ̡ӇJIҋ\SnT*OӋ[үJOU̡ҿJUOPҫTRɅ
2016–2021 [Mr. Nguyen Phu Trong Is Elected as the State President in the Term 2016–2021]’ (5OHUKHUonline, 23 October 2018) <http://www.nhandan.com.vn/chin-
O[YPP[LT *)VUNJOPUN\`LUWO\[YVUNK\VJIH\SHTJO\[PJOU\VJUOPLTR`O[TS%HJJLZZLK+LJLTILY
9 Reporter, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index 2018: Corruption in Vietnam’s Public Sector Is Still Perceived as Highly Serious’ (Towards Transparency), <https://toward-
Z[YHUZWHYLUJ `]ULUJWPF]PL[UHTFFLU%HJJLZZLK+LJLTILY
10 The National Assembly has the authority to elect or ratify the State President, the Prime Minister and members of the government, the Chief Justice and the Supreme 
Court justices, the President of the Supreme Procuracy, the President of the National Election Council, the Head of the State Audit, and leadership positions of the 
National Assembly.
11 The model of a Developmental State requires a certain concentration of power in order to lead and promote socio-economic development while requiring leaders to 
have a good political will and be ethical for the people.
12 Le Minh Tung, ‘The Report on the Vietnam National University School of Law’s Conference on Assessment of the Implementation of the 2013 Constitution’ (VNU 
:JOVVSVM3H ^6J[VILY#O[[W!SH ^]U\LK\]UHY[PJSLUL^ZO[TS%HJJLZZLK+LJLTILY
13 The Constitution of Vietnam, Art. 90, para. 2. 
14 According to the Constitution, the President does not have substantial power; however, he is powerful in leading and deciding policies with his new role as General 
Secretary. Meanwhile, according to the Constitution and practice, the Prime Minister and its government mainly exercise their tasks and powers as policy enforcers. 
They initiate polities and submit to the National Assembly and the CPV’s central authorities for decisions.
15 ;OPZWVSPJ`^HZVɉJPHSS`KLJSHYLKPU9LZVS\[PVU5V58;>VM[OL*7=»Z*LU[YHS*VTTP[[LLVU[OLYLMVYTHUKHYYHUNLTLU[VM[OLWVSP[PJHSZ`Z[LTVU6J[VILY
25, 2017.
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budget16 on public personnel through the 
integration of titles and organization of the 
CPV and government. More importantly, 
the position of President provides legitima-
cy for the General Secretary in public gov-
ernance. It has been argued that the CPV 
should exercise power through representa-
tion in the government. The motivation for 
integration is that the General Secretary of 
the CPV, arguably the most powerful per-
son in Vietnam’s political system, does not 
hold any proportionate position in the gov-
ernment.17 A former senior member of the 
National Assembly put forward a bold pro-
posal that Vietnam should adopt a bicamer-
al legislature, with the National Assembly 
serving as a lower house and the CPV’s 
Central Committee as an upper house.18 In-
tegration could allow the General Secretary 
DQG&39RI¿FLDOV DQGDJHQFLHV WREHPRUH
accountable to the people. As the constitu-
tional norm of single-party leadership was 
increasingly contested, consolidation of par-
ty leadership has become the central issue of 
the CPV.19 The CPV’s accountability to the 
SHRSOH LV SURYLGHG IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH LQ WKH
2013 Constitution: “the Communist Party of 
Vietnam maintains closest with the People, 
services the People, submits to the People’s 
supervision and is accountable to the People 
in its decisions.”20
However, integration raises certain concerns 
about the risk of abuse of power that arises 
from the concentration of power. According 
to the Constitution, the President’s authority 
is more symbolic than substantial, like most 
heads of state in parliamentary systems.21
However, in practice, as a key member of 
the CPV’s Political Bureau (Politburo),22 the 
President is one of the most powerful per-
sons in Vietnam’s political system, and now 
the consolidated post of President and Gen-
eral Secretary is even more powerful. In Chi-
na, the Chinese Communist Party’s General 
Secretary, President Xi Jinping, led a con-
stitutional amendment to abolish the restric-
tion on term limits, paving the way for his 
re-election to the presidency for a third term. 
This raises the need to build mechanisms to 
control the power of the State President and 
the General Secretary. In terms of the state, 
the State President’s power is limited by the 
Constitution and laws. Meanwhile, in terms 
of the CPV, the power of the General Sec-
retary is mainly ruled by CPV regulations.23
According to the Constitution, all organiza-
tions and members of the CPV operate with-
in the framework of the Constitution and the 
law.24 However, the Constitution is silent on 
a clear role for the party and the relation-
ship between the party as an entity towards 
the law and all other state institutions,25 and 
there is still no law or legislative regulation 
on the CPV. Although a proposal for such 
has long been discussed, its realization has 
faced many obstacles and challenges. Schol-
ars tried to propose enhancing political con-
trol over the General Secretary within the 
CPV system (e.g., switching the role of se-
lecting the General Secretary from the Cen-
tral Committee to the National Congress of 
the party;26 creating an independent inspec-
tion agency of the CPV; and enhancing pub-
lic participation in the CPV’s governance). 
However, as the state is under the CPV’s 
OHDGHUVKLSLWLVGLI¿FXOWWRLPSOHPHQWFRQVWL-
WXWLRQDOFRQWURORYHU LW:KHQ9LHWQDPZDV
building the 2013 Constitution, a proposal 
for a constitutional council was presented 
before the constitutional drafting committee. 
But this proposal was rejected because of 
one main rationale—this kind of mechanism 
could challenge the leadership of the CPV. 27
The lack of a possible power control mecha-
nism on the General Secretary is a challenge 
of integration; however, as argued above, in-
tegration itself is better for control of power. 
It can produce potential positive impacts in 
making political life more transparent and 
responsible, so it may be considered a long-
term solution in the future.
16 The budget for the CPV comes mainly from the state budget.
17 The General Secretary only holds a public position as a member of the National Assembly. However, the National Assembly’s members do not have much substan-
tial power.
18 Le Hong Hiep, ‘Power Shifts in Vietnam’s Political System’ (Eastasiaforum, 5 March 2015) <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/05/power-shifts-in-vietnams-polit-
PJHSZ`Z[LT%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
19 Bui Hai Thiem, ‘Constitutionalizing Single Party Leadership in Vietnam: Dilemmas of Reform’ (2016), Volume 11, Special Issue 2 (Special Issue on Vietnamese and 
Comparative Constitutional Law), 219-234.
20 The Constitution of Vietnam, Art. 4, para. 2.
21 The Constitution of Vietnam, Chapter 6.
22 The Political Bureau, composed of the party’s highest ranking members, is the party’s supreme policy-making body; it possesses unlimited decision- and poli-
cy-making powers.
23 According to the charter and other regulations of the CPV, the General Secretary is subject to the inspection and supervision of the National Party Congress, the 
Central Executive Committee, and the Politburo. Among these institutions, the Politburo leads, inspects, and supervises the implementation of the party’s resolutions. 
The Central Inspection Committee assists the Politburo and other Central Party agencies in carrying out the tasks of inspection and supervision. The promulgation of 
the standards of the General Secretary is the basis for party agencies to supervise the enforcement of the power of the General Secretary.
24 The Constitution of Vietnam, Art. 4, para. 3.
25 Bui Hai Thiem, ‘Constitutionalizing Single Party Leadership in Vietnam: Dilemmas of Reform’ (2016), Volume 11, Special Issue 2 (Special Issue on Vietnamese and 
Comparative Constitutional Law), 219-234.
26 The Central Committee—the party organization in which political power is formally vested—meets more frequently than the National Party Congress, at least twice 
annually in forums called plenums, and is much smaller in size (the current Central Committee consists of 180 full members and 20 alternate members). Like the Na-
[PVUHS7HY[`*VUNYLZZOV^L]LYP[\Z\HSS`HJ[Z[VJVUÄYTYH[OLY[OHULZ[HISPZOWVSPJ `0UYLHSP[ `[OLJYLH[PVUVMWVSPJ`PZ[OLWYLYVNH[P]LVM[OL7VSP[PJHS)\YLH\^OPJO[OL
Central Committee elects and to which it delegates all decision-making authority.
27 Bui Ngoc Son, ‘The Discourse of Constitutional Review in Vietnam’ (2014), 9 1V\YUHSVM*VTWHYH[P]L3H ^ 191-221.
334 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
There are no constitutional cases in Vietnam 
in a strict sense because the courts are not 
empowered to solve constitutional cases and 
disputes. The power of constitutional review 
is mainly exercised by political organs28 while 
the courts have only the right to request that 
these organs examine and decide on constitu-
tional questions. However, in a broader sense, 
FULPLQDO FDVHV DJDLQVW SXEOLF RI¿FLDOV WRXFK
upon many relevant constitutional issues. 
Indeed, these cases involved not only the ju-
diciary but also linked with the leadership of 
CPV and law enforcement in Vietnam.
2018 was a special year, with a series of 
anti-corruption cases against high-ranking 
RI¿FLDOV29$PRQJWKHPIRUWKH¿UVWWLPHLQ
Vietnam’s history, a member of the CPV Po-
litburo, Mr. Dinh La Thang,30 was brought 
to trial.31 The cases were part of the CPV’s 
campaign against corruption, especially in 
the public sector, which has been perceived 
as highly serious.32 Mr. Thang was convicted 
and subjected to severe punishments.
In this anti-corruption campaign, the CPV 
has played a decisive role in cases from in-
vestigation, to prosecution, to the trial stage. 
&DVHVLQYROYLQJKLJKUDQNLQJRI¿FLDOVRIWKH
CPV and government are under its supervi-
sion and direction. Based on the direction 
of the CPV, public authorities will conduct 
the proceedings to handle cases in accor-
dance with the law. The CPV usually pro-
vides its own disciplinary measures before 
legal proceedings are conducted. The case 
of Mr. Dinh La Thang was brought to trial 
in 2018 after a series of instructions by the 
CPV. In 2005, Mr. Thang started working at 
PetroVietnam  before being assigned to sev-
eral senior positions in the party and govern-
ment. He held these posts until he was pros-
ecuted and arrested in December 2017 for 
frauds committed while working for Petro-
Vietnam.33 Previously, from April 24 to 26, 
2017 in Hanoi, the CPV’s Central Inspection 
Committee met and decided to recommend 
the highest-level agencies of the CPV to 
consider and enforce sanctions against Mr. 
Thang. On May 10, 2017, the CPV decided 
to punish him, dismiss his Politburo member 
position, and demote him to an unimportant 
position in the party. Only after these actions 
were legal procedures initiated. On Decem-
ber 8, 2017, after the National Assembly’s 
Standing Committee had approved the deci-
sion to prosecute and arrest Mr. Thang (he 
was still a member of the National Assem-
bly), the Ministry of Public Security decided 
to prosecute the case and arrested Mr. Thang 
for his violations against the state’s regula-
tions on economic management. Afterwards, 
Mr. Thang was suspended from engaging in 
CPV activities. On August 1, 2018, he was 
brought to the Court for the First Instance 
Trial in Hanoi. After being sentenced on 
May 9, 2018, he was expelled from the CPV. 
The party’s leadership in the anti-corruption 
campaign has been formalized along with the 
establishment of a specialized mechanism 
on anti-corruption. The previous anti-cor-
ruption mechanism was established in the 
executive branch, but it proved ineffective 
because it lacked autonomy and indepen-
dence from the CPV in dealing with crimes 
FRPPLWWHGE\SXEOLFRI¿FLDOV,QGHHGSXEOLF
authorities dealt with a few corruption cases 
despite growing awareness that corruption 
had become increasingly serious. That is 
why the CPV developed an anti-corruption 
mechanism to lead anti-corruption work. In 
2013, the Central Steering Committee for 
Anti-Corruption under the Politburo, headed 
by the General Secretary, was established. 
Additionally, the CPV’s central and provin-
cial internal committees are empowered to 
advise the CPV on internal and anti-corrup-
tion affairs. Meanwhile, public authorities, 
with some changes, still exercise anti-cor-
ruption tasks based on the direction of the 
CPV. In a meeting of the Steering Commit-
tee on Anti-Corruption on November 10, 
2018, Mr. Trong requested public authorities 
to complete investigations on 8 cases, issue 
LQGLFWPHQWV IRU  FDVHV RSHQ ¿UVW LQVWDQFH
trials for 2 cases, open appeal hearings for 5 
FDVHVDQGFRPSOHWHYHUL¿FDWLRQV IRUDI-
fairs in accordance with the plan set out by 
the CPV’s Anti-Corruption Committee.34
This reform aims to transform the role of 
public authorities into CPV agencies in the 
campaign against corruption. The CPV’s 
anti-corruption mechanism has come into 
operation and achieved positive results. The 
Steering Committee handles most corruption 
cases—hundreds since its establishment. 
Five hundred accused were sanctioned with 
strict sentences (10 accused, with 11 death 
sentences; 19 accused, with 20 life imprison-
ment sentences; and 459 accused, with im-
28 Among the political organs, the National Assembly and its organs have the highest and most powerful authority in constitutional review of laws and regulations.
29 :VTLPTWVY[HU[JHZLZPUJS\KL[OLJHZLVM[OLMVYTLY7VSP[I\YVTLTILY+PUO3H;OHUN[OLOPNO[LJONHTISPUNJHZLPU]VS]PUNOPNOYHURPUNWVSPJLVɉJLYZ[OL<[
Troc case involving military generals, the AVG Selling case in connection with the Minister of Information and Communications, the case of the former Minister of Plan-
UPUNHUK0U]LZ[TLU[HUK[OLJHZLVM=\5OVTPU]VS]PUNTHU`NV]LYUTLU[VɉJPHSZ
30 Mr. Dinh La Thang, before being tried by the Court, held many important positions in the CPV (the CPV’s Politburo member and Secretary of Ho Chi Minh City), the 
government (National Assembly deputy and Minister of Transport), and state incorporations (chairman of PetroVietnam).
31 Mr. Dinh La Thang was prosecuted and tried on charges of intentionally disobeying the state’s regulations on economic management, causing serious damages and 
corruption of property, and was subjected to 2 sentences of 13 and 18 years in prison, respectively.
32 Vietnam scored 33 points out of 100 on the 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index reported by Transparency International. The Corruption Index in Vietnam averaged 
28.04 points from 1997 until 2018, reaching an all-time high of 35 points in 2017 and a record low of 24 points in 2002. See: Transparency International, ‘Vietnam Cor-
Y\W[PVU7LYJLW[PVUZ0UKL_»;YHUZWHYLUJ`0U[LYUH[PVUHS#O[[WZ!^^ ^[YHUZWHYLUJ `VYNJV\U[Y`=54%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
33 PetroVietnam is the trading name of Vietnam Oil and Gas Group (PVN). PetroVietnam is wholly owned by the Vietnamese central government and responsible for all 
oil and gas resources in the country, becoming its largest oil producer and second-largest power producer.
349LWVY[LYº;ҹUN)x[O̡*OӋ[үJOU̡ҿJJOӋ[YүJ\ҽJOұWWO~UNJOҵUN[OHTUOȺUNB;OL.LULYHS:LJYL[HY`¶;OL:[H[L7YLZPKLU[7YLZPKLZ6]LY[OL4LL[PUNVU
Anti-Corruption]’, (Online newspaper of the Vietnamese Government, 11 November 2018) <http://baochinhphu.vn/Thoi-su/Tong-Bi-thu-Chu-tich-nuoc-chu-tri-cuoc-
OVWWOVUNJOVUN[OHTUO\UN]NW%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
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359LWVY[LYº*\ҽJȒ҉\[YHUOWO~UNJOҵUN[OHTUOȺUN¶UȋTUOyUS҅PB;OL(U[P*VYY\W[PVU*HTWHPNU¨¶3VVRPUN)HJRMVY-P]L@LHYZD»6USPULUL^ZWHWLYVM[OL
CPV’s Central Internal Committee, 21 August 2018) http://noichinh.vn/cong-tac-phong-chong-tham-nhung/201808/cuoc-dau-tranh-phong-chong-tham-nhung-5-
UHTUOPUSHP%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 
36 ;OL3H^VU(U[P*VYY\W[PVUVMOHZUL^WVPU[ZYLSH[LK[V[OLYLN\SH[PVUZVUHZZL[HUKPUJVTLKLJSHYH[PVUVMW\ISPJVɉJPHSZ^P[OWVZP[PVUZVMH\[OVYP[ `
37 0U[OLJHZLVM+PUO3H;OHUNHUK;YPUO?\HU;OHUO[OLYL^LYLH[V[HSVMSH^`LYZ:LL!/VHUN/PLWº*}IHVUOPv\S\ґ[Z̡[OHTNPHWOPvU[~H_ӑǘPUO3H;OȋUN
;YүUO?\oU;OHUO&B/V^THU`SH^`LYZHYL[OLYLPU[OL[YPHSVM+PUO3H;OHUN;YPUO?\HU;OHUOD»Viettimes, 5 January 2018) <https://viettimes.vn/co-bao-nhieu-luat-
Z\[OHTNPHWOPLU[VH_\KPUOSH[OHUN[YPUO_\HU[OHUOO[TS%HJJLZZLK1HU\HY` 4Y;OHUN^HZKLMLUKLKI`SH^`LYZ
38 The principle of institute legal proceeding against is recognized in the 2113 Constitution (Art. 103, para. 5) in order to improve judicial independence and accountabili-
[ `;OPZWYPUJPWSL^HZ\ZLKMVY[OLÄYZ[[PTLPU[OLJHZLVM+PUO3H;OHUN
39 In some cases, the press has a decisive role in detecting and publicizing violations, as in the case of Trinh Xuan Thanh, who was later involved with Mr. Dinh La 
Thang. In this case, from the information of a private car with a state license number plate, the press informed that Trinh Xuan Thanh, the owner of this car, did not have 
the right to use this license, and then the press investigated and found many violations being committed.
prisonment spanning between 12 months to 
30 years).35  In the political context, the par-
ty’s leadership and intervention in the state’s 
activities play a very active role in detecting 
and handling violations in society, especially 
YLRODWLRQVE\SXEOLFDXWKRULWLHVDQGRI¿FLDOV
However, the decisive role of the CPV’s 
agencies in leading the handling of corrup-
tion cases also poses the risk of its interven-
tion in the management of public authorities, 
especially judicial agencies. Under the di-
rection of the CPV, public agencies can lose 
their independence and proper power in ad-
judication under the provisions of the law. In 
the process of revising the Law on Anti-Cor-
ruption, it was proposed to establish an in-
dependent anti-corruption committee under 
the National Assembly, but it was unnoticed 
and unlikely to be feasible in the current po-
litical regime in Vietnam. Therefore, it was 
not included in the Law on Anti-Corruption 
adopted in late 2018.36 Meanwhile, a number 
of reforms were implemented to promote 
WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV HI¿FLHQF\ DQG LQGHSHQ-
dence of public agencies, especially of judi-
cial agencies. However, these reforms often 
challenged judicial independence. Although 
not being regulated by law, judges and pros-
ecutors are CPV members. The courts are 
often more independent and autonomous in 
private affair cases (civil and commercial) 
than in public cases (administrative and 
criminal), especially in anti-corruption cases 
DJDLQVWVHQLRURI¿FLDOV$OWKRXJKLWLVXQGHU-
stood that the CPV only directs broad poli-
cy of judicial adjudication, the process and 
GHFLVLRQPDNLQJLQDVSHFL¿FWULDODUHXQGHU
the jurisdiction of the relevant judicial au-
thorities by the law, but delineating this rela-
WLRQVKLSLVQRWFOHDUDQGGLI¿FXOWWRLGHQWLI\
Similarly, the prosecutor is also dependent 
on the party. Public access to trials is lim-
ited; however, access to counsel is robust in 
corruption cases.37 Lawyers play a more im-
portant and independent role in trials,38 con-
tributing to improved judicial independence 
and the legitimacy of the CPV’s anti-corrup-
tion campaign.
The recent anti-corruption campaign also re-
ÀHFWVWKHLQFUHDVLQJUROHRIWKHSUHVVLQWKH
discovery of corruption violations.39 State 
media has gained an increasingly indepen-
dent position, creating more space for dis-
cussions and information delivery to society, 
while social media plays a major role as a 
forum for public discourse. These chang-
es were in line with a new approach by the 
CPV to the press when the CPV recognized 
the media’s need to promote its role and raise 
LWVUHVSRQVLELOLW\LQWKH¿JKWDJDLQVWFRUUXS-
tion. The legal framework also amends a 
number of statutes governing the press and 
WKHDGRSWLRQRIWKH¿UVW/DZRQ$FFHVVWR,Q-
formation. However, there have been many 
concerns about the barriers and challenges of 
the press, especially with social media since 
the adoption of the cybersecurity law.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
The developments will occur in transition, 
so they will create many positive effects and 
results, but there will also be many prob-
lems and challenges. The issue of power 
control (between the power of the CPV and 
government; between public agencies in im-
plementing legislative, executive, and judi-
cial power; and between the state and local 
governments) will remain at the center of 
GLVFXVVLRQV WR ¿QG IHDVLEOH UHIRUPV LQ WKH
framework of Vietnam’s communist political 
system. Many global issues have appeared 
in Vietnam, such as human rights, security, 
and law in the context of the fourth industri-
al revolution. Constructing a developmental 
state will also continue to be one of the pol-
icy targets that needs to be a case study for 
reference over the next few years. 
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VNM/> accessed 26 December 2018
BUI Ngoc Son, ‘Constitutional Mobilization’ 
(2018), Washington University Global Stud-
ies Law Review, Volume 17, Issue 1 <https://
openscholarship.wustl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
FJL"DUWLFOH 	FRQWH[W ODZBJOREDOV-
tudies> accessed 26 December 2018
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Argentina
In 2017, an ostensibly minor decision by 
the Supreme Court but with heavy implica-
tions regarding the policies of memory and 
justice concerning human rights violations 
had invited strong backlash. In 2018, the 
Court revisited it. Yet the most important 
constitutional discussion, concerning the 
legalization of abortion, transpired outside 
the courts. 
Austria
In 2018, the centenary of the Austrian 
Republic, the new Federal Government 
launched several constitutional reform proj-
ects. The most important of these amends 
the federal allocation of powers and dereg-
ulates further issues. The Constitutional 
Court’s decisions particularly concerned 
the violation of rights, such as equality or 
private life.
Bangladesh
Ten years after the last participatory elec-
tions, the 11th General Election was held, 
although its credibility and inclusiveness re-
main questionable. Two student movements 
were deplorably suppressed, indicating the 
poor state of civil rights. The judiciary was 
largely reticent on civil rights but showed 
activism against gender-based violence.
Belgium
During the last two months of 2018, Bel-
gian politics were dominated by controver-
sy whether Prime Minister Charles Michel 
could approve the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration at the inter-
national level. The disagreement resulted 
¿UVWLQDPLQRULW\JRYHUQPHQWDQGXOWLPDWH-
ly to the resignation of the government.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
The distribution of mandates after elections 
in 2018 proved to be a contentious issue in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, political stakeholders 
¿QGWKDW LPSXJQDEOHFRQVWLWXWLRQDODQGOH-
gal provisions are still in effect.
Brazil
In 2018, Brazil celebrated the 30th anniver-
sary of the 1988 Constitution, a symbol of 
its democracy, but it also elected a far-right 
president, who may trigger a process of 
democratic backsliding. How the Supreme 
Court behaved in 2018 speaks volumes 
about the challenges that lie ahead in Bra-
zilian democracy.
Bulgaria
In its most debated judgment in 2018, the 
Bulgarian Constitutional Court declared the 
“Council of Europe Convention on Prevent-
LQJDQG&RPEDWLQJ9LROHQFHDJDLQVW:RP-
en and Domestic Violence” (the so-called 
“Istanbul Convention”) unconstitutional. 
The Court thus obstructed an important step 
LQ WKH ¿JKW DJDLQVW JHQGHUEDVHG DQG GR-
mestic violence in Bulgaria. 
Cabo Verde/Cape Verde
In 2018, the CC conducted a small constitu-
tional revolution in criminal procedure, giv-
LQJHI¿FDF\WRWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOJXDUDQWHHV
that were transposed to the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code but often applied rather reluc-
tantly and in a very limited manner by both 
criminal investigation organs and ordinary 
courts.  
Cameroon
The most important constitutional progress 
in Cameroon in 2018 was undoubtedly the 
effective establishment of the Constitution-
DO &RXQFLOZKLFK IRU WKH ¿UVW WLPH LQ LWV
history, started ruling on matters pertaining 
to its jurisdiction. To that end, it ruled on 
presidential and senatorial elections held 
during year.
Caribbean
The most important developments were the 
decisions of the Caribbean Court of Justice 
in two cases—Nervais v The Queen and 
McEwan et al v Attorney General Guy-
ana—in which the Court adopted a radical-
ly different approach to the interpretation of 
the region’s constitutions from that of the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
Chile
Following the trend of recent years, in 2018 
the Chilean Constitutional Court continued 
to use its ex-ante judicial review power to 
declare the unconstitutionality of parts of 
some legislative bills, and the number of 
ex-post cases that reached the Court in-
FUHDVHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\
Colombia
The Colombian Constitutional Court faced 
four key issues in 2018. They concerned 
transitional constitutionalism; effective 
protection of social rights; solving colli-
sions between participatory, environmental, 
and indigenous rights and rights and inter-
ests linked to mining; and catalyzing delib-
erative democracy in constitutional justice. 
Croatia
In 2018, the main issues dealt with by the 
Croatian Constitutional Court concerned 
popular constitutional initiatives. Since the 
Referendum and Other Forms of Personal 
Participation in the Exercise of State Power 
and the Local and Regional Self-govern-
ment Act does not regulate all issues rele-
vant to the implementation of referenda, the 
Court had a key role in resolving procedural 
issues through judicial review.
Cyprus
The most important constitutional devel-
opment in Cyprus for 2018, which still re-
mains unresolved, concerned the judicial 
assessment of the absence of the notion of 
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“non-occupied” parliamentary seats in the 
constitutional text and the subsequent un-
successful attempt to establish procedures 
for replacing seats vacated before the com-
mencement of the parliamentary term.
Czech Republic
The year 2018 in the Czech Republic was 
marked by growing concerns about a con-
ÀLFW RI LQWHUHVW FRQFHUQLQJ3ULPH0LQLVWHU
$QGUHM %DELã %RWK &]HFK DQG (XURSH-
DQ DXWKRULWLHV FRQ¿UPHG LWV H[LVWHQFH0U
%DELãDOVR UHPDLQVXQGHUFULPLQDO LQYHVWL-
gation for fraudulently obtaining European 
funding for the so-called Stork Nest Farm.
Denmark
In Denmark, a constitutional rule was by-
passed to allow an expansion of voting 
rights. However, in issues related to immi-
grants, strict policies were enacted. These 
LQFOXGHGORZHULQJVRFLDOEHQH¿WVWRDSRWHQ-
tially unconstitutional level as well as creat-
ing the possibility for “double punishment” 
for crimes in certain neighbourhoods.
Ecuador
Ecuador expressed a strong consensus 
DERXWWKHQHHGWR¿JKWFRUUXSWLRQ7KHWUDQ-
sitory Council for Public Participation and 
Social Control was set up to investigate the 
abuse of power and lack of impartiality in 
the judiciary. The result was the unveiling 
of corruption scandals and the dismissal of 
the Constitutional Court.
Egypt
The year 2018 witnessed a semi-continuous 
status of emergency, the origin of which 
goes back decades. Under this status, the 
Prime Minister issued a decision deferring 
a wide range of crimes to the State Securi-
ty Emergency Courts (a type of exception-
al court), raising serious challenges to the 
2014 Constitution.
Finland
The Government’s plans to introduce new 
intelligence legislation continued to be a 
prominent theme in 2018. The constitution-
DOSURYLVLRQRQWKHFRQ¿GHQWLDOLW\RIFRP-
munications was amended in order to allow 
the enactment of the intelligence legislation 
package. Another pressing topic was the 
reform of the healthcare and social welfare 
system.
France
The Constitution should have been amend-
ed for its 60th anniversary, but that was 
postponed due to political circumstances. 
Meanwhile, the Constitutional Council up-
held the applicability of the maxim “Lib-
erty, Equality, Fraternity.” Ensuring the 
SURWHFWLRQRISHUVRQDOGDWD LW FODUL¿HG WKH
relations between domestic and suprana-
tional norms.
Gambia
In order to consolidate democracy and align 
governance architecture with regional and 
international human rights standards, 2018 
witnessed developments in improving hu-
man rights and addressing past human 
rights violations through transitional justice 
mechanisms (the Truth and Reconciliation 
and Reparations Commission, Constitu-
tional Review Commission and National 
Human Rights Commission).
Georgia
This report on 2018 includes a brief intro-
duction to the Georgian constitutional sys-
tem, constitutional amendments, the last di-
rect presidential election, main challenges 
of the judiciary, an overview of landmark 
judgments of the Georgian Constitution-
al Court, developments expected in 2019 
related to Court vacancies, Constitutional 
Court cases and other related events.
Ghana
The creation of new regions was the single 
PRVWVLJQL¿FDQWSROLWLFDODQGFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
development in 2018. The last time a region 
was created, it was by a dictator. The ten-
sions that characterized the process, though 
disturbing, indicate how tangibly different a 
constitutional government acts from a dic-
tatorial one. 
Greece
The initiation of a long-due constitutional 
revision process marked 2018. It is an open 
question whether it shall be successfully 
concluded. Jurisprudence dealt with issues 
stemming from the continuing impact of the 
¿QDQFLDODQGUHIXJHHFULVHVWKDW*UHHFHKDV
been facing during recent years. 
Guatemala
2018 was marked by a backlash against the 
International Commission Against Impuni-
ty in Guatemala (CICIG) and the Constitu-
tional Court by the President of Guatemala. 
The President launched domestic and in-
ternational legal action against the CICIG 
and Constitutional Court, creating a consti-
tutional crisis months ahead of the general 
election.
Hong Kong
Hong Kong is a Special Administrative 
Region of the People’s Republic of China, 
governed under a Basic Law adopted pursu-
ant to the Chinese Constitution. The bound-
aries between the two jurisdictions are one 
of the major issues considered in this report.
Hungary
In 2018, the restructuring of the consti-
tutional system continued. The Seventh 
Amendment to the Fundamental Law and 
new laws established further fundamental 
rights limitations and constraints on inde-
pendent constitutional institutions, espe-
cially the courts. The Constitutional Court’s 
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relevance within the system of separation of 
powers continued to decrease.
India
In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court, through 
a Constitution bench, allowed the Indian 
state to implement a national biometric 
LGHQWL¿FDWLRQ V\VWHP NQRZQ DV $DGKDU
:KLOH VWULNLQJ GRZQ FHUWDLQ OHJDO SURYL-
sions that infringed privacy, the Court held 
that the law underlying Aadhar withstood 
judicial scrutiny and, in particular, a newly 
framed proportionality test.
Indonesia
The most intriguing case in 2018 was the 
Presidential Threshold XV case, in which 
the Court refused to intervene to resolve 
a constitutional crisis over a presidential 
election nomination, which required that 
a presidential candidate’s nomination be 
based on outdated legislative election re-
sults rather than new ones.
Iran
The most important development of 2018 in 
Iran jurisdiction was the reform of an elec-
toral law of city councils, allowing consti-
tutional religious minorities, Zoroastrians, 
Jews, and Christians to run for elections 
even in regions with a Muslim majority, and 
also represent them.
Ireland
2018 saw the long-anticipated referendum 
on Article 40. 3. 3., the 1983 amendment 
that restricted access to abortion. 66% vot-
ed to replace the Article with one enabling 
Parliament to introduce legislation; legisla-
WLRQZKLFKXQGHUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKH&LWL-
zen Assembly, was ultimately more liberal 
than previously expected.
Israel
In Israel, the most important constitution-
al development in 2018 was the enactment 
of a new chapter in the Israeli constitution 
concerning national identity: Basic Law: 
Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish Peo-
ple, anchoring the state’s symbols and the 
Jewish People’s right to national self-deter-
mination.
Italy
The Italian Constitutional Court’s 2018 
case law stands out for an apparent judicial 
engagement on fundamental rights. The 
Court reasserted its crucial role through 
many segments of its 2018 case law, par-
WLFXODUO\LQWKH¿HOGRIMXGLFLDOHQIRUFHPHQW
of rights.
Japan
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) wanted to present 
to the Diet a draft of an amendment to the 
Constitution in 2018. Following a succes-
sion of political scandals, however, the LDP 
had to abandon the plan, and the movement 
toward amendment lost momentum.
Kenya
The beginning of apparently serious discus-
sions about amending the Constitution—
unfortunately many ill-informed, and some 
motivated by the concerns of individual 
politicians—may be the year’s biggest de-
velopment. The biggest change was tran-
sitioning to a parliamentary system from a 
presidential one. 
Latvia
The most noteworthy case in 2018 con-
cerned the restriction of the right to be 
elected to Parliament for former members 
of the Communist Party. The case contained 
LPSRUWDQW¿QGLQJVRQWKHSULQFLSOHRIPLOL-
tant democracy and contributed to the judi-
cial dialogue.
Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein’s 40-year ECHR member-
ship promoted scholarly engagement. The 
consequences of political party splits were 
debated throughout 2018. The GRECO 
recommendations to ban anonymous dona-
tions to political parties were implemented. 
The Constitutional Court increased asylum 
seekers’ access to legal aid and demanded 
that whistle-blowers observe the accuracy 
of published information. 
Malaysia
Malaysia experienced a peaceful, democrat-
ic transition of power at the federal level for 
WKH¿UVWWLPHVLQFHLQGHSHQGHQFHIROORZLQJ
the country’s 14th General Election in May 
2018. This change of government holds 
considerable potential for meaningful legal 
and structural reforms that will strengthen 
constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Mexico
The most important development in consti-
tutional law concerned the Internal Securi-
ty Law, published in December 2017 and 
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in November 2018. This law autho-
rized the Executive branch to use the mil-
itary as a regular force for public security.
Moldova
A deadlock between the President, Prime 
Minister and the parliamentary majority 
WKDW FXOPLQDWHG LQ ¿YH WHPSRUDU\ VXVSHQ-
sions of the President by the Constitutional 
Court changed constitutional and political 
life beyond recognition. In the grey zone 
EHWZHHQ (DVW DQG :HVW WKLV FRQÀLFW KDV
entrapped the country in democratic back-
sliding.
New Zealand
Constitutional developments largely came 
via the judiciary, with some important deci-
sions handed down by the nation’s Supreme 
Court relating to the two main issues in 
New Zealand’s contemporary constitutional 
discussions: the relationship of Parliament 
DQGWKHFRXUWVDQGWKHULJKWVRI0ƗRULXQ-
GHUWKH7UHDW\RI:DLWDQJL
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Nigeria
2018 was challenging for liberal democracy 
in Nigeria. A transparent electoral process, 
separation of powers, rule of law, judicial 
independence, and other mechanisms nec-
essary to secure continuing popular control 
and public accountability of government 
suffered reverses. Government actions were 
not always compliant with procedural safe-
guards, such as due process.
Norway
:KLOH SROLWLFDOO\ WXUEXOHQW  ZDV FRQ-
stitutionally more of an ordinary, yet varied 
year. Central cases concerned freedom of 
conscience, rights of indigenous peoples, 
protection of privacy, and constitutional in-
terpretation where fundamental rights are 
protected both nationally and international-
ly. Concerning Europe, cases assessing the 
Norwegian child welfare system dominated.
Palestine
Palestine’s accession to a large number of in-
ternational treaties occurred in the absence of 
DFRQVWLWXWLRQDOSURYLVLRQWKDWFODUL¿HGWKHLU
status within the domestic legal system. In 
2018, the Supreme Constitutional Court un-
VXFFHVVIXOO\WULHGWR¿OOWKLVJDSDQGIXUWKHU
exacerbated the problem it sought to resolve. 
Peru
ZDVPDUNHGE\WKH¿JKWDJDLQVWFRUUXS-
tion in the name of the rule of law. The key 
constitutional development was the consti-
tutional reform of the judiciary through ref-
erendum. Moreover, this referendum raised 
questions about the relationship between the 
executive’s and the legislative’s power.
Philippines
Constitutional democracy eroded in the 
Philippines. President Duterte, miffed at the 
Chief Justice’s independence, ordered her re-
PRYDO:LWKRXWDGHFHQWLPSHDFKPHQWFDVH
the government secured the removal 
through a petition for quo warranto instead. 
The Court surrendered the Chief Justice in a 
ruling that exposes all government employ-
ees to removal. 
Poland
The combined effect of changes introduced 
in 2015-2016, management of the Court’s 
workload by the (irregular) President of the 
&RXUW-XGJH-XOLD3U]\áĊEVNDDQGFRQWLQXHG
adjudication by “irregular judges” marginal-
L]HGWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKHMXULVSUXGHQFHRI
the Constitutional Court in the Polish legal 
order.
Portugal
 ZDV D VLJQL¿FDQW \HDU DV WKH 3RUWX-
guese Constitutional Court repositioned 
itself as a faithful guardian of fundamental 
rights. In Ruling no. 225/2018, the Court de-
clared that the legislative power can change 
the legal framework of assisted reproductive 
techniques if protection to the children and 
the surrogate mother is granted.
Romania
The most important characteristics for the 
2018 constitutional year in Romania are the 
active stance taken by the Constitutional 
Court in diminishing the powers of the Pres-
ident and the refusal of the population to en-
dorse a conservative revision of the Consti-
WXWLRQUHJDUGLQJWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIPDUULDJH
Russia
The current Russian Constitution was adopt-
ed at a time of extreme internal and interna-
tional weakness. In 2018, there was no talk 
of major constitutional reforms, but Russia’s 
continued distancing from European consti-
tutional values set a troubling trend given the 
background of ‘sovereignism’ and constitu-
tional identity.
Serbia
The Government submitted to the National 
Assembly the proposition (initiative) for the 
adoption of constitutional changes. The ma-
jority of the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
concerned constitutional complaints regard-
ing issues such as the violation of the right to 
a trial in a reasonable time. 
Singapore
The year 2018 saw courts grappling with 
constitutional interpretation, particularly in 
determining the proper balance of powers 
among the different branches of government. 
There were several legislative initiatives 
with implications for constitutional rights. 
There was also continued reliance on pub-
lic consultation as part of the government’s 
law-making process.
Slovakia
2018 started on a high note after the reso-
OXWLRQ RI D SURORQJHG LQWHUEUDQFK FRQÀLFW
over the appointment of constitutional judg-
HV7KH1DWLRQDO&RXQFLOWULHGWR¿[WKHVH-
lection and appointment mechanism before 
QLQHMXGJHVRIWKH&RXUWZHUHWROHDYHRI¿FH
in mid-February 2019, but failed.
South Africa
Pressed by a faction with socialist tendencies 
within the governing party, a process that 
may lead to the reduction of the constitution-
al protection of private property got under-
way. Parliamentary approval of the process 
was obtained, but its eventual implementa-
tion depended on the May 2019 elections.
South Korea
After inauguration, the Moon administration 
promoted the “eradication of deep-rooted 
evils.” In 2018, former conservative Pres-
ident Myung-bak Lee was arrested, subse-
quent to Geun-hye Park in 2017. Under the 
Moon administration, Japan-Korea relations 
GHWHULRUDWHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\ZKHUHDVLQWHU.R-
rean summits were held three times in 2018.
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Spain
Judgment STC 58/2018 addressed the ques-
tion of whether news stories published in 
the past could remain accessible on the 
internet. The CC judged that the passage 
of time diminished public interest in the 
information and its continued presence on 
the internet violated the right to privacy and 
honour. The CC recognised the right to be 
digitally forgotten.
Sri Lanka
2018 was very eventful in Sri Lankan con-
stitutional history. Parliament engaged in a 
constitution-making process, an effort was 
made to transform the presidential system 
into a parliamentary one, and there was an 
attempted constitutional coup by the Presi-
dent of the Republic to illegally dismiss his 
own government and replace it with another. 
Sweden
On September 9, 2018, Sweden elected a 
new parliament. None of the traditional blocs 
obtained a majority. As a result, Sweden was 
left without a government for 115 days—the 
longest time in its history—after which a 
left-center government was installed. 
Switzerland
Switzerland has a small and open economy 
reliant on globalization while its Constitu-
tion emphasizes democratic self-governance. 
Constitutional practice in 2018 shed light on 
the inherent tensions between popular sover-
eignty and economic globalization, referred 
to as the “globalization paradox” (Dani Ro-
drik), in court cases and popular votes alike.
Taiwan
Taiwan’s constitutional development moved 
in a new direction in 2018 following the 
2017 statutory easing of the thresholds for 
citizens’ initiatives. As the initiatives intend-
ed to curtail Interpretation No. 748 on same-
sex marriage illustrate, the TCC arrived at a 
crossroads amid the rise of popular constitu-
tionalism and referendum politics.
Thailand
The 2019 election was critical to the survival 
of the junta. The National Council of Peace 
and Order devised several tricks to win. The 
Constitution was ill-designed. The Election 
Commission collaborated by ignoring intim-
idation and bribery. The public then lost trust 
in this election and the Constitution.
Turkey
The weakening of the authority of the Turk-
ish Constitutional Court continued in 2018 
due to non-execution of its judgments by 
¿UVWLQVWDQFH FRXUWV WKH &RXUW¶V VLOHQFH LQ
controversial cases and the new political sys-
tem, which gives the executive organ nearly 
absolute power.
Ukraine
2018 was another year of political turbu-
OHQFHPDUNHG E\ WKH RQJRLQJ FRQÀLFWZLWK
Russia, resulting in martial law for 30 days 
in 10 regions, and further cooperation with 
the EU. It was proposed to amend Ukraine’s 
Constitution to proclaim ‘irreversibility of 
the European and Euro-Atlantic course of 
Ukraine’.
United Kingdom
As in 2017, Brexit dominated constitutional 
debates in 2018. Contestation regarding the 
Government’s exit negotiations with the EU, 
and new legislative powers for implement-
ing Brexit tested Parliament’s capacities 
and powers and spurred litigation between 
the devolved governments and parliaments 
against the UK’s plans before sub-national, 
UK, and EU courts. 
Vietnam
“Integration” stands for the concurrent hold-
LQJ RI WKH RI¿FHV RI 6WDWH 3UHVLGHQW DQG
General Secretary of the Communist Par-
ty of Vietnam (CPV). This reform aims to 
consolidate and legitimize the leadership of 
the CPV, but raises issues about the party’s 
control over the government and the trouble 
delineating their relationship.


